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This thesis explores the experiences and perspectives of men imprisoned in the segregation 
unit at HMP Whitemoor in 2019, specifically with a view to understanding how the law 
functioned in this unit. HMP Whitemoor opened in 1992 and is one of eight prisons in the 
long-term high security estate (‘LTHSE’) in England. It is able to accommodate 458 men1 
convicted of the most serious crimes (such as murder, rape and terrorism offences). The 
segregation unit has a variable capacity. It has 30 individual cells, the population of which 
fluctuated on a daily basis during this research (between 25 and 30 men).2 
 
Segregating individuals away from the general prison population has existed in the English 
prison system at least since the 1700s. I was able to trace the usage of segregation back to the 
Penitentiary Act 1779 which called for the use of solitary imprisonment, accompanied by 
labour and religious instruction (London Metropolitan Archives, 2018). Although a long-
standing tradition of the English penal system, very little research explores segregation in 
English prisons. In fact, this study is the first of its kind, in which a researcher has spent an 
extended period of time undertaking an in-depth ethnographic study in a typically 
impenetrable part of the English prison system. It is also the first time that segregation has 
been considered in the context of legal mechanisms and the influence of law. 
 
The main fieldwork was conducted over a four-month period at HMP Whitemoor. It draws on 
semi-structured interviews with 25 prisoners and 17 staff, as well as rich and extended periods 
of observation of life in the segregation unit. I focus on three areas which were of interest 
from the start of my PhD but the nuances of which developed during the fieldwork. Firstly, I 
explore how segregation is and should be used, and how law sets the parameters of such usage 
(in theory at least). Secondly, I investigate the complex web of laws and rules, as currently 
applies to segregation, and their relationship with the actors responsible for their 
																																																								
1 The population fluctuated on a daily basis as prisoners were transferred in and out of the prison. E.g. on the 31 
May 2019 HMP Whitemoor held 453 prisoners against an operational capacity of 458 (Independent Monitoring 
Board (2018); (2019)). On 31 May 2019, 133 were Category A prisoners and 3 were High Risk Category A. The 
remainder were Category B prisoners and a small number of Category C prisoners (IMB, 2019, p. 7). 
2 The capacity of the segregation unit was changeable and reflected the operational challenges faced in the unit. 
Some cells were out of use because they were damaged by prisoners, some had to be closed to be cleaned after a 
dirty protest or suicide attempt.  
 3 
implementation. Thirdly, I examine the context within which the laws and rules are 
implemented, to make the argument that laws and rules are not only capable of being 
undermined by the culture of people but also the culture of context; whereby the application 
of, and accessibility to, law is limited by the prison environment.  
 
Segregation units are characterised by substantial power imbalances, more so than elsewhere 
in the prison. They also hold some of the most difficult, vulnerable and marginalised 
individuals in our prison system. Accordingly, the segregation unit is a place where legal 
safeguards should be robust and able to uphold human rights standards. However, I suggest 
that the laws and rules are not always robust, and do not always give effect to important ‘rule 
of law’ principles. I argue that whilst there are opportunities for law and policy reform, alone, 
they will not be sufficient for changing or improving the practices, standards and culture of 
the segregation unit. For example, law and policy change may not mitigate the chaotic, violent 
and turbulent wings; the high rates of mental illness; lack of opportunities for progression; 
and capacity issues found elsewhere in the prison estate. Many of the problems of segregation 
originate elsewhere: not just in the wider prison, but also in the social, political and economic 
environment in which prisons function. Thus, law reform directed solely at the segregation 
unit may not address the broader issues which necessitate the use of segregation. Instead, 
segregation reform should be considered as part of broader prison reform efforts, ones which 
cultivate respect, dignity, faith and compassion. Importantly, until there is greater acceptance 
that segregation is innately harmful and dehumanising, the law may be of limited 
consequence: the law cannot be expected to ‘remedy injustices legally before they are 
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The last twelve months have been an unusual and difficult time to finish a PhD. The global 
pandemic brought complications and distractions, along with closures of libraries, which 
made writing up rather challenging. However, the past year has been all the more difficult 
because of the tragic events at Fishmongers’ Hall, on the 29th November 2019, at which I was 
present. Jack Merritt was a dear friend, Saskia Jones was one of my students, and Usman 
Khan was one of my participants (albeit, an ‘informal’ one). On that day, I lost my friends but 
I also lost some faith. I began to question my involvement with the prison education charity, 
Learning Together, along with the value of my PhD. My previous optimism, hope and faith in 
my work, but also in others, was replaced by concern, self-doubt and distrust. My previous 
belief – that we all have capacity to do great good yet all have capacity to inflict great harm – 
began to disintegrate. I wished that ‘good’ and ‘bad’ could be binary: it would make it far 
easier to untangle my thoughts on the Fishmongers’ incident and the actions of Usman Khan.  
 
Shortly after the Fishmongers’ incident, I sat in Nicky Padfield’s kitchen and expressed total 
grief, loss and bewilderment at how I was ever going to carry on. This is why I feel especially 
grateful to all the people in my life over the past few years. They have not been easy years: 
researching and writing this PhD has been very hard at times. There were several occasions 
during which I thought this final draft would never be possible.	Words will never do justice to 
the amount of thanks and gratitude I feel towards those individuals. This work is the sum of 
all their help, shared wisdom, encouraging advice and friendship. 	
 
I would like to thank Alison Liebling for sharing her advice and invaluable prison expertise. I 
would also like to thank Nicky Padfield for sharing her legal knowledge and prison law 
insights. Together they made a formidable supervisory team: they challenged my perceptions, 
my understandings and helped shape and develop much of this PhD.  
 
I am grateful to all the staff at HMP Whitemoor, for opening their doors to me and for making 
this research possible. Particular thanks go to Will Styles, Martin Butler, Gary Payne and all 
the staff in the segregation unit. I am also grateful to all the men held in HMP Whitemoor, 
who gave me their time, shared their personal stories, who made me laugh and sometimes 
made me cry. I feel privileged to have met you and I hope I can make you proud.  
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Thank you to the Office of the Sentencing Council, who I interned with for three months. The 
team trained me on data analysis, they patiently listened to presentations on my thesis, they 
asked me questions and stretched my thinking. They were a wonderful team to work for and 
really helped me to develop my ideas.  
 
I would also like to thank Professor David Feldman, Dr Adrian Grounds, Professor Eyal 
Benvenisti, Professor Ben Crewe, Professor Ian O’Donnell, Alex Sutherland, Howard Sapers, 
Ivan Zinger and Alice Ievins. All met with me and shared their insights, their advice and their 
time. I am truly grateful for all of their intellectual suggestions and broader support.  
 
Thank you to the Economic and Social Research Council who funded this research. I would 
also like to thank the Institute of Criminology and Jesus College, Cambridge, for providing 
some of my fieldwork expenses. Also, I am grateful to the Cambridge Society for Applied 
Research who provided me with a financial award for my research.  
 
I am immensely grateful to His Honour John Samuels QC, who has been a mentor, a friend 
and wonderful person in my life. He has shared his books, his intellect and his kindness. I am 
also extremely grateful for another mentor, Sir Pushpinder Saini, who diligently read each 
chapter, challenged my arguments (and questioned my syntax and semantics). Thank you both 
for reading the final draft of my PhD and for all your help and suggestions. I really would not 
be here without you.  
 
I would like to thank my friends who have been so loving, kind and supportive during the 
PhD. Particular thanks to my friends from school, for providing light relief when needed. 
Thank you to Izzy and Frances for keeping me going, making me laugh and for being so full 
of wisdom. I am so thankful to Cathy, Matt, Kristina and Seb, for always being there, for 
giving me perspective, and for being a wonderful blanket of love and warmth. I am so grateful 
for Julia, Azra, Rose, Saoirse and Niala, who have been incredibly supportive friends. I would 
also like to thank my family: David, Sue, Matt, Gill, Arran and Rose. They helped keep me 
sane; provided encouraging words along the way; and even developed their own passions for 
prison work. 
 
Finally, I am thankful to the Learning Together community. Particular recognition goes to Dr. 
Ruth Armstrong and Dr. Amy Ludlow, who I met in the first month of starting at Cambridge. 
They later became my mentors, colleagues and are now my lifelong friends. They are truly 
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inspirational and made me believe that anything could be possible. They provided hope, in 
times of true despair. It is no exaggeration to say that I would not be here without them either. 
And, lastly, I give my thanks to Jack Merritt, for being a dear friend; for supporting me 
through Cambridge; for introducing me to a few too many Cambridge pubs; for having faith 
in me, particularly when my own was lacking; and for inspiring so much good in others. You 




Defined Terms and Abbreviations 
 
ACCT Assessment, Care in Custody and Teamwork.  
Centre Office Main office in the Unit. 
CC Cellular Confinement. 
CPT European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 
CRC Control Review Committee. 
CSC Close Supervision Centre. 
DDC Deputy Director of Custody. 
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights. 
HMCIP Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Prisons. 
HMP Her Majesty's Prison. 
HMPPS Her Majesty's Prison and Probation Service. 
IEP Incentives and Earned Privilege(s). 
IMB Independent Monitoring Board. 
LASPO Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. 
LAT Legal Aid Transformation.  
Local Site Rules HMP Whitemoor: Information Booklet and Segregation Unit Expectations, 
dated January 2019. 
LTHSE Long Term High Security Estate. 
MHT Mental Health Team. 
OMT Offender Management Team. 
PPE Personal Protective Equipment. 
PR 1999 The Prison Rules 1999. 
PSIs Prison Service Instruments. 
PSO 1700 Prison Service Order 1700 – Segregation. 
PSOs Prison Service Orders. 
SMT Senior Management Team. 
SO Supervising Officer. 
SRB Segregation Review Board. 
SSU Special Security Unit. 
The Mandela Rules United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (as 
amended on 5 November 2015 by the General Assembly). 
Unit HMP Whitemoor segregation unit. 
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YOI Young Offender Institution. 






Since March 2020, the world has faced a global pandemic from Covid-19. The virus had a 
significant impact on societies and economies. It also had a substantial impact on prisons. In 
the United Kingdom, for almost a year, prisons have – to varying degrees – been ‘locked 
down’: prison activities were curtailed and visits (from family members and the IMB) 
cancelled. Many prisoners were locked alone, in their cells, for 23 or more hours a day. The 
practice of segregation, which I describe and discuss in this thesis, was applied prison-wide 
and was no longer reserved primarily for the segregation unit.  
	
In July and August 2020, HMCIP visited HMP Whitemoor for a ‘scrutiny visit’ (HMCIP, 
2020). It found that prisoners were confined to their cells for at least 22 hours a day. Thus, the 
experiences and challenges I identified in the segregation unit, during my research, have since 
permeated across the rest of the prison. It means the project has taken on a broader relevance, 
in relation to the prison’s response to Covid-19. Segregation was no longer predominantly 
localised to the segregation unit. I encourage you to read this thesis with this in mind. In 
recent months, the operations and regime at HMP Whitemoor, as a whole, have much more 
closely resembled the conditions and the regime of the segregation unit, discussed in this 
thesis.  
 
In addition, HMCIP (2020) reported its key concern, at that time, was segregation. The 
pandemic had ‘halted its work to reintegrate segregated prisoners...as a consequence, the 
number of prisoners in segregation had increased, and the average length of stay had nearly 
doubled to an excessive 95 days’ (p. 6). More prisoners were being segregated than the 
segregation unit could accommodate, leading to prisoners being segregated in the ‘inpatient 
unit’ (p. 11). HMCIP reported: 
 
Formal systems for redress were in disarray; more than 200 complaints had gone unanswered, 
and the responses we saw did not always address the issue raised. The Independent 
Monitoring Board (IMB) had not yet resumed its visits to the prison, and limited telephone 
access prevented prisoners from using the IMB freephone number. (p. 11). 
 




Chapter One – Introduction 
	
While one may bear up against the monotonous hardships and relentless discipline of an 
English prison: endure with apathy the unceasing shame and the daily degradation: and grow 
callous even to that hideous grotesqueness of life that robs sorrow of all its dignity, and takes 
from pain its power of purification: still, the complete isolation from everything that is 
humane and humanising plunges one deeper and deeper into the very mire of madness, and the 
horrible silence, to which one is, as it were, eternally condemned, concentrates the mind on all 
that one longs to loathe, and creates those insane moods from which one desires to be free, 
creates them and makes them permanent… 
 
But the solitary confinement, that breaks one’s heart, shatters one’s intellect too: and prison is 
but an ill physician: and the modern modes of punishment create what they should cure, and, 
when they have on their side time with its long light of dreary days, they desecrate and destroy 
whatever good, or desire even of good, there may be in a man (Wilde, 1896, pp. 667-668).  
 
1. A brief history of segregation3 
 
Many will be familiar with the words of Oscar Wilde. In 1895 he was sentenced to two years’ 
imprisonment for the crime of gross indecency with other males. He served most of his time 
in solitary confinement at Pentonville, Wandsworth and Reading prisons (Housden, 2006). 
His words are a compelling example of the long-standing reliance on solitary punishment in 
English prisons, and the long-standing pains endured by those confined under such 
conditions. His words allude to the paradoxical nature of solitary punishment. It is intended to 
manage order, ensure discipline and invoke control. Yet it is also capable of producing, if not 
exacerbating, mental illness, anger, and frustration, and it does little to improve post-release 
outcomes (for a critique, see Haney, 2018; Scharff-Smith, 2006a, and see Part Three of this 
chapter). It is characterised by conflict: an entrenched part of our prison system that has 
commonly been the subject of severe criticism.4 
 
The English prison system has a long established system of segregation, although it has 
evolved over the past two hundred years, transformed not only in name but also in substance. 
																																																								
3 For a history of segregation see Brown (2003); Scharff-Smith (2006a); Smith (2009); Webb and Webb (2020). 
4 Criticisms date back to early 1900 and include concerns about the overly restrictive and dehumanising nature of 
segregation and its ineffectiveness for deterring and/or rehabilitating prisoners (Brockway & Hobhouse, 1922). 
For current concerns and reform efforts, see Haney, Williams, and Ahalt (2020).  
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It first appeared as prison-wide mandatory solitary punishment in English prisons; the history 
of which has been well researched by others5 and will not be rehearsed here. However, a brief 
outline is provided to understand the different iterations of segregation, which in turn help us 
understand why the prison service remains so reliant on the use of segregation today.  
 
Prison-wide solitary punishment developed from the ideas of John Howard. Howard was a 
High Sheriff of Bedford, interested in prison reform. In the 1770s, he visited every prison in 
England and Wales, as well as European penal institutions. He was impressed by the 
programme of silence and solitude at San Michele House of Correction in Rome and 
advocated for a similar programme in English prisons (Howard, 1777). Howard’s 
recommendations led to the Penitentiary Act 1779, which called for solitary imprisonment to 
be accompanied by labour and religious instruction (Jackson, 1983, pp. 10, 15); they were 
believed to deter individuals from crime, whilst simultaneously reforming individuals and 
inure them to the customs of industry (London Metropolitan Archives, 2018). Howard’s 
proposals were adopted at Gloucester Prison, which opened in 1785 (Howard, 1960; 
Parliament, 2018). The opening signalled a new approach to the construction and 
management of English prisons. Gloucester was predicated on principles of isolation; it was 
built with solitary cells and incorporated a regime which required prisoners to sleep and work 
alone. However, the conditions and operations at Gloucester quickly became unsustainable. 
Pressures of overcrowding soon required prisoners to share cells. Frequent disturbances and 
riots ensued; provoked by the frustration of prisoners who refused to comply with the solitary 
nature of their confinement (Jackson, 1983, p. 17).  
 
The problems at Gloucester did not signal the end of segregation. Practices of segregation 
continued to appeal to the British Government, in large part because of the perceived success, 
in 1834, of the solitary system at Eastern State Penitentiary in Pennsylvania (the Pennsylvania 
Model). This led to the opening of a new prison – Pentonville Prison – in 1842, which was 
designed specifically for cellular confinement and organised along similar principles (silence 
and solitude) to the Pennsylvania Model (Howard, 1960, p. 17). Pentonville prison was 
intended to house convict prisoners between the ages of 18 and 35 years, sentenced to 
transportation for their first offence, and was conceived to be the ‘portal to the penal colony’ 
(Cross, 1971, p. 8). Pentonville’s principles of solitary punishment later spread to Millbank, 
Wakefield, Leicester, Wormwood Scrubs, Chelmsford, Dorchester, Durham, Exeter, Lewes, 
Reading, Winchester, Knutsford and Leeds (Gladstone Committee, 1895, p. 28). In the words 
																																																								
5 See Charleroy and Marland (2016); Fox (1934); Howard (1960); Jackson (1983); Scharff-Smith (2006a); 
Shalev (2011); Shalev (2015); Smith (2020).	
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of Henriques, this period was the ‘great age of the separate system of prison discipline’ (1972, 
p. 78), where prison administrators firmly believed that prisoners could be reformed through 
isolation and religion, and that when a prisoner’s resolve was truly shattered, the prison 
chaplain would be there to restore the prisoner to live a new, honest life (Henriques, 1972, p. 
79).6   
 
The ‘great age’ of a separate system was short-lived. By the 1850s, in England and Wales, 
support for isolation began to wane. In some prisons, isolation gave way to practices of 
cruelty: indefinite confinement alone, in dark cells, with only bread and water; restraining 
prisoners in straitjackets; and abuse of practices like the crank and treadwheel (Bailey, 1997; 
Henriques, 1972). Critics began to question the utility of isolation amidst increasing rates of 
reoffending and its perceived failure to reform prisoners, and growing concerns about the 
prevalence of mental illness, which was considered to be brought about by solitary 
confinement (Henriques, 1972, p. 86). There was a tentative changing of the tide. Questions 
were asked in Parliament and Committees were established to review the practice of solitary 
confinement. The Select Committee of the House of Lords on Gaols and Houses of Correction 
(1863), whilst reluctant to do away with the practice, expressed unease about the purpose of 
isolation and whether it can truly reform individuals. Later, the Gladstone Committee 
expressed concern with the ‘dull and wearying monotony of the constant isolation’ which for 
many led ‘to moral and physical deterioration’ and advocated for greater association (1895, 
pp. 20-21). By the early 1900s, prison-wide solitary punishment had lost much of its support. 
It was permanently done away with in 1931 (Bailey, 2019, pp. 188-189; Fox, 1952).  
Whilst prison-wide solitary punishment remains in the past, the system of special units 
(including segregation units) – created to house those deemed particularly violent or who 
posed a substantial risk of escape – remains a fundamental part of the modern English prison. 
Whilst much was written about the historical roots of prison-wide solitary punishment, less is 
known about the history of the separate special units.  
I was able to trace the origins of a separate system of confinement, for those who violated 
prison rules, to at least the 1840s. The Prison Regulations, at that time, allowed for a visiting 
justice to impose close confinement, not exceeding one month, for any ‘criminal prisoner 
guilty of any repeated offence against the rules of the prison’ (1843, p. 16). Close 
confinement saw a prisoner confined alone, to his own cell or to a cell on a landing set apart 
																																																								
6 During this period, principles of isolation were not restricted to England or the United States. Similar 
developments were seen in Switzerland and Germany (Grassian, 2006, p. 342; Jackson, 1983, p. 20) and Demark 
(Smith, 2008).  
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for punishment. All articles were removed from the cell, except a stool, chamber, one 
educational book and the Bible, and the prisoner was initially prohibited from attending 
exercise, labour or chapel, although the latter three ‘privileges’ could be reinstated for good 
behaviour (Brockway & Hobhouse, 1922, p. 236). Close confinement was a punishment that 
appeared in various iterations of the early Prison Rules:7 it was commonplace amongst 
English prisons8 and was the blueprint for segregation.  
However, in the early 1920s, there was growing scepticism about close confinement, and 
whether it was the best way to manage indiscipline in prison. The Prison Commissioner of 
1922 reported that reliance on close confinement had ‘practically disappeared…at several of 
the Institutions’ (p. 21). The Commissioner acknowledged how it was ‘difficult to see that 
close confinement can do anything but harm’ (p.21). Challenging questions were asked in 
Parliament and the practice declined in prisons (see Commissioner Reports of 1922; 1932, 
1946, 1955), at least until the 1960s.  
By 1960, the Prison Service faced rising prison populations, escapes and assaults (on 
prisoners and staff) (Home Office, 1964; Prison Commissioner reports of 1960; 1962). These 
were met with concern from prison administrators who sought new solutions to manage 
indiscipline and disorder in prisons. In response, the Prison Service created a number of 
special units at different prisons across England and Wales. It created special units in 
Durham, Hull, Parkhurst, Brixton, Manchester and Wakefield prisons (Liebling, 2001a, 2016; 
Home Office, 1964; Prison Commissioners, 1961; 1962). These units were designed to hold 
men who posed grave threats to security and discipline (Prison Commissioners, 1961, p. 4). 
The units had various names: Brixton was termed a ‘diagnostic centre’ (Prison 
Commissioners, 1962, p. 12) and the two units at Wakefield were named ‘control units’.9 
Whilst the design and regime of the units varied somewhat, they were the genesis of the 
segregation units we have today.    
The rise in special units during this period coincided with changes to the legislative 
																																																								
7 See ‘Draft of rules proposed to be made under the Prison Act 1898’ and ‘Draft of rules proposed to be made 
under the Prison Act 1899’. 
8 See ‘Report Relative To The System of Prison Discipline’ (1843) and Brockway and Hobhouse (1922, p. 237) 
who describe the commonality of close confinement. 
9 The two ‘control units’ at Wakefield were heavily criticised for having a negative effect on prisoners (fuelling 
resistance and anger at the prison authorities) and swiftly closed in 1975 (Liebling, 2016, p. 486). Following the 
failure of the ‘control units’ at Wakefield, the Prison Service sought suitable replacements. In 1985, pursuant to 
recommendations from the Control Review Committee (‘CRC’), a number of smaller self-contained units were 
opened (HMCIP, 2015). The CRC units operated according to unstructured regimes, with an emphasis on 
managing prisoners in an individualised way (Liebling, 2016, p. 486). These regimes were also subject to 
criticism: some prisoners struggled to cope with the unstructured regime (HMCIP, 2015), whilst others learned 
to cope too well and refused to locate elsewhere in the system (Liebling, 2001a; 2016, p. 486). The CRC units 
closed in 1995 and, in 1998, were replaced by Close Supervision Centres (‘CSC’).  
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framework. Primary legislation, in the form of the Prison Act 1952, was introduced to replace 
the Prison Act 1898. As far as segregation was concerned, the new Act changed very little.10 
However, it was the Prison Rules 1964 (a statutory instrument created pursuant to the new 
Act), which had a much greater influence. The Prison Rules 1964 departed from the language 
of close confinement and established the practice of ‘removal from association’ (Rule 43), the 
form of segregation which currently exists in prisons in England and Wales. The Prison Rules 
1964 were replaced by the Prison Rules 1999 (‘PR 1999’). Specifically, Rule 43 became Rule 
45, although the language (and practice) changed very little. Rule 45 allows a prison governor 
to remove a prisoner from association for the maintenance of good order or discipline or for a 
prisoner’s own interests. Despite various amendments by the Secretary of State for Justice, the 
PR 1999 are still in force and the practice of segregation, authorised by Rule 45, remains 
substantially the same as that envisaged by Rule 43 in the 1960s.  
For now it is important to recognise that, over the last two hundred years, the English prison 
system has seen ‘segregation’ evolve from being a prison-wide practice, to being one which 
takes place in separate special units. These units take various forms, including segregation 
units, close supervision centres, special security units, the protected witness units and detainee 
units (Liebling, 2016, pp. 487-488). Whilst the legal authority for such units, the ways in 
which they are used and the profiles of the prisoners they contain, have changed over time, 
their continued existence reveals an ideological commitment to separation and segregation. 
This ideology is predicated on the belief that segregation is important, if not essential, for the 
proper functioning of the English dispersal system. The relative merits of the dispersal (as 
opposed to a concentration) system have been discussed elsewhere at length (Mountbatten, 
1966; Radzinowicz Committee, 1968; King, 1999; Liebling, 2016; Price, 2000). Importantly, 
the integration of the dispersal approach meant that, in England and Wales at least, there was 
a significant departure from the ideas first espoused by Howard and an implicit rejection of 
the wholesale isolation of prisoners. England and Wales adopted a system of association, 
whereby prisoners of all different security categorisations associate together. Therefore the 
system of small special units, within this dispersal system, became attractive to policy-makers 
and prison managers, perceived as being the best possible way to manage indiscipline 
(Liebling, 2001a, 2016). Segregation is deeply embedded in the English penal system, albeit 
not without scrutiny, sceptics and challenge.  
																																																								
10 The Prison Act 1952, s47(1) still enabled the Secretary of State to ‘make rules for the regulation and 
management of prisons’ and equipped the Secretary of State with a large amount of discretion in organising and 
managing the prison system (Lazarus, 2004; Livingstone, Owen, & Macdonald, 2003). 
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2. The definition of segregation11 
	
Segregation, at its most basic, means ‘put apart from the rest’ (Oxford English Dictionary, 
2011). As the above illustrates, there are varying degrees and manifestations of segregation 
and different approaches to ‘putting apart’.  
 
Segregation took the form of a practice, in the mandatory prison-wide solitary confinement 
imposed under the Penitentiary Act 1778. However, as a practice, it continues to be used in 
contemporary prisons today, although its form is substantially different. For example, Rule 55 
of the PR 1999 allows a governor to impose ‘cellular confinement’ not exceeding 14 days. 
This is a form of segregation imposed on individuals, on the wing, and prohibits individuals 
from taking part in association and other activities (or sometimes imposed on individuals 
ordered to serve their ‘CC’ in the segregation unit). Cellular confinement may even be 
imposed on full spurs or wings – as total wing lockdowns – whereby all prisoners are detained 
in their single cells on the wing and are not unlocked for association. There are also hybrid 
forms of segregation, for example, the practice of ‘single unlock’ which, if imposed, prohibits 
a prisoner from being unlocked with other prisoners.12  
 
However, the historical account described above also highlights how segregation manifests as 
a place: the introduction of special units led to the creation of separate segregation units in 
many of our prisons. Further, the development of Rule 45 of the PR 1999 provided the legal 
authority for moving individuals, away from the wings, into segregation units. Therefore, 
segregation is capable of manifesting as both a practice and place. Notably, the conditions, 
regimes and names assigned to the place – the segregation unit – have changed over time. For 
example, in 2008/09 the Prison Service attempted to ‘rebadge’ segregation units as ‘care and 
separation’, ‘reorientation’ or ‘intensive supervision’ units. Despite the rebranding of the unit, 
																																																								
11 My research focuses on segregation in men’s prisons. During my research, I found little attention had been 
given to women’s experiences of segregation. I could not untangle whether this was because women’s 
experiences were less visible, or whether segregation was less common, or researchers less interested. In any 
event, women’s experiences are omitted from this research and they would be worth investigating further.   
12 The English courts have been asked to consider a range of practices, specifically to determine whether they 
constitute ‘removal from association’ for the purpose of the legal frameworks. In R(AB) v Secretary of State for 
Justice [2017] EWHC 1694 (Admin) the High Court was asked to consider whether ‘single unlock’, the practice 
of allowing a young offender to only leave his cell alone, between 30 minutes and 2 hours each day, constituted 
removal from association. In R (Syed) v Secretary of State for Justice [2017] EWHC 727, the High Court 
considered whether an individual who had the possibility of association with other prisoners – albeit such 
association varied in the number of hours and operated on a reduced regime compared to the wider prison 
population – was able to enjoy association with other prisoners or whether his conditions constituted removal 
from association for the purposes of Rule 45. In R (KB, a child, by his litigation friend LW) v Secretary of State 
for Justice [2010] EWHC 15 the court considered the meaning of ‘association’ but avoided defining the term 
other than by reference to its ordinary meaning.  
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little changed in substance: ‘they continued to operate as traditional segregation units, with 
the emphasis on separation rather than care’ (HMCIP, 2010, p. 67). Whilst the ‘care and 
separation’ unit has been retained in some prisons (such as Doncaster), Whitemoor never 
deviated. It was committed to the segregation unit, in both name and substance (see HMIP 
reports from 2008, 2011, 2014, 2017). 
 
Whilst there are various forms and degrees of segregation, my research focused on the 
segregation unit, and therefore considers segregation as a place.  This thesis concentrates on 
Rule 45 segregation (‘removal from association…for good order, discipline or own interests’). 
The reason being a practical one: only two or three prisoners (less than 10%) were in the 
segregation unit under Rule 55 during my fieldwork. Therefore, I focused my inquiries on the 
most commonly occurring form of segregation, that which was sanctioned by Rule 45 of the 
PR 1999.13 
 
Before moving on, it should be noted that the term segregation has, at times, been conflated 
with ‘solitary confinement’. The term solitary confinement features commonly in 
international legal frameworks. For example, the European Prison Rules (2006), the United 
Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (as amended on 5 
November, 2015, by the General Assembly and reaffirmed as the ‘Mandela Rules’), and the 
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (2011) all use the term ‘solitary confinement’. They define this, although with 
some variation, as the confinement of prisoners for at least 22 hours a day without meaningful 
human contact.  
 
In contrast, at the domestic level, legal frameworks (and the English courts) revealed a 
preference for the terms ‘removal from association’ and ‘segregation’. In fact, the courts 
determined the two terms are effectively one and the same.14  That said, the courts have also 
looked to international legal frameworks for guidance. Consequently, international law 
principles and the language of solitary confinement have penetrated the analyses of English 
courts.15 
																																																								
13 In reality, this division was somewhat artificial. There were two cells for CSC prisoners and, whilst they had a 
slightly different regime (see Chapter Three), their material conditions were the same as anyone else detained in 
the unit. Moreover, Rule 55 prisoners had the same conditions and regime as those detained under Rule 45.  
14 R (Dennehy) v Secretary of State for Justice and Sodexo Limited [2016] EWHC 1219 where the High Court 
interpreted removal from association to be segregation.  
15 R(AB) v Secretary of State for Justice [2017] EWHC 1694 (Admin), the High Court referred to both 
segregation and solitary confinement, and was explicitly guided by both domestic and international legal 
frameworks (appealed: [2019] EWCA Civ 9). 
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Whilst this creates some level of ambiguity: segregation arises in different forms (‘CC’, 
‘removal from association’), in different parts of the prison (on the wings or a designated unit) 
and attract different labels (‘wing lockdown’, ‘segregation’, ‘solitary confinement’), there is 
some commonality across the different forms (whether Rule 45 or Rule 55) and solitary 
confinement (as defined in international legal instruments). For example, they all involve 
extreme isolation: confining someone alone to a cell with limited contact with staff and other 
prisoners. In England and Wales, segregated prisoners cannot associate with other prisoners, 
they have limited visitation rights and they cannot participate in the full range of activities 
made available to the main prison population (Arrigo & Bullock, 2008; Shalev, 2015; Shalev 
& Edgar, 2015). Isolation is imposed for a substantial part of the day, varying between 20 and 
24 hours. Staff are largely responsible for much of the prisoner’s day; staff determine when he 
eats, when he showers, has exercise or makes a phonecall.  
3. Challenges to segregation 
 
Segregation has not always been readily accepted. Even in its earliest forms, segregation 
received criticism from individuals within and outside the Prison Service. For example, in 
1922, the Prison Commissioner expressed concern that it was ‘difficult to see that close 
confinement can do anything but harm’ (1922, p. 21). Similar concerns were reiterated in 
1931, in a heated Parliamentary debate. Labour MP Peter Freeman asked John Clynes, then 
Home Secretary, whether he was satisfied that the separate treatment of prisoners was the 
‘best method of dealing with delinquent cases?’ (11 June, 1931, Vol 253, cc1187-8). This 
question was not resolved at the time and is one which many scholars, politicians and lawyers 
still grapple with today (Howard et al., 2018; Vince, 2018). 
 
In fact, for much of the 20th Century, segregation in Western prisons has attracted substantial 
criticism from politicians, lawyers, psychologists, criminologists and sociologists. Many grew 
concerned about the impact of segregation on prisoners’ health and well-being, and a 
substantial body of literature developed to explore this. The literature developed gradually, in 
a fragmented manner, and was not limited to prison environments.  There are discrepancies 
and disagreements (see Brown, 2020), especially in relation to the question of the harmfulness 
of segregation. However, a substantial number of studies suggest that segregation is 
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significantly associated with negative psychological consequences,16 which broadly include: a 
greater prevalence of psychological distress (Miller, 1994; Miller & Young, 1997); post-
traumatic distress (Hagan et al., 2017); psychiatric morbidity (Andersen et al., 2000); and 
greater incidents of self-harm, in segregated groups when compared against non-segregated 
groups (Jones, 1986; Kaba et al., 2014; Lanes, 2009; Lanes, 2011). Moreover, segregation has 
been found to do little to mitigate subsequent institutional violence or reoffending (Butler, 
Steiner, Makarios, & Travis, 2017; Mears & Bales, 2009; Medrano, Ozkan, & Morris, 2017; 
Morris, 2016; Motiuk & Blanchette, 2001); and has been found to lack an obvious deterrent 
effect (for a review, see Brown (2020)).  
 
Concerns about segregation have not been limited to the academic and political realms.17 
Concerns have been echoed by practitioners, like the Independent Monitoring Board (‘IMB’). 
Alex Sutherland, Chairman of the IMB at HMP Whitemoor (2015-17), wrote:  
 
Segregation is a blight on the Prison Service….[I]n too many cases segregated prisoners are 
being stored rather than progressed. In such cases the effects are not even neutral. Prisons 
don’t set out to use segregation to break prisoners but in managing it badly they risk doing just 
that (2018, p. 48).  
 
Specifically, there have been calls from senior directors within HMPPS, to seek alternatives, 
to reform the law18 and even to abolish segregation in prisons (Prison Reform Trust Perrie 
Lectures, 2018; Vince, 2018).  
 
Penal reformers have turned to legal mechanisms to challenge the use of segregation (Janes, 
2018; Lee, 2016). For example, the Howard League for Penal Reform has been a loud voice 
in calling for legislative changes to segregation and especially active in using the courts to 
challenge: the procedures for segregating individuals;19 the inability of individuals to make 
representations before being segregated;20 and the lack of educational provision during 
																																																								
16	Luigi, Dellazizzo, Giguère, Goulet, and Dumais (2020) for a recent systematic review and meta-analysis of 
segregation. They found a significant relationship between segregation and an increase in adverse psychological 
effects, self-harm and mortality. 
17 Nor have they been limited to the United Kingdom. After publishing my systematic review on segregation, I 
was contacted by the head of psychology in the Israeli Prison Service, to discuss opportunities for reform. I have 
also spoken to colleagues in Canada and Norway about changes to their use of segregation.		
18 During 2018 – 2019, I was invited by the MOJ to offer advice on revising PSO 1700. I met twice with their 
working group. They presented their draft, little had changed, with most amendments made to the formatting 
rather than the substance of the order.  The group has since been disbanded, moved to other parts of government, 
and support for the project appears to have disappeared.  
19 R(KB) v Secretary of State for Justice [2010] EWHC 15 (Admin).  
20 R(SP) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 1750.	
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segregation.21 Thus, the law has been an important resource for prisoners to challenge the 
practices and procedures involved in prison segregation in the English courts.22  
 
In particular, in 2015, Kamel Bourgass successfully challenged his segregation in HMP 
Whitemoor (my fieldwork site). His case went all the way to the Supreme Court (R 
(Bourgass) v Secretary of State for Justice [2015] UKSC 54). Bourgass, on the one hand, 
inspired hope. The Supreme Court was disappointed with the prison service for failing to seek 
external approval from the Secretary of State, for Bourgass’s segregation, and its failure to 
provide Bourgass with sufficient information about why he was being segregated. The case 
raised important questions about procedural justice, the powers of the governor23 and the 
importance of internal and external oversight mechanisms. Importantly, it touched on the 
ability of law, as a mechanism, for upholding prisoners’ rights, and reminded us of the need to 
subject the internal processes and decisions of prison authorities to external review. It was 
heralded as a major advancement in prisoners’ rights and procedural justice (Beaton, 2016).  
 
However, Bourgass was one of few cases which achieved a positive legal outcome, and its 
impact was limited. Shortly after the judgment, the Secretary of State amended the PR 1999 in 
a way which strengthened the governor’s discretion and weakened the external review process 
(discussed further in the next chapter). The case was a prime example of how litigation can 
provoke unintended consequences and only offers limited, retrospective redress. A court can 
determine whether an individual’s rights have been violated, and whether the prison has 
complied with its obligations. However, litigation cannot rewind the clock: it cannot undo the 
harm that may have already occurred. Whilst the courts have an important role, as an external 
arbiter, in overseeing and safeguarding the use of segregation, in many ways, their 
involvement comes too late. ‘Law’ is not just a matter for the courts, it is effected in the 
everyday decisions of staff and prison managers. Law is made present, for example, in the 
internal safeguarding mechanisms of segregation review meetings, in the approval processes, 
in the time limits, via the duties of the IMB, the Ombudsman, and so forth. Therefore, the law 
is contingent on the ‘good faith’ of the administration. It is for the prison administration itself, 
to act in good faith, and assume a responsibility to supervise the fairness of segregation 
(Jacobs, 1977, p. 116).  
																																																								
21 R(AB) v Secretary of State for Justice [2017] EWHC 1694. 
22 See Annex One for an overview of the legal cases which challenged segregation.  
23 ‘Governor’ is a broad term which captures managers at ‘governor-grade’ levels within the prison. It is distinct 
from the ‘Governing Governor’, who is in charge of the prison and responsible for the decisions of the governor 
grade managers; and such distinction is used throughout this thesis.   
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4. Segregation and law 
	
I: What do you think the law is for in seg units? 
R: The law? … What do you mean by the law? Do you mean our human rights, miss? Or do 
you mean the law as to why I’m down here? 
I: It can be any of those things really because the law is... yes human rights… but you’ve also 
got processes and procedures…  
R: I think the law is there to protect the prisoner... the processes and procedures are guidelines 
for staff to abide by.  
I: Has the law ever helped you? 
R: To be honest, the law has made a bit of an arse out of me miss. (Mark, prisoner). 
 
The primary aim of this research was to understand how law ‘worked’ in the segregation unit 
at HMP Whitemoor. I am mindful that ‘law’ as a concept, is subject to various different 
meanings, constructions and interpretations (Freeman, 2014; Llewellyn, 1930). The purpose 
of this thesis is not to engage in a jurisprudential discussion about the purpose and meaning of 
law. Instead, it seeks to understand how legal rules, such as those contained in the PR 1999, 
are complemented by non-legal rules (like the Prison Service Orders (‘PSOs’) and local site 
rules) and how they, together, apply in practice. I have not neglected the informal norms and 
customs, which can be at least as influential on behaviour, culture and practice, as formal 
rules and laws. As Hayek (1973), Hart (1961) and Duxbury (2017) suggest, local norms and 
customs can attract the character of ‘law’, as broadly construed, albeit they are distinguished 
from formal laws. In fact, much of staff behaviour was influenced by entrenched norms and 
customs (see Chapter Five). Importantly, segregation is not governed by one clear distinct law 
(or set of laws). Instead, it functions according to a complex and fragmented web of legal 
rules (in the PR 1999) and non-legal rules (PSOs, local-site rules and local norms and 
customs). The latter may give rise to duties, obligations and entitlements, but are not directly 
enforceable in the courts. The point being, any study of ‘law’ must include a consideration of 
the non-legal rules, the individual actors, the norms and customs, that all give effect (or 
attempt to give effect) to the law (which, at its narrowest, is Rule 45 of the PR 1999, as the 
primary authority for segregation).  
 
During my research, ‘understanding law’ transformed into broader questions about the 
existence and utility of law in segregation units, and how law (and all the rules and 
procedures) can function in such a restrictive and controlled environment. Few environments 
are so naturally conducive to despotism and arbitrariness. They are isolated and hermetic 
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units, where prisoners are particularly vulnerable to staff abuse, procedural breaches, human 
rights violations and wilful neglect. All this has been exposed by a number of long and 
interesting case law histories (see Chapter Two). Segregation units are places of harm: they 
facilitate or exacerbate the psychological deterioration of prisoners, have high incidents of 
self-harm and suicide, and can be environments which perpetuate violence and ‘ethical 
violations’ of human dignity (Guenther, 2013; Kupers, 2006; Montford, Hannah-Moffat, & 
Hunter, 2017, p. 142). They are places in which prisoners are rendered vulnerable, although 
such vulnerability can take various forms: mental illness, threats on the wing, or because of 
the substantial power differentials and prisoners’ almost complete reliance on staff. 
Consequently, segregation units are parts of the prison where the law must be robust, and the 
‘rule of law’ must be present.  
 
The ‘rule of law’, traditionally postulated by A.V. Dicey (1915, p. xvii), means law should 
operate: (i) without any arbitrary or discretionary power of the decision-maker; and (ii) in a 
manner which places every man as equal before the law i.e. free from discrimination and bias. 
Dicey’s ideas were developed by Lord Bingham (2006), in his eight principles for the rule of 
law: (i) the law must be accessible, intelligible, clear and predictable (p. 6); (ii) legal 
questions should be resolved by the application of law and not by the exercise of discretion (p. 
10); (iii) laws should apply equally to everyone (p. 12); (iv) law must provide adequate 
protection for fundamental human rights (p. 16); (v) means must be provided for the 
resolution of civil disputes (p. 20); (vi) ministers and public officers must exercise their 
powers reasonably, in good faith and for the purpose in which they were conferred (p. 23); 
(vii) adjudicative procedures must be fair (p. 26); and (viii) the state must comply with 
obligations in international law (p. 29). For Dicey and Bingham, the ‘rule of law’ was the 
bedrock to the proper functioning of law in England and Wales. In addition to rule of law 
principles, there also exists the concept of natural justice in English law. Natural justice 
requires that everyone receives a fair and unbiased hearing before any decision is made which 
will negatively affect them (Shauer, 1976). 
 
In the prison segregation unit, attempts are made to give effect to the ‘rule of law’ in several 
ways. The PR 1999, PSOs and local site rules together, purportedly, set out the law in a 
manner which is ‘accessible, intelligible, clear and predictable’. The rules attempt to limit the 
use of segregation to certain prescribed situations (for ‘good order or discipline’ or an 
individual’s ‘own interests’). They introduce internal oversight mechanisms, such as 
segregation review boards, internal approval processes and time limitations for segregation. 
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The rules also allow for independent bodies, like the IMB, to be involved in the oversight 
process (by attending segregation review boards). In addition, prisoners retain certain rights: 
to access their legal advisers and to have recourse to a court, as final arbiter of the workings of 
the ‘law’. Together, these rules and rights are important mechanisms for constraining 
discretion and arbitrary power, and for reducing the opportunities for discriminatory decision-
making.  
 
However, as we proceed through the thesis, I suggest that the ‘law’ does not always function 
in ways which give effect to ‘rule of law’ principles. I identify how the legal rules (like PR 
1999) and non-legal rules (PSO 1700 and local site rules) are not clear or predictable. 
Moreover, they contain substantial discretionary power, which means, at times, they function 
according to the whims of the actors responsible for their implementation – sometimes staff, 
prison managers and the judiciary (Chapters Two and Four). I suggest that law is not always 
enacted through procedures which are fair, or able to remove bias and constrain discretion. 
Specifically, in Chapter Six, I discuss the various safeguarding mechanisms (segregation 
review meetings, approval processes and complaints mechanisms) to demonstrate some of the 
limitations of law in protecting prisoners’ rights in segregation. Throughout, I identify a 
contradiction between the external law of segregation and the internal norms, customs, 
cultures and practices which give effect to the law in segregation. Whilst law is ‘present’ – in 
name, language and the complex web of rules and procedures – it is subsumed within 
everyday life of the segregation unit. The effect being, at times, ‘the rule of law is absent, 
although rules are everywhere’ (Arbour, 1996, p. 180). Thus, the ‘rule of law’ is a guiding 
benchmark to which I return in most chapters. I rely on its principles to identify the ways in 
which laws and rules in segregation may, or may not, be ‘effective’ in preserving the eight 
principles of Lord Bingham (as described above). 
 
The law, and specifically rule of law principles, are important conduits for creating or 
diminishing the legitimacy of the prison institution. When prison authorities comply with 
their own rules and procedures, it may be more likely that the prison institution is perceived as 
fair and legitimate (Sparks, Bottoms, & Hay, 1996). Thus, conformity with the ‘letter of the 
law’ is of fundamental importance for the legitimacy of the prison (Whitty, Murphy, & 
Livingstone, 2001, p. 239). However, it is not enough for institutional legitimacy to simply 
comply with the letter of the law. Decision-making processes also need to be perceived as fair 
(i.e. neutral, transparent and allowing voice to those involved) and individuals need to feel 
treated with respect and dignity (Bradford, Hohl, Jackson, & MacQueen, 2015, p. 4). Thus, 
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institutional compliance with the rules is important, but so are the ways in which the rules are 
implemented (and the latter is where ‘rule of law’ principles are valuable). Specifically, staff 
discretion and the inter-personal relationships between staff (those who implement the rules) 
and prisoners (those affected by the rules) are important contributors towards institutional 
legitimacy. There is a utility for the prison to comply with its rules and procedures; existing 
research supports the idea that if a prison is deemed more legitimate, then prisoners will more 
likely comply with its rules, laws and processes (Tyler, 1990). Thus, legitimacy has important 
consequences for the safety and order of the institution.  However, there are also broader 
ethical and moral dimensions to the role of law in prison. Law and rules are important 
mechanisms through which prison authorities can be made, and held, accountable. The 
existence of rules and laws can impose limits on the exercise of discretion and encourage the 
‘right’ use of power. Law and rules are especially important in the segregation unit, which is 
the deepest part of the prison, containing especially vulnerable prisoners, and is characterised 
by significant power differentials. Therefore, rules and processes, such as those which 
demand: an external review of segregation after 42 days; the approval of the governor and 
mental health team; the involvement of the IMB; and regular meetings with, and reviews by, 
the segregation review board, become all the more important. They are important not just for 
the legitimacy of the institution, but for the safety of the individuals confined there.  
5. The structure of this thesis 
 
In Chapter Two (‘Law and Sociology: Bridging the divide’) I discuss the existing legal and 
non-legal rules24 which govern segregation in English prisons. Through an analysis of case 
law, I demonstrate the ways in which segregation has been challenged by prisoners in the 
past, and how procedural complaints are often more successful than substantive treatment 
complaints. I argue that the rule of law is limited, in the prison context, by the court’s narrow 
construction of human rights, as well as its preference for procedural justice (over substantive 
justice), and its deference to prison authorities. I suggest that prisoners’ rights are narrowly 
construed and can be constrained by the behaviour of the individual, but sometimes by the 
very fact of imprisonment. I also discuss the benefits of a socio-legal research approach which 
underpins much of this thesis. I review and challenge the current division in the existing 
literature – the fissures between criminological and legal scholarship – and suggest that, in 
order to understand properly how law is understood, applied, used and experienced in 
																																																								
24 ‘Non-legal rules’ are explained in Part 2, Chapter Two. 
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segregation units, we need to bridge the ‘gap’ between the two. Only then can we understand 
how law matters (Levine & Mellema, 2001) in segregation units.  
 
In Chapter Three (‘Methods: At the margins, without trust and the fragmented self’), I discuss 
the research design, site and methods used in this thesis. I describe HMP Whitemoor and its 
segregation unit (‘Unit’).  I draw out the challenges I experienced from researching two, often 
polarised, groups. I close by exploring four challenges which arose from researching at the 
margins of the worlds of both prisoners and staff. In particular, I was confronted with ethical 
and practical difficulties relating to: maintaining trust and mitigating suspicion; being able to 
truly understand their worlds; retaining my own sense of ‘self’; and grappling with the 
ethnographic loneliness which ensued as a result.  
 
In Chapter Four (‘Law and contradiction: the use of segregation’) I focus on the ways in 
which Rule 45 PR 1999, as the initial authority for ‘removal from association’ and the first 
step in the segregation process, is interpreted and applied in practice. I suggest that the current 
law of segregation is an inadequate mechanism for controlling and constraining the use of 
segregation in prison for three reasons. Firstly, the concept of ‘removal from association’ 
contained within the PR 1999 is vague and imprecise. It has been interpreted and applied in a 
number of ways by the English courts and, accordingly, creates problems for legal certainty 
and undermines some of our most basic rule of law principles. Secondly, the concepts of 
‘good order or discipline’ and ‘own interests’, also within the PR 1999, are just as broad. As 
such, they are used to justify a range of prison decisions. Contrary to the intention behind the 
legal rules, I suggest that segregation may not be the ‘last resort’, nor is it reserved for the 
most violent offenders. Thirdly, I demonstrate how the PR 1999 are characterised by a 
substantial amount of discretion, which is not constrained by the supplementary PSO 1700 or 
local rules. I suggest that, although there are opportunities for legal and policy reform (to 
improve the PR 1999, PSO 1700 and local rules), and opportunities for strengthening the ‘rule 
of law’, such efforts may only result in limited outcomes. Reforming the rules may do little to 
reform the circumstances which necessitate the use of segregation (such as the violent and 
turbulent wings, high rates of mental illness and lack of progression in the prison).  
 
In Chapter Five (‘Law and discretion: the culture of segregation’) my analysis focuses on the 
next phase of segregation, once prisoners are moved to the Unit, and how the rules interact 
with the regime, staff conduct, and individuals’ experiences. I demonstrate how the rules are 
contingent on those responsible for their implementation. I show how staff culture is a 
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dominant force; and how the culture strongly influences the ways in which individuals engage 
with, and apply, rules. I argue, in this chapter, that the rules create a space in which staff 
discretion can thrive. For the most part, staff discretion is exercised in ways which result in 
the selective enforcement of rules. Those rules (whether legal or not) are used to legitimate, or 
are even rejected in favour of, practices which are sometimes punitive, discriminatory and 
unfair. Moreover, the dominant staff culture erodes certain oversight and accountability 
mechanisms, and means there are weak internal constraints on staff discretion. Consequently, 
the rules do not always function in accordance with the rule of law. Instead they are subsumed 
within the Unit’s culture; and the Unit’s culture has important implications for reform efforts. 
I discourage efforts which focus only on policy or legal reform: they will not remedy the 
complex operational, organisational and cultural conditions of the Unit.    
 
In Chapter Six (‘Law and context: application, accessibility and authority’), I advance the 
argument that the functioning of law is contingent on the staff who implement it, but also on 
the institutional context in which it applies. I suggest that ‘structural’ constraints manifest as 
the proceduralisation of law, whereby processes, paperwork and bureaucracy seep into the 
Unit in ways which prioritise ‘procedural justice’ above ‘substantive justice’. I highlight how 
‘structural’ constraints also appear in the limited and contingent ways in which prisoners 
access and engage with legal resources and safeguards. Together, they cultivate, for staff and 
prisoners, a lack of faith and distrust of legal mechanisms and processes. Importantly, they 
create a sense that the rules and processes privilege the ‘other’ (i.e. staff group or prisoner 
group). Specifically, for prisoners, they create a degree of ‘legal authority’ – they justify the 
decisions of those in power – but fail to create ‘legitimate authority’ (they do not render those 
decisions ‘legitimate’). 
 
The aim of this study is not to diminish the value of law. As a previously practising lawyer, I 
remain committed to the importance and usefulness of law in segregation units. I do not 
dispute that law reform is needed. However, I aim to inspire more reflection about whether 
and how the ‘rule of law’, along with principles of human rights and procedural justice can 
best be supported. In Chapter Seven (‘Challenge, change and hope’) I note, with regret, how 
law alone is not the most appropriate mechanism for improving standards in the Unit. Even if 
the legislation and accompanying guidance are revised, and if legal knowledge, practice, 
procedures, appeal mechanisms and remedies are at their very best, there are still a number of 
limits to the law. Specifically the law may not be able to correct the attitudes, customs and 
culture of the segregation unit, nor may it correct the problems found elsewhere in our prison 
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system (overcrowding, mental illness, volatile wings and inexperienced staff), nor the 
‘legitimacy deficit’ (Sparks et al., 1996, p. 299) found in the prison; nor the deficiencies of 
our social, economic, political and criminal justice system. The law may be of limited 
consequence until there is greater acceptance that segregation is innately harmful and 
dehumanising, and capable of perpetuating violence and violations of dignity. As Hudson 
argued the ‘law cannot be expected to remedy injustices legally before they are recognised as 
injustices socially’ (2006, p. 30).  
 
The final chapter closes by making the point that, although law may not be the most 
appropriate mechanism for reform, it does not mean that all is lost. The law is one of a range 
of factors affecting the prison, so we should not limit ourselves to seeking change by law 
reform alone. Change is possible: HMP Wormwood Scrubs and HMP Oakwood had a 
different vision for their segregation units; and HMP Warren Hill managed to close its unit.  
 
I am conscious that, by focusing my analysis on efforts to improve standards and the 
substantive experience of segregation, I may be inadvertently diverting attention away from 
bigger questions about the justification for segregation. Perhaps by attempting to resist, curtail 
or revise segregation based on ‘best practice’ or ‘humane treatment’ we, in effect, work to 
normalise this mode of captivity, we inadvertently support its existence and sustain its 
immunity from abolition (Montford et al., 2017, p. 151). This was never the aim of this study. 
However, the practical reality is that segregation exists: there is an institutional reliance on its 
use, and it seems, for the moment, that it may be here to stay. I hope to show that whilst there 
are opportunities for change, there are also opportunities for asking uncomfortable questions 
about the utility of segregation. Segregation perpetuates violence and harm, it can dehumanise 
and ‘other’ prisoners. This creates risks for the prison but also the rest of society. As 
Desmond Tutu (2000, p. 35) argued, the greater whole of humanity is diminished when we 
agree that others within it can be humiliated, denigrated or treated as less than human (quoted 





Chapter Two – Law and Sociology: Bridging the Divide 
 
[Y]ou’ve seen the law changing prison policy…if you go through all the way down, from Rule 
39, where a prisoner could have confidential correspondence with their lawyer, that’s been 
there a long time. Then you had searching, where the prisoner was kicked out of their cells and 
legal documentation was searched. There’s been so much case law in regards to prison, 
actions of management, so yeah I say the law is an important part of being in prison. It’s funny 
that a prisoner is in prison, has abused the law but yet they readily rely on the law to enforce 
their human rights. That’s kinda ironic, innit? (David, prisoner).  
 
At the start of this study, one of the primary aims was to understand how law functions in the 
segregation unit. I set out to explore how law is construed, understood and used. I questioned 
the relevance of law in the Unit, and was interested in learning what law can (or cannot) 
achieve in restrictive spaces, like segregation units. To put it another way, I was interested in 
understanding how law matters – to individuals, to the prison institution and to social change 
(particularly in changing prison standards) (Levine & Mellema, 2001). To explore this, it was 
first important to understand the rules (both legal and non-legal) which apply to segregation in 
English prisons. Therefore, in this chapter, I first outline the formal legal rules, followed by a 
description of the non-legal rules, which govern segregation. I then, through an analysis of 
case law, discuss the ways in which legal mechanisms have been used to challenge 
segregation in prison. I identify some of the limits to litigation: some are financial in nature 
(changes to legal aid), judicial (preferences for procedural rather than substantive justice) and 
remedial (reluctance to award damages). The case law analysis raises important questions 
about the function and availability of law in prison; questions which a purely doctrinal (case 
law) approach cannot adequately answer. As such, the fourth and final part of this chapter 
closes with a discussion of the value of legal sociology, and of ‘gap studies’, for 
understanding the relationship between law, rules and experiences (Levine & Mellema, 2001, 
p. 172).  I argue that a socio-legal approach offers considerable value for understanding how 
law matters, as well as some of the limits to law, and pervades much of this thesis.  
1. Legal rules 
 
The use of segregation is established and governed (in theory, at least) by a complicated legal 
framework. This framework exists to ensure prisoners’ rights are upheld and that decisions 
are made legally, fairly and consistently. Prison rules and regulations provide a dual purpose: 
they serve as both ‘a shield and a sword’. Legal rules can protect prisoners from arbitrary and 
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improper interference with their rights and can, at the same time, legitimate and justify the 
decisions of prison officials, and thereby protect them (and the institution) from unscrupulous 
or groundless complaints.  
 
The current legal framework derives from s47(1) of The Prison Act 1952, which permits the 
Secretary of State to make ‘rules for the regulation and management of prisons’. Importantly, 
the Secretary of State has a vast discretion in organising and managing the prison system 
(Lazarus, 2004, p. 146). Exercising this function, the Secretary of State created the PR 1999. 
The PR 1999 are statutory instruments, approved by Parliament and have been amended on 
several occasions. 
 
Rule 45 of the PR 1999 provides for ‘removal from association’ and, whilst it does not 
explicitly refer to ‘segregation’, the courts have interpreted the rule to mean ‘segregation’.25 
Rule 45 of the PR 1999 was amended in 2015, as a result of the decision of the Supreme 
Court in R (Bourgass) v Secretary of State for Justice [2015] UKSC 54. Pursuant to the 2015 
amendment (enacted by the Prison and Young Offender Institution (Amendment) Rules 2015) 
the rule now states: 
   
[W]here it appears desirable, for the maintenance of good order or discipline or in his own 
interests…the governor may arrange for the prisoner’s removal from association (R45(1)). 
 
The governor can authorise removal for up to 14 days (R45(2)), which can be renewed for 
subsequent periods of 14 days (R45(2A)), except, any removal beyond 42 days requires leave 
from the Secretary of State (R45(2B)). 
 
Similarly, the Young Offender Institution Rules 2000 (‘YOI Rules’) permit the governor to 
remove the offender from association where it appears desirable for the maintenance of good 
order, discipline or for his own interests (R49(1)). Such removal shall not exceed three days, 
without the authority of a member of the board of visitors or the Secretary of State (R49(2)). 
Such authority can authorise removal for up to 1 month (for a female offender aged 21 or 
over) but, in the case of any other offender, shall not exceed 14 days (R49(2)) and may be 
renewed from time to time for a like period (R49(2)).  
 
																																																								
25 See Dennehy v Secretary of State for Justice and Sodexo Limited, [2016] EWHC 1219 (Admin) [9] and R 
(Bourgass) v Secretary of State for Justice [2015] UKSC 54, in which the Supreme Court described removal 
from association and segregation and solitary confinement as one and the same. 
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In addition, human rights protections are set out within the European Convention on Human 
Rights (‘ECHR’), which was given effect in domestic law by the Human Rights Act 1998. A 
number of prison segregation decisions have been challenged on the basis of Article 3 
(prohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) and Article 8 (right to 
respect for private and family life) (see Annex One). Segregation decisions have also been 
challenged on grounds of ‘procedural fairness’. This common law right requires prison 
decision-makers to act fairly ‘when reaching a decision which could adversely affect those 
who are the subject of the decision’ (Roberts v Secretary of State [2005] UKHL 45 (per Lord 
Woolf [41]). Procedural fairness requires that the individual affected by the decision is: (i) 
given an opportunity to make representations ‘with a view to producing a favourable result’ 
(R v Secretary of State for the Home dept ex p Doody [1994] 1 AC 531 (per Lord Mustill); (ii) 
provided with information pertaining to the ‘substance’ of the case against him (R (Bourgass) 
v Secretary of State for Justice [2015] UKSC 54 [100]); and (iii) an opportunity to participate 
in decision-making in order to contribute relevant information or to test information before 
the decision-maker (R (Osborn) v Parole Board [2013] UKSC 61).  
 
Moreover, public law mechanisms, such as judicial review, are important for allowing the 
decisions of public bodies (such as a prison) to be challenged in the courts and scrutinised by 
the judiciary (see Creighton & Arnott, 2009, pp. 607 - 609). Private law mechanisms have 
also been relevant to segregation: prisoners have brought legal complaints founded in a breach 
of statutory duty, negligence, assault and discrimination (to name only a few).  
International law standards have also been given some weight by the English courts. For 
example, the courts have, in the context of prison segregation, considered the European Prison 
Rules 2006, as well as the Mandela Rules, and have treated the reports from the European 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(‘CPT’) as compelling forms of evidence (R (AB) v Secretary of State for Justice [2019] 
EWCA Civ 9).26  
2. Non-legal rules 
 
Throughout this thesis I refer to ‘non-legal rules’. By this I mean the guidance and rules 
which supplement the formal legal rules, set out above, which are not contained in primary or 
																																																								
26 This thesis does not explore these international legal standards in great detail. The European Prison Rules may 
be persuasive for the English courts but they are not binding. The Mandela Rules and CPT reports have only 
been referenced in a small number of cases. They were given little mention during fieldwork, with staff and 
prisoners having little knowledge of their existence. Together, they appeared to be of limited impact in the prison 
(Abati et al., 2018).   
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secondary legislation, nor are they derived from the common law. I am specifically referring 
to: (i) Prison Service Order 1700 (‘PSO 1700’); and (ii) the local guidance issued within 
Whitemoor.  
 
PSO 1700 is a non-statutory government policy specifically created to manage the use of 
segregation in prisons. PSOs were issued until 2009. They were intended to be ‘long-term 
mandatory instructions, designed to last indefinitely’.27 PSOs remain in force until they are 
replaced by Prison Service Instructions (‘PSIs’) or are cancelled. PSO 1700 was issued in 
October 2003. It was amended in 2006 by PSI 17/2006, which was replaced in 2009 by PSI 
26/2009, and subsequently cancelled in May 2018. However, HMPPS states that the 
amendments have been ‘included in the Segregation website PSO 1700’28 (see HMPPS, 
2019a, 2019b). PSO 1700 does not have any direct legal status:29 it cannot legitimate 
infringements of prisoners’ rights, empower prison administrators beyond the statutory prison 
rules, nor can it give rise to any specific legal entitlements to prisoners (except insofar as it 
creates a ‘legitimate expectation’, which may be recognised by the courts in certain judicial 
review cases) (Lazarus, 2004, p. 158). 
 
PSO 1700 sets out the purpose of segregation and affirms how segregation should only be 
used ‘as a last resort’ and with a focus on managing behaviour and problems instead of 
punishment (p. 4). PSO 1700 is a 73-page document which sets out matters such as: the 
training of staff in segregation units; the purpose and reasons for segregation; the process for 
authorising segregation; and the process for returning a prisoner to normal location. 
Importantly, PSO 1700 contains a number of safeguarding provisions. For example, it 
stipulates that segregation must be reviewed by a doctor or nurse within 2 hours of the 
prisoner being segregated; segregation must also be approved by a governor; it should be 
																																																								
27 As described on the Ministry of Justice website. However, the ‘mandatory’ status is far from clear in the 
wording of PSO 1700, where only certain parts are designated as mandatory. For example, it is mandatory for a 
doctor to visit prisoners in segregation daily and for the ‘segregation, monitoring and review group’ to monitor 
and review the number of prisoners held in segregation each week, as well as their ethnic statuses, and to 
‘assess…any prisoner’ held in segregation for over three months. However, many of the rules, in PSO 1700, are 
not designated as mandatory and therefore, by implication, are discretionary.  
28 HMPPS means, although not expressed clearly, the up-to-date PSO 1700 can be found online, on the PSO part 
of its website. Although this is only made clear after one reviews the other documents, follows the paper trail, 
finds this instruction (contained in the PDF list of all PSOs) and returns to the webpage. It is a circuitous process.  
29 The status of PSO 1700 has been disputed. In R (on the application of MA) v Independent Adjudicator [2013] 
EWHC 438 ,the defendant alleged that PSO 1700 was ‘non-statutory’ and  therefore had no mandatory 
requirements: at ‘its highest, it conferred a legitimate expectation’ [30]. The courts have not resolved this issue 
and I do not intend to resolve it here. For now, it is important to note that PSO 1700 has a complex status: it 
contains both mandatory and discretionary instructions, and the courts have not defined the extent to which it 
imposes obligations or rights on prisoners.  
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monitored and reviewed by segregation review boards every two weeks; and the IMB should 
be involved in the process.  
 
Within PSO 1700 there is a provision urging prisons to create local segregation policies, 
which ‘reflect their own needs’ (p. 4). This, in part, recognises the difficulties of creating a 
comprehensive policy, appropriate for every prison. There is no denying that there is a role for 
discretion in the penal and legal system (Klatt, 2007), and this is evident in PSO 1700 which 
equips each establishment with a substantial amount of discretion to develop a segregation 
policy specific to its environment and circumstances. Although it would be difficult to create 
an all-encompassing policy applicable to each category of the male, female and young 
offenders’ estates, this perpetuates the uncertainty and inconsistency in the existing rules. 
 
In response to PSO 1700, Whitemoor developed local site-specific guidance: ‘HMP 
Whitemoor Segregation: Information Booklet and Segregation Unit Expectations’, the latest 
version of which was dated February 2019 (‘Local Site Rules’). Notably, during fieldwork, 
they had not been distributed to staff. The Local Site Rules restate rules 45, 46, 53, 55 of PR 
1999 and describe the accommodation, the regime and behavioural expectations of prisoners 
(p. 5). For example, the rules instruct how cells must be cleaned, curtains opened, how 
property will be checked, how razors will be issued and removed. They state there will be no 
passing of newspapers or other items and noise must be kept to a reasonable level (p. 14). 
They make clear that access to the regime and other facilities is based on prisoners’ behaviour 
and staff judgments. There is ample discretion within the rules and, importantly, they are 
drafted as a framework for prisoners to abide by. They are not additional guidance to staff or 
managers on how segregation should be used, nor do they contain conditions or standards for 
the Unit or the regime. The Local Site Rules satisfy the instruction in PSO 1700, in that they 
‘reflect the needs’ of staff and management, but provide little consideration to the needs and 
rights of prisoners contained there. 
 
During fieldwork, it became clear that the segregation unit was a part of the prison where the 
language of law was very present. Staff commonly referred to prisoners by their associated 
Rule: ‘oh, he’s a Rule 45 prisoner’, ‘he’s Rule 46’; or ‘he’s a 42 day-er’, meaning the prisoner 
had been in the Unit beyond the 42 day approval period, set out in the PR 1999. There was 
also a language of ‘rules’, ‘rights’ and ‘entitlements’ and these became difficult to untangle. 
Some staff referred to ‘rules’ in the context of the formal legal rules (in PR 1999) or non-legal 
rules like PSO 1700. Whereas others referred to ‘rules’ in the context of formalised local 
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practices, those contained in the Local Site Rules, but also those dictated by informal ways of 
working, established norms and practices. 
 
Thus, a complex and fragmented framework, of both legal and non-legal rules, applies to the 
segregation unit. The legal rules dictate, at least in theory, how segregation is used, when it is 
used and why it should be used. The non-legal rules shape how discretion is exercised, the 
availability of entitlements and privileges. Together, the rules can make time in segregation 
more or less survivable. By understanding experiences of law and rules, we can understand 
broader experiences of segregation. The ways in which rules are implemented can have an 
important impact on experience, and particularly how individuals assess whether a practice or 
decision is deemed to be fair. If rules are followed, and implemented fairly, by an honest and 
impartial authority, one who listens to views and treats individuals with respect and dignity; 
then the outcome is more likely to be experienced as just and reasonable (Paternoster, Brame, 
Bachman, & Sherman, 1997; Tyler, 1988, 2003). However, if a practice operates outside the 
established rules and procedures, it will more likely be experienced as illegitimate and may 
create a strong sense of injustice and feelings of discontent. Consequently, the rules and 
procedures which govern segregation, and the ways in which they are implemented, are 
important for shaping one’s perceptions and experience of segregation. Therefore, any 
analysis of segregation must take into account the role of both legal and non-legal rules, as 
well as the actors responsible for their implementation (see Chapters Four, Five and Six). 
3. Case law  
	
The aim of this research – to understand law in the segregation unit – could have been 
answered in one of two ways. Firstly, through a traditional doctrinal approach, by reviewing 
case law decisions and court judgments, to understand the ways in which prisoners have used 
the law to hold prison administrators to account. Or, secondly, through a sociological analysis, 
to explore how prisoners conceptualise law, how they exhibit ‘rights consciousness’ and, 
relatedly, make use of their legal rights (Murphy & Whitty, 2016, p. 130); and how staff 
interpret legal obligations and engage with legal processes. As the remaining parts of this 
chapter show, both approaches have promises and pitfalls, therefore a multi-disciplinary 
‘socio-legal’ approach is needed.  
 
An examination of case law can be valuable as a means for understanding the use and 
experience of segregation. Legal disputes have, in the past, served as conduits for academic 
research and culminated in published works (Grassian, 1983; Haney, 1993; Jackson, 1983). 
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Much of this work was produced in the United States and in Canada, but very little has arisen 
from the UK context. Litigation can reveal the parameters of the acceptability of prison 
conditions and regimes, and can expose the instances in which these parameters become 
breached. Case law can reveal our tolerance threshold. We all have different ideas about 
justice, fairness, entitlements and equality, and the point at which losses, grievances or 
treatment move beyond an acceptable threshold and divert into the realms of unacceptability 
and illegitimacy (Ewick & Silbey, 1998). Reviewing segregation, in the context of legal 
challenges, furthers our understanding of where that threshold lies. It is through legal 
complaints that conditions and/or treatment can become recast as illegitimate practices.  
 
Since 1980, in England and Wales, there have been twenty-four30 reported cases brought 
against segregation (or some aspect) (see Annex One). My initial case searches revealed 
hundreds of cases (377). Some challenged practices in Immigration Removal Centres, secure 
psychiatric hospitals, as well as prisons. The cases involved a range of issues, including 
extradition proceedings, challenges to security categorisation, appeals of conviction and 
sentence, challenges to prison policies and procedures. However, a more nuanced review 
revealed twenty-four cases which directly concerned segregation in prison.  
 
Much was learned from the case law review. The majority of complaints were made by men, 
a finding which reflects the realities of our prison population: men substantially outnumber 
women.31 The majority of complaints were submitted by prisoners in public prisons (twenty-
one), in the High-Security Estate (ten), followed by local prisons (eight), YOIs (five) and one 
unknown prison location.  
 
Eight cases were heard between 2009 and 2012. The remainder were unevenly distributed 
across the years, and only five cases were heard from 2013 to 2020. The patterns in the 
number and frequency of cases follow a similar trajectory to the patterns witnessed in the 
provision of legal aid. During 1997 to 2007, the cost of legal aid provision increased from 
£1.5bn to £2.1bn (Grimwood, 2015, p. 5). The increase provoked concerns for the 
																																																								
30 During 1 March–11 June 2020, I searched the Westlaw database for cases on ‘segregation’, ‘solitary 
confinement’, ‘seclusion’, ‘isolation’, ‘prison’ and ‘YOI’, in various combinations. ‘Solitary confinement and 
prison’ revealed 264 results, ‘isolation and prison’ revealed 1505 results, ‘seclusion and prison’ revealed 105 
results and ‘segregation and prison’ revealed 375 results. Taken together, they would have created a large, and 
repetitive, dataset. Many of the cases appeared on a repetitive basis, regardless of whether ‘segregation’, 
‘seclusion’ or ‘solitary confinement’ were used. Consequently, I limited the search terms to ‘segregation AND 
prison’. This search revealed 377 cases.  I then reviewed each case and created a spreadsheet with 86 headings 
such as: case name, date of judgment, court, location, length of segregation, alleged violations, outcome and 
remedies. A second phase of review was undertaken which simplified and consolidated the review into 28 
categories, to enable the data to be more easily reviewed and analysed. 
31 At 5 June 2020 there were 79,878 male prisoners and 3,255 female prisoners (Ministry of Justice, 2020c). 
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Government and, in July 2005, Lord Carter of Coles was commissioned to review the 
provision of legal aid. Lord Carter called for a new system in England and Wales, which 
centred on ‘best value…quality, competition and price’ (Carter, 2006, p. 3). As a result, a 
number of changes were made to the provisions of both civil and criminal legal aid. As far as 
prisoners were concerned, this culminated in the development of the Legal Aid, Sentencing 
and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (‘LASPO’), enacted in 2013. LASPO reduced funding 
for legal aid and narrowed the scope of the eligibility criteria, meaning that fewer people had 
access to legal advice and representation (Organ & Sigafoos, 2018, p. 6). This occurred 
alongside the implementation of the Legal Aid Transformation (‘LAT’) programme, which 
specifically affected the scope of legal aid available for prison law cases. From 2011, there 
was a reduction in the number of publicly funded prison law cases, with a steep reduction in 
the number of claims relying on ‘free standing advice and assistance’ (Figure One).   
 
Figure One: Prison Law Completed Cases April 2011 to December 2019 (Ministry of Justice, 
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From April 2011 to April 2019 the volume of publicly funded prison law matters reduced by 
54% (from 42,681 claims in 2011 to 19,516 claims in 2019) (Ministry of Justice, 2020a, table 
2.1). The number of prison law legal aid providers reduced by 65% (from 485 in 2011 to 170 
in 2019) (Ministry of Justice, 2020a, table 9.1). Taken together, they illustrate how macro 
level changes to the provision of public funding may have substantially impacted the 
prevalence of prison litigation. It illustrates the importance of the broader socio-political 
context in which litigation is pursued. It demonstrates how legal funding and resources both 
have an important impact on engagement with the law, and the circumstances in which people 
resort to ‘using’ the law (Ewick & Silbey, 1998, p. 185). As previous research found, those 
with greater resources, including income, funding, education, or familiarity with the law, were 
more likely to use the law to resolve disputes (Carlin, Howard, & Messinger, 1966; Goodman 
& Sanborne, 1986; Mayhew & Reiss, 1969). 
 
Further, the case law review revealed a multitude of legal issues. Importantly, about half (13) 
challenged the processes and procedures which authorised segregation; and another half (12) 
challenged the substance of segregation (sometimes both featured in the claim).  
 
Insofar as the procedures were concerned, complaints challenged the lack of opportunities to 
make representations and to receive information associated with the segregation decision, the 
adequacy of oversight mechanisms, as well as procedural fairness (see Syed, Dennehy, 
Bourgass, S.P, Ex Parte Hague, MA, AB). Complainants challenged the substance of the 
regime, insofar as it related to the limited provision of fresh air (Malcolm) and food (Ex Parte 
Russell), and access to ‘purposeful activities’ including education and exercise (see S.P, Bary, 
MA, AB). A number of cases illustrated the detrimental impact of segregation on both those 
with and without pre-existing mental health conditions (see Racz and Bary), and incidents of 
self-harm and suicide in segregation units (see Keenan, BP, Russell). A small number of cases 
involved allegations of staff abuse and violence (Weldon, Racz, Russell). We can observe, in 
case law, how prison complaints became reframed within a human rights discourse. Wide-
ranging complaints, such as poor physical conditions, extensive isolation, bare cells, and a 
lack of purposeful activity were recast as Article 3 violations (protection from torture, 
inhuman, degrading treatment or punishment) or Article 8 (right to private and family life) 
ECHR complaints. In doing so, the actualities of the experience became depersonalised, 
selectively extracted and decontextualised, removed from the individual, his/her treatment and 
the institution (Armstrong, 2020, p. 90). 
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Notably, Article 3 complaints were rarely successful. Whilst the courts have a wide ambit to 
consider a range of factors, to determine an Article 3 claim,32 complaints often failed to reach 
the high ‘severity of treatment threshold’. Prisoners had difficulties as ‘ideal’ complainants: 
the court judgments painted a negative picture of the prisoner, often as risky, disruptive and 
violent individuals (see Hassan and Dennehy). At the same time, the judgments presented a 
positive picture of the prison authorities: judges deferred to the expertise of prison officers, 
accepting their views of risk, the justification for segregation, and their assessments of what 
was necessary to maintain security and control within the prison. In Hassan, when referring to 
evidence from prison staff, the court said ‘[t]heir expertise, knowledge and experience in a 
testing environment warrant respect’ [49]. The court aligned itself with the prison authority’s 
view; it ‘respected’ its expertise and appeared to treat this party as an expert (Armstrong, 
2020, p. 94). Thus, a weak test of proportionality, necessity and reasonableness seemingly 
operates (this is not unique, see Armstrong, 2020, pp. 93, 94; and Whitty et al., 2001, p. 242). 
For example, in Bary, the High Court assessed the segregation of the claimants according to 
the ‘…risk they present to staff…risk of escape…risks they present to themselves….[and] risk 
they present to other prisoners…’. However, the court overlooked the extent to which ‘risk’ 
was compounded by the institution; it was not relevant for assessing the legal issue at stake. 
The court overlooked the harmful impact of imprisonment, instead, deviance was construed as 
a deficit of the individual claimants, who were blamed for the risks they posed. Thus, the 
court denied the difficulties of ‘surviving such deeply damaging environments’ (Armstrong, 
2020, p. 101). In Bary, the court concluded: ‘even harsh regimes may not be in breach of 
Article 3, if the regime is justified by the particular risks posed by the prisoner’. By doing so, 
the court demonstrated how rights (including Article 3, which is supposedly absolute in 
nature) can be limited or qualified not only by the behaviour of the individual, but by the very 
fact of imprisonment and its demands of risk, security and order (Eady, 2007, p. 265).  
 
Prisoners found greater success from procedural complaints i.e. those which challenged the 
interpretation and application of the PR 1999 and YOI Rules. It was easier, for the courts, to 
assess whether a procedural rule or requirement was complied with, than to gauge the full 
impact of segregation (and imprisonment) on a person. This reflects the orientation of the 
																																																								
32 The courts can consider ‘the duration of the treatment, its physical or mental effects…the sex, age and health 
of the victim’ (Keenan v United Kingdom [2001] 33 EHRR 38 [108])	and such considerations are, as the court 
observed in Keenan, relative. The courts can also consider whether there was an intention to debase or humiliate 
the individual, whether there was any specific justification for the measure, whether the measure was arbitrarily 
punitive as well as the ‘particular conditions, the stringency of the measure, its duration, the objective pursued 
and its effects on the person’ (Ahmad v United Kingdom [2013] 56 EHRR 1 [178] [209]). There is, as the court 
in R (Bary and Others) v Secretary of State for Justice and the Governor of HMP Long Lartin [2010] EWHC 
587 [36] noted ‘no test of universal application’ for determining severity of treatment. 
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English courts: their preoccupation that justice, or at least procedural justice, is seen to be 
done (Kingwell, 2017, p. 8). As Gelsthorpe and Padfield (2013, p. 12) argue, the courts are 
more interested in ‘procedural justice rather than substantive justice’, to ensure that the 
procedures are fair. Whether the outcomes are fair is another matter. In the segregation cases, 
the courts spent much time considering whether the right approvals were sought, from the 
right people, according to the correct timeframes, and whether the paperwork was completed. 
Whilst procedures are important for fairness, transparency and governance, focusing on the 
procedural duties diverts attention away from considering whether segregation, itself, is an 
acceptable outcome. The courts assume the current institutional framework, rather than 
question it – they focus on how segregation units are managed, and the enforcement of fair 
procedures, rather than question why this measure is used in the first place (Garland, 1990, p. 
3). Whilst the courts are limited in what they can and cannot question, challenge and consider 
(and the foundations of segregation may be beyond the court’s remit), we cannot deny this 
stark illustration of one of the limits of the law.   
 
Moreover, when claims succeeded, they did not necessarily result in the outcomes the 
claimants’ desired. For example, the courts were reluctant to award damages, preferring to 
make a declaration i.e. declaring that a party had been wronged and that procedural or human 
rights had been violated (for a discussion of the respective merits and limitations of 
declarations see Foster (2017) and Shelton (2006)). There is always a risk with litigation: the 
case may not be resolved in a manner satisfactory for the claimant or the claim may result in 
unforeseen (and unintended) consequences. This is best illustrated by R (Bourgass) v 
Secretary of State for Justice [2015] UKSC 54. Bourgass was segregated, for at least seven 
months, following an incident with another prisoner. His segregation was renewed by the 
prison governor. Bourgass complained that the governor was not authorised to extend his 
segregation and that the external review mechanisms (which required an external referral to 
the Secretary of State for any segregation beyond 72 hours) were not followed. The Supreme 
Court declared that segregation, beyond 72 hours, must be approved by the Secretary of State. 
This was an important safeguard to ensure external scrutiny and review of segregation 
decisions. The decision, taken by the prison governor, was therefore unlawful and breached 
the PR 1999.  
 
Bourgass also complained that he should have: (i) been given an opportunity to make 
representations; and (ii) been provided with the reasons and information behind his 
segregation. Lord Reed was persuaded that prisoners should ‘normally have a reasonable 
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opportunity to make representations and should be given sufficient information’. He criticised 
the information provided which, at best, gave only the ‘most general idea’ about the reasons 
for segregation and that ‘more could and should have been said’ [100]. He expressed 
disappointment in the prison service for imposing prolonged periods of segregation ‘on the 
basis of what are, in substance, secret and unchallengeable allegations [which] is, or should 
be, unacceptable’ [100]. 
 
The Bourgass judgment was viewed as a major advancement in prisoners’ rights and 
procedural justice (Beaton, 2016). Lord Reed set out a minimum level of information, reasons 
and evidence that should be made available to prisoners facing segregation. The judgment 
was important for reaffirming the roles and responsibilities, as well as the decision-making 
limits, of prison officials. It was a positive example of the power of litigation and its potential 
for prison reform. The judgment highlighted the failings of the prison service and provided a 
strong reminder of the importance of procedural safeguards in prison segregation.  
 
After Bourgass, there was a window of opportunity in which the law of segregation could 
have been reviewed (and improved). The opportunity was taken, but not in a manner which 
benefited prisoners. Two months after Bourgass, the Secretary of State amended the PR 1999. 
A new Rule 45(2) was enacted on 4 September 2015 which specified that the governor may 
authorise segregation beyond 72 hours up to a period of 14 days, and may renew each period 
of segregation up to 42 days. Segregation beyond 42 days must be authorised by the Secretary 
of State. This is a significantly longer period: external approval was previously required for 
any segregation beyond 72 hours. Extending the timeframe for external review weakened the 
protections afforded by the legal rules: early referrals to the Secretary of State were an 
important safeguard against arbitrary and unlawful segregation decisions (and an approval 
mechanism which the Supreme Court, in Bourgass, regarded as extremely important).  
 
The reaction by the Secretary of State reveals the reluctance by the British government and 
prison service to affirm prisoners’ rights (Eady, 2007; Lazarus, 2004). It demonstrates how 
court decisions may not always translate into progressive changes in law, policy and practice 
(Whitty et al., 2001, p. 241) without political will. The outcome of the Bourgass litigation (the 
amendment to PR 1999) redefined the parameters through which segregation (and governor 
decision-making) can lawfully operate. The outcome was a form of ‘legal proofing’ (Whitty, 
2011, p. 129), which created new minimum standards for external oversight and makes 
segregation harder to legally challenge. Bourgass proffers a cautionary lesson about the merits 
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of litigation: whilst Bourgass succeeded in his legal challenge, he undermined some of the 
safeguards and protections afforded to the prison community as a whole.  
 
The case law review revealed how litigation may have unforeseen consequences. It also 
revealed how, for prisoners, the substantive experience of segregation matters just as much as 
the process for segregation. It provided insights into common areas of contention in prison 
and into prisoners’ experiences and their engagement with the law. However, we need to be 
mindful that case law only offers a narrow lens through which law and experiences can be 
understood:  
 
Much legal study, perhaps most of it, by its very nature concerns itself with the extraordinary. 
To focus on case law is, as we know, to focus on the unusual. Most disputes do not reach the 
stage of court judgments, let alone litigation. (Halliday & Morgan, 2013, p. 2) 
 
As Halliday and Morgan (2013) correctly observed, most complaints do not result in litigation 
and will not be evidenced in case law. Reported judgments only provide a limited window 
into disputes. Disputes which crystallise in litigation, and proceed all the way to judgment, are 
those which overcame a number of barriers. Firstly, they were brought by claimants who had 
the financial resources to support a claim. The claimants, in each of the referenced cases, were 
either publicly funded through legal aid or self-funded. The matter of financial resources is a 
significant barrier for accessing the justice system. Court cases are costly and the fees of 
solicitors, barristers and the courts soon mount. Secondly, the reported cases were those 
which managed to satisfy the procedural requirements of judicial review or appeal. The 
claimants managed to demonstrate a ‘chance of success’; that they were within the strict 
limitation periods; and were therefore able to pursue their complaints in the courts. Thirdly, 
they were disputes which a defendant (HMPPS or Ministry of Justice, for example) deemed 
crucial to defend. For a defendant, there would usually be arguable grounds for dispute or 
sometimes a strategic motivation for defending the claim. Perhaps a defendant believes their 
case to be correct in law or wishes to avoid opening the floodgates for further cases. In other 
words, there might be strategic or public policy grounds for mounting a defence. As such, 
case law comprises a set of unique disputes, ones which have not been diverted away by 
resource considerations, and ones which have not been settled out of court.  
 
Further, the cases referenced here were heard in higher tier courts, such as the High Court, 
Court of Appeal and Supreme Court. Lower tier judgments are not reported to the same 
extent. Therefore, this analysis only includes judgments from the superior courts and, as a 
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consequence, only offers a small snapshot of litigation in the context of segregation units.33 
Moreover, as Annex One demonstrates, a whole host of issues can arise, in a variety of 
contexts. Case law only affords a limited perspective on law: one which narrowly relates to its 
interpretation and application by the judiciary, not one which exposes the real, lived 
experiences of law. Written judgments provide truncated narratives, they contain technical 
descriptions of the prisoner, his treatment, and the matters at the heart of the case, but fall 
short on both ‘depth and dimension’ (Murphy & Whitty, 2016, p. 132). Case law is not 
designed to explore why prisoners brought their cases at that particular moment in time. Was 
it because a particular constellation of resources, support and individual indignation made it 
possible and proved to be the catalyst? What was it about the experience of segregation 
which, for some, culminated in the need to embark on legal action? Whereas, for others, legal 
action was overlooked, dismissed or avoided? Was litigation pursued by those who had 
greater faith and belief in the utility of law? Or was litigation the final, last resort, when 
prisoners felt they had no other choice but to resort to legal proceedings? What did prisoners 
hope to achieve by resorting to litigation? There are a whole host of ancillary questions which 
can help us understand individuals’ engagement with, and use of, the law. These questions 
cannot be answered by case law alone.  
 
Whilst case law offers the opportunity to understand law in the context of litigation, it is not 
the mechanism (and nor was it ever intended to be) through which broader subjective and 
sociological questions can be explored. Moreover, through case law, individual experiences 
become reframed as human rights violations and procedural injustices. The substance of the 
experience becomes lost in a rhetoric and language of law, and becomes contingent on 
resources, time-limits and procedural obligations, all imposed by the law in order to engage 
with the law. Accordingly, case law speaks to the transcendental nature of law in the books, 
one which is removed from the daily experiences of law in action (Armstrong, 2020; Silbey, 
2005). 
4. The bridge 
 
This division, between ‘law in the books’ and ‘law in action’, touched upon by Silbey (2005) 
is, in the main, a product of the disciplinary fissure between legal and criminological research 
(the latter deploying broader sociological principles). On the one hand, lawyers have 
																																																								
33 Importantly, judgments from the higher courts bind decision-makers in the lower courts. Their principles 
(ratios) will be followed by lower courts and therefore will be influential in our common law system. As such, 
the reported cases are helpful in providing insights into the approaches of senior courts, their legal analysis and 
legal precedent, which should be followed by lower tier courts. 
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produced textbooks on prison law (Creighton & Arnott, 2009; Livingstone et al., 2003), 
analyses of legal frameworks and historic case law decisions (Kerr, 2015; Parkes, 2017; 
Polizzi, 2017) and explored the relationship between segregation and human rights 
frameworks (Coppola, 2019; Scharff-Smith, 2006b; Shalev, 2008, 2011), as well as broader 
principles of prisoners’ rights (Crawford, 1971; Easton, 2013; Lazarus, 2004; van Zyl Smit, 
2010). They approached their inquiries through a strict legal lens, analysing case law and 
legal instruments but with little empirical qualitative research.  
 
In contrast, criminologists have grounded their prison research in empirical investigations, to 
consider wide-ranging cultural issues. Prisons research, generally, has explored the character 
and behaviour of prison officers (Liebling, 2000; Liebling, Price, & Shefer, 2011); 
institutional culture (Liebling, 2004; Liebling, 2007; Liebling, 2016; Liebling & Kant, 2018); 
prison monitoring bodies, like the Independent Monitoring Board (Padfield, 2017; Rogan, 
2019); and the exercise of power  (Crewe, 2007, 2009; Scott, 2006) and discretion (Liebling, 
2000; Padfield & Gelsthorpe, 2013). Insofar as segregation is concerned, researchers have 
been more narrowly focused on understanding the impact of segregation practices in the 
United States of America, 34  Canada, 35  Denmark 36  and, to a lesser extent, the United 
Kingdom.37 The majority of the studies sought to understand the experience of prisoners in 
segregation conditions, particularly its psychological impact, as well as its influence on 
subsequent institutional violence or reoffending rates. The sociological studies provided first-
hand accounts of segregation and invited us into the lives and societies of the participants 
involved. However, in a similar manner to the partisan accounts offered by legal scholarship, 
which often neglected the lived experience and realities of segregation units, research studies 
from the social sciences largely neglected law.38 This was a disappointing omission. Legal 
principles were often in the background, ever present, but received less attention. Shalev and 
Edgar (2015), in one of the few studies of segregation from England and Wales, attempted to 
reconcile this division, in their analysis of the legal foundations of segregation, and their 
exploration of how segregation practices were used and experienced. Their report culminated 
in a number of best practice recommendations. Their study achieved breadth: they visited 
																																																								
34 See Butler et al. (2017); Hagan et al. (2017); Jones (1986); Kaba et al. (2014); Korn (1988); Lanes (2009); 
Lanes (2011); Mears and Bales (2009); Medrano et al. (2017); Miller (1994); Miller and Young (1997); Morris 
(2016); O Keefe et al. (2010); O'Keefe (2007). 
35 See Motiuk and Blanchette (2001); Zinger, Wichmann, and Andrews (2001). 
36 See Andersen, Sestoft, Lillebaek, Gabrielsen, and Hemmingsen (2003); Andersen et al. (2000); Andersen, 
Sestoft, Lillebæk, Gabrielsen, and Kramp (1996). 
37 See Coid et al. (2003a, 2003b).  
38 This division was also identified by Whitty and Murphy (2007a, pp. 798-801) who argue that there is little 
overlap between criminologists and lawyers, particularly in the concepts of risks (which permeates 
criminological thinking in prisons) and human rights (a preoccupation of lawyers).  
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fourteen segregation units and interviewed fifty segregation prisoners and forty-nine prison 
officers. However, the depth of the study was limited by the type of prisons they attended – 
only two high security prisons – and the limited time spent at each prison site (only three 
days). The findings, whilst informative, prioritise breadth at the expense of depth.  
 
The separation of law and criminology means our understanding of segregation (and prison 
more broadly) is incomplete, only understood through the distinct lens of each discipline. This 
disconnect partly reflects the ‘disciplinary boundaries’ (Murphy & Whitty, 2007a, p. 800), the 
impenetrability of law for non-lawyers, the divergence of intellectual interests, the issues 
under inquiry, and the research methods deployed. However, as this chapter (and the rest of 
the thesis) attempts to show, much can be gained from the intersection of law and criminology 
and this thesis attempts to bridge that gap. Law is a social phenomenon and therefore 
criminology, as a social science, must be able to accommodate analyses of law (and vice 
versa) (Ehrlich, 2002). Law, culture and experience are interdependent. Ideas about law, both 
conscious and unconscious, can influence how people behave, how they ascribe meaning to 
interactions and how they make sense of their social worlds (Nielsen, 2000). Understanding 
law, and its role in the Unit will in turn help us understand the use and experience of 
segregation for both prisoners and staff. As a consequence, this research embraces a socio-
legal orientation, to explore how law works in societies ‘law in action’ as opposed to ‘law in 
the books’ (Morison, 1982, p. 190), to understand the ways in which law matters (‘gap 
studies’) (Levine & Mellema, 2001, p. 172).  
 
Important for the development of socio-legal studies is the branch of inquiry known as ‘legal 
consciousness’, which explores how ordinary citizens perceive and understand law, its 
institutions and rules (Ewick & Silbey, 1998; Merry, 1985, 1990; Nielsen, 2000, p. 1058). As 
a concept, legal consciousness has gained prominence over the last thirty years. It has been 
keenly studied, debated and discussed by scholars interested in law and society (Hull, 2016, p. 
551). It has been considered in many different contexts, including legal elites (Kennedy, 
1980), poor and marginalised working class groups (Merry, 1985, 1990; Sarat, 1990), 
claimants in court  (Yngvesson, 1993), social activists (McCann, 1994; Silverstein, 1996) 
religious groups (Greenhouse, 1986) and victims of discrimination (Bumiller, 1988).  Legal 
consciousness has gained value as a concept which can help us understand the way people 
perceive, experience and use the law (Hull, 2016; Merry, 1990, p. 5). It offers, according to 
Halliday and Morgan (2013), an ‘interesting and distinctive way’ of contextualising law; it 
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departs from traditional instrumental perspectives and moves our attention towards 
understanding law’s interactive and constitutive role in society (p. 2).  
 
Legal consciousness has been defined by Merry, in her much-cited definition, as ‘the way 
people understand and use law…[it] is the way people conceive of the ‘natural’ and normal 
way of doing things, their habitual patterns of talk and action, and their common sense 
understanding of the world’ (1990, p. 5). Nielsen (2000, pp. 1058, 1059) elaborates, ‘it is [the] 
prevailing norms, everyday practices, and common ways of dealing with the law or legal 
problems’, those which have a role in ‘constructing understandings, affecting actions, and 
shaping various aspects of social life’. Importantly, as Cowan suggests, it is ‘not merely a 
state of mind. Legal consciousness is produced and revealed in what people do as well as 
what they say’ (emphasis in the original) (2004, p. 932). For legal consciousness scholars, law 
is not perceived as a natural consequence of common human conceptions of morality (natural 
law), nor as the product of formal rules and sanctions (positivists), nor solely embedded 
within the powers of the judiciary (interpretivists). Instead, law is connected to and embedded 
within social life, normative systems and social institutions. Conceived this way, law is 
subject to cultural constrains, as well as the influence of social norms. Law arises from the 
‘bottom up’; it emerges from routine, discretionary interactions among individuals, 
institutions and society more generally.  Therefore, law is part of an interactive process in 
which it can shape our understandings, influence our actions and various aspects of social life 
(Nielsen, 2000, p. 1059). 
 
Legal consciousness is traditionally associated with Ewick and Silbey’s (1998) work 
published in The Common Place of Law. They aimed to ‘trace the ways in which 
commonplace transactions and relationships’ came to assume a ‘legal character’ (p. 17).  They 
sought to demonstrate how ‘legality’ was an ‘emergent feature of social relations rather than 
an external apparatus acting upon social life’ (p. 17). They refer to the broader concept of 
‘legality’ as opposed to ‘law’. The former was intended to capture the broader frameworks, 
cultural norms, social networks and interactions which ‘bear the imprint of law’ (p. 20).  
Legality was perceived as a form of cultural practice, as an ‘emergent structure of social life 
that manifests itself in diverse places, including but not limited to formal institutional settings. 
Legality operates then, as both an interpretive framework and a set of resources with which 
and through which the social world (including that part known as law) is constituted’ (1998, 
p. 95). Conceived this way, individuals are all agents insofar as they ‘actively make law, even 
when no formal legal agent is involved’ (p.20). ‘Legality’ was therefore deployed as a term to 
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refer to the ‘meanings, sources of authority and cultural practices that are commonly 
recognised as legal, regardless of who employs them or for what purpose’ (1998, p. 22). This 
term is distinct from law in that it is distinguished from the formal laws of the constitution, 
statutes and court decisions which, for Ewick and Silbey, were too narrow a lens through 
which law could be understood.  
 
In their analysis, Ewick and Silbey (1998) reject ‘attitudinal approaches’ to law, as well as 
‘social structural’ approaches. Instead, they concentrate on ‘cultural practices’ which produce, 
shape and transmit legal consciousness. They focus on ‘schemas’ (codes and established 
patterns) and ‘resources’ (the full range of human resources, anything from knowledge to 
physical strength). They argue that the relationship between both schemas and resources 
underscores variations in social power and agency (p. xii), and produces three typologies of 
legal consciousness (‘before’, ‘with’ and ‘against’ the law).  
 
Participants were ‘before the law’, when they expressed ‘loyalty and acceptance of legal 
constructions’, convinced of the legitimacy of formal laws, awed by their majesty, and held a 
belief that formal legal procedures would produce just and appropriate outcomes (p. 47). This 
group positioned formal law as external to everyday life. When they encountered the law, 
whether it be through an interaction with a police officer, being audited by the tax authorities, 
or serving on a jury, it constituted a disruption to their ordinary lives (p. 77).  
 
Those ‘with the law’, described law as a game, an arena in which existing rules can be 
deployed and new rules invented ‘to serve the widest range of interests and values’ (p. 48). 
These participants perceived law as a tool ‘putting it to their own ends’ (p. 131), which could 
be used to gain strategic advantages; wielded to purse their own self-interests. Respondents 
accepted formal legal constructions and procedures, but only insofar as they related to their 
own personal objectives and situations. Individuals were less concerned about the legitimacy 
of legal procedures and more concerned about the effectiveness of law for achieving their 
own desires (p. 48).  
 
Those ‘against the law’ revealed a sense of ‘being caught within the law, or being up against 
the law’ (p. 48). Participants in this group described legality as a net in which they were 
trapped, one from which they sought freedom (p. 184). The schemas and resources were 
perceived as overriding their individual capacity to maintain distance from formal legal rules 
(p. 49). Legal rules were ‘palpably present’, limiting movement, curtailing choices, meaning 
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and action (p. 184). Within this group, participants described much resistance towards legal 
rules and processes. Their narratives revealed forms of practical opposition – acts of defiance 
and disruption – sometimes in the form of delays and foot dragging. However, participants 
also described opposition in the form of silences, refusals and absences – resistance did not 
always require overt action (p. 188). This group identified a self-defining and arbitrary power 
of the law and were particularly critical of the unrestrained power of legal actors such as the 
judiciary, police, and public officials (p. 190). For this group of individuals, engagement with 
formal laws and legal actors was to be avoided. The law was perceived as capricious, a 
product of arbitrary power, and therefore dangerous to invoke (p. 192). For those who could 
not avoid legal encounters, they were accepted with a resignation and deference (p. 194).  
 
Ewick and Silbey’s legal consciousness framework has not been without its critics. For 
example, Nielsen (2000) and McCann (1999) criticised Ewick and Silbey’s typologies for 
overlooking the importance of social status. Nielsen (2000) suggested that members of 
marginalised or disenfranchised groups would more likely be ‘against the law’ and employ 
variable methods to ‘resist’ the law. However, Ewick and Silbey failed to acknowledge the 
impact of such variable social status. Nielsen (2000) also suggested that Ewick and Silbey 
took for granted the numerous problems and contexts in which ‘legal consciousness’ arises. 
There was homogeneity to their case examples, which failed to adequately consider how 
one’s experience with law may translate across into other areas of law, which involve 
different issues, institutions and individual actors (Nielsen, 2000). Moreover, their concept of 
‘legal consciousness’, which conceives law as embedded within society, rather than as 
external and autonomous from it, was also criticised by Mezey (2001). For Mezey (2001), 
their work revealed both the ‘strengths’ and ‘shortcomings’ (p. 145) of legal consciousness as 
an intellectual influence. Ewick and Silbey theorise that law is paradoxical: law is both 
‘constituting and being constituted by social relations and cultural practices’ (Mezey, 2001, p. 
148). Law exists through the formal invocations of law, legal concepts and terminology as 
well as through its informal (and extra-legal) associations with social structures: it becomes 
constituted through everyday actions and practices (Ewick & Silbey, 1998, p. 43). This 
analysis therefore positions law as ‘everywhere, so much so that it is nowhere’ (Mezey, 2001, 
p. 153). The ‘law’ becomes lost in this constitutive approach: ‘once law is reconceptualised as 
all forms of power and authority, legal consciousness is no longer meaningfully legal’ 
(Mezey, 2001, p. 165). In a similar manner, Levine and Mellema (2001) suggest that Ewick 
and Silbey falter in their assumption of the permeation of law in every day life; that Ewick 
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and Silbey artificially transplant law into everyday interactions, ones which have little to do 
with law.  
 
It is clear that a balance needs to be struck. There will undoubtedly be instances in which law 
is more present, and its impact felt directly. The prison institution is a good example of this. 
Departing from the critiques of Levine and Mellema’s (2001) and Mezey (2001), prison is a 
place in which law is everywhere. There is a complex framework of prison rules, processes 
and procedures which govern the daily lives of prisoners. Formal legal rules function to 
control, constrain and inhibit behaviour (of both staff and prisoners). Albeit there are also 
complex non-legal rules, complicated social relations and cultural practices (as Ewick and 
Silbey would suggest) which constrain, reimagine and mould the influence and function of 
law in this environment.39 In fact, during fieldwork, I observed how much of the way law 
functioned, and was understood, was embedded within the prison institution and its individual 
actors. It became apparent that law could not be understood simply as a system of formal rules 
and processes, nor could it be conceived purely as the product of judicial interpretation. The 
‘law’ was a fluid construction. Sometimes it functioned as a system of rules, those contained 
in legislation and PSOs/PSIs, which were enforced by prison staff. At other times, the law 
was subordinated below established cultural norms and customs (see Chapter Five). Staff 
culture, and their exercise of discretion, was sometimes more relevant for shaping the ‘lived 
experience’ of prisoners, rather than strict legal processes. Accordingly, the value of a socio-
legal approach, and more specifically legal consciousness, lies in bridging the gap between 
the pragmatism associated with law in action and the transcendental nature of law in the 
books (Silbey, 2005). As Silbey asserts, legal consciousness is a mechanism through which 
the ‘mutually constitutive relationship between these two’ can be examined (p. 359). As a 
research tradition, legal consciousness helps us understand how institutions can create cultural 
meaning, social norms, influence individual behaviour and perceptions. It allows us to explore 
how law might affect relationships, values and shape people’s understanding of their ‘social 
reality’(Cotterrell, 1998, p. 182). Thus, there is substantial value to legal consciousness, as a 
framework of analysis, and a theory to which I return in Chapter Six.		
	
																																																								
39 Emphasis is placed on the environment; prisons, as institutions, are complex and unique. They are criminal 
justice institutions, given life and authority through the law. It is only to be expected that the law would, on the 
surface, be prominent. Although, as the rest of this thesis demonstrates, there are other factors (staff culture, 
staff-prisoner relationships, prisoners’ perceptions and understanding of the law) which all influence the extent 




This chapter sought to explore the legal framework which applies to segregation in prisons. 
However, it became clear that there is no neat, tidy, legal framework. Instead, there is a 
complex and fragmented web of legal and non-legal rules which govern the use of 
segregation. This chapter also analysed the ways in which segregation has been challenged in 
the English courts. The broader socio-political context is important: changes to legal aid had a 
substantial impact on the volume of prison law cases. Legal funding and resources have a 
substantial impact on when, how and why prisoners resort to litigation; and this represents one 
of the barriers, or limits, to the rule of law. Limited legal funding is a hindrance to the 
adequacy of the ‘means’ provided for the resolution of disputes (rule of law principle v). The 
public funding arrangements, discussed above, meant that fewer people had access to legal 
advice and representation and, by implication, fewer prisoners would have been able to access 
the courts to resolve their segregation complaints.   
 
Moreover, the case law review importantly identified the common legal complaints associated 
with segregation. Legal complaints concerning the conditions and experience of segregation – 
substantive justice type complaints, grounded in Article 3 – often failed. In contrast, process 
complaints – procedural justice ones – had greater chances of success. I argued that this 
reflects the orientation of the English courts and their preference for procedural justice. 
Importantly, it represents another limitation to the reach of law. To succeed, prisoners will 
need to recast their complaints as procedural failures. In doing so, the law fails to legitimate 
their claims: their lived experiences are denied, their realities are lost and the extent of their 
suffering is overlooked. Prisoners’ rights were narrowly construed: notably, they were 
constrained by the behaviour of the individual but also by the very fact of imprisonment (and 
its preoccupation with risk, security and control). I suggested that the courts were overly 
deferential towards prison authorities, they were especially cynical of prisoners and 
overlooked the ways in which imprisonment, itself, contributed towards prisoners’ risks and 
violence. In this context, the law may not be an adequate mechanism for protecting human 
rights, as required by ‘rule of law’ principle iv.  
 
The case law review also revealed how litigation may, at times, result in unforeseen (and 
unintended) consequences. I relied on Bourgass to show how court decisions may not always 
translate into progressive changes in law. Bourgass proffers a warning: prison litigation can 
be politicised and one cannot be too sure of its outcome.  
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Whilst the case law review was important and informative, it only offers a partial 
understanding of segregation. Case law helps us explore how legal rules are interpreted and 
applied by the courts, but cannot provide insights into how rules (both legal and non-legal) 
mould practices, culture and experiences in the Unit. Therefore, in the final part of the 
chapter, I made the case for a socio-legal research study, one which considers the relationship 
between law, rules and experiences. I hoped to demonstrate how there is more to the 
experience of segregation than legal commentary, or sociological empiricism, can reveal in 
isolation. I highlighted the value of legal consciousness as a means for understanding the 
broader context in which our perspectives on, and engagement with, law takes place. This is 
where this research becomes valuable. By adopting a multi-disciplinary approach, I was able 
to explore how law ‘works’ in the segregation unit and how it might impact decision-making, 
operations (like the daily regime) and individual perspectives in the Unit. In the following 
chapters, I consider how legal and non-legal rules can be instrumental in shaping the 
experiences of staff and prisoners; how they can influence decisions and practices (Chapter 
Four); interact with culture (Chapter Five); and influence perspectives on the utility of law in 




Chapter Three – Methods: At the Margins, Without Trust and the 
Fragmented Self 
 
Little Alice fell down 
the hole, 
bumped her head 
and bruised her soul.40 
 
It may seem odd to begin a methods chapter with a quote from Alice in Wonderland but it is a 
quote to which I have returned throughout this research. It was prompted by the words of one 
participant, who said ‘you’re like Alice in Wonderland here, how can you ever understand my 
world?’. He is right, to a degree, and I have reflected on the extent to which I am able to 
understand ‘his world’; how any such understanding is shaped by my race, my gender, my 
experiences and my ideological beliefs; and how it is influenced by the narratives I assign to 
the stories I am told. Like Alice, I entered a world of unfamiliarity, where I discovered trust 
was a precious commodity. It was an environment where acting on intuition and developing 
relationships was crucial. Importantly, I entered with a choice. I chose to do this study 
because of my concerns about the use of segregation in prison. Segregation units have 
historically been sites of abuse, where power has been exploited and prisoners mistreated. 
They also have the potential to inflict real harm on those confined within (Gendreau & Bonta, 
1984; Jackson, 1983; Scharff-Smith, 2006b); and are a part of the prison where self-harm and 
suicide occur at disproportionate rates (Kaba et al., 2014; Toch & Kupers, 2007). As a lawyer, 
I found myself asking how can abuse happen? Why do complaints of torture, inhuman or 
degrading treatment arise in segregation units?41 Why are there such high incidents of 
violence, self-harm and suicide? And what is the law achieving in these units, if not 
constraining harm?  
 
When I embarked on the PhD I was sceptical about the utility of segregation. The scepticism 
remained during fieldwork, although I gained a better appreciation of the complexities of the 
Unit: its contrasting functions; the difficult experiences of staff and prisoners; and the broader 
social, political and economic environment in which it functioned. Whilst those views were 
																																																								
40 These words have been attributed to Lewis Carroll, however, the original source is unknown. The words did 
not feature in Lewis Carroll’s ‘Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland’ (1865) but were inspired by Alice’s 
reflections: ‘I almost wish I hadn’t gone down that rabbit-hole – and yet – and yet – it’s rather curious’ (p. 27). 
41 A number of human rights complaints have been made by prisoners in segregation units. See R (Bary) v 
Secretary of State for Justice [2010] EWHC 587 (Admin), R (AB) v Secretary of State for Justice [2019] EWCA 
9 and R (Bourgass and another) (Appellants) v Secretary of State for Justice (Respondent) (2015) UKSC 54.  
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shaped, challenged and tempered during fieldwork, they raise important questions about the 
extent to which we, as researchers, can ever truly be neutral in our research. As Liebling 
reflected ‘personal and political sympathies contaminate (or less judgmentally, inform) our 
research. But do they distort it?’ (2001c, p. 472). I kept the question of distortion in mind 
during my research, and particularly my fieldwork. I intended to undertake my research in an 
impartial manner – as an objective observer – but this was not always easy. The research was 
contingent on relationships. It was so very human. I was asking people to reveal their most 
vulnerable selves, to allow me access into their worlds, through their stories and experiences. 
It demanded a level of openness and trust – both of me and from me – which was not always 
easily reconcilable with the role of bounded researcher.  
 
In the first part of this chapter, I outline the research design, research site, and the methods. 
The second part follows with a discussion focused on the main challenges of researching two 
polarised groups – staff and prisoners. I worked at the margins of both their worlds. As such, I 
faced difficulties with: (i) maintaining trust and navigating suspicion; (ii) truly understanding 
their worlds; (iii) retaining my sense of ‘self’; and (iv) grappling with the ethnographic 
loneliness which ensued as a result.  
1. Research design 
 
My research design was, in large part, influenced by my preference for socio-legal methods, 
the benefits of which I explored in Chapter Two. Socio-legal research offers the lens through 
which the lived experiences of law can be understood. It prioritises empirical research and 
emphasises the value of first-hand accounts and observational research methods. I hoped to 
use empirical methods to bridge the gap, as identified in Chapter Two, between law in the 
books and law in reality. I also hoped to synthesise criminology and law – to bring ideas, 
methods and understanding from the former, to the latter, and vice versa. I hoped to 
understand how law functioned in segregation units, what it achieved (and perhaps failed at), 
whether it influenced the use of segregation and the experiences of those within. To best 
achieve this, I adopted an ethnographic approach, which I deemed to be the most appropriate 
method for understanding the lived experiences of the participants, through their stories and 
narratives.  
 
Ethnography, at its most basic, is about understanding the way people make sense of their 
world, to ‘generate intellectual insight’ (Liebling, 2001c, p. 475). It has special value in 
understanding societies and cultures, as well as the discovery and remaking of realities 
 55 
(Liebling, 2001c, p. 475). Fieldwork is the foundation of ethnography, which broadly includes 
observation, participation and interviews (Wolcott, 2008, p. 44). Ethnography is both a way of 
looking and a way of seeing. Through participant observation, and a presence in the field, we 
can experience, enquire and examine the worlds of our participants (Wolcott, 2008, p. 48). 
We are effectively ‘living one’s way’ into an environment and its culture (Wolcott, 2008, p. 
45). Our experience is largely influenced by what we hear and what we see, but also through 
less tangible observations, such as body language, smell and our own intuition (Troman, 
Jeffrey, & Walford, 2005). We can enquire into the lives and experiences of participants, by 
taking an active role in asking questions, rather than simply being a passive observer. 
However, enquiring creates a dilemma: how far do we intrude into the field, to ask questions, 
and therefore risk influencing the behaviour and responses of participants? Is it better to 
remain silent and hope that some phenomenon will be revealed in a naturally occurring way? 
(Wolcott, 2008, p. 49). I grappled with these questions throughout fieldwork. I chose to be 
inquisitive, and asked questions, but I tried to frame them in ways which were open-ended, 
neutral and not leading. However, there were times, as explained below when I intervened in 
the field and felt my role shifted beyond being a passive observer to become an active 
participant. The third element, for Wolcott, is the examination of environments, documents 
and behaviours. Taken together, experiencing, enquiring and examining, allow us to gain 
holistic insights into the people and the places they inhabit.  
 
Ethnographic research is interactive. It is valuable not because it necessarily guarantees 
certain knowledge but because it brings us ‘into direct dialogue with others’, allowing us to 
explore knowledge as a shared experience, exchanging ideas and finding common ground 
(Jackson, 1996, p. 8). As a method, it emphasises the role of the researcher, who is the 
primary research instrument. As such ‘our social gumption and social skills, as much as our 
scientific methodology, become [the] measures of the limits and value of our understanding’ 
(Jackson, 1996, p. 8). I was acutely aware of my role in the research and how I – through the 
questions I asked, the places I went, the people I spoke to and the way I interpreted the 
experiences – would shape the research. It was therefore important to maintain a level of 
neutrality and open-mindedness in the research; something which I deemed best achieved by 
becoming appreciatively informed (‘Appreciative Inquiry’; see below) about the participants 
and the site during fieldwork.   
 
Appreciative Inquiry focuses on the ideas people have about what matters to them most. It 
allows for broader conversations about – and a more neutral ‘appreciation’ of – experiences. It 
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can facilitate the exploration of the full range of accounts, emotions and experiences of 
individuals (Liebling, 2015a, p. 253). It avoids some of the pitfalls of existing research by 
framing questions in a generative or positive way (Ludema, Cooperrider, & Barrett, 2001), 
rather than focusing exclusively on the problems or negative aspects of segregation, which 
some researchers have tended to do (Grassian, 2006; Haney, 2003; Jackson, 1983; Reiter, 
2016). Appreciative inquiry avoids starting from a wholly critical perspective and therefore 
looks beyond the failures, limitations and detriments, to fully explore the complex nature of 
segregation (Liebling, 2001b). After all, experiences of segregation are not universally 
negative (O'Keefe et al., 2013; O’Donnell, 2014).  
 
We know from existing research (Elliott, Liebling, & Arnold, 2001; Liebling, 2001b, 2015a) 
that Appreciative Inquiry can be useful in prison to move conversations beyond negative 
descriptions, starting from a process of building on ‘what is best’ rather than what is failing 
(Reed, 2007). It can provide a more balanced approach by: (i) adopting an engaged rather than 
a disengaged stance, founded in the active input of those involved in the study; (ii) bringing 
people together from different backgrounds and levels within an institution, to share and 
explore their experiences; (iii) focusing on the stories and language that people use to express 
their ideas and experiences (Reed, 2007). I therefore hoped that appreciatively informed 
findings would reveal more about the segregation unit than the ‘single (and partially sighted) 
preoccupation with failure’ (Liebling, 2015a, p. 264).  
 
There was an additional benefit to adopting an appreciatively informed perspective. Certain 
gatekeepers to the research – senior individuals within HMPPS, as well as the Senior 
Management team (‘SMT’) and Governing Governor of HMP Whitemoor – were exploring 
alternatives to segregation and avenues for reform. There was a policy agenda which aligned 
with my research, which sought constructive suggestions, rather than a reiteration of the old 
criticisms of segregation. Appreciative Inquiry was therefore an important tool for 
understanding what worked, and what required improvement, and this aligned particularly 
well with the agendas of certain decision-makers within HMPPS. Most notably, I had the 
support of Richard Vince, the Executive Director of the LTHSE in HMPPS. Richard had 
aspirations of creating a ‘new norm’ in segregation. He voiced his proposals in the Perrie 
Lectures in 2017, later published in a special edition of the Prison Service Journal: Can Any 
Good Come of Segregation? He articulated an aspiration to reduce the ‘over reliance on 
segregation’ (2018, p. 26) and suggested that bespoke actions, alternative locations on the 
wing, smaller discrete units, and the training of staff, could all be reviewed and updated to 
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allow for a more considered use of segregation. His ambitions were clear: ‘can we aspire to a 
future that concentrates not on punishment and compliance but integration based on meaning, 
purpose and hope?’ (Vince, 2018, p. 26). This context was important for granting me access 
to HMP Whitemoor. The support of Richard Vince meant, by extension, I had the support of 
the Governing Governor (Will Styles at the time) and, in turn, the SMT. For some members of 
the SMT, the study presented hope and was a chance to confront the culture of segregation:  
 
I’d like to see your completed project because hopefully you’ll get some insights into what 
might work and what might not work because we are tearing our hair out… to make the seg an 
exception rather than a go to area for prisoners.  
 
This support undoubtedly allowed me to obtain privileged access. I was given the keys to the 
prison, both in a literal and metaphorical sense. I had the keys (physically) to explore the 
prison, to come and go, and was relatively unrestricted. Moreover, having the trust and 
support of the Governing Governor42 meant my presence had an element of legitimacy and I 
was able to ask my questions (sometimes personal, sometimes probing), bring in my 
dictaphone and make notes without hindrance – in theory at least. I return to this in the latter 
part of the chapter. For now, it is enough to mention that this support – although in many 
ways beneficial – was not without its problems.  It raised questions for staff and prisoners 
about my allegiance and my impartiality: was I acting for the Prison Service? Was my 
independence compromised? Was I a conduit for other people’s agendas?  
2. Research questions 
 
I started the study with one main research question in mind: What is the function and impact 
of law in segregation units? Within this question, I considered: 
 
a) How is segregation used and why? 
b) How is segregation experienced? 
c) How, if at all, does the law impact that use and experience? 
																																																								
42 With thanks to my supervisor, Alison Liebling, for helping cultivate this support. Her reputation and previous 
work at HMP Whitemoor, along with her introductions to the Governor, were instrumental in fostering trust and 
confidence from the SMT.  
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3. The site 
HMP Whitemoor  
 
HMP Whitemoor opened in 1991. It is one of eight men’s prisons in the LTHSE. It holds 
Category A (including high risk Category A) and Category B offenders, and has an 
operational capacity of 458. During fieldwork, prison occupancy remained close to this. For 
example, on the 8th May 2019, there were 453 prisoners, comprising 14 High Risk Category 
A, 132 Category A and 307 Category B offenders.  
 
Whitemoor is situated outside March, a Fenland town in Cambridgeshire. Whitemoor has 
three wings, A, B and C, each with three spurs, and approximately 40 men on each spur. One 
spur, on A wing, was a Psychologically Informed Planned Environment (PIPE). There was a 
fourth wing, D Wing, which was a Dangerous and Severe Personality Disorder Unit with 
capacity for 70 prisoners. There was also a CSC (capacity up to 10), a segregation unit 
(capacity of 30) and a healthcare wing (capacity of 7). All prisoners were accommodated in 
single cells with integrated sanitation facilities but showers were separate.  
 
Whitemoor has a turbulent history. In September 1994, six Category A prisoners briefly 
escaped from Whitemoor’s Special Security Unit (‘SSU’) (five IRA members and one with an 
armed robbery conviction). Two of the men had pistols which had been smuggled into the 
prison and subsequent searches revealed one pound of semtex, fuses and three detonators 
concealed in a prisoner’s paint box (Barker, 1998; Woodcock, 1994, p. 3). The escapees were 
recaptured a short distance from the prison, but one prison officer was shot and wounded 
during the escape.  
 
The escapes attracted substantial attention: ‘the media, prison management, the Government 
and the public all demanded to know how such an outrage could have happened, and in 
particular at a flagship top-security prison’ (Woodcock, 1994, p. 2). There was an urgent 
inquiry, led by Sir John Woodcock (1994), intended to investigate the escapes and prevent 
any reoccurrence. The escapes were particularly inexcusable for Whitemoor, which was a 
‘new and high tech prison’ and ‘virtually escape proof’ (Woodcock, 1994, p. 1). Woodcock 
criticised Whitemoor for numerous failings: that prisoners in the SSU could not be observed – 
officer views were obscured by curtains hung by prisoners (p. 23); insufficient use of CCTV – 
staff were reluctant to reposition the CCTV because ‘prisoners apparently did not like it’ (p. 
54) and ‘played up’ for the cameras (p. 56); inadequate searching processes (of both staff and 
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visitors); poor management of the visitation process – prisoners and visitors were left alone, 
unmonitored, in visit rooms and prisoners could take all property received during their visit 
back to their cells, unchecked (p. 44); staff did not accompany prisoners out to the yard (p. 
56); prisoners had excessive amounts of personal property (p. 64); and staff would go 
shopping for prisoners in the SSU, to obtain food items from Peterborough and King’s Lynn 
(some 20 and 25 miles away), which caused particular tensions in the prison and gave rise to 
the impression, held by staff, that the prisoners in the SSU controlled the regime (p. 65). 
These practices were a far cry from the Whitemoor I observed during fieldwork. The security 
breach went to the heart of Whitemoor, it was woven into the fabric of the prison (see 
Liebling, 2000, p. 340; Liebling & Price, 1998), and a number of interviewees mentioned the 
escapes, without prompting, even those who were far too young to bear witness.  
 
The escapes at Whitemoor form an important part of the institution’s memory and its identity. 
The Woodcock report made 62 recommendations. It set out prescriptive procedures for 
searching staff and prisoners, called for more dog patrols and the increased use of CCTV. 
Nearly all were implemented at Whitemoor and signalled a significant change for the 
institution (Drake, 2011, p. 374; Resodihardjo, 2009). The escapes were also the catalyst for a 
new era in prison administration, heralded as ‘defining moments in the Prison Service’ 
(Drake, 2011, p. 372; Sparks, 2000) the consequences of which sparked ‘one of the most 
dramatic transformations of the inner life of prisons witnessed to date’ (Liebling, 2008, p. 28). 
As Drake describes, the escapes were ‘attributed to the ‘liberal’ and ‘permissive’ dispersal 
prison policy’ (2011, p. 373). They provided the impetus to move away from the more liberal 
parts of prison management, towards more punitive policies (Dunbar & Langdon, 1998; King, 
2010), ones marked by ‘penal and security discourses’ (Drake, 2011, p. 372), with a focus on 
‘decent but austere’ prison conditions and practices (Liebling, 2008, p. 28). The new approach 
– securitisation of the prison – saw a  ‘harshening of the emotional tone of penal policy’ 
where there was a ‘deepening of the prison experience – so that prisoners felt the depth, 
weight, or psychological burden of prison life more acutely’ (Liebling, 2008, p. 28). 
 
The changing of the penal tide had a long-lasting impact at HMP Whitemoor. Most notable 
was the effect on staff-prisoner relationships. In 2008, Anne Owers, then HM Chief Inspector 
of Prisons (‘HMCIP’), reported that staff-prisoner relationships were ‘distant and distrustful’ 
and a fundamental problem (2008, p. 6). She raised concerns, particularly for Muslim 
prisoners: ‘staff appeared to have little idea of, and …given no support in, how to relate to this 
group, except as suspected national security risks or extremists – even though only 8 of the 
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120 Muslims had been convicted of terrorist offences’ (2008, p. 5). The inspection ‘charted a 
growing disaffection and distances between those [Muslim] prisoners and the prison system: a 
gap which urgently needs to be abridged’ (2008, p. 6). The findings of HMCIP were echoed 
in Liebling, Arnold and Straub’s (2011) second study in which they revisited Whitemoor in 
2009-10. Like HMCIP, they found staff-prisoner relationships were generally distant and 
were characterised by low levels of trust and high levels of suspicion (p. ii–iii). Staff were less 
confident and less ‘professional’ than in the earlier study, and were especially hesitant in 
building relationships, and policing the boundaries, with Muslim prisoners (p. iii). These 
issues remained a prominent feature of Whitemoor, with similar findings reported by 
subsequent Inspectorate visits and IMB reports (IMB, 2014; IMB, 2018; HMCIP, 2011). All 
criticised Whitemoor for its high proportion of prisoners who reported feeling unsafe (60%), 
which was ‘significantly more than in other high security prisons’ (HMCIP, 2011, p. 6). 
HMCIP and the IMB have routinely expressed concerns about the discriminatory practices, 
racist incidents and the tensions between Muslim and non-Muslim prisoners. The impact of 
staff–prisoner relationships, and the divisions between certain groups of prisoners, was also 
felt in the Unit. Although not a focus of this study, a striking number of participants were in 
the segregation unit to avoid the broader ‘Muslim dynamics’ on the wing (see Chapter Four). 
The segregation unit 
 
Prisons are, at times, an impenetrable part of our criminal justice system, and this is even 
more pronounced in the segregation unit, which is the ‘deepest’ part of the prison. Conceived 
this way, it is a part of the prison which is both physically and metaphorically distant from the 
outside world (Crewe, 2015, p. 54). It is where authority is wielded to achieve upmost 
security and control, where practices are oppressive and psychologically invasive, where 
freedoms and bodily autonomy are the most restricted (Crewe, 2011, p. 521).  
	
The segregation unit is a separate and distinct unit in HMP Whitemoor. It had, at the time of 
my research, capacity for 30 prisoners although the occupancy fluctuated between 25 and 30 
whilst I was there.43 The Unit had its own facilities: a small kitchen,44 three phone booths, five 
																																																								
43 During fieldwork, the Unit was in a state of transition. Part of the Unit was being repurposed to become ‘The 
Bridge’, a special unit designed to support prisoners progressing out of segregated conditions and back to the 
main wings. The Bridge opened in April 2019 with six prisoners, and had capacity for 12 prisoners. Prisoners in 
the Bridge had greater association and could be out of their cells. The Bridge caused a few challenges for staff. 
For example, staff had to take prisoners from the Unit through the Bridge to access the yards, meaning all 
prisoners in the Bridge had to be locked up during this movement. Also, there were undercurrents of animosity 
towards the staff members who moved from the Unit to the Bridge: they were perceived as abandoning the Unit 
(Fieldwork notes, p. 91).  
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showers and exercise yards (five yards at the back, divided by metal mesh, and two at the side 
of the Unit). It also had a meeting room used for adjudications, reviews, and staff briefings. 
There was a room colloquially known as the ‘Bubble’. The Bubble was divided into two 
smaller rooms, separated by Perspex glass. The prisoner would be taken in first and locked 
into one part, ready for meetings with individuals from psychology, education and offender 
management. The majority of my interviews took place in the Bubble.  
 
The main office was in the centre of the Unit (‘Centre Office’) – where staff congregated and 
where the cell bells would ring. There was a glass window which looked out from the Centre 
Office to the landing of the Unit, and it had the message #Segboys4life written on the 
window. Staff also had their private space – the staff room – where they would eat lunch, play 
video games and take their breaks. The staff room was adorned with crude and explicit 
images, some poking fun at staff members, others at prisoners. It was described by one 
member of staff as the ‘wall of shame’ (Fieldwork notes, p. 59). 
  
The Unit spanned two levels. It was painted yellow but paint was peeling from the walls and 
corridors were often dirty, with food scraps, tissue paper, broken furniture, shredded clothes 
and general rubbish on the floor. The ceiling had large vented windows which staff tended to 
keep open. Whilst it meant the Unit felt very cold, it had an important function when 
prisoners were on dirty protest: allowing air to circulate. The Unit felt cold in more ways than 
one. It felt punitive and austere. Other parts of the prison had fresher paint, large colourful 
prints on the wall, whereas the Unit was bare.    
 
The Unit had a number of special cells. There were two cells which the staff called ‘the Box’, 
appropriately named because they were, quite literally, concrete boxes. They had a basic 
interior, without a bed, furnishings, toilet or window. There was a concrete slab on which 
prisoners could sleep and a cardboard bedpan. There was a small circular observation panel in 
the side and one in the ceiling (Fieldwork notes, p. 56). There were two ‘dry cells’ which had 
a bed but no toilet or sink. They were designed for prisoners who were in possession of 
contraband (e.g. a mobile phone) and intended to prevent items being flushed away. There 
was one ‘gated cell’ which had a Perspex front, allowing officers a view into the cell at all 
times. This was used for prisoners on suicide watch. It had a bed, with ligature proof bedding, 
																																																																																																																																																																													
44 The kitchen was staffed by a prisoner from the wing and one member of staff. Some prisoners could come out 
of their cells to collect their meals. However, this was not a consistent practice: it depended on the behaviour of 
the prisoner, the number of staff available and whether the regime (i.e. showers, phonecalls, yard time etc) was 
running on time. If the regime was delayed, there was no time for prisoners to collect their own meals. 		
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but nothing else. It had two CSC cells, for prisoners subject to the Rule 46 prison regime.45 
These cells had flaps through which food could be passed. Staff did not need to open the door 
for these prisoners.   
 
Ordinary cells in the Unit were 8 x 6 feet. They had a sink, a toilet and a window. During 
fieldwork, the windows were being upgraded to ‘safer custody windows’. Some of the cells 
with older style windows were unable to close and therefore very cold. One participant had 
placed paper over the window to keep the wind and snow out (Fieldwork notes, p. 75). The 
older windows had metal cages on the outside but, as a member of staff described, prisoners 
were able to swing lines of string, with contraband, between the windows (Fieldwork notes, p 
26). Prisoners had also, in the past, made weapons by tearing off the metal bars. The new 
windows had no metal cage and could only open a small way. They were designed to prevent 
the passing of objects and to remove ligature points. The new windows kept the heat in better 
during winter but, on warmer days, they were stifling. 
 
The cells had a bed, a cupboard, a nightstand and a kettle. Some prisoners were innovative – 
one participant showed me how to make scrambled eggs, mushrooms and baked beans in his 
kettle. Some cells had electric sockets, whilst a smaller number (5 cells) did not (meaning 
they had no kettles, no radios or TVs). The extent to which prisoners were allowed a radio, 
stereo, television or games console, depended on their Incentives and Earned Privilege (‘IEP’) 
status. Most prisoners, when first arriving in the Unit, were assigned the ‘basic’ status, except 
if they were transferred to the Unit from a different prison, where they would retain their pre-
transfer IEP level. ‘Basic’ prisoners were eligible for very little. Through good behaviour, 
their status could be changed to ‘standard’ or ‘enhanced’ and therefore they were entitled to 
have extra items (like a radio, TV, stereo) in their cells. IEP status also influenced the amount 
of money prisoners received through in-cell education: per session, they were eligible for 
0.28p (basic), £1.41 (standard), £1.52 (enhanced).  
 
Most prisoners had some property which they had brought from their cells on the wings, such 
as books and clothing. Officially, prisoners were only allowed two sets of clothes: the set they 
were wearing and a spare set for visits. However, in practice, some prisoners had their own 
boxers, shoes and jumpers, whereas others had to wear prison issue clothing. For staff, this 
																																																								
45 Whitemoor had a separate CSC designed to hold a small number of prisoners which, in many ways, resembled 
the Unit. However, the prisoners in the CSC were allowed supervised association, they could use the kitchen and 
take part in group activities (such as education). There were two CSC cells in the Unit, which operated on a more 
enhanced regime (access to the showers everyday and a phonecall everyday) but otherwise had little difference 
in their regime and conditions. 
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practice was an inconsistency in the application of the rules. For prisoners, it represented 
unfair and discriminatory practices. Prisoners did not like the idea of wearing prison issue 
boxers which they deemed unhygienic (transcript with officer (Phil) and prisoner (Billy)). 
They resented other prisoners for having additional clothing ‘privileges’. Issues with clothing 
often arose during fieldwork. Clean clothing was supposed to be provided on Tuesdays and 
Fridays, with socks and boxers every other day. However, the shortage of clothing and 
bedding in the Unit prevented staff from always adhering to these requirements (Fieldwork 
notes, p. 109).  
 
Each cell had a ‘call bell’ which prisoners could use to signal for staff attention. The bell 
would ring in the Centre Office and a staff member would answer by visiting the cell. Some 
members of staff were quick to respond, whereas others let the bell ring for 15 or 20 minutes 
(Fieldwork notes, p. 36). Each cell had an observation panel in the door, with a metal flap (on 
the staff side) to cover it. Some items of property (knife, fork, spoon, extra books, deodorant, 
razors) were hung outside the door of each cell. They were provided to prisoners when needed 
and swiftly removed when no longer required. 
 
In terms of the regime, there was a morning briefing for the staff team at 8am, every day. 
Then the ‘rounds’ would start, where a member of staff would visit every cell door and collect 
written ‘applications’. Prisoners were required to make applications for a shower, exercise or 
phone call, and to make requests for property, visits or a legal call. After the applications were 
collected, staff would then commence ‘movements’ for exercise i.e. moving prisoners to the 
yards. Usually prisoners would be given an hour outside, one in each yard. The yards were not 
covered and therefore open to the elements but often, I observed, prisoners would readily go 
outside. They reported craving fresh air, as well as the opportunity to talk to others on the 
yards, regardless of the weather (Fieldwork notes, p. 15). After exercise, staff then moved 
prisoners to the shower or for a phone call. The Unit was working to a ‘split regime’ during 
fieldwork. This meant prisoners were allowed an hour of exercise each day, but only a shower 
or phone call every other day (Fieldwork notes, p. 16).46 Prisoners had the opportunity to 
leave their cells for at least an hour each day, for exercise, but only if they chose to do so. 
Some prisoners refused exercise, their shower and their phone call and therefore remained in 
their cells for days. Lunch would be delivered to each cell between 11.15am and 12.00pm. 
																																																								
46 This regime applied to everyone except the Rule 46 prisoners who were able to have a shower, a phone call 
and exercise every day (Fieldwork notes, p. 106). One member of staff noted how ‘in an ideal world, if we had 
less prisoners, we would do that for everyone…[but] we haven’t done that in 3 or 4 years’ (Fieldwork notes, p. 
106). 
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Dinner would be provided between 4.00pm and 5.00pm. The dinner tray would include extra 
bread or cereal for breakfast the next morning. During the remainder of the day, prisoners 
would be visited by a member of the healthcare team, Chaplaincy and a governor level 
manager. These visits took place every day. A representative of the IMB visited each prisoner 
once a week and the Governing Governor, or deputy, visited every Friday.   
 
Some men passed the time with books, watching TV, listening to the radio or doing activities 
such as paint by numbers and Sudoku. Some were engaged with in cell-education (e.g. 
English or Maths work packs) and two undertook paid employment. These two prisoners were 
trusted by staff and had been in the Unit for a long time. For example, Aiden would put 
together ‘tea packs’, which contained tea bags, milk and sugar and would be distributed to 
other prisoners. Keith was paid to clean the yards, which had become littered with torn 
clothing, bedding, excrement and rubbish thrown out of the windows (Fieldwork notes, p. 
103).  
 
A prisoner’s transfer to segregation was reviewed within the first 72 hours. Segregation 
review meetings occurred every 14 days thereafter. Prisoners would be invited to the meeting 
and, typically, about half would attend.47 The meetings took place every Tuesday afternoon. 
They were chaired by a governor grade manager and attended by members from the IMB, the 
mental health team (‘MHT’), offender management team (‘OMT’), the supervising officer 
(‘SO’) and the administrative assistant from the Unit. The meetings were intended to review a 
prisoner’s health and well-being and to try to understand avenues for progression (e.g. 
referrals to other prisons and strategies for returning to the wing) (as required by PSO 1700, 
pp. 11-12). 
 
The Unit was mostly run by specific segregation staff. There was a core team of 10 officers, 
however, the Unit required 15 staff to function properly and ‘guests’ (staff from the wings) 
would be drafted in to make up numbers. Staff were required to work every other weekend, as 
well as night shifts.   
 
The Unit had a turbulent history. Concerns about the conditions and regime in the Unit were 
frequently raised in HMCIP and IMB reports,48 as well as by major media outlets. For 
																																																								
47 The numbers fluctuated between 8 and 12 (Fieldwork notes, p.3. p. 31 – 34, p. 42 - 46).  
48 The concerns of both the IMB and HMCIP, about the impoverished regime and inhumane conditions, were 
raised at least six years ago and have persisted at HMP Whitemoor. Their objections had a limited (ineffectual) 
impact on changing the standards of the Unit (see Sutherland, 2018, pp. 50, 51). 
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example, more recent HMCIP reports, (2014, 2017) found that staff-prisoner relationships on 
the wings had generally improved. However, in the Unit, relationships were described as 
especially ‘disappointing’ and HMCIP criticised the  ‘particularly poor’ regime on offer and 
the lack of care, from the prison, which did little to prevent the ‘inevitable psychological 
deterioration that results’ from segregation (2014, p. 5). These concerns were reiterated in the 
more recent, HMCIP 2017 report, which made a particularly damning assessment:  
 
At this inspection, we were still seriously concerned about some aspects of segregation. Some 
men with persistently challenging behaviour were held for long periods in the Unit and others 
who were not segregated under prison rules were refusing to relocate back to the normal 
location. Some men in the latter group had been segregated for many months. The Unit was 
full and the regime offered was poor, consisting at best of a telephone call or shower every 
other day (2017, p. 5).  
 
HMCIP also raised concerns regarding the poor, dirty conditions of the Unit: 
 
Although some communal areas in the large Unit were reasonably clean, some cells were dirty 
and poorly furnished. The secure room used to interview prisoners was grubby, and paint was 
flaking from the ceilings in the showers. The caged exercise yards were grim (2017, p. 26).  
 
Similar accounts were provided by the IMB who, in its 2018 report (reiterated in its report of 
2019), criticised the prison for routinely failing to provide clean clothing, bedding and 
cleaning materials and therefore failed to satisfy even the most basic human needs (2018, p. 
10, 12): 
 
Residents had to choose between a daily shower or a phone call. TVs were frequently not 
available for all entitled to them. If radios could be provided, batteries often could not. Men 
were locked up in excess of 23 hours a day, with little meaningful human contact, breaching 
the UN’s Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture (OPCAT). Men segregated for 
their own protection were usually treated no better than those there for bad behaviour (2018, p. 
10). 
 
Not only has the Unit received extensive criticism from HMCIP and the IMB but has also 
been in the media spotlight, attracting headlines such as: ‘HMP Whitemoor: Prison ‘breaching 
UN torture protocol’’ (BBC, 2018); ‘Segregation concerns at HMP Whitemoor after 
unannounced inspection’ (Cox, 2017); ‘HMP Whitemoor inmate kept in segregation for two-
and-a-half years, report finds’ (Guardian, 2015). Much like the broader prison, the Unit’s 
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difficult and chequered history proved influential for the identity and culture of the Unit (see 
Chapter Five). 
4. Research methods 
 
I visited HMP Whitemoor in October and December 2018 to meet with the Governing 
Governor, as well as the head of special accommodation (which includes the Unit) and other 
staff. These meetings were useful opportunities for me to discuss the research with, and gain 
support from, senior management. They helped orient me to the prison – I was given a full 
tour of HMP Whitemoor and introduced to members of staff. I started fieldwork on 4 
February 2019, which continued for nearly 4 months, until 30 May 2019. In this sense, the 
senior managers at Whitemoor, and the senior staff who worked in the relevant areas, were 
very supportive. During this period, I spent at least 3 days a week in the Unit. I arrived early 
for 7.30am and often did not leave before 7pm. The majority of my time was spent in the 
Unit. However, there were times when I went to the wings to follow up with prisoners who 
had been transferred back from the Unit. During the first 6 weeks, I did not have keys 
(because I was waiting for my security clearance to come through). This meant that I was 
reliant on staff to collect me at the gate, walk me to the Unit, and I had very little freedom 
once there. Staff had to unlock the toilet for me, and the kitchen when I needed a glass of 
water, and they escorted me to the exit at the end of the day. Without keys, I felt burdensome 
and conflicted about treading the fine line between being there and being in the way 
(Fieldwork notes, p. 14).  
 
Once I received keys, I had greater freedom in the Unit, and the rest of the prison, which was 
a substantial benefit for both my physical and psychological agency. However, this also 
created complications. Some prisoners saw me as a member of staff, some called me ‘miss’, 
and others assumed I had a level of authority which I felt was gravely misplaced. The 
perception that I had power, as someone staff might listen to and by extension was part of the 
establishment, did little to help my message that I was an external researcher, affiliated with a 
University and not representing the SMT. 
 
I spent the first few weeks trying to overcome a recruitment problem. Staff were suspicious of 
me and extremely reluctant to engage. During the early weeks, I attended staff briefings in the 
Unit (at 8.00am and 1.30pm), initially to observe but later to explain the research study and 
my intentions for the fieldwork. I hoped to encourage staff participation although, as 
described below, obtaining staff support was one of the most challenging aspects of the 
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project. I also suffered a recruitment problem with prisoners. Due to the restrictive nature of 
the Unit, I was not able to engage in ‘deep hanging out’, the cornerstone of ethnographic 
studies and an approach favoured by prison researchers (Browne & McBride, 2015; Geertz, 
1998; Matfin, 2000). Prisoners were locked in their cells for at least 23 hours a day. The 
regime was tightly monitored and controlled, meaning there was little opportunity for organic 
interaction with prisoners. Instead, I would talk to people on the yards, attend segregation 
review meetings, talk to people who were waiting to be moved from the telephone booth back 
to their cells and speak to people through the flaps in their doors. This was time-consuming 
and meant, for the first few weeks, my days were dedicated to these intentional interactions, 
in the hope of garnering trust from staff and prisoners.            
5. Interviews, document reviews and observations 
 
The aim of the study was to understand how law functioned in the segregation unit. I was 
keen to understand this from participants’ perspectives during interviews, and was particularly 
interested in how they conceived law and their legal rights. However, I also hoped to examine 
the implicit functioning of law, its indirect consequences and manifestations (for example, its 
relationship with discretion, power and authority), which required an analysis beyond that 
which could be evidenced in the explicit narratives of participants. Therefore, the interviews 
were complemented with document reviews and observational data.  
	Interviews 
 
Before commencing fieldwork, I designed an interview schedule, one for staff and one for 
prisoners (Annex Three). The questions were informed by existing research (Shalev & Edgar, 
2015) and Appreciative Inquiry (Liebling, 2001b, 2015a). The interviews were semi-
structured – I had key questions but would deviate from the schedule when the circumstances 
required. This approach was valuable: it meant conversations felt natural, better resembling a 
conversation between equal participants, and participants were able to share their stories and 
experiences, in their words and without being overly constrained by a rigid interview schedule 
(Hammersley, 2006; Mason, 2002; Wilson & Sapsford, 2006). 
 
The interview schedule evolved during fieldwork – I realised that some questions were less 
successful than others. When I asked the more positively framed questions of prisoners, such 
as ‘what makes a good day for you?’, ‘can you give me an example of a time when something 
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good has happened in the Unit?’, they were sometimes answered with scepticism and 
incredulity, or examples were provided which were outside the Unit: 
 
R:  What is good? What is good about segregation? You kidding? Segregation’s not good 
for no one. (Shawn, prisoner). 
 
R:  Nothin good happens here. It just makes you appreciate the wing a bit more. (Billy, 
prisoner). 
 
R: Something good that’s happened? 
I: Yeah so if you had to think of the best thing… 
R: That’s happened since I’ve come to seg? [long pause]…Ah, I had a visit the other 
day…That’s the best thing by far. (Ricky, prisoner). 
 
The positive framing of the questions did not work well for some prisoners in the segregation 
unit. Limited staff interactions, constrained agency and very few freedoms, meant there were 
limited opportunities, in their eyes, for positive experiences. It meant I had to adapt the 
interviews. Rather than presuming that something ‘good’ had happened in the Unit, I framed 
the question more neutrally ‘have you had any positive experiences here? If so, please 
explain?’. 
 
Other questions proved unexpectedly challenging. The questions designed to ease people into 
the interaction, such as ‘what are you most proud of in your life?’, were often emotional and 
difficult for both staff and prisoners. Their responses commonly focused on family and 
children, and both groups of participants described pride but also regret and loss. Both sets of 
participants also struggled with the question ‘what is law for in prison?’. Typically this was 
met with responses asking for clarification: 
 
I: So then given those kind of limitations that you talked about, what do you think the law is 
for in seg? 
R: What law? (Nazeer, prisoner). 
 
I: What do you think the law is for down here? 
R: The what, sorry? 
I: The law. 
R: The law? What do you mean? (Tony, staff). 
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When I was asked to explain what I meant, I referred to the PR 1999, but also to the non-legal 
rules contained in the PSO 1700 (such as the need for segregation review meetings). But, for 
many, law was too broad and intangible as a concept.  
 
Despite the challenges of some questions, I managed to get through all questions in the 
schedule with the participants. Both groups of participants were willing to share their 
perspectives once the interview started, and some even described how the interview itself was 
a positive experience. For staff, it offered an opportunity to be heard:  
 
R: It’s really strange...I don’t know how I got on to that, sorry…you’ll have to tell me off for 
rambling.  I don’t get a chance to talk very often, it’s quite nice to just… 
I: Do you find this therapeutic? Some people have said, staff and prisoners, that afterwards 
they feel much better. 
R: Yeah we should do it more often in terms of giving people an opportunity to talk. Not just 
about thoughts and ideas but about how they feel as well. (Jeff, staff). 
 
For prisoners, it was an opportunity for time out of their cells – a novelty in an otherwise 
monotonous and uneventful day.  
 
I’m out of my cell...I’m interacting! You see with this, this makes my day better because I’m 
interacting with someone. Normally we are just stuck in our cell not doing anything. Literally. 
Apart from that work I have to do, there’s nothing. (Henry, prisoner). 
 
Staff interviews took place either in the meeting room or the staff room. For prisoner 
interviews, I asked staff to unlock prisoners and bring them to either the meeting room or the 
Bubble for interview. The meeting room was usually my preference because the sound quality 
was poor in the Bubble and audio recordings were not always clear. The location of the 
interview depended on the level of trust afforded to the prisoner. I interviewed three prisoners 
in the meeting room, the rest took place in the Bubble. Sometimes the trust from staff 
appeared misplaced49: it was rooted in familiarity and I had one experience in the meeting 
room which felt uncomfortably risky. Joe was a prolific self-harmer and he revealed that he 
																																																								
49 I tended to reach different conclusions about those who I deemed trustworthy. Staff seemed to trust prisoners 
who had been in the Unit for longer periods, often those who were mentally unwell and, as a consequence, were 
unable to return to the wings. For me, those individuals were often more volatile, unpredictable and I found the 
interviews much more difficult to navigate and less safe. In contrast, individuals who had been transferred to the 
Unit for possession of contraband or engaging in violence were often closer in age to me, charismatic and 
welcoming, and those interviews felt more straightforward, were easier to establish a rapport and felt ‘safer’ i.e. 
more predictable (although not all were). 
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had two razor blades in his mouth. During the interview, in the meeting room, he was volatile 
and went to great lengths to describe previous violence in prison: 
 
I nearly killed a man with a pool ball, a snooker ball in a sock – I nearly killed him. I smashed 
the back of his head in with it, and I wouldn't have stopped. The only reason why I stopped 
[was] because the snooker ball popped out of the sock; if it wasn't for that, I would have killed 
him…And there's blood all in his hair – he's got long hair... He's actually screaming. And I'm 
smashing and smashing and there's no expression on my face, I don't have a care for the world 
or nothing…I can smash a man's head in and have no feelings, no regrets, no remorse, 
nothing. (Joe, prisoner). 
 
He then reflected how it would be easy for him to become violent ‘it would just take that 
[click of his fingers] and I’d be off on one’. He then described how he could smash the table 
‘to bits right now’ and no one would be able to stop him, and it would be too late for me 
because staff would not get there in time. Just as he said that, staff locked the door to the 
meeting room. I felt trapped with Joe, and a little panicked. I stood up and explained I would 
see what staff were doing. I caught the attention of an officer through the observation window 
in the door. I mouthed ‘what’s going on?’, to which he replied ‘two minutes’. Later, I found 
out, they had locked me in with Joe because another prisoner was being moved past our room, 
to the phone booth. The other prisoner apparently had a vendetta against Joe and staff were 
concerned that he would come into the room and harm Joe and potentially me. I used the 
interruption as an excuse to change the direction of the conversation. This was one of the few 
occasions where I felt fearful for my own safety. The interview felt unmanageable and I 
sensed that Joe enjoyed talking about his past violence and made attempts to make me feel 
uncomfortable (in which he succeeded, although I tried not to show that).  
 
Time felt precious in the Unit. Staff would often describe feeling busy and stressed, so I was 
conscious about the burden of the interview. We had to schedule the interviews around staff 
commitments and the Unit’s regime. Three staff kindly agreed to be interviewed over their 
lunch breaks or at the end of their shifts.  
 
Time felt no less precious for interviews with prisoners. I had to schedule their interviews into 
the regime, after their exercise, before staff left for lunch (at which point only two officers 
would be left on duty and prisoners would not be unlocked), and around their phone calls or 
showers. It sometimes felt hurried and staff, on several occasions, interrupted the interviews 
to request that a prisoner be taken back to his cell. This tended to occur near lunch or 
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dinnertime although, on a small number of occasions, staff would do this even though it was 
an hour or two before a mealtime and there seemed to be little legitimate basis for this. Staff 
would also look through the windows, into the meeting room or Bubble, and it was hard to 
distinguish whether they were doing this to ensure safety or out of suspicion and distrust.   
 
In total, I carried out forty-four interviews with nineteen staff and twenty-five prisoners. All 
participants, except one, agreed to be recorded. I took extensive notes during each interview, 
which were important for assisting with transcription, as the sound quality varied in the 
Bubble. On average, staff interviews lasted 1 hour and 7 minutes, with the longest being 1 
hour and 51 minutes, and the shortest being 37 minutes. On average, prisoner interviews 
lasted 1 hour and 16 minutes, with the longest being 2 hours and 53 minutes (over two parts), 
and the shortest being 38 minutes. Five of the prisoner interviews took place over two 
sessions and one took place over three sessions. It is not surprising that staff interviews were 
slightly shorter – I had fewer questions for staff, and the interviews were subject to time 
constraints and work pressures.  
 
It was more difficult to recruit staff to participate: some said they were too busy, others said 
they did not understand the study and some met me with a general suspicion and distrust. The 
lack of trust was related to several things, somewhat beyond my control. Firstly, staff 
complained to me that they felt ‘burned’ by the recent IMB report (2018), which described the 
Unit as breaching human rights standards. Secondly, some staff were frustrated by previous 
studies undertaken at Whitemoor, which they felt did not accurately represent officers’ 
attitudes and behaviours. One manager recalled how staff were suspicious because researchers 
have ‘come in before with agendas and motives’ (Fieldwork notes, p. 34). Thirdly, when I 
explained the study to staff, along with my interest in law and background as a lawyer, 
responses would take the form of ‘are you checking we are complying with the law?’, ‘do you 
not think we do everything by the book?’ (Fieldwork notes p. 8, 9 and 56). Fourthly, my 
status as a researcher, as a ‘civilian’, attracted suspicion and some disdain: an officer said to 
me ‘you civvies hold up the security check’ and another said to the manager of the Unit, in 
front of me, ‘you have too many civvies on the Unit today’ (Fieldwork notes, p. 30). The 
distrust and suspicion manifested in several ways and is discussed more fully in the latter part 
of this chapter.   
 
It was considerably easier to recruit prisoner participants. In my first week I attended the 
segregation review meetings, where my role was explained to prisoners and several offered to 
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speak to me. I followed up on those offers and soon word spread in the Unit about my 
presence and my study. Prisoners would talk to me on their walk to the exercise yard or to the 
phone booth or showers. Most prisoners welcomed the opportunity to speak to me. They also 
provided me with names of others in the Unit (and on the wing) who they thought I should 
interview (snowballing). Only one participant, on my asking, chose not to speak to me. He 
explained he had taken part in research before and, for him, it achieved very little.  
 
In terms of participant profiles, I recruited staff participants from a range of roles including 
officers, SOs, senior management and those with administrative functions in the Unit. I kept a 
full breakdown of the participants and their roles but, due to the small number of staff in the 
Unit, I have not included specific data here, in order to protect participant identities. All staff 
participants were white. Four participants were female (21%), and the remainder were male 
(79%). The average age was 37 years, ranging from 22 to 58 years. The staff participants had, 
on average, spent nine years at HMP Whitemoor, ranging from 2.5 years to 26 years; and on 
average 3 years in the Unit; and segregation experience ranged from 1 to 5 years.  
 
Most of the prisoner participants were recruited from the Unit (22). Three were interviewed 
on the wing, a few weeks (between two and six weeks) after their segregation experience. The 
majority of prisoner participants were Black Caribbean (12), followed by white British (8), 
Asian Pakistani (2), not stated (2), mixed white and Black Caribbean (1), mixed white and 
Black African (1), Asian Indian (1). The average age of prisoner participants was 31 years, 
ranging from 22 to 51. On average, they had spent 118 days (3.8 months) in the segregation 
unit, but time in the Unit ranged from 3 to 605 days (nearly 20 months).  
 
The majority of prisoner participants were serving life sentences for murder (16), attempted 
murder (4), or manslaughter (1). Others were in prison for a fixed term, for crimes of GBH (2) 
and armed robbery with a firearm (2). Their average sentence length was twenty years, 
ranging from six years to thirty-five years. Most of the men had a substantial amount of time 
remaining.50 The majority (14) had at least ten years of their sentence remaining. Five 
prisoner participants had one to five years, three had six to ten years, seven had eleven to 
fifteen years, and seven had sixteen+ years remaining. One was high-risk category A, nine 
were category A, and fifteen category B. The majority of prisoners had been received into the 
Unit from the wing (17), four were segregation-to-segregation transfers (from other prisons), 
one was received from a secure hospital and three were unknown. In terms of religion, Islam 
																																																								
50 For those with life sentences, this was calculated according to the minimum term i.e. up to the parole 
eligibility date. 
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dominated the participant group: fourteen of the twenty-five were Muslim, two Roman 
Catholic, one was Spiritualist, six were unknown and two reported no religion. Nine of the 
participants had known mental illnesses, including anxiety (1), personality disorder (6), 
schizophrenia (1), PTSD (1). 
Document reviews and observational data 
 
I supplemented the interviews with reviews of the following Whitemoor documentation: 
• the Local Site Rules; 
• local adjudication and punishment policies;  
• the induction procedure for those entering segregation;  
• application forms (to request showers, phone calls, visits etc); 
• complaint forms; 
• the log book in the Centre Office, where incidents like self-harm, attempted suicides 
or violence were recorded; 
• the white board in Centre Office, where all prisoners were listed with their cell 
number, offence type, security category, segregation rule (Rule 45 or 46), unlock 
level and review date; and 
• segregation review forms. 
 
I requested access, from each prisoner participant, to their prison files (stored in the offices in 
the Unit). All consented and I reviewed the hard copy files which contained information on 
their offence, sentence length, adjudication history, reason and dates for transfers to the Unit, 
security classification, IEP status, age, ethnicity and religion. I also reviewed (if available, 
some were missing) for each participant prisoner: 
• Form OTO27 – the initial authority for segregation. This is required for each prisoner 
on transfer to the Unit. It sets out the reasons for segregation and contains a health 
screening form;  
• Form OTO25 – the authority for continued segregation. This is required within 72 
hours of a transfer to the Unit. It contains the reasons for, and approval of, continued 
imprisonment in the Unit. It is also accompanied by a ‘prisoner representation’ form, 
which prisoners can complete with further information (sometimes explaining the 
reasons for their behaviour resulting in segregation, or behind a refusal to return to the 
wing) or the form can be used to dispute a placement into segregation; and 
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• any authorisation(s) from the Deputy Director of Custody (‘DDC’), required for 
prisoners held in segregation for 42 days or more. This is a one-page form, signed by 
the DDC, approving the extension of time in the Unit.  
 
I also supplemented the interviews and document reviews with observational data. I filled 
four A4 100-page notebooks. I had informal conversations with staff in the Centre Office, 
administrative staff, prisoners on the yard or in the phone booth, the Chaplain, the IMB, 
doctors and nurses from MHT and representatives from the OMT who attended the 
segregation review meetings. I accompanied staff ‘on the doors’, whose duties were to open 
the doors and escort prisoners to the yard, shower or phone booth. I spent time out on the 
yards, and in the kitchen on the Unit. I attended staff briefings, both morning and afternoon, 
and those which took place before a planned ‘use of force’ incident. I observed all ‘control 
and restraints’ that took place in the Unit during my fieldwork.51 I spent much of my time on 
the landing of the Unit, observing interactions between staff, prisoners and visitors (e.g. the 
governor and IMB). I made detailed notes of segregation meetings and attended some 
adjudication hearings. My observations were not limited to the Unit. I spent time on each 
wing, informally talking to staff and prisoners about their perceptions, and experiences, of the 
Unit. I went to almost every part of the prison, including the kitchens, visits, the control room, 
the management block, workshops, gym, laundry and outside yard spaces.  
Ethics 
 
Before an interview, each participant was given a consent form and participant information 
sheet, attached at Annex Four. I explained the study, format of the interview, and that all data 
would be anonymised and remain confidential. I made clear there were limits to my promise 
of confidentiality: where prisoners posed a risk to themselves or others. These limits were 
tested and two instances raised particularly difficult ethical questions for me.  
 
Segregation units hold a complex population: those who have violated a prison rule, those 
who are at risk of harm from others and those who are at risk of harm from themselves. 
Whilst the numbers varied somewhat – between five and ten prisoners – it was common for 
the Unit to hold a number of prisoners on ACCTs (Assessment, Care in Custody and 
Teamwork plans designed for those at risk of suicide or self-harm) (Fieldwork notes, p. 87 
																																																								
51 I observed eight incidents where staff were kitted up in their protective clothing, including helmets and 
shields. Sometimes a dog would be brought to stand outside the cell. Control and restraint practices were used on 
prisoners who were deemed violent, volatile or non-compliant.  
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and 113). It was therefore not surprising, during interviews, to hear accounts of self-harm and 
suicide ideation. Whilst these accounts were sometimes graphic and disturbing, they tended to 
be reported by those on an ACCT and therefore I did not disclose those conversations. 
However, there was one individual who spoke about suicide, who was not on an ACCT and 
caused me some concerns. Daniel’s interview was devoid of hope and he described how he 
spent his time in his cell ruminating on past decisions. He did not go out to the yard and he 
had no family members to call. He had a very isolating experience in the Unit. The next 
morning, I interviewed Nazeer, a participant from the cell next to Daniel’s. Nazeer described 
how he ‘talked Daniel down’ from a ligature because he ‘wasn’t in a good headspace’ and 
that he, Daniel, wanted to be placed into the dry cell – the safety cell without ligature points 
(Fieldwork notes, p. 39). Before disclosing my concerns to staff, I decided, with the advice 
from a colleague52, to speak to Daniel the next day. I went to his cell over lunch time, 
knowing there would be fewer staff to overhear the conversation, and asked how he was. I 
explained how the interview gave me some concerns. I said I was worried about his well-
being and if he wanted, I could raise it with a member of staff, someone who he trusted or 
liked, on his behalf. He said he would not do ‘that’, implying suicide, but expressed feeling 
lost and deflated. We agreed, together, that I would not disclose our conversation to staff. This 
felt like the correct approach at the time: I did not want to violate his trust and I wanted to 
preserve some level of autonomy for Daniel. I signposted help and suggested he talk to a 
Listener or raise it with a member of staff himself (Fieldwork notes, p. 41). I am unsure of the 
outcome of this advice as, three days later, Daniel was transferred to another prison.   
 
The second case was rather different and placed me in another difficult ethical position. 
During an interview with Wayne, he made explicit threats towards staff. I reminded him of 
the limits to my confidentiality: 
 
I: I do have a duty of disclosure if someone says something that suggests they’re a risk to 
themselves or to somebody else. 
R: But I haven’t said that though have I? 
I: Well…You made one comment –what did you say– when I said ‘if you’re not using the law, 
how would you resolve it?’. And you said ‘well you’ll have to wait and see’. 
R: Yeah because I don’t know how it’s gonna go. 
I: Yes but in some ways that does sound like a bit of a threat.  
R: I don’t think that’s a threat. That’s me saying I don’t know how it’s gonna go. It’s different 
from when I told you ‘I’m gonna slash Jason’. 
																																																								
52 With thanks to Dr. Amy Ludlow for her advice and support.  
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I: So, in your mind, saying ‘I’m gonna slash Jason’, do you think that sounds like a threat? 
R:  Well… that’s not what I’m saying. Ah, I can’t trust you now…That’s the thing with me 
now. I don’t know. I don’t know why I’ve done this now. I regret doing this now. Cos I don’t 
know where it’s gonna go…What I’m saying is like, I ain’t doing this interview for you to go 
back to the officer and just fuck me completely over. Because…I said today, the threats are 
done…I’m just saying, if they come tonight or tomorrow and they put me in kit, then 
obviously I’ll know you’ve had something to do with it. And if you fuck me over, I’ll make 
fucking sure that everyone in this block knows it was you, and that you speak to staff. 
(Wayne, prisoner). 
 
I left that interview feeling uneasy. Staff had, a few days earlier, found a weapon in Wayne’s 
cell. It was a large piece of wood, with ragged ends, which he had fashioned out of the cabinet 
in his cell. I was conflicted between disclosing our conversation and preserving my research. 
On the one hand, there was a strong possibility that, by disclosing the threats to staff, Wayne’s 
unlock level would be increased (meaning more staff would be present, possibly in their ‘kit’ 
with shields and helmets, to escort him to the yards or showers etc); I would become known 
as a confider in staff and could lose the trust I had spent weeks working hard to gain. On the 
other hand, if I failed to disclose the information and Wayne acted on his threat, there was a 
real potential that someone (staff or him) could be seriously harmed. I deliberated a while and 
eventually decided not to disclose this to staff for two reasons. Firstly, the day before, Wayne 
sent a letter to staff which contained similar and explicit threats. His letter said, ‘I promise I 
will cut Jason and Tony. I promise you won’t get the weapon. I’m coming for your 
staff…their kit won’t keep them safe’ (Fieldwork notes, p. 71). This was one of many letters 
he had sent, all containing clear threats of violence towards staff. Secondly, he had a list of 
staff names, on his wall, which staff jokingly called the ‘hit list’. He shouted out his threats on 
a daily basis. I gently probed staff – to explore their level of knowledge about his threats – 
and found his threats, anger and frustration were known by staff.  I therefore decided that, if I 
disclosed our conversation, I would not be revealing anything new. Staff were aware of his 
risk, he was already on a high unlock level, albeit he was not at the level requiring personal 
protective equipment (including masks, shields, vests etc) (‘PPE’).   
 
I was relieved that, as far as I knew, nothing violent arose from either Daniel’s suicide 
comments or Wayne’s threats of violence. However, both cases were difficult to navigate. I 
had to make judgments about suicide ideation and violence, whether the threats seemed 
genuine, whether the risks were already known, and the extent of the risk posed. They were 
not judgments I felt well equipped to make. 
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Ethical questions arose beyond the interview context, particularly in deciding whether and 
how to intervene in certain circumstances. I had to decide whether to accede to prisoners’ 
requests to hand in their complaint forms, or to relay messages from staff to prisoners, 
including information about transfers out of the wing. In both cases, I complied, perceiving 
these as minor decisions and marginal involvement in an otherwise busy segregation Unit. 
However, my marginal role was challenged in two major incidents. Firstly, during one 
lunchtime, a prisoner started a fire in his cell. Smoke was billowing out into the landing. 
Given the timing, there were only two members of staff on duty, and both were sat in Centre 
Office. I quickly went and reported it to staff. On a second occasion, I observed a prisoner 
assault one of the officers – he punched him in the face. I ran up the stairs and alerted staff to 
the incident. I watched from the landing as one officer pressed the emergency alarm and 
others tackled the prisoner to the ground.53  
 
These judgments, decisions and interventions positioned me out of passive bystander towards 
active participant in the research field. They are examples of the difficult decisions 
researchers have to make, and the extent to which we allow ourselves, not to exactly penetrate 
our research environment, but to put ourselves ‘in its way’, permitting it to embody and 
‘enmesh’ us (Geertz, 1995, p. 44). They are also examples of the deeply paradoxical nature of 
qualitative research. We are urged to understand the participant’s point of view – the ‘native’ 
– without actually ‘going native’. They reveal how ‘participant observation’ is inherently 
contradictory. It is ‘split at the root’, by demanding we ‘act as a participant’ but not too much, 
not to distort the field, and all the while ensuring we keep our eyes open and our gaze neutral 
(Behar, 1996, p. 5).  
Analysis 
 
As I promised my participants, I kept the data confidential and secure. I transferred every 
audio-recording to my personal computer and password protected every file. I transcribed 
twenty-eight of the interviews. The remaining sixteen were completed by an external 
transcriber, subject to a comprehensive confidentiality agreement.  
 
																																																								
53 This was an incident which I observed to be an excessive use of force on the prisoner (Fieldwork notes, p. 93). 
Six members of staff had him pinned to the ground, including one who jumped on his back and said in the 
briefing later ‘I was okay, he’s not – did you see me get him right in the back?’ (Fieldwork notes, p. 93).  
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Keeping interviewees anonymous was fraught with difficulties. It was a small Unit, with a 
low turnover of staff and prisoners. It was obvious when I spoke to prisoners – staff would 
have to unlock them and escort them to the meeting room or Bubble. It was just as obvious 
when I interviewed staff. Interviews were sometimes interrupted and staff were not discreet 
about being interviewed. To maintain anonymity, I have assigned aliases to all participants, 
and amended or removed words or identifiers from quotes and descriptions54.   
 
I uploaded all transcripts to Atlas Ti, a qualitative data analysis tool. It assists in coding and 
organising the data. I had a list of general concepts – themes – I was interested in. For 
example: segregation usage, segregation experience, law and implications for methods. 
However, these were very broad. To help narrow the categories, and assign more precise 
codes, I deployed an inductive technique characteristic of grounded theory, developed by 
Glaser and Strauss (1967) and later refined by Strauss and Corbin (1990). I first approached 
my data by open coding, to identify concepts related to my research questions. These 
developed organically, as I went through my data. I created codes such as: Experience – 
Control, Experience – Frustration, Experience – Respite, Law – Lack of faith in, Law – Lack 
of Access, Law – Self-Informed, Law – Protection, Methods – Trust, Methods – Ethics, 
Purpose – Discipline, Purpose – Mental Illness and so forth. During the process, I created new 
codes, amended existing ones and removed those which seemed less relevant. It was an 
iterative process and culminated in a list of codes which were specific and lengthy. I then 
proceeded with the second phase of coding – to create more focused codes (Charmaz, 2002) 
and to identify relationships and patterns in the concepts. Atlas Ti was a useful tool for this: 
its ‘concept mapping’ function created graphical representations of the most commonly 
occurring concepts and relationships between them. 
 
I typed up all my fieldwork notes. Although they were analysed less systematically, they 
informed my codes and supplemented my analysis. Notes from the document reviews were 
inputted into a password protected Excel spreadsheet. It includes information on prisoners 
such as: age, date in/out segregation, rule for segregation, reasons in the OTO25 and OTO27, 
sentence start date, tariff expiry/parole eligibility date, security classification, IEP level, 
unlock level, received from wing or other prison, nationality, religion and existence of mental 
illness. For staff, it included: age, sex, ethnicity, experience at Whitemoor and in the 
segregation unit.  
																																																								
54 I do not distinguish between different staff grades (e.g. CM, SO, officer) for staff participants;  the same, small 
number of staff worked in the Unit and this would have made anonymity difficult.  
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6. Research at the margins 
 
Moving between such contrasting worlds required tuning into different frames of reference 
and constantly shifting between diverse views. It also had an impact on my vacillating feelings 
towards each of the groups involved. (Foster, 1999, p. 2).  
 
I opened the chapter contemplating the extent to which our personal and political sympathies 
can contaminate, or distort, our research. During fieldwork, it was impossible to fully set them 
aside; they are fundamental aspects of being human. Part of being human is having the 
capacity to feel, to show emotions, to forge relationships and to sympathise and identify with 
our participants (Dickson-Swift, James, Kippen, & Liamputtong, 2009; Gilbert, 2001). During 
fieldwork, I was conscious of my tendency to side with the underdog and kept Howard 
Becker’s (1967, p. 244) work in mind. For Becker, there was no question of whether we can 
set our values and sympathies aside. He suggested ‘the question is not whether we should take 
sides, since we inevitably will, but rather whose side we are on’ (1967, p. 240). On starting 
the PhD, I would have answered that with conviction: the side of prisoners, those who I 
perceived to be in particularly vulnerable positions in the segregation unit. At times, my initial 
sympathies were validated. Prisoners described (and sometimes I witnessed) torments by 
staff, both psychological and physical. For example, some prisoners described being beaten, 
having their ‘heads stamped on’, or being ‘smacked in the face with the shield’. Others 
relayed being put in a body belt, a mechanism that goes around the stomach and pins the arms 
to the side, and being kept in the ‘Box’ for days. I observed a particularly distressing scene 
where one prisoner, in cold February, was marched through the Unit, only in his boxers, with 
the body belt around him. Head hanging low, he looked ashamed and broken. I witnessed use 
of force, where six members of staff went into a small cell, I heard the bang of the shield and 
a small prisoner came out with a bloody nose. But my eyes were also opened to the 
challenging, unrelenting, and often unreported aspects of working in the Unit for staff.  
 
Staff recounted horrifying experiences. One recalled being taken hostage and a bladed 
weapon held to her neck, another described working for weeks in the Unit, with six prisoners 
on dirty protest, where he had to ‘wade’ through faeces and urine to do his duties. One 
member of staff described the distressing impact of a prisoner obtaining his home address and 
making threats to his partner and children. Physical assaults on staff were common. I 
witnessed three serious incidents whilst I was there, and one officer was so badly attacked that 
he was signed off work on the grounds of ill health. Not only did staff have to deal with their 
 80 
own safety, and see colleagues harmed, but they also faced harrowing encounters with 
prisoners that left their mark. In December 2017, two prisoners set fire to themselves (on 
separate occasions) after taking large doses of the drug ‘spice’. One of these prisoners died. 
Members of staff described the sights, the smells and their despair from trying to prevent 
someone being burned alive, but failing. Another member of staff provided a vivid account of 
cutting someone down from a ligature, trying to resuscitate him with CPR but being too late, 
having to cover the body and return to work. All staff made reference to the commonality of 
self-harm and suicide, and some were forthcoming on how they dealt with the psychological 
difficulties which ensued: 
 
R:  Yes I’ve been in cells where people have tried to kill me, I’ve cut people down, I’ve 
been in cells painted red, cells covered in shit, and taken hostage.  
I: How do you deal with all of that? 
R: You put it in a box and shove it to the back of your head…And…well… you hope that 
box never opens. (Jessica, staff). 
  
The accounts provided by staff and prisoners divided my sympathies. There was no obvious 
answer to Becker’s question ‘whose side are we on?’. Prisoners provided compelling 
descriptions of terrible staff abuse and violence that should not have happened. However, staff 
also recounted distressing incidents which, as I observed, were all too common. I witnessed, 
often on a weekly basis, dirty protest, self-harm, and attempted suicides. Staff undoubtedly 
work in a difficult environment, which is physically and psychologically demanding, and 
which takes its toll. I was only there for a few months and it began to feel too much for me. I 
can only imagine the impact it might have on staff after years of working in the Unit. I felt 
compassion and empathy for both groups.  
 
Liebling recounts how, in her experience, it was possible to ‘take more than one side 
seriously’ (2001c, p. 473). By including dual perspectives, from staff and prisoners, we can 
‘appreciate the prison world with more of those who shape it present’, can ‘synthesise’ 
competing accounts (2001c, pp. 478, 482) and avoid colluding with pre-existing social and 
political power structures. Taken together, it means we can better attempt to achieve a 
position of neutrality through adopting, as Liebling denotes, a ‘side’ view (2001c, p. 478). 
However, including perspectives from two groups meant, as Foster (1999) described, I 
straddled two contrasting worlds. I was sometimes an outsider, pulled between groups and 
had to transition between the two. I had to navigate the ‘complex relationship’ between 
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myself, as field researcher, and my participants (Spradley, 1970, p. 18), and this created a host 
of problems.  
Suspicion and trust 
 
Attempts to embed myself with both staff and prisoners created suspicion from both groups. 
They questioned my motives and sympathies, and there was often an undercurrent of distrust. 
This distrust was representative of broader cultural dynamics within the Unit (discussed in 
Chapter Five). I would sometimes sit in Centre Office, the central hub of the Unit, where most 
staff congregated. This presented a problem for some prisoners who saw me there, engaging 
with officers. One prisoner said: ‘I see you go in the office and talk to the officers quite a 
lot… what do you say to them, after the interviews?’ (Wayne), and the suspicion was clear in 
the question of another: ‘Do you just report all this stuff back to staff?’ (Ricky). My replies 
were careful. I reiterated my role as an external researcher, stressed the confidential nature of 
our interviews, but highlighted the limits of that duty.  
 
Similarly, I faced difficult questions from staff. Some displayed a natural curiosity, asking 
how the research would be used and what I hoped to achieve afterwards. Others were more 
suspicious and asked what I talked to prisoners about and what I was ‘busy doing in the 
Bubble’ (Fieldwork notes, pp. 24, 69). I caused friction when I postponed an interview with 
an officer, to prioritise one with a prisoner (intended for transfer the next day). I was the 
subject of comments, said jovially, but which betrayed the officer’s irritation and the stark ‘us 
and them’ attitudes which characterised the Unit: 
 
R: She cancels on us but as soon as a prisoner will speak to her she goes running. We have 
jobs to do Ellie. It’s not really on is it? You expecting us to talk to you in our own time. You 
need to speak to detail to get us relieved.  
I: I know, I know. I’m sorry...It’s been hard to fix them in because you are all so busy.  
R: And then you ditch us for prisoners anyway. (Fieldwork notes, p. 91). 
 
Staff suspicion was experienced in several ways. For example, an officer left a room saying 
‘I’m going to go because Ellie’s got her pen out again’ (Fieldwork notes, p. 97), others made 
comments like ‘watch yourself boys, she’s writing it down again’ (Fieldwork notes, p. 28) and 
one senior officer said ‘from now on, the Centre Office is a no pen zone’ (Fieldwork notes, p. 
34). Whilst most of these comments were said without malice, they were accompanied by 
behaviour, from staff, that bordered on hostile. Staff would stop talking when I entered rooms, 
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they would close doors on me, communicating how my presence was not always welcome. 
Whilst I was mostly able to tolerate the hostility, there were times when the Unit felt like a 
hard and unwelcoming place. This was not helped by some staff who made inappropriate 
comments. For example, when confirming an interview with one officer, another approached 
and said loudly, ‘I’m sure he’ll do an interview with you if you unbutton your shirt more’ 
(Fieldwork notes, p. 109). Managing relationships with staff was one of the most challenging 
aspects of fieldwork. I was mindful of the necessity to maintain positive relationships with 
staff: they were the gatekeepers to my research. They were gatekeepers for formal access, the 
ones who initially escorted me to the Unit and who would unlock prisoners and facilitate 
interviews. They were also the gatekeepers for informal access: without them, I would only 
have one group of research participants. So I would brush off remarks which bordered on 
sexual harassment and tolerated treatment which I would not otherwise tolerate.  
 
Remaining on the ‘edge’ had implications for trust, rapport and acceptance. It was difficult to 
achieve the position of  ‘acceptable marginal member’ (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). I 
was pulled between two polarised groups – staff and prisoners – who, at times, subtly 
demanded my allegiance, support and trust. Of course, there was a symmetry, as I demanded 
much the same from them.  
Their worlds 
 
I had questions about whether I could ever truly understand their ‘worlds’. Transitioning 
between both groups, sometimes on the ‘outside’, being on the edge, whilst at other times 
being on the ‘inside’, made me question whether I adequately managed to understand the 
culture and dynamics of either group. This was brought to the fore in a number of interviews: 
 
R: You have to walk in a prisoner’s shoes to understand the madness of segregation. (Joe, 
prisoner).  
 
R: You are oblivious, and you actually try to see the best in everything…You just bounce in 
and you're happy… I call it living in a bubble. You're just in your own zone…You live in a 
totally different world than I do. (Johnny, prisoner). 
 
R: … [I]t’s easy for research…so you breeze in for example and you haven’t got to lock that 
guy up at lunch… you’re not the one telling him [to] ‘get off exercise’ and ‘no you’re not 
having extra butter’ and ‘get behind your door’. You’re not having to do that all day, every 
day. So you breeze in, you’re someone new, you ask some questions… and you know, it’s 
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really easy to think, ‘this is really sad, this is a really good guy and if people had done things 
differently and if the officers had done A and the managers had done B and the governor had 
done C, he wouldn’t be in the seg now’… and the relationship you’ll have with prisoners is 
different to the relationship you would have if you had to exercise authority over them. (Jeff, 
staff). 
 
I was an outsider coming into the prison. I was also a relatively young, white, woman, from a 
socially advantaged background. There were aspects of my own circumstances and 
experiences that made it difficult, at times, for me to intuitively understand participants’ 
accounts. This manifested in minor ways, like having to ask for clarification when a certain 
word – slang – was used. For example, asking prisoners to define ‘Pad spins’ (cell searches), 
‘lines’ (of cotton or material that allowed contraband to be thrown outside cell windows and 
passed to other prisoners) or what staff meant by the word ‘fraggle’ (a term used by staff – for 
both prisoners and staff – who could no longer tolerate the Unit, those who were ‘burnt out’). 
It also manifested in more substantial ways. For example, asking probing questions to 
understand how a prisoner kept blades in his mouth, how another concealed a mobile phone in 
his anus for hours, and having the invasive strip search process explained to me in detail. The 
latter, for one participant, sadly triggered memories of his childhood abuse. There were 
aspects to the experiences – both from life inside and outside the prison – that felt alien to me.  
 
I was conscious of the impact that my personal characteristics might have on the field. I 
received a small number of comments from both prisoners and staff, although more common 
from the latter, about my appearance, my relationship status and sometimes my sex life. It 
made for awkward conversations and raised questions, for me, about how best to maintain 
boundaries. However, I suspect that my gender, youth and character (as ‘light’, ‘bouncy’ and 
‘happy’) were more of a help than a hindrance. I got the sense that staff perceived me as a 
naïve student and therefore mostly acceded to my requests to review documents and were 
forthcoming with information. Whereas prisoners, although sometimes suspicious of my 
intentions and whether I would share the information with staff, saw me as a confidante and 
someone they enjoyed talking to, but also as someone who had their best interests in mind, 
who might advocate for changing their circumstances:55 
 
R: I could sit down and talk to you all day... Like you're calm, you get me…You're good 
people, man. You're my type of person, and I could sit down and talk to you on the road. 
(Johnny, prisoner). 
																																																								
55 Some prisoners gave me the nickname ‘rebel with a cause’. 
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R: I just find it hard to be engaged in anything. Like, take this for instance, this I can do 
because it’s like interacting with a person that I’ve never met…know what I mean…but at 
certain times I find it hard. And don’t take this the wrong way miss, but because you’re a 
pretty young lady as well…it makes it easier.  
I: You’re saying if I was an old man you wouldn’t want to talk to me? 
R: It does make it easier…it’s nice when there’s you there smiling like that…and it just makes 
it easier. It makes it easier to be engaging, know what I mean? (Mark, prisoner). 
 
R: You are one of these people that think you can change the world…you think you can use 
this [the research] to make it better. Well that makes it a stressful world for you, 
mate…because you see it’s wrong and there’s nothing you can do about it. (Johnny, prisoner). 
 
There was also a corresponding risk of whether I understood – or perhaps penetrated – their 
worlds too well. On my last day, I had a long discussion with a senior manager: 
 
R: How do you think you’ve done? 
I: I think I’ve done alright. 
R: Yeah you have. You’ve woven your way through really well. I don’t know whether that’s 
compromised your research or not but staff don’t moan about you, they speak very positively, 
they’re really interested in what you’re doing. You haven’t upset anyone, which is really hard 
when you’re a civvie, who’s only here from time to time. And you’ve been here long enough 
now that you’ve kind of been accepted into the seg staff gang have you? 
I: Yes but I have some unease about that because erm…should I have been better at 
maintaining those boundaries because…you don’t want to be considered too much like a 
friend. That wasn’t what I was trying to do but, then again, you don’t want to be too distant 
that people think you’re hostile…it’s a really fine line to tread. 
R: Yeah. Well if you haven’t got relationships you’re not gonna do any research are you…so 
sometimes you have to compromise. (Jeff, staff). 
 
This conversation caused me to reflect on my relationships with staff, whether I fitted in too 
well, in a way which undermined the integrity and impartiality of my research. I concluded 
that was not the case. For, it was difficult always to get the boundaries right, and the study 
undoubtedly demanded the forming of relationships (both with staff and prisoners) some –
although not all – of which lacked authenticity. The relationships, the ‘fitting in’, had a degree 
of intention behind them which allowed for a level of neutrality. I was guarded with my 
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emotions and my ‘self’ something which, although beneficial for the research, felt 
compromising to me as a researcher, and as a human, and led to the third challenge.  
Sense of self  
 
Straddling two worlds meant, at times, it was difficult to retain a firm sense of self (Atkinson, 
Coffey, & Delamont, 2003). I was in a situation where friendships sometimes felt 
instrumental (both with staff and prisoners), not as a result of shared likes and interests, but 
instead to facilitate access and encourage participation. I made statements that were intended 
to be encouraging and supportive, I laughed at jokes, I outwardly projected openness and 
friendship – behaviour with which I was not entirely comfortable. In many ways, I sensed that 
participants opened up to me because I was sympathetic, perceived as being on ‘their side’, 
but this undermined my attempts at outward neutrality. The research required a level of 
‘emotional management’, monitoring and adapting my own feelings and outward displays of 
emotions (Hochschild, 1998, p. 9). Managing my ‘self’ and emotions felt essential for 
remaining detached, to prevent me becoming emotional during fieldwork, and was intended 
partly to preserve the research and partly to protect my own mental well-being.  
 
This fragmentation of self felt necessary because access to the field was rarely one-
dimensional. In many ways, both staff and prisoners held the keys to my research. My study 
depended on their participation and acceptance. I felt, at times, revealing my own 
perspectives, or true feelings, would have done little for the study. For example, feelings of 
anger, anxiety and fear were not uncommon. I was particularly outraged by staff behaviour, 
when they told a prisoner that he would be transferred ‘imminently’. The prisoner interpreted 
this as a matter of days, but the staff knew it would be weeks. They took pleasure in watching 
him hurriedly eat all his food, in his cell, making fun of him ‘stuffing his face’ and expressed 
little intention to correct his understanding of ‘imminently’ (Fieldwork notes, p. 96). I felt 
unable to reveal my discomfort at one prisoner’s account of his crime of drugging and raping 
two women, murdering one and leaving the other paralysed. I felt unable to show my distress 
when I stood at the entrance to a cell containing a prisoner who had self-harmed, and both he 
and his cell were covered in blood. I concealed my discomfort, as well as my frustrations, and 
my anger, at witnessing incidents which felt unjust. I masked my feelings of powerlessness –
all I could do was write them down – but took some comfort in knowing I had a permanent 
account of them.  
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Actively managing outward displays of emotions is common in qualitative research, which 
has been described by Dickson-Swift et al. (2009, p. 68) as an ‘embodied experience’, 
naturally requiring emotional work (and see Shaffir, Stebbins, & Turowetz, 1980). Yet, in 
part, it felt deceitful and disingenuous. Whilst a prisoner cautioned me to the risks of 
dishonesty:  
 
It must be hard for you, miss, because prisoners don’t like being truthful. It’s hard for you to 
know what’s a lie and what isn’t. We find it hard to open up and be honest. (Mark, prisoner). 
 
I felt, at times, that I was the one being dishonest. Perhaps my comments and behaviour were 
manipulative and I exploited friendship and trust to further my research. How, during 
research, do you balance integrity with access? Can you truly gather data, in environments 
like prisons, without being duplicitous? Or does deception come with the territory?  There is 
clearly a balance to be struck. Being entirely honest about my views and emotions would have 
risked alienating (and perhaps even caused emotional harm to) my participants and 
undermining my research. However, there is something to be said for revealing parts of 
ourselves and being the ‘vulnerable observer’ during our research (Behar, 1996). Research is 
a reciprocal process and by making ourselves vulnerable we implicitly invite our participants 
to be vulnerable. We can therefore establish a better rapport, trust and create a more equal 
position for participants (Brannen, 1988; Dickson-Swift, James, Kippen, & Liamputtong, 
2007; Liamputtong, 2007).  
Ethnographic loneliness  
 
I was not able to get the balance right all the time and by concealing my emotions, presenting 
a different version of the ‘self’, I created a final, and related, challenge: an associated isolation 
and ethnographic loneliness that came from burying parts of myself and straddling two 
worlds, alone. The Unit was challenging, for staff and prisoners, but also for me as a 
researcher. I had difficult conversations and witnessed distressing incidents. One example is 
particularly vivid for me. One of my prisoner participants was in the gated cell. He had no 
clothes on, was on dirty protest and had created a ligature out of his boxer shorts. He was 
distressed and called me over. I pleaded with him to remove the ligature from around his 
neck, ‘there are other ways to be heard, please don’t… I don’t want to see this and I don’t 
want you to do it’ (Fieldwork notes, p. 92). The pleadings were futile, he became 
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unconscious, a code blue56 was called and healthcare arrived and resuscitated him. At times, I 
left the Unit feeling burdened. I feared that prisoners, with some of whom I had started to 
build friendships, would not be there the next day. 
 
Participants confided in me. Some relayed their fears about opening the cell door, their 
worries that segregation was making them ‘go insane’ or that they were losing their grip on 
reality – common in narratives from both staff and prisoners. Staff sometimes shared 
extremely personal information. Some described how the stress and pressure from the Unit 
followed them home, to their partners and children (Fieldwork notes, pp. 4, 25). Some 
participants cried, they expressed anger, they revealed insecurities and vulnerabilities which 
were not obvious from the selves they projected elsewhere in the Unit.  
 
After hard interviews or witnessing traumatic incidents, I had no one in whom to confide. My 
duties of confidentiality meant there were few people I could turn to for support. When faced 
with ethical questions, I had to largely resolve them alone. At times, I questioned my own 
judgment and often hoped that confessions of self-harm, suicide attempts, or threats of 
violence would not be executed.  During fieldwork I felt isolated and withdrawn. I did not 
want to talk to anyone about the research, I felt that no one could understand or, more 
accurately, I did not want to make them understand. I found some events so harrowing that I 
did not want to repeat them, not to anyone, not ever.  
 
Fieldwork was, like Behar described, a lone voyage through a tunnel:  
 
Loss, mourning, the longing for memory, the desire to enter into the world around you and 
having no idea how to do it, the fear of observing too coldly or too distractedly or too 
raggedly, the rage of cowardice, the insight that is always arriving late, as defiant hindsight, a 
sense of the utter uselessness of writing anything and yet the burning desire to write 
something, are the stopping places along the way. (1996, p. 2). 
 
I went to great lengths to ensure my participants did not leave the interviews feeling too 
dejected or disempowered, yet made very little effort to protect myself and own well-being. 
Being alone in the field, I sometimes struggled with resolving ethical questions, of knowing 
when to breach confidentiality, or how to reconcile feelings of deceit and exploitation. I did 
not know where to put the anger and the frustration that would surface when witnessing 
																																																								
56 ‘Code blue’ is for more serious breathing/collapses. ‘Code red’ is for less serious blood/burns (see PSI 
03/2013) . 
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someone else’s pain, distress and injustice. Nor did I know how to reconcile feeling 
powerless: having little recourse for injustices, other than the ability to write them down. 
Fieldwork was about ‘confronting, without our contemporaries’ my own morality, humanity 
and true ‘self’ (Behar, 1996, p. 172). I learned much through the practice of fieldwork – about 
methods, ethics and not least about myself – as most ethnographers do (Behar, 1996; 
Bourgois & Schonberg, 2009; Gilbert, 2001; Hamm & Ferrell, 1998; Liebling, 2014; Rowe, 
2014). Fieldwork was an experience, like Behar’s voyage, which was a journey characterised 
by detours of despair, junctures of joy, where the path was sometimes lost, but hope 
sometimes found. It was undoubtedly an experience that left a mark and one, which like 




Chapter Four – Law and Contradiction: Use of Segregation 
 
R: Well, segregation’s not a destination is it? Segregation is like something that appears on 
different journeys, so some people make choices that inevitably result in being segregated but 
no one has a preference to be segregated. The choice you make: ‘is that less bad than what I’m 
being segregated from’. So if you know you’re gonna get killed on B Wing, being segregated 
is a less bad option. In some ways, if you go on the netting to get down the seg, that is your 
choice, but it’s not really a choice is it, it’s the lesser of some quite evil evils, isn’t it? 
I: What do you think segregation is for?  
R: Refuge for some men. Some people need to be on their own for a period of time, so refuge 
and respite. Sometimes it’s an opportunity for us to stabilise people and it’s an 
intervention…you know where we’ve got someone that’s escalating in some bad ways; 
substance abuse issues, behaviour or violence. It’s an opportunity for us to intervene and re-
steer them, re-influence them in the right way. Sometimes it’s just a straight punishment, CC 
[R55 cellular confinement] is a punishment, you know? There’s no rosy way of getting around 
that. And, although you wouldn’t read this in a manual, there are times when it’s about 
sending a message. (Jeff, staff). 
 
A multitude of reasons, I mean, for some of them, they wind up here because they think they'll 
get a progressive move quicker, or they'll get moved to another prison. Some of them are here 
because they are genuinely scared of what it'll mean for them if they stay on location, whether 
it be a debt to someone, or if they're being expected to do something they don't want to do. For 
some… especially some of the ones who have got quite bad mental health problems, the seg 
can almost be a safe place…Because it is very structured and very regime-driven. They know 
that the only person coming to their door is a member of staff and, in the vast majority of 
cases, a member of staff is not going to hurt them. So they know that in the morning they'll go 
out for their exercise, and then they'll come back and they know that they'll go out for their 
shower, and then they'll come back. And they know that the meal will come through at 
lunchtime. That level of structure and regime is quite safe and quite containing for them. 
Whereas, obviously, being on a main wing amongst all of those different people, the noise, the 
goings on with drugs and phones and violence; this can almost seem like a safe place to be for 
some of them. (Richard, staff). 
 
Segregation has the potential to cause real harm for the individuals confined there (see Chapter 
One, Part Three). It is also a severe sanction. In fact, after the death penalty, it is the most 
extreme sanction a state can impose (Jeffreys, 2013, p. 106). It subjects individuals to almost 
total staff control, and erodes their bodily autonomy and personal agency. Staff determine if, 
and when, an individual is able to leave his cell, attend the exercise yard, take a shower or use 
 90 
the phone. Staff also set the parameters of human contact – choosing when and how to respond 
to a ‘cell bell’, how to manage complaints and how to engage with prisoners. Staff also 
determine, to a degree, whether a prisoner can leave the Unit and return to the wing (although, 
as discussed below, some decisions are negotiated, for example when prisoners refuse to return 
to the wings).  
 
Thus, the Unit is an area of the prison characterised by a high concentration of power. The 
power is distinct from the ‘softer’ forms of power that Crewe (2009, p. 81) describes. The 
almost total isolation and almost complete reliance on staff are more indicative of the coercive 
form of power identified by King (2005) in ‘super-max’ prisons. The Unit is also, as this 
chapter explains, a part of the prison where there is flexibility in the rules, considerable staff 
discretion, and a vulnerable prisoner population. ‘Vulnerability’ is interpreted broadly to 
include prisoners rendered vulnerable due to mental illness or threats faced on the wing, but 
also due to their almost total reliance on staff. Power is unequally distributed in the Unit; 
concentrated in the hands of the institution and its staff actors. It is a situation in which the law 
is fundamentally important. Law recognises the absence (or unequal distribution) of power and 
introduces safeguards to protect rights, constrain discretion and protect the vulnerable (Steiner 
& Wooldredge, 2018; van Zyl Smit & Snacken, 2009). In the Unit, legal safeguards can take 
various forms. As Chapter Two described, external approval from the Secretary of State is 
required for any prisoner detained in segregation beyond 42 days; a doctor, nurse and governor 
must review and authorise the initial segregation decision; segregation review boards monitor 
and authorise continued segregation; and bodies, like the IMB, have a safeguarding role in 
overseeing segregation (PR 1999 and PSO 1700).  
 
In the segregation unit, at its best, the law (and non-legal rules like PSO 1700 and the Local 
Site Rules) should be setting the parameters of how segregation is used and why, and how such 
use is monitored and constrained. However, as this chapter argues, the current law of 
segregation is not an effective mechanism for controlling and constraining the use of 
segregation. There are three arguments to support this, which form the three main parts of this 
chapter.  
 
Firstly, the concept of ‘removal from association’ contained in the PR 1999 is vague. Does it, 
for example, apply to those released on ‘single unlock’? Whole wing lock-downs? Or those 
subject to substantially reduced association? These are questions which have been asked in, and 
considered by, the English courts. As argued, the broad and ill-defined nature of the PR 1999, 
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which apply to segregation, make it difficult to foresee when the rule applies in the first 
instance. This creates problems for legal certainty and undermines, as Lord Bingham described 
(detailed in Chapter One), some of our most fundamental rule of law principles. This creates a 
problem which is more than an abstract concern; it exposes prisoners to the risk of abuse and 
unfair treatment. 
 
Secondly, the concepts of ‘good order or discipline’ and ‘own interests’, within the PR 1999, 
are also broad and opaque. It means Rule 45 – and segregation – is used to address a multitude 
of functions. Jeff and Richard, at the start of this chapter, describe a complex reality: the 
segregation unit is used as a form of punishment, but also as a deterrent, it can be a preventative 
mechanism, as well as a place intended for care and rehabilitation. These aims are contradictory 
and broader than those set out in the PR 1999.57 Moreover, examples from my fieldwork reveal 
how the use of segregation is contextualised within the broader prison – situated in the prison’s 
culture, its actors, and reflects their attitudes towards risk, safety and punishment. The prison, 
as an institution, has an important role in setting the parameters of how segregation is used. 
Such use challenges the existing paradigm that segregation is reserved for only the most violent 
individuals and is intended to be a last resort. It raises further questions about the purpose and 
function of the Unit. The Unit attempts to manage a range of individuals, with a multitude of 
needs; in doing so, its primary aims and intentions become lost, muddied and confounded.  
 
Thirdly, the PR 1999 are characterised by a substantial amount of discretion, which culminates 
in a lack of certainty and precision in the rules. This is not overcome by supplementary 
guidance in the form of PSO 1700 or in the Local Site Rules created by Whitemoor’s SMT. 
They create a void in which local practice and custom steps in to shape how segregation is used 
and why. 
 
Taken together, these factors make it difficult for the rules (both legal and non-legal) to be an 
effective force in setting the parameters of how segregation is used. I identify how the rules are 
imprecise, ill-defined and contain substantial discretion for the prison authorities. I suggest that, 
even if the rules could be improved – made clearer, more precise and specific – there would be 
a limit to what they can achieve. I suggest that the rules are bounded: by the individual actors 
responsible for their implementation, by the institution and the broader penal system. 
Therefore, reform efforts which focus primarily on law or policy change are unlikely to lead to 
a reform of behaviour, or to encourage a more constrained use of segregation.  
																																																								
57 They mirror the contradictions and inconsistencies found in imprisonment more broadly (care versus custody, 
rehabilitation versus deterrence, punishment versus reform).  
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1. Prison Rules – removal from association 
 
As described in Chapter Two, Rule 45 of the PR 1999 (and Rule 49(1) YOI Rules 2000) 
provides for ‘removal from association’, where it appears ‘desirable, for the maintenance of 
good order or discipline or in his own interests…the governor may arrange for the prisoner’s 
removal from association’ (R45(1)). 
 
Both the PR 1999 and the YOI Rules omit a definition of ‘removal from association’. The 
omission has caused a problem for some prison decision-makers who, in the past, tried to 
implement confinement regimes which did not fit within Rule 45. Consequently, it was left to 
the courts to interpret the scope and applicability of Rule 45. In R (AB) v Secretary of State for 
Justice [2017] EWHC 1694 (‘AB’), AB was sentenced to 12 months in Feltham YOI. When he 
arrived at Feltham, due to previous disruptive behaviour at Cookham Wood YOI, AB was 
placed on ‘single unlock’. He was therefore unable to leave his cell when any other detainees 
were out of theirs. AB complained, as a consequence, he was only allowed out of his cell for 
between 30 minutes and 2 hours each day. He alleged that the restrictions breached Rule 49 of 
the YOI Rules, Article 3 and Article 8 of the ECHR. The High Court considered whether the 
practice of single unlock constituted ‘removal from association’ for the purposes of Rule 49 of 
the YOI Rules. The court concluded that single unlock had the effect of removal from 
association and therefore had to be in accordance with the YOI Rules [10, 17]. This was 
reaffirmed by the Court of Appeal ([2019] EWCA Civ 9), which reconsidered the human rights 
complaints. However, the breach of Rule 49 was not in dispute. The Secretary of State 
acknowledged, and issued an apology for, failing to follow the process for removing AB from 
association, and failing to implement the process of regular reviews required by Rule 49.  
 
Similarly, R (Syed) v Secretary of State for Justice [2017] EWHC 727 (‘Syed’)  concerned an 
individual who had been sentenced to life imprisonment for performing an act preparatory to an 
act of terrorism. In 2016, Syed was transferred to a ‘specialist unit’ for the management of 
prisoners with particularly difficult and disruptive behaviour. Syed complained that he was 
only allowed out of his cell for less than 2 to 2 ¼ hours each day. Syed submitted that his 
restricted association, when compared with the general prison regime which allowed up to 8 
hours association a day, represented ‘removal from association’ pursuant to Rule 45 [39]. The 
High Court recognised that one of the fundamental issues was the ‘proper construction of Rule 
45’ and consequently engaged in a lengthy consideration of how this rule, and ‘removal from 
association’, should be interpreted [40]. The High Court concluded that Syed was provided 
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with the possibility of association with other prisoners – albeit such association varied in the 
number of hours and his association operated on a reduced regime compared to the wider 
prison – he was therefore able to ‘enjoy association with other prisoners’ and this did not 
constitute removal from association for the purposes of Rule 45 [51]. The court was clear: Rule 
45 meant ‘removal from’ not ‘limitation’ or ‘reduction’ of association with other detainees 
[41].  
 
R (KB, a child, by his litigation friend LW) v Secretary of State for Justice [2010] EWHC 15 
(‘KB’) concerned a 17 year old boy detained at Wetherby YOI. Wetherby YOI operated an IEP 
scheme which, according to the claimant, curtailed the opportunity for association with others. 
Due to poor behaviour, KB lost a series of ‘awards’ under the IEP policy, namely the loss of 
association in the evenings. KB alleged that the restriction on his association constituted 
‘removal from association’ for the purposes of YOI Rule 49 and the protections contained 
therein. The judge firmly eschewed any attempt to define association which was not, as the 
judge stated, defined in the rules or any other document to which he was referred [73]. The 
judge reasoned that association ‘conveys the idea of being in the company of, and interacting 
with, fellow human beings’ [73] and, as KB was able to participate in work and educational 
programmes, KB had not therefore been removed from association for the purpose of the YOI 
Rules. 
 
Finally, in R (MA and others) v Independent Adjudicator and Director of HMYOI Ashfield 
[2013] EWHC 43 (‘MA’) the High Court considered whether an informal scheme of restricting 
MA and others to their wing, outside the usual procedural safeguards, created a ‘shadow 
segregation regime’ in  Ashfield YOI [9].  The seven claimants entered the sports pitch at 
Ashfield and commenced a protest against the removal of toilet seats from a housing block. The 
young detainees were armed with pieces of a broken football goal and made threats to the staff. 
A team of custody officers entered the pitch, but the seven claimants failed to surrender and 
were consequently restrained by staff. MB and AB were detained in the segregation unit 
(Brunel Unit), whilst five other young persons were detained on Phoenix Wing – all seven were 
held under restricted conditions pending adjudication. For three days, the five individuals held 
in Phoenix Wing were confined to their cells and were only permitted to leave their cells alone, 
for very limited periods, in order to take exercise, make a phone call or take a shower [27, 36]. 
Mrs Justice Davies found the practice on Phoenix Wing constituted ‘removal from association’ 
for the purposes of YOI Rule 49 and declared it was ‘segregation by another name’ [36]. The 
practice on Phoenix Wing operated outside the scope of the YOI Rules and PSO 1700 i.e. 
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outside the procedures which governed assessment, monitoring and review and was therefore 
held to be unlawful [27, 80]. 
 
Syed, AB, KB and MA demonstrate the limits of Rule 45 and YOI R49. The lack of a precise 
definition of ‘removal from association’ means the legal rules potentially capture a host of 
different practices and restrictions. It creates a corresponding risk of substantial uncertainty in 
the interpretation and application of the rules. It raises questions about the circumstances and 
scenarios which constitute removal from association, and when the procedural protections 
contained within Rule 45/ YOI R49 are engaged. Of course, most legal rules contain a degree 
of uncertainty: it may be difficult to foresee exactly when and how a particular rule will apply, 
in every possible scenario (Waddams, 2015, p. 59). However, the above cases demonstrate how 
the rules, as currently apply, create substantial legal uncertainty and considerable scope for 
judicial interpretation. Taken together, it may be difficult to foresee whether the rule, in the first 
instance, will be engaged (as illustrated in Syed) and this has corresponding implications for 
fundamental rule of law principles, as described by Lord Bingham and set out in Chapter One. 
The uncertainty in the rule itself (and a lack of clarity as to the scenarios and circumstances 
pursuant to which it will be engaged) carries the risk that the rule is applied inconsistently, 
unfairly, is exposed to abuse and that any eventual legal outcomes will be inherently fact 
specific.  
 
I observed this impact during fieldwork. The prison did not dispute the application of Rule 45 
in the Unit. However, on the wings, I observed the practice of ‘total wing lockdown’. When 
imposed, prisoners were unable to leave their cells, sometimes for a whole day or consecutive 
days. They were prohibited from social association and from attending classes or workshops. In 
effect, they were detained in isolation on the wing. This is a practice which may engage Rule 
45 and be the ‘segregation by another name’ identified by Mrs Justice Davies in MA.  
2.  Prison Rules – GOoD 
 
As discussed above, the concept of ‘removal from association’ has caused problems for prison 
decision-makers, as well as judges, in understanding when and how the rule applies in the first 
instance. Moreover, Rule 45 creates an additional problem: it is narrow in focus yet broad in its 
application.  
 
To reiterate, pursuant to Rule 45(1) of the PR 1999 (YOI Rule 49) a prison governor may 
decide whether segregation is necessary, and this decision may be taken to satisfy a range of 
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purposes: good order or discipline or for the individual’s own interests.  The rule has a 
deliberate discretionary character. The initial segregation decision is reserved for the governor 
(and contingent upon the exercise of his discretion); and the justification for segregation (good 
order or discipline) is incredibly broad and ambiguous. It means that segregation can be 
imposed as a response to a range of behaviour or issues that arise in prison. This is evident 
from the case law, for example, Syed, AB, KB and MA, are all examples of the wide-ranging 
circumstances in which segregation (or alleged segregation) can be imposed. It was also clear 
from my fieldwork that segregation was imposed for a multitude of reasons and was intended 
to fulfil a multitude of functions. Annex Two demonstrates how good order or discipline was 
interpreted broadly. It applied to twenty prisoners, including those who had taken drugs on the 
wings or ‘jumped on the netting’, who were in possession of a mobile phone or who had taken 
part in a ‘riot’. Own interests was interpreted just as broadly and applied to five prisoners: some 
were at risk of self-harm or suicide and others who faced threats on the wings. 
 
When considering the imposition of segregation, for good order or discipline, the courts have a 
wide discretion to decide case-by-case whether segregation is a justifiable response. As Lord 
Reed explains, in R (Bourgass and another) v Secretary of State for Justice [2015] UKSC 54, 
courts must consider all the relevant circumstances, including the ‘reasonableness of any 
apprehension that association with other prisoners might lead to a breakdown in good order and 
discipline, and the consequences to the prisoner and to other prisoners of segregating or not 
segregating him’ [125, 126]. By undertaking a broad approach to the assessment of segregation, 
the courts have upheld its use as a preventative mechanism,58 as traditional punishment59 and 
even where the regime was particularly severe in nature.60 The prison institution is given 
considerable latitude to make operational decisions, and determinations, about the necessity for 
segregation. 
 
This latitude was translated into practice. During fieldwork, I observed how Rule 45 varied in 
its interpretation and application by staff. Segregation was imposed to achieve a range of 
ancillary functions. Segregation was used for prevention, to prevent those who were deemed 
																																																								
58 R (AN) v Secretary of State for Justice [2009] EWHC 1921. AN and X were each detained in single cells due 
to security concerns that they were persuading others to adopt a particularly violent strand of Islam and were 
contemplating disruption in the prison. A preventative decision was taken at HMP Belmarsh to remove them 
from association due to the potential threat they posed to the order of the prison. The judge supported the pre-
emptive approach and stated ‘It cannot be right that the authorities are required to await the actual outbreak of 
disorder before any decisive intervention takes place’ [113]. 
59 See Dennehy v Secretary of State for Justice and Sodexo Limited [2016] EWHC 1219; and R (AB) v Secretary 
of State for Justice [2019] EWCA 9.	
60 In R (Bary and Others) v Secretary of State for Justice and the Governor of HMP Long Lartin [2010] EWHC 
587, the High Court reasoned ‘even harsh regimes…may be justified by the particular risks presented by the 
prisoner’ [32]. 
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‘risky’ from engaging in violence or misconduct. Segregation was also used by prisoners who 
‘engineered’ a move to the Unit with the hope of securing a transfer out of the prison 
(instrumental reasons). At times, segregation was used for more traditional punishment 
purposes, but also as a means for the prison management to communicate disapproval, 
censorship and for ‘sending a message to the rest of the prison’. Each of these is discussed 
further below. Together, they demonstrate how segregation, at any one time, is intended to 
fulfil a multitude of functions; its use is complex and outside the short and simple provision of 
the PR 1999 which, as suggested below, are deliberately vague and ambiguous. 
 Prevention 
 
To some, Rule 45 was applied pre-emptively, either in response to historic violence at a 
previous prison (in the case of ‘seg to seg transfers’) or for those who had allegedly been 
involved in misconduct and the prison was undertaking further investigations. Segregation was 
imposed to manage their perceived risks, to prevent any future misconduct or violence.   
 
Three individuals arrived at the Unit as ‘seg to seg transfers’; transferred from a segregation 
unit in another prison because of their involvement in previous violence (Wayne and Mark) or, 
in the case of Imran, because of his offence (a terrorism offence) which provoked staff concern 
about his ‘influence’ over other prisoners. Wayne, Mark and Imran were initially deemed too 
high risk to move to the wings. Imran went to the wing after five weeks; he adhered to the rules 
of the Unit, was ‘well-behaved’ and able to satisfy staff that he could safely (as far as the 
institution was concerned) survive on the wing. However, Wayne and Mark decided they did 
not want to ‘locate’ on the wing and wanted to remain in the Unit. Both were transferred to a 
segregation unit in another prison (Wayne, after 109 days in the Unit; Mark after 249 days).  
 
Four were held in the segregation unit before their wrongdoing had been established. All were 
told they were in segregation ‘pending the outcome’ of the prison’s investigations. For 
example, Johnny was held in segregation whilst ‘the facts of a serious incident were 
established’ (held for 3 days) (personal file). Patrick was segregated due to there being ‘some 
intelligence’ that he had access to mobile phones, so was held on ‘GOoD in the seg whilst this 
is being investigated’ (personal file). Ali and Kelvin were both segregated for being involved in 
a ‘serious incident on the exercise yard’ (personal file). The incident was, at the time of their 
placement into the Unit ‘still being investigated’ and their ‘risk to GOoD’ was ‘unknown’ at 
the time of their segregation decision (personal files). For those four individuals segregation 
was imposed because they represented a risk, although the extent of that risk was not known 
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nor established – they were held in segregation ‘pending investigation’. At the end of my 
fieldwork, all (except Johnny) were still in segregation, held there for 98, 49 and 49 days 
respectively and the investigations were still ‘on-going’ at the time my fieldwork ended. 
 
When segregation is imposed preventively, or as a pre-emptive measure whilst investigations 
are on-going, it challenges the paradigm that segregation is there as a ‘last resort’, as set forth 
in the PSO 1700 (p. 4) and the Mandela Rules.61 This was especially true for those subjected to 
segregation, who were awaiting the outcome of the prison’s investigations. Segregation was 
imposed before any wrongdoing was established, in which case, it was very much a ‘first 
resort’. This was not unique to Whitemoor. Shalev and Edgar found that prison administrators 
were sometimes quick to send people to segregation – it was not consistently used as a last 
resort across the prison estate (2015, p. 25).  
 
The ways in which officers make and impose their decisions, and wield their power, can 
influence prisoners’ perceptions about the legitimacy of their authority and the legitimacy of 
the prison institution (Bottoms, 1999; Steiner & Wooldredge, 2018; Wooldredge & Steiner, 
2016). In turn, it can impact on prisoners’ willingness to comply with the prison regime, prison 
rules, and on prison order (Hepburn, 1985; Sparks et al., 1996). When segregation is used pre-
emptively, as Patrick and Ali describe, it can result in frustration, anger and a sense of injustice:  
 
Yeah I was pissed off because another prisoner got nicked a few weeks ago with a phone, an 
actual phone, a handset and he got brought down here but, two days later, he was back on the 
wing. Whereas they’re saying to me that they think I’ve got access to one, they weren’t saying 
I had one, they were saying I had access. If I had access to a phone, the rest of the wing’s got 
access to it, hasn’t it? So I felt like I was getting hard done by... I am a bit pissed off. (Patrick, 
prisoner). 
 
I tried to put my version across and I said not guilty, but I’m already being punished. They’ve 
got me on basic for a month now. And nothing has been proven against me. Basic is a form of 
punishment isn’t it. I was an enhanced prisoner. I was doing well, I was staying out of trouble, 
working on the servery. I had a lot of roles…I was doing quite a few different things and then 
obviously this has happened, and everything has come crashing down. Without any formal 
proper procedures being followed. So, I’m on basic for a month now. Later on, if I get found 
guilty, I’ll be punished again. Double punishment. It don’t make sense. (Ali, prisoner). 
																																																								
61 Rule 45 of the Mandela Rules provides that: solitary confinement shall be used only in exceptional cases as a 
last resort, for as short a time as possible and subject to independent review, and only pursuant to the 




Ali and Patrick described how segregation, when experienced as lacking a legitimate 
justification, can lead to a sense of frustration, indignation and injustice. These are responses 
which may lead to greater resistance, defiance and may undermine principles of safety and 
order in the prison (Kauffman, 1988; Liebling, 2004; Sparks et al., 1996) and go against the 
aims of Rule 45. Of course, frustration and indignation do not always result in behaviour and 
actions which threaten the order of the prison, and sometimes the coercive use of power is 
necessary to maintain order and safety. The point is, if segregation is frequently used pre-
emptively, and commonly experienced as lacking a legitimate foundation, the Unit will be 
releasing (most likely back to the wings) a number of angry and frustrated individuals, who 




Five participants were in segregation for relatively minor, non-violent infractions. For example, 
Marcus, Kamil and Jamal explained how they ‘jumped on the netting’ with the intention of 
trying to secure a transfer out of the prison. For them, the Unit was the only place in the prison 
where they could talk to a governor, weekly. They felt their concerns were not being heard, so 
were left with ‘no other choice’: 
 
Where progress isn’t being made on the wings, I’m basically trying to use this time to get 
myself out of here. (Kamil, prisoner). 
 
I jumped on the netting to make a peaceful protest, and that resulted in me being down the 
block. Obviously, I know there could have been other ways, but I feel like I've exhausted 
those avenues, and I felt like this was the only way for me to be heard. It seems like when 
everyone goes down here, everything gets sorted out. It doesn't make sense. This is what I'm 
saying, this is backwards, this is how this jail works and it's backwards like that. (Marcus, 
prisoner). 
 
Engaging in non-violent conduct, to bring about a transfer, is also not unique to Whitemoor. 
Shalev and Edgar found that 38% of their participants, recruited from fifteen prisons, were in 
segregation because they had ‘engineered’ moves to the unit, with the aim of pressurising the 
prison to transfer them to another prison (2015, p. vi). Whilst only three of my participants 
expressed this initial intention, as time went by, a substantial number of participants (15 out of 
 99 
20) refused to go back to the wings and were effectively using the Unit as a means to enforce a 
transfer. Those fifteen were brought to the Unit for a range of reasons, as set out in Annex Two. 
Most were initially willing to return to the wings. Over time, their views changed. For some, 
this resulted in a prolonged period of time in segregation. For example, George and Norman 
were originally transferred to the Unit because of their drug dependencies (and related issues on 
the wing) but, after time, refused to return to the wing. They were in segregation for 605 and 
326 days respectively. For others, it meant there was a ‘stand-off’ with the prison: 
 
There was a kick off on C Wing and they needed space. I’d been down here about a week. So 
I said I’m happy to go back up if you want, if you need the space. And they said no. But a 
week or so later they came and said ‘do you wanna go back to the wing?’ and I said ‘no, I’m 
alright’. They could have sent me back the week before but they didn’t. So, that’s when I 
made my mind up that I’m just gonna stay down here. I’ll just sit down here, even if it takes 6 
months, to sit down here and wait to go to my next jail. I’d happily just sit here and wait. 
(Patrick, prisoner). 
 
I had another nickin, and came down here, and I just decided I'm not going back to the wing. 
I'll stay down here until they ship me out to another prison. (Theo, prisoner) [although he later 
decided to return to the wing]. 
 
Such comments reveal some prisoners’ need to claim a degree of agency and control, in a place 
where there was very little autonomy and opportunity for individual decision-making. They 
represent the active negotiation of power, one of the few ways in which prisoners in the Unit 
could assert themselves as human agents (Giddens, 1982, 1987; Sparks et al., 1996). They also 
reflect a perception, commonly described to me by prisoner participants, that Whitemoor was 
not a ‘good prison for progression’. Some participants described their frustration at the lack of 
opportunities in Whitemoor to undertake the mandatory courses needed for their sentence plan, 
those which were necessary for reducing their risk status. As George explained ‘I have been to 
11 prisons in 5 years…one of my courses is 12 months, I’ve never been in a prison longer than 
12 months, how am I supposed to do that course to progress?’. Others criticised Whitemoor for 
being slow to ‘downgrade’ prisoners to a lower risk category or to move them to a different 
prison, perhaps one closer to home. Taken together, they contributed to a culture whereby 
prisoners (and staff) perceived misbehaviour, and ‘acting out’, as the only way to transfer out 
of the prison:  
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About 4 weeks ago, a guy was down and he smashed up his flap and started shittin up, shit in 
the showers, and he was gone three weeks later. It looks like bad behaviour pays in this place. 
I suppose if I do that, I’ll get out of here quicker but I can’t be arsed. It’s disgusting. I’d rather 
sit behind the door and wait. But yeah there are things you could do. I can see why some 
people do that because they’ve got nothing to lose. You’re in a cell doing nothing, you just do 
whatever you can to get a transfer; but I just think ‘keep your head down’, it’s probably the 
best way. And hopefully you’ll go but we’ll see. But I’ve heard prisoners say that ‘if they’re 
not gone by this date, they’re gonna start acting up’, so it could be a quicker way of getting out 
of here. (Patrick, prisoner). 
 
When you’re well behaved, you try do all the courses and try keep your head down, you don’t 
get anywhere. But if you act up and start being like a bad man, cause trouble, they kick you 
out because they don’t want you anymore. (Ricky, prisoner). 
 
We do send the message that the bigger fucking problem you are the more chance you’ve got 
of going out. (Trevor, staff). 
 
There was a problematic culture in Whitemoor whereby rule violations were strategic and there 
was a utility to violence and disorder. Rule 45 was used by prisoners to further their own aims, 
for instrumental reasons (transfer, downgrade etc). It was a tool which could be used for 
illegitimate means, and fulfilled a purpose beyond that explicitly contained in the PR 1999. The 
prison’s rules and procedures could be turned against it (Crewe, 2009, p. 218). It also illustrates 
the undercurrent of dysfunction in the way the law (specifically Rule 45) was implemented and 
operated, but also spoke to a greater dysfunction in Whitemoor, as an institution. There was a 
common perception, amongst staff and prisoners, that the most problematic prisoners were 
most likely to obtain a transfer. I saw this borne out for a number of prisoners. For example, 
Jed was transferred to the Unit for jumping on the netting, he wanted to move to a prison where 
his son was located. He smashed his observation panel and started a dirty protest. He was 
transferred two weeks later, to the prison where his son was located. Both staff and prisoners 
were critical of his transfer, commenting that his ‘bad behaviour was rewarded’ by the prison 
management. It fuelled the perception that the only way to obtain a transfer was through 
violence and disorder. Thus, Rule 45 had unintended consequences, and sometimes brought 






Eight participants were in the Unit for punishment, although the seriousness of their 
misconduct varied substantially.  
 
Theo was in segregation for having possession of a mobile phone. Daniel was in the Unit for 
kissing an officer and Leroy was in for pinching an officer. Daniel and Leroy acknowledged 
their behaviour was inappropriate but explained how it occurred in the context of their 
relationships with specific members of staff. A conflicting narrative was constructed by some 
officers. For example, Jeff was critical of their actions and expressed a counter narrative in 
warning that their actions were ‘offence paralleling behaviour’ (Jeff, staff member). This was 
more relevant for Daniel, who was in prison for a sex offence, but less so for Leroy, who was 
convicted of murder. Jeff’s comment shows how risks are constructed in prison. We know, 
from existing research, that the judgments officers make about behaviour – determining 
whether it is a security risk or dismissed as something minor – are influenced by staff attitudes 
towards safety and security. Perceptions of risk and dangerousness are related to officer 
characteristics, such as personal demographics, job satisfaction, stress and attitudes towards 
their own power (Armstrong & Griffin, 2004; Britton, 1997; Stichman & Gordon, 2015). Staff 
assessments of risk can also be bound up with the prisoner. Liebling and Williams (2018, p. 
1210) found that race (black or mixed race), physique (muscular, ‘walking with swagger’) and 
prisoner charisma (if ‘influential’, having confidence) affected prisoners’ risk status. 
Constructions of risk are also embedded within local prison culture (Liebling & Williams, 
2018, p. 1211) and the degree to which senior managers respect officers, and perceptions of 
procedural justice in the prison institution as a whole (Gordon, Proulx, & Grant, 2013; Taxman 
& Gordon, 2009).  
 
Perceptions of risk, and the determinations made by staff towards behaviour, particularly 
whether such behaviour warranted a punishment like segregation, were also borne out in the 
cases of Billy, Henry, Shawn and Ricky. They were segregated for their involvement in a 
‘serious incident on C Wing’ (personal files). This was an incident on one of the spurs, where 
violence ensued between a group of eight prisoners and staff. It was labelled a ‘riot’ by some 
staff and newspapers. However, other members of staff, particularly those in the Unit, 
dismissed it as a ‘violent eruption’ which was quickly quelled and lacked the requisite 
challenge to authority to constitute a ‘riot’ (Terry, staff member). A similar narrative was 
offered by others involved in the incident. For example, Billy explained how it occurred as a 
 102 
result of a disagreement with an officer. He described how the officer was ‘rude’ and made a 
‘racist remark’ when instructing him and others to go into their cells. As a result, Ricky and 
Billy confronted the officer, challenged him on his remarks, and the officer pressed the 
emergency alarm. Staff responded to the alarm and entered the spur. The situation escalated, 
officers took out their batons, ‘punches were thrown’ by both staff and prisoners, but the 
prisoners then returned to their cells, of their own accord (explained by Terry and Phil (staff), 
and in the accounts of Billy, Henry, Shawn and Ricky). Violence ensued in response to a 
dispute between two prisoners and an officer. It was an impulsive reaction by those involved 
and, in the accounts provided to me, lacked the components of a riot. For example, there was 
no ‘significant breakdown’ in the social order of the institution (Bottoms, 1999, p. 206; Useem 
& Kimball, 1989). Instead, the violence took place within the ‘everyday framework of the 
prison’s social order’ (Bottoms, 1999, p. 206), it was a form of ‘interpersonal violence’ 
(Braswell, Montgomery, & Lombardo, 1994), intended to settle a disagreement between Ricky, 
Billy and the officer, but lacked the shared aims or collective resistance, identified by Carrabine 
(2005), commonly associated with prison riots.  
 
The cases of Daniel, Leroy, Billy, Henry, Shawn and Ricky, illustrate the varying ways in 
which staff interpret violence. They show how staff make different assessments and reach 
different outcomes regarding behaviour which warrants punishment and, if so, the type of 
punishment that should be imposed. Staff make human judgments about segregation and 
whether it is a proportionate and reasonable response. The broad language of Rule 45 allows 
staff to make broad assessments about behaviour which infringes the Good Order or Discipline 
of the institution. However, as the preceding paragraphs demonstrate, this behaviour is wide-
ranging. The rule functions in a fact-specific way, the outcome of which is dependent on the 
individuals making the assessment, and those being assessed. Judgments are grounded in staff 
discretion (Crewe, 2009; Liebling, 2000, p. 343), staff assessments of risk and their perceptions 
about punishment. Staff have a very active role in determining when segregation is used, for 
whom, and its duration (Poole & Regoli, 1980). Importantly, staff discretion and judgment are 
exercised within the wider culture – the social and moral climate (Liebling & Kant, 2018) – of 
the prison. Consequently, to understand the use of segregation, we need to also understand the 
broader institutional context in which it is used (see Chapter Five). 
Censure and deterrence 
 
Those involved in the ‘riot’ caused a problem for the prison’s managers. The head of the wing, 
where the incident took place, strongly opposed their return, whereas the manager of the Unit 
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voiced concerns about their indefinite detention in segregation, instead advocating for them to 
return to the wings or be transferred to a different prison. This led to a series of seemingly 
inconsistent decisions by the management team. Ricky was transferred to a different prison 
after 21 days in the Unit. Henry was allowed back on the wing after 68 days, but Shawn and 
Billy were still in the Unit, at the end of my fieldwork, and had been there for 93 days. This 
caused frustration for Shawn and Billy, and their mental health deteriorated. They both 
described their increasing impatience, anger and frustration. Both attempted suicide, by 
creating ligatures in their cells. Some staff were critical of and frustrated by the decisions, 
which they perceived as inconsistent and poor-decision making by the SMT: 
 
They probably need to be transferred, they should be transferred but clearly that’s not 
happening, which is exactly the same as what happened last January [when there was a stand-
off between prisoners and management and a lengthy period of dirty protest by six prisoners]. 
(Jessica, staff). 
 
There’s quite a lot of management decisions that get made and you think ‘ah that’s really 
gonna affect us’… They should have been gone quite a while ago, if not, then put them back 
on the wing. Move their wings, split them up, fine whatever; but why are they still down here? 
They’ve done their time, they’ve done their punishment, and now at some point you’re just 
segregating people unfairly. (Holly, staff). 
 
I don’t get it because in any other prison, they’d be back to the wing as soon as they could, as 
soon as their punishment is done, get rid of them. Whereas here it takes forever. That wouldn’t 
happen at another prison, they’d be down here, serve their punishment and go back to a wing. 
Whether it’s the same wing or not, it doesn’t matter, they just go back to the wing but it 
doesn’t seem to be that way here. They seem to keep people in seg for the sake of it 
sometimes. (Phil, staff). 
 
Jessica, Holly and Phil were critical of the way segregation was used and expressed concerns 
that segregation was imposed for too long. I observed, during fieldwork, how segregation was 
not always imposed for as short a time as possible, in contradiction with PSO 170062 (p. 17) 
and Rule 45 of the Mandela Rules. For prisoner participants, their time in segregation ranged 
from 3 days to 605 days, with an average of 108 days (3.5 months). There were a number of 
explanations for these lengthy periods. Firstly, operational constraints across the prison estate 
made it difficult to transfer prisoners to other locations. Most other segregation units in the 
																																																								
62  Segregation under Rule 45 (YOI Rule 49) (for GOoD) is, according to the PSO 1700, to be imposed for the 
‘shortest period of time consistent with the reason for separation in the first place’ (p. 17).  
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LTHSE, at the time, were either full or unwilling to accept prisoners who were deemed 
disruptive (Fieldwork notes, p. 40, 52). Attempts were made to find another prison for Billy, 
Shawn and Patrick. However, due to their prison histories – Billy and Shawn’s alleged 
involvement in the ‘riot’, and Patrick’s history of violence and possession of contraband (phone 
and drugs) – other prisons were reluctant to accept them. The OMT had to negotiate with, and 
persuade other prisons, to accept prisoners from the Unit. This led to an informal procedure, 
colloquially known in the prison as ‘sale or return’, which operated between the segregation 
units of the LTHSE (Fieldwork notes, pp. 1, 52). If a prisoner was transferred elsewhere, but 
did not locate on the wings or proved troublesome, he would be transferred back to Whitemoor. 
There was an implicit system of negotiations and trades for prisoners in the segregation units 
across the estate. Secondly, as discussed above, some individuals were detained in the Unit 
longer than intended, because of their refusal to return to the wings. Thirdly, there was a 
tendency to use segregation as a means to send the message that staff were in control and that 
there would be repercussions for those who did not abide by the rules: 
 
The only thing I can say.. not in my defence, or our defence.. is that jumping on the netting is 
at least a non-violent way of saying ‘I wanna move’, but what we try and avoid doing is 
moving them straight away. So we kinda get our pound of flesh in a way, or try and highlight 
the fact that ‘yes you may get a move but you will spend months in the segregation before you 
get a move’. Of course we are shooting ourselves in the foot by doing that, because we’ve got 
them stuck in our seg. (Tim, staff). 
 
Although you wouldn’t read this in a manual, there are times when it’s about sending a 
message. So if A Wing refused to lock up tonight, after they do go away, tomorrow I will find 
out who the ring leaders were and everyone will be locked up and whoever the four were or 
three or six or whatever, who led that, they will be segregated. Do they need to be segregated? 
Is that absolutely necessary.. Well, in terms of them individually, maybe not. But in terms of 
maintaining order and control in the whole community, I’m really reluctant to use the phrase 
‘sometimes you need to make an example’ but sometimes you do. Or maybe sometimes you 
don’t – I dunno. That’s what we always do, that’s our culture. (Jeff, staff). 
 
I am quite quick to use segregation because it’s a quick, firm, clear, unambiguous 
intervention, which sends a message to everybody else about what we will accept and what we 
won’t accept and it sends a message to individuals that ‘you crossed the line’, and when you 
cross the line, the choices you make – when they’re bad – there’ll be bad consequences for 
you. (Jeff, staff). 
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It [segregation] is used sometimes…sometimes just to demonstrate we are in control. (Trevor, 
staff). 
 
What they like to do, if you’ve assaulted a member of staff or something like that, when you 
come down segregation, they’re gonna hold you down here for a number of months, to send a 
message to the other people on the normal location, ‘don’t do this because this is what you 
will go through’. (Shawn, prisoner). 
 
As these accounts reveal, the use of segregation was rarely one-dimensional. It was sometimes 
imposed as a preventative mechanism, sometimes as punishment, or sometimes used as a 
means to secure a transfer. Jeff’s description highlights an additional function – segregation can 
be used to communicate a message of authority, that the staff wielded power and that bad 
behaviour would not be tolerated. 63  Punishing certain offenders was an ‘exemplary 
demonstration of power’ of the kind identified by Sparks et al (1996, pp. 287, 293), to signal to 
the rest of the prison to keep in line. Segregation, as a response, was also connected to 
managerial philosophy and style: some managers saw substantial value in the utility of 
segregation. Segregation was used as a mechanism for control, aimed at censoring and shaming 
those deemed deviant and to deter others from engaging in similar behaviour. Despite the overt 
justifications of ‘deterrence’, or its perceived instrumentality for ‘maintaining order’, 
segregation was used punitively. When segregation was used to send a message, it was a 
deliberate and ‘heavy’ exertion of power, one which can have important implications for the 
prison experience (see Crewe, Liebling, and Hulley (2011) who found the over-use of power 
undermined assessments of trust, safety, fairness and professionalism; and Liebling (2007) who 
concluded that the way in which power is used and experienced can have important 
implications for the prison experience).  
 
The comments from Jeff and Shawn expose the presumption, not just in prison but entrenched 
in society, that punishment controls crime – it deters individuals from rule-breaking (Morris, 
1966, p. 631; Sherman, 1993, p. 445). Much like crime control in the community, where prison 
is a reaction to rule-breaking, segregation is the prison’s response to deviance and non-
compliance. Segregation has some of the same components as punishment in society – shaming 
and censorship – which, as Jeff and Shawn described, were deemed necessary for order and 
control. Academics have warned, for decades, of the risks of ‘disintegrative’ rather than 
‘reintegrative’ shaming (Braithwaite, 1989). The former relies on punishment, exclusion and 
																																																								
63 Like the ‘functions’ of punishment generally which Garland (1990) suggests ‘reaffirms specific forms of 
authority and belief’ (p. 80).	
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stigma for social control (Braithwaite, 1989, p. 18). It is experienced as ‘stigmatic shaming’ 
(Sherman, 1993, p. 446), creates a ‘class of outcasts’ and pushes individuals towards criminal 
subcultures and further delinquency (Braithwaite, 1989, pp. 4, 55). On the other hand, 
‘reintegrative shaming’ involves a process of initial community disapproval, ranging from 
‘mild rebuke to degradation ceremonies’, followed by gestures of reacceptance (such as 
forgiveness) which integrates individuals back into the community (Braithwaite, 1989, pp. 4, 
55). Segregation is a severe punishment, one that is characterised by social exclusion and 
isolation. It carries the risk, to use Braithwaite’s terminology, of ‘disintegrative shaming’. This 
risk was justified by Trevor and Jeff (and in many other staff accounts) as necessary for the 
order and stability of the prison. They perceived segregation as an important mechanism for 
deterrence, to deter prisoners from breaking prison rules and to encourage compliance with the 
institution and its regime. This logic is firmly rooted in a ‘utilitarian calculus’ (Bennett, Crewe, 
& Wahidin, 2008, p. 185), that prisoners are active, rational decision makers who respond to 
incentives and deterrents (Clarke & Cornish, 1985, pp. 155-156). Yet we know that humans are 
not always rational, and are not always receptive to a system of rewards and punishments 
(Cohen, 1996; Scheff, 1992; Zafirovski, 1999). As Levine suggests, there are ‘customary, 
habitual, emotional…and serendipitous dimensions of human action’ (1997, p. 7), which 
influence the way we evaluate decisions and the conduct we engage in. Our actions, responses 
and decisions will all be influenced by our histories, ideologies and experiences (Rawls, 1992). 
We cannot be reduced to rational decision-makers who only behave according to cost-benefits 
analyses. Moreover, there is a danger that ‘segregation as a strategy of deterrence’ might 
overstate the extent to which deviance or disorder (or as Sparks et al. (1996, p. 296) define, 
‘control problems’) are the product of difficult individuals, and obscures the social and 
situational context in which such problems arise (like the lack of legitimate opportunities for 
progression which, for some, gave rise to wing violence).  
 
Many studies have explored the (in)effectiveness of general deterrence theory. Its main premise 
is that sanctions (or the threat thereof) will deter crime (Dölling, Entorf, Hermann, & Rupp, 
2009; Nagin, 2013; Paternoster, 2010; Tonry, 2008). Sanctions may have a role in deterring 
law-breaking, but there are many other factors which influence human behaviour and decision-
making. Thus, Sherman (1993) provides a comprehensive explanation of how individual 
demographic differences (including age, previous offending history, employment and sex), as 
well as ideological differences (whether people believe the rules, and their administration, are 
fair and legitimate) and situational factors (an individual’s relationship, or ‘bond’, to the 
community, which may be evidenced by close family ties), can impact the way someone 
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responds to the threat of sanction. A small number of scholars specifically explored whether 
segregation deters ‘rational actors’ from rule-breaking, and therefore maintains the order of the 
prison. Most studies found little deterrent effect on prisoners (Barak-Glantz, 1983; Briggs, 
Sundt, & Castellano, 2003; Lucas & Jones, 2019; Morris, 2016) and some even reported an 
increased risk of subsequent institutional misconduct and post-release offending (Mears & 
Bales, 2009; Medrano et al., 2017; Motiuk & Blanchette, 2001).  
 
The use of segregation at Whitemoor was partly justified by the perception that sanctions led 
(incorrectly) to deterrence and, more importantly, that segregation was an effective means for 
maintaining order and security of the prison.  When used in this way, it created, as Tim (staff) 
suggests, operational pressures. There was a conflict between: (i) the operational need to 
transfer individuals out of the Unit, to make space for incoming transfers; and (ii) the use of 
segregation as a method for communication, to signal to the rest of the prison that bad 
behaviour would not be rewarded, and that jumping on the netting or engaging in violence will 
not immediately bring about a transfer. Not only that, when segregation is used to ‘send a 
message’, there is risk that segregation loses its legitimacy and soon descends into something 
which is deemed unfair or excessive. There is a suggestion that segregation is the punishment 
of the few, to ensure the order of the many. Some may feel ‘wronged by the system’, causing a 
loss of legitimacy for the rules and the institution (Anderson, 1978, p. 130). A loss of 
legitimacy can have important ramifications: eroding order and control, and ultimately leading 
to defiance and increased rule-breaking (Sherman, 1993). This raises questions about the utility 
of segregation, its legitimacy and efficacy.  
3. Prison Rules – own interests 
 
Five participants were in segregation for their own interests. They are examples of how the 
broader prison context can have an impact on the need for, and use of, the segregation unit. 
This limb was reserved for two groups of prisoners, those rendered vulnerable because of: (i) 
complex mental health issues; or (ii) threats from other prisoners on the wings.  
Mental health 
 
Across the prison estate, mental health problems and substance abuse are more common than in 
the community (National Audit Office, 2017, p. 13). For example, Light, Grant, and Hopkins 
(2013, p. 19) found that 49% of 1,300 prisoners, who had recently arrived into prison, reported 
anxiety and depression – triple the rate of mental illness in the general population (16%). The 
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Committee of Public Accounts, relying on evidence from the Institute of Psychiatry, concluded 
that over 50% of prisoners have common mental disorders including depression, post-traumatic 
stress disorder and anxiety (2017, p. 9). The Institute of Psychiatry also estimated that around 
15% of prisoners have specialist mental health needs and 2% have acute and serious mental 
health problems (2017, p. 9).  
 
Self-harm and suicide are also more common in prison than the general population (and both 
have increased over the last 10 years). For example, Hawston et al. (2013, p. 1152) found that 
self-harm was prevalent in 5-6% of men in custody, representing a much higher proportion than 
the 0.6% of the UK population who reported self-harming in the previous year. There has been 
an increase in the number of self-harm incidents in prisons over the last decade. Between 
December 2018 and 2019, there were 63,328 incidents of self-harm (746 incidents per 1,000 
prisoners). This was a record high. It was a 14% increase from the previous 12 months and an 
increase of almost 150% from 2009 (in 2009 there were 299 incidents per 1,000 prisoners) 
(Ministry of Justice, 2020d, p. 3). 
 
As far as suicide rates are concerned, the National Audit Office reported that men in prison are 
six times more likely to take their own life than men in the community, and women in prison 
are 24 times more likely to die by suicide (2017, p. 15). These findings were corroborated by 
Fazel et al (2017). More recently, the Ministry of Justice reported that, in the period March 
2019 to 2020, 286 deaths occurred in prison custody, 80 of which were self-inflicted (2020d, p. 
2). This was a small decrease from the previous year (87 self-inflicted deaths) but was still 
within a general upwards trajectory. For example, since 2010, self-inflicted deaths have risen 
by almost 38% (from 58 self-inflicted deaths, occurring at a rate of 0.7 per 1,000 prisoners, to 
80, a rate of 1.0 per 1,000 prisoners) (Ministry of Justice, 2020d, p. 2). 
 
Prison populations are complex – characterised by high rates of mental illness, self-harm and 
suicide – and such complexity is especially evident in the segregation unit. Segregation may 
exacerbate pre-existing mental health conditions and/or cause the development of new mental 
illness in prisoners admitted to segregation units (see Brown, 2020; Shalev & Edgar, 2015). 
Danish researchers found a significantly higher incidence of psychiatric morbidity in 
segregated prisoners (28%) than non-segregated prisoners (15%) (Andersen et al., 2000; 
Andersen, Sestoft, Lilleboek, Gabrielsen, & Hemmingsen, 2003). Others found greater 
psychological distress in more restrictive environments, like segregation units (Miller, 1994; 
Miller & Young, 1997) and a significant association between segregation and post-traumatic 
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stress disorder (Hagan et al., 2017), as well as anxiety and depression (Haney, 2003, p. 133), 
paranoia, withdrawal and anger (Gallagher, 2014, p. 4). Moreover, the risks of self-harm and 
suicide may be greater in segregation units. For example, Lanes found that segregation was a 
significant risk factor for self-harm incidents (Lanes, 2009; Lanes, 2011), findings which were 
corroborated by Kaba et al. (2014, p. 444), who found that prisoners assigned to segregation 
units were twice as likely to self-harm when in segregation and six times more likely to self-
harm during the days when outside segregation, relative to prisoners who had never been 
assigned to segregation. 
 
There has been some disagreement, in existing literature, about the relationship between 
segregation and mental illness although most scholars and policy-makers recognise that 
segregation can be psychologically harmful to those confined, and there is some level of 
consistency in the symptomology of segregated prisoners (Brown, 2020). There are broader 
questions about whether mental illness, self-harm and suicide are more common in segregation 
units because they: (i) hold people who are already suffering from some form of mental illness 
and are therefore likely to end up in the segregation unit (whether because it manifests as a 
disciplinary issue or self-harm/suicide attempts on the wings); (ii) make existing conditions 
worse; and/or (iii) cause new mental health problems. During fieldwork, I found support for all 
three explanations. 
 
Joe and Aiden had complex mental health issues, and/or were at risk of self-harm and suicide, 
and were not able to cope on the wings. Joe was transferred to the Unit directly from 
segregation at another prison because of the risk he posed to himself. Joe had a complex drug 
addiction and was a prolific self-harmer: neither could be adequately managed on the wings 
(personal file and interview transcript). Aiden returned to the Unit after a period of treatment at 
a psychiatric hospital. He returned to the wing but struggled to cope with his depression and 
anxiety. He attempted suicide and self-harmed and was taken to the Unit for his own safety 
(personal file and interview transcript). Both Joe and Aiden described how they felt segregation 
was the only place in the prison that could support their mental health conditions. For example, 
Aiden explained how he could not cope in the secure hospital, he asked to be transferred back 
to Whitemoor, he then struggled on the wings, and described how the Unit was the only place 
in the prison where he felt his mental health could be managed: 
 
R: I have anxiety and paranoia and I can’t be around people, so they can’t put me on normal 
location.  
I: You don’t want to go back on the wing? 
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R: I can’t, because of my anxiety, it won’t let me. It’s a mental disorder so they can’t force 
me. I came here [to segregation] to do some work with mental health about my anxiety. I’ve 
told them, I’ll never go out there, on a normal wing, that will never happen.  
I: Mentally, how do you feel in seg? 
R: I feel safer. 
I: Do you think there are any other options for you? 
R: What? Beside seg? For me? No. (Aiden, prisoner). 
 
Joe explained how he had a long history of self-harm, including severe suicide attempts. He 
described how he forced a piece of sharp steel through his neck, was taken to hospital, and 
returned to the segregation unit. A few days later, he went out to the exercise yard, found 
another piece of steel, ‘sharpened it up’ and ‘shoved it straight through the chest into my heart’ 
(Joe, transcript). I asked whether he wanted to return to the wing at some point and he replied:  
 
No, they've got to basically keep me in the seg. They've offered me the healthcare unit but I've 
refused and I've said no. I don't really want to go anywhere else at the moment. I think this has 
to be the only place for me because I still don't feel right. I don't know why. I don't understand 
myself. Deep down I don't want to play the computer, I don't want to listen to the radio, I don't 
want to paint anymore, I want to fuck off and die. Curl up and die somewhere, because deep 
down I'm worried. My life has been turned upside down. The shit and the misery that I've had 
to put up with, everything. And if I'm totally honest, it wouldn't take much for me to sharpen 
up my paintbrush and stick it through my chest again. It wouldn't take much. And I say to 
myself every day: how comes I ain't doing it? Why am I not doing it? (Joe, prisoner). 
 
Aiden and Joe were firm in their perspectives that the Unit was the only place for them and 
their mental health needs. In their accounts, they did not recognise how segregation might be 
contributing to their deteriorating mental health. Nor did they recognise how their repeated 
attempts to self-injure might be construed by the institution as ‘risks to be managed’ (Hannah-
Moffat & Klassen, 2015, p. 146) and might legitimate the use of austere forms of control, like 
segregation. Mental health needs (along with security and deterrence) can create a ‘state of 
necessity’ in which separation and containment become necessary tools to maintain order, and 
become the institutional foundations for the continued use of segregation (Hannah-Moffat & 
Klassen, 2015, p. 147).  
 
Some prisoners were acutely aware of the impact that segregation was having on them:  
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I’ll watch some TV but it’s hard because you lose concentration quickly. I stopped going out 
on the yard. I had my regime – like shower and phone call – less and less. My anxiety and 
mental health got worse because I wasn’t going out and being around people. That’s why I 
find it so hard now to come out of my cell. (George, prisoner). 
 
When I used to be on the wing with my mates, I was fine. I came to the seg and I used to see 
people who had completely lost the plot. I used to laugh. I used to think it was funny that 
they’d lost the plot. You’d hear them chatting to themselves in their cell and I used to laugh.  
I’d say ‘that would never happen to me’. But two years down the line, I now realise what 
those other people were going through. I don’t think it’s nice. I can’t sleep…I over think 
everything…I’ll have little conversations with myself in my cell. I don’t know why. I guess 
that’s because of doing so long in segregation. (George, prisoner). 
 
I suffer from depression. Obviously being in a cell, like in seg, where there’s nothing really to 
do, all I’ve got is time to think about all the pain that I’ve been through in life; especially the 
fact that I’ve got life and banged up as a young kid; a lot of my mates are dying and especially 
the one that died in my arms. So, those are the things, they get to you after a while; especially 
in this space, where you’re just by yourself for 23 hours a day. (Henry, prisoner).  
 
You have nothing to do but think. What else is there to do? And the thing about thinking –
because people might think ‘oh, you think about your behaviour’ – [but] you're not thinking 
about that, you're thinking about certain things that are traumatic. I wake up in cold sweats 
sometimes and I think about when I got stabbed. And, obviously, I'm not shouting out loud but 
it's just, sometimes, I get up and I start pacing up and down my cell like a madman. (Nazeer, 
prisoner). 
 
Whilst studying the impact of segregation on mental health was not an explicit aim of this 
study, during fieldwork, it was an area of inquiry that could not be avoided. Nine of the twenty-
five prisoner participants had been diagnosed with a mental illness (nearly 40%) ranging from 
anxiety, personality disorder, schizophrenia and PTSD. During interviews, it was clear how 
segregation was used as a mechanism to manage those with complex mental health needs. 
Some suggested they came to the Unit with pre-existing mental illness, but others suggested it 
was segregation which caused their mental health to deteriorate. Many prisoners described the 
isolating nature of segregation, how this gave them too much time alone, too much time to 
think and ruminate on past traumas, how it exacerbated depression and anxiety, and how their 
emotions oscillated between feeling happy and content, to feeling angry, frustrated and 




‘Own interests’ was not limited to those who suffered from mental illness. It also applied to 
Sam, Nazeer and Eric, who described feeling unsafe on the wings. They primarily felt unsafe 
because of the power wielded by certain Muslim groups (personal files and transcripts). Nazeer 
named them the ‘Muslim brotherhood’ and, from his perspective, they controlled the prison.  
He described how the group put pressure on people to join, how they had a system of rules 
which, if broken, would be met with violent repercussions. Nazeer was a practising Muslim and 
he took issue with how the religion was being used in prison, to effectively mask what was, in 
his mind, ‘a gang issue’ (transcript). The tensions relating to faith and power, as well as fears of 
extremism and radicalisation, were evident from several prisoner and staff accounts. Their 
narratives were not new, and echo the findings of Liebling, Arnold, et al. (2011) who studied 
the prison in 2009-10. They reported that faith and conversion played an important role in 
Whitemoor. They identified how participation in Islamic practices afforded a much-needed 
opportunity for individuals to find belonging, support, trust and friendship (p. iii). However, 
there were darker undercurrents to ‘faith identities’. They observed how there was considerable 
ignorance and confusion about Islam, which enabled extremist views to creep in, to fill the 
knowledge gap with ‘misinformation and misinterpretation’ (p. iv). They noted, as my 
participants also described, how some ‘heavy players’ in the Muslim population were able to 
amass power, by re-establishing their outside identities as leaders inside the prison (p. 95). 
Some used their faith status to exert authority, to influence and control others, resulting in fear 
and the real risk of violence (p. 101). These descriptions were reflected in the accounts of my 
prisoner participants, including those who were not in segregation for ‘own interests’. Many 
spoke about the dynamics and culture on the wing, about the pressure it brought and how 
segregation could, at times, be a place of solitude, to avoid the ‘wing dynamics’ (Fieldwork 
notes, p. 18 – 19, and interviews with Patrick, Joe, Imran, George, Sam, Nazeer, Billy):  
 
I’m actually alright. You see, when you’re on the wing, all the bollocks and what’s going on, 
all the shit, when I come down here, it’s cleared my mind a bit, it’s made me reassess what I 
want and what I’ve got to do. I’m feeling good. I feel better than what I did on the wing. It 
might just be because of this jail, know what I mean? A lot of shit goes on up there. (Patrick, 
prisoner). 
 
The whole Muslim situation on the wings is crazy. It’s hard to explain. It’s like they’re trying 
to set up an Islamic State, or something, but on the wings. They go round telling you that you 
have to go chapel, you can’t listen to music, you can’t smoke on the landing, you can’t cook 
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bacon in the kitchen. You know, certain things that you can and can’t do. But then, when 
people don’t do it, people are getting cut and beat up. It’s crazy. (Sam, prisoner). 
 
It's a place of safety. If you can switch off and read your book, do your art, listen to the radio, 
and don't care or have any concerns [about] what's outside that door of yours, and live in your 
own little world, I suppose it's bliss. It's calm and peaceful. You switch off and you do your 
own thing, and you get yourself in a little routine. (Joe, prisoner). 
 
Their accounts allude to the relationship between the Unit and the rest of the prison. If the 
wings are volatile and perceived as unsafe, the Unit can be an important place of respite; a 
chance to escape the complex and challenging dynamics of the wings. This important inter-
relationship was identified by O’Donnell, in his exploration of Prisoners, Solitude and Time 
(2014). O’Donnell argued that whilst there is a constellation of negative reactions to 
segregation, there are also positive (less documented) adaptations to isolation. He refers to 
prisoner accounts which describe segregation as a place of sanctuary, which affords a sense of 
safety, as well as somewhere which provides the time and space to reflect, to ‘consolidate the 
self’ (p. 68), to awaken intellectual, artistic and spiritual sensibilities (p. 78). He, like Martel 
(2006, p. 608) acknowledges how segregation is a dual place – one which can save, as well as 
punish – which depended on the characteristics of the individual, the context in which the 
isolation was taking place, and the world (on the wing) being escaped from (O’Donnell, 2014, 
p. 85). 
 
Throughout this chapter, I have explored how the broader prison context has a role in 
influencing when and why segregation is used. The culture on the wings was an important 
factor which led prisoners, like Nazeer, Sam and Eric, to seek safety in the Unit. Relationships 
with staff, which had deteriorated for Ricky and Billy, resulted in a confrontation and 
ultimately led to their transfer to the Unit. For others, like Marcus, Kamil and Jamal, it was the 
lack of progression in Whitemoor that led to their disruptive conduct.  
 
Moreover, the response by the prison to the ‘riot’ reveals how the use of segregation is, in part, 
a product of the decisions made by the prison institution and its various actors. Construed this 
way, senior managers (and other staff members) have an important role in setting the 
parameters of when and why segregation is used. Not only that, but senior managers can also 
determine how long segregation is imposed for, whether an individual is returned to a wing or 
immediately transferred out. Their individual attitudes towards risk, safety and punishment, 
will influence whether they judge segregation to be a fair and proportionate response. 
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Importantly, the broad language of Rule 45 legitimises this discretion and, by extension, 
legitimises staff control. Rule 45 ensures that decisions of segregation, along with assessments 
of the reasonableness and proportionality of such, remain firmly with prison staff. 
 
All of these examples suggest that Whitemoor – through its collective institutional response 
and individual actors – has an important function in directing prisoners’ pathways to the 
segregation unit. Thus, segregation cannot be viewed in isolation, it needs to be considered 
within the broader context of the prison. Any assessment of segregation must be rooted in an 
understanding of the way the prison (and its staff) responds to disorder, attitudes towards risk 
and punishment, general culture, safety and security of both staff and prisoners.  Therefore, the 
use of segregation must be contextualised within the prison and the broader penal system 
within which it functions.  
 
When viewed this way, law (e.g. Rule 45, PR 1999) only has a marginal role in directing and 
constraining the use of segregation in prison. Instead, it is the culture of the institution, effected 
by staff (in their attitudes, customs and decisions), which sets the parameters for the use of 
segregation. Accordingly, Rule 45 was used to address a range of behaviour: from jumping on 
the netting, to possessing a mobile phone, engaging in a suspected ‘riot’ to attempting suicide. 
The implicit, unwritten functions of segregation go beyond those explicitly set out in the PR 
1999. For example, in some cases it was used as a deterrent, to send a message to other 
prisoners about intolerable behaviour. For others, it was used as a substitute for a healthcare 
unit, to manage complex mental health problems. Thus, segregation serves conflicting aims: to 
support those in crisis, at risk of self-harm or suicide; and to punish others for wrongdoing.  
 
This duality reflects the conflict between rehabilitation and punishment, care and coercion, that 
exists elsewhere in the criminal justice system64 (Lynch, 2001). It is recognised in the 
distinction in Rule 45 of the PR 1999 between (i) good order or discipline; and (ii) own 
interests. For those in the Unit who had violated a prison rule and engaged in misconduct, there 
was a common rhetoric of punishment. Whereas for those in the Unit for ‘own interests’, to 
ensure their safety, there was a rhetoric of care. This rhetoric obscured the punishing nature of 
the Unit, and those aims –to care and punish– were contradictory and not often simultaneously 
achieved (Becker, 1968, p. 198).  
 
																																																								
64 For example, s142 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 provides that the purpose of sentencing is to: (a) punish 
offenders; (b) reduce crime – deterrence; (c) reform and rehabilitate offenders; (d) protect the public; (e) allow 
offenders to make reparation to their victims.  
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Staff recognised the multiple functions which the Unit fulfilled. Most staff acknowledged how 
the Unit was not reserved for the most dangerous or difficult prisoners. Instead, it held 
prisoners who were mostly there for their own protection: 
 
I think it's supposed to be somewhere for prisoners that are bad and volatile. They should be 
down here because they've caused destruction on the wings. But anyone who is bored of 
sitting on the wing or who wants a ship out, they'll just jump on the netting, then they'll refuse 
to locate, and they'll just sit down here until they go somewhere else. And we've got a lot with 
mental health issues, so it becomes more of a mental health unit. There's only a handful of 
prisoners down here who I'd say couldn't go on a wing, because they'd be too dangerous on a 
wing. Whereas the rest of them, they're either scared or won't locate because they want to ship 
out. (Oli, staff). 
 
The actual ones that are segregated, not a lot of them are here for punishment, it's mostly for 
their own protection. It's strange because that's not what a seg should really be for. I think seg 
should be for punishment. They shouldn't be here just for their own protection. I think there 
should be other wings for that. If they're scared, they shouldn't be segregated. Segregation 
should be for the naughty boys, and not for the people that are just scared of the naughty 
boys…It should be more of a punishment wing; but you're punishing people that aren't here 
for that reason, which isn't fair, really. (Tony, staff). 
 
Several staff commented on the need for a different wing, perhaps a ‘vulnerable prisoner’ wing, 
to house those who were under threat on the wings or a risk to themselves. This is another 
illustration of how the use of segregation is, in part, driven by institutional decisions. 
Whitemoor previously had a vulnerable prisoner wing but it closed in 2006. The Unit now has 
to fulfil this role but, as several staff acknowledged, this was far from ideal: 
 
You’ve got people that come down on OP [own protection]. Sometimes it’s because they’ve 
helped us out – given us information, prevented some horrific incidents – and they’ve come 
down here and they shouldn’t – well I don’t believe they should – be treated as a seg prisoner. 
They’ve still got to have the same regime but maybe some more entitlements, more benefits. 
They’ve helped us, they’ve stopped one of us having our throat cut which, at the end of the 
day, we should be grateful for. (Holly, staff). 
 
I think staff used to see it as a punishment, if they’re in the seg they should have the 
minimum…but, as things change, like Muslim gangs and stuff, that’s a problem here, 
prisoners come down for their own protection. Then you think ‘why should a prisoner who’s 
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here on own protection not have a tele? or a radio?’. He’s not here because he won’t locate, 
he’s here because if he goes to the wing he’ll get beat up, or cut up, or taken hostage or 
something. So you try and meet in the middle somewhere but there’s only one rulebook. 
There’s not one for a prisoner on GOoD and one for a prisoner on own interests, which I think 
there should be. (Charlie, staff). 
 
As Charlie (and several staff and prisoners) described, the Unit was not able to accommodate 
the duality of functions set out in Rule 45. The different pathways to segregation were not 
reflected in the conditions of the Unit nor its daily regime. There might be some variation in the 
activities provided, for example some prisoners might receive in-cell work, others might have a 
radio or television, but they depended on the prisoner’s IEP status. Generally the regime and 
conditions applied rigidly, regardless of why a prisoner was there. Moreover, there was a real 
lack of opportunity to do rehabilitative work with those who needed it. As Tim (staff) 
explained, the Unit should be a short-to-medium term measure, to hold men in a time of crisis. 
For him, the Unit should be a place where rehabilitative work could be done. Instead, ‘because 
the numbers are so high, we don’t do the work; we just contain [prisoners] and try give them 
the regime and usually fail at the rehabilitation side. It’s all just a bit chaotic’ (Tim, staff).  
 
Importantly, as staff recognised, the Unit was not reserved for the ‘worst of the worst’. Most 
staff relayed how the majority of prisoners could return to the wings. As Oli, Phil and Tony 
said, there were only a handful of prisoners that were too volatile and violent to return to the 
wings. My fieldwork observations and participant accounts all challenge the perception that 
segregation is for punishment, reserved for the worst of the worst. From my experience of 
Whitemoor, the Unit was reserved primarily for those who were at risk on the wing or who 
were frustrated and saw the Unit as the only avenue leading to a transfer.   
4. PSO 1700 and Local Site Rules 
 
Rule 45 is short in length but expansive in application. Thus, additional guidance, in the form 
of PSO 1700 and the Local Site Rules, supplements the PR 1999. PSO 1700 is brief in its 
discussion of the ‘use’ of segregation. It states that segregation should only be used ‘as a last 
resort’ to manage behaviour and problems rather than strictly for punishment (p. 4). As the 
above discussion demonstrates, segregation was not reserved as a ‘last resort’, for some it was a 
‘first resort’. Little attempt is made in PSO 1700 to clearly describe the situations or 
circumstances in which segregation is an appropriate and proportionate response. The only 
prisoners for whom segregation should be ‘avoided’, according to PSO 1700, are those on an 
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ACCT plan. ACCTs are typically used to manage prisoners at risk of self-harm and/or suicide. 
Yet, segregation housed several prisoners on ACCTs (between five and ten prisoners, see 
Chapter Three). The healthcare unit was full so, for those prisoners, the Unit was the only 
option. There was a conflict between the PSO guidance and operational realities.  
 
Moreover, as highlighted in Chapter Two, the Local Site Rules provide few additional 
requirements or obligations over and above those contained in PSO 1700. In fact, the Local Site 
Rules say very little about when, why and how segregation should be used. Together, PS0 1700 
and the Local Site Rules, do little to set the parameters for the use of segregation. They create a 
void in how segregation should be used, and how the formal rules should be interpreted and 
applied. That void is, to a degree, occupied by local customs and practice. It allows segregation 
to be used to ‘send a message’ or as a ‘preventative’ function. It means the use of segregation is 
not constrained by law but, in many ways, is dictated by institutional culture. It is therefore 
rooted in local attitudes, customs and practices – some which may be beyond the scope of, or in 
direct contradiction with, the formal legal rules (of PR 1999) and non-legal rules (in PSO 1700 
and the Local Site Rules). This is discussed in more depth in the next chapter but, for now, it is 
important to recognise the risks associated with broad, ill-defined legal frameworks: they 
function according to individual interpretation, contain a large amount of discretion, allow for 
uncertainty (and inconsistency) to creep in and, at the very worst, mean segregation can be used 
in illegitimate ways. This danger of uncertainty and inconsistency is seen across the prison 
estate. PSO 1700 requires each prison to create a site-specific policy for the management of 
segregation. Therefore, each prison has its own rules and procedures for the segregation unit. It 
means, as many staff and participants described to me, there is substantial variation in the 
conditions and regime offered in segregation units across our penal system. This is not 
conducive for creating consistency and certainty in punishment, aspects which are integral 
components of the rule of law.   
5. Conclusion 
 
The challenges I identified with the interpretation and application of Rule 45, (and, briefly, 
PSO 1700 and Local Site Rules) are not unique to Whitemoor. Since 1980 there have been 
twenty-four legal challenges to the use of segregation (see Annex One). The complaints, often 
similar, arose in a number of different prisons, such as HMP Exeter (Keenan v UK (2001) 33 
EHRR 38), HMP New Hall (R (P) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] 
EWHC 1418), HMP Leeds (Racz v Home Office [1994] 2 WLR 23) and, notably, HMP 
Whitemoor (Russell v Home Office [2001] 3 WLUK 43 and R (Bourgass and another) v 
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Secretary of State for Justice [2015] UKSC 54). Questions which related to the interpretation 
and application of the PR 1999 (and PSO 1700) have not been resolved in practice. My 
fieldwork revealed how the imprecise and poorly defined ‘removal from association’ was 
interpreted broadly and applied inconsistently. The prison authorities were given considerable 
latitude by Rule 45 to determine how, when and why segregation should be used; specifically, 
they had substantial scope to decide what was in the best interests for ensuring the ‘good order’ 
of the prison. At times, preserving the ‘good order’ of Whitemoor, saw the use of segregation 
as ‘prevention’, as ‘punishment’, as ‘deterrence’ – all are broader aims than currently set down 
by Rule 45.  
 
Rule 45 was a mechanism for preserving the ‘good order’ of the prison: segregating an 
individual was intended to allow life on the wings to continue. However, my fieldwork 
revealed how a significant number of individuals sought out segregation to avoid the wings 
because life on the mainstream wings was hard. Segregation, for them, was a place which could 
support their mental health needs, mitigate their risks of harm on the wings, or result in a 
transfer.  
 
The segregated population was rendered vulnerable in many ways – whether because of mental 
illness, or threats on the wing, or because of a near total reliance on staff. Alongside the 
vulnerability of the population, was the concentration of power in the hands of staff and a 
corresponding risk of abuse (Bittner, 1970). The context requires the law to be robust, to 
protect the rights of prisoners who, through their imprisonment had lost their general liberty 
and, through their segregation, had lost any residual liberty; and are arguably individuals who 
are most in need of legal protection. However, the legislation (PR 1999) is not robust. It is 
broad, imprecise, ill-defined, requires considerable interpretation and contains extensive 
discretion. This was intentional: segregation is valuable for prison managers because it is 
discretionary, expedient and without excessive formality. It means the rules, in their current 
form, are brief and limited. Moreover, the failings in the PR 1999 are not corrected by PSO 
1700 or the Local Site Rules, which provide insufficient detail on the circumstances in which 
segregation is a proportionate or reasonable response. 
 
Rule 45, along with PSO 1700 and Local Site Rules, could be updated. They could have clearer 
definitions, be more precise, could better articulate the purpose of segregation and limit the use 
of segregation to certain specific circumstances (with stringent timeframes) and could be 
drafted to prevent indefinite segregation detention. Thus, they could be redrafted to give greater 
 119 
effect to the rule of law, which commands that the law must be (i) ‘intelligible, clear and 
predictable’ and that powers must be exercised (vi) ‘reasonably, in good faith, and for the 
purpose in which they were conferred’. The latter, as the law currently stands, is difficult to 
satisfy. For what purpose is the power of segregation conferred? As the above suggests, the 
power to segregate is wielded to serve a multitude of purposes (some of which are conflicting 
and beyond the PR 1999). However, there would still be a limit to what the rules (if updated 
and improved) could achieve. Segregation is a reactionary measure, imposed to address 
particular tensions within the everyday relations of the prison (the tensions of mental health 
crises, wing relations, violence or disorder) but segregation, itself, is often the focus of 
contention. Segregation highlights the conflict between claims of utility and necessity and those 
of justice, fairness and consistency, which are ‘chronically present’ in prisons; and it is a place 
where the ‘legitimacy deficit’, routinely found in prisons, is revealed in an ‘acute form’ (see 
Sparks et al., 1996, p. 299). Amending the legal rules may not correct this ‘legitimacy deficit’, 
which is more closely related to the way in which the rules are implemented (Sparks et al., 
1996). Moreover, ‘better’ (i.e. clearer, stricter, more precise) legal rules may not address the 
contextual issues, such as the turbulent and unsafe wings, high rates of mental illness and the 
lack of progression, which necessitate the use of segregation. In the interests of caution, I 
should make clear that I am not denying the importance of rules. The point is that the rules, 
pertaining to the use of segregation, are bounded. There are important operational, cultural, 
procedural and other variables, often well beyond the rules, which impact the use of 
segregation (Padfield & Gelsthorpe, 2013, p. 10). Importantly, within its usage, there is a huge 
amount of discretionary power and I expand, in the next chapter, on how that discretionary 
power is wielded. Whilst greater regulation, or the expansion of legal rules, may create more 
control of discretion, it may not result in better control of discretion (see Baldwin & Hawkins, 
1984). Rather than improving statutory standards alone, efforts should be directed towards 
reforming the circumstances which necessitate the use of segregation. For example: (i) better 
support could be provided to those with mental health needs, on the wings or in other parts of 
the prison, to prevent segregation being used as a psychiatric unit; (ii) opportunities for 
progression could be reviewed and improved, so that the Unit is no longer a holding ground or 
site of containment for those seeking transfers; (iii) efforts should be directed towards making 
the wings safer and less volatile; (iv) the ideological commitment to segregation, from prison 
managers and staff, needs to be challenged. Entrenched perceptions, that segregation is 
necessary for deterrence and is fundamental for ensuring order (for which the evidence is 
unconvincing65), unless addressed, will undermine reform efforts.  
																																																								






little deterrent effect; and Mears and Bales (2009); Medrano et al. (2017); Motiuk and Blanchette (2001) found 
segregation increased risks of institutional misconduct, disorder and reoffending.   
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Chapter Five – Law and Discretion: Culture of Segregation 
	
We have the rules and I’ll follow the rules because they are there. But if I like one prisoner 
more than I like another, I might apply the rules slightly differently. Take Arthur, he is a really 
difficult man to like, and he makes me want to apply the rules very strictly. But Wayne – he 
can be more threatening – but is quite likeable, in a childlike kind of way, so I'll bend the rules 
for him. (Terry, staff). 
	
The previous chapter illustrates the broad way in which Rule 45 of the PR 1999 can be 
interpreted and applied in prison. It also highlights how supplementary guidance – PSO 1700 
and Local Site Rules – may do little to constrain the ample discretion within the main legal 
rules. Whilst I identify opportunities for improving the rules of segregation, I suggest that law 
and policy change would only go so far. This is because no matter how precise, clear and 
well-drafted the law or policy might be, there will always be a ‘certain flexibility, ambiguity 
or discretion in how it is applied in practice’ (Padfield & Gelsthorpe, 2013, p. 3). i.e. there is a 
space between the formal position of the rules and actual practice. This ‘space’ is occupied by 
organisational, occupational and cultural factors which, as Padfield and Gelsthorpe (2013, p. 
9) suggest, may be ‘as important’ as the rules and policies which guide action. It is, in this 
chapter, the ‘organisational, occupational and cultural factors’ to which I turn: specifically, 
the relationship between rules, policy and culture.  
 
On the surface, there was the rhetoric of law, rules and rights in the Unit, yet this did not 
necessarily determine staff practices and conduct. Instead, as the first part of this chapter 
discusses, staff culture was a greater force in the Unit. The staff culture was characterised by 
staff who prioritised the regime over rehabilitation; who held mostly punitive or negative 
attitudes towards prisoners; developed especially close working relationships; and a suspicion 
and scepticism towards outsiders. Staff, in the Unit, formed a group characterised by 
solidarity, independence and close friendships. Such attributes mutually enforced staff 
attitudes towards law, their adherence to rules and staff practices (McConville, Sanders, & 
Leng, 1991). Importantly, staff culture was influenced by the fear and anxiety associated with 
working in the violent and unpredictable Unit. There was a strong correlation between staff 
culture and the context within which it was created and sustained.  
 
The second part of the chapter discusses how the rules create a space in which discretion can 
thrive – sometimes for the benefit of prisoners, but sometimes to their detriment. The point is 
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not so much that staff discretionary judgments, and their decision-making, will always be 
‘inferior or more problematic’ (Scott, 2006, p. 13). In fact, as demonstrated in the second part 
of this chapter, staff discretion clearly benefited certain prisoners. However, I observed a 
tendency for staff discretion to be exercised in ways which resulted in the selective 
enforcement of rules: rules (whether legal or not) were used to legitimate, or even rejected in 
favour of, practices which were sometimes punitive, discriminatory and unfair. Moreover, the 
dominant staff culture eroded the proper functioning of oversight and accountability 
mechanisms; it meant there were weak internal constraints on staff discretion. Importantly, 
the law and rules could be used in ways which protected the interests and ideologies of the 
more powerful staff group (Drake, 2012, p. 135). Thus, at times, the rules were subordinate to 
the cultural norms and customs of the Unit. When practices function according to social and 
organisational norms or informal rules, they become ‘untied from the rule of law’ and, 
consequently, ‘untied’ from principles of public scrutiny and the legal or democratic 
principles of fairness, transparency and accountability (Scott, 2006, p. 13). As a result, legal 
aims relating to natural justice, and rule of law principles (like consistency and predictability), 
can become subsumed within the organisational and occupational culture. Paradoxically, the 
Unit – a place which is created by law and whose authority to contain individuals is 
prescribed in law – becomes characterised by the avoidance, the manipulation and the 
negotiation of law (Scott, 2006).  
 1. Staff culture 
 
Whilst the culture in the Unit was, in large part, shaped by staff members, it was also firmly 
embedded within and shaped by the broader prison institution and organisational decisions. 
The Unit was physically separate: it was treated as a discrete unit and operated mostly 
according to its own localised rules and procedures. Importantly, the same group of staff often 
implemented the rules and procedures. These operational decisions cultivated a culture in 
which staff were distant from the rest of the prison, absented from managerial oversight, and 
able to develop strong group solidarity. However, institutional decisions cannot fully account 
for other parts of the Unit’s character, those which related to daily practices, attitudes, ways of 
working and the exercise of discretion. These are aspects in which staff, in the Unit, had an 
important role. Prison officers have a substantial role in shaping the institution’s culture, 
particularly its ‘social and moral climate’ (Liebling & Kant, 2018). As Liebling and Kant 
(2018) suggest, just as 80% of prison costs are accounted for by staff, 80% of the ‘moral 
climate’ in prison ‘can be accounted for by staff attitudes and practices’ (p. 210).  
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Liebling and Kant (2018) comprehensively explored why officers tended to distrust managers, 
were cynical towards penal reform and removed from ‘liberal humanitarian goals’ (Liebling 
& Kant, 2018; Thomas, 1972 p. 209). They distinguished between two cultures in a prison: 
‘professional-supportive’ and ‘traditional-resistant’.  ‘Professionally-supportive’ officers were 
characterised by a professional pride, had respect for the legal rules but used them carefully, 
and used ‘well-judged discretion’ to secure social order (p. 210). They were good-humoured, 
patient, honest and supportive. They were reliable and had an optimistic, but realistic, 
outlook.  Importantly, they viewed offenders as people with futures, and saw themselves as 
having an important role in helping to bring about a better future. They valued human 
relationships, which they perceived as important for growth and development. However, these 
kind of officers were ‘not typical’ but existed in small numbers across the whole prison 
system (pp. 210, 211). In contrast, they identified a ‘traditional-resistant’ staff culture. This 
was characterised by staff who were ‘trapped in the past’ and believed in the ‘romanticised 
relics of repression’ (Morris & Morris, 1968, p. 161); who preferred control over care; were 
preoccupied with discipline; and characterised by distrust, cynicism and negative attitudes 
towards prisoners (pp. 211, 212).  
 
When considering the two contrasting cultures, Liebling and Kant (2018, p. 217) drew on the 
work of William Muir (1977) who developed two typologies of police officers, the ‘tragic’ 
versus ‘cynical’ officer. Individuals who held a ‘tragic’ perspective were able to ‘grasp the 
nature of human suffering’ (1977, p. 3); and it was ‘suffering’ (human tragedy) which 
connected humanity. From the ‘tragic’ perspective, human nature was unitary: there was 
common ground between humans. This perspective acknowledged that cultural and 
environmental factors impacted personality, that behaviour and decision-making were rooted 
in context. Some individuals might become anxious, callous, irrational or remorseless, but 
these were exceptions which resulted from ‘circumstantial abnormalities, to which all persons 
were susceptible’ (1977, p. 225). The ‘tragic’ perspective refused to separate the world into 
‘Us and Them’; it ‘saw weakness and strength as inextricably bound. It found the sources of 
evil and good in the same origins. And it respected the problems and complexities of 
individual life’ (1977, p. 226). Applied to the prison officers in Liebling and Kant’s study, it 
was a hopeful perspective, one which recognised that offenders shared similarities with staff, 
that they could be trusted and were able to change (2018, p. 218). Whereas the ‘cynical’ 
perspective was dualistic: it conceived human nature as ‘consisting of warring camps’ and the 
natures of those in the warring camps were perceived as fundamentally different (1977, p. 
226). The ‘cynical’ perspective, for Muir, meant empathy and love could not cross ‘enemy 
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lines’ (p. 226). When applied to prisons, the ‘cynical’ officers perceived offending as a result 
of an individual’s choice, the offender was ‘othered’, could not be trusted, and was perceived 
as dangerous and manipulative (Liebling & Kant, 2018, p. 217).  
 
Whilst there were exceptions – and I am not suggesting that staff attitudes and behaviours 
were homogenous and unitary – but during fieldwork, I observed an identifiable, distinctive 
culture in the Unit. By ‘culture’, I mean the shared ‘assumptions, values, beliefs, and attitudes 
that officers express, directly and indirectly’ and which influence their action and daily 
practices to a greater or lesser degree (Liebling, 2007, p. 106). The culture was much closer to 
the ‘traditional-resistant’ typology than the ‘professionally-supportive’ one, identified by 
Liebling and Kant (2018). Staff tended to prioritise the regime over rehabilitation; were 
disengaged from prisoners; were extremely tight-knit; and hostile to other staff and visitors to 
the Unit. These are all aspects of the ‘traditional-resistant’ culture and each is discussed, in 
turn, below.  
Prioritisation of the regime 
 
Generally, amongst staff, there was a preoccupation with ‘getting the regime done’. As 
Charlie described ‘whatever job you’re on, you’ve just gotta get it finished. Just get it done. I 
don’t think there’s much more to it’. This culminated in a sense, described by several officers, 
of pressure to get through the regime – to provide all prisoners with access to the exercise 
yard, shower or phonecall, as well as meals. This is a prime example of what Liebling and 
Kant termed ‘system maintenance’, whereby the regime and its processes were prioritised 
over rehabilitation or other meaningful activities (2018, p. 212). This pressure was, for many 
staff, caused by the capacity of the Unit – often between 25 and 30 prisoners: 
 
When we’ve got such high numbers, we’ve got no time to have a decent conversation with any 
of them. You’re literally at the door like yeah yeah yeah, walk away.. it’s just about getting it 
done, rather than having a purposeful conversation with someone. That’s only because we’ve 
got 26 seg prisoners. It dropped a little while ago to about 19, 22, something like that, and that 
was so much better. And it’s only 4, 5, or 6 less prisoners, meaning you can actually have a 
conversation at the door and not be thinking ‘come on, shut up, I need to get to the next door 
to move him on to the yard’. It’s more about the regime than it is the people. (Charlie, staff). 
  
The Unit operated a ‘regimented regime’ (James, staff), whereby prisoners were detained 
behind their doors for most of the day and staff controlled prisoner movements and 
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entitlements. The Unit was also close to, or at, operational capacity. Together, it meant there 
were limited opportunities for human interaction and, as staff described, it was not easy to 
establish relationships with prisoners, nor build a positive rapport. As such, there was little 
opportunity for rehabilitative work: 
 
There’s no rehabilitative stuff down here. We might be able to do it with long-term seg 
dwellers, as we get to know them a bit more, it makes it easier to build a relationship, but 
generally we can’t, we don’t have the time. (Josh, staff). 
 
It’s not rehabilitative really. They’d [senior management] like it to be. But it’s so hard with the 
numbers and the behaviour of some of the individuals…we’re just hanging on really. We’re 
coping and providing a decent regime, we try treat them with respect but we’re just battling 
every day with it, to keep it ticking over. To try and do rehabilitative, amazing, work is so 
difficult when our main priority is just to get the regime done, get the apps processed, get 
them in the showers and all the rest of it. That is a huge achievement every day. We get to the 
end of the day and think ‘phew well we got through that’, when all we’ve really done was give 
them the regime. That’s the achievement, which is not that ambitious really. (Tim, staff). 
 
Most staff, during interview, recognised the value of human relationships but felt, due to 
‘regime pressures’, there was little opportunity for them to develop in practice. Staff had very 
little time to talk to prisoners. They rushed from cell door to cell door. Exchanges were short 
and staff described a reluctance to engage in longer conversations:  
 
Because we’re so busy, we don’t have time to do all that chatting bollocks, it’s like …‘do you 
want regime today?’...[prisoner replies] ‘er er er’…‘do you want exercise or a shower?’...and 
then they want to discuss it with you. I’m like ‘look, do you want it or not?’ cos I‘ve fucking 
got shit loads to do and I need to get it done. Whereas if there’s a bit more time, then maybe I 
could stand at the door for a few more minutes. (Charlie, staff). 
 
I don’t talk to them on the yards, at their doors…or take them in the Bubble and speak to them 
for 20 minutes. I haven’t got time for that and, to be honest, I’m just not interested in that, 
because you're here to do a different kind of job, really, and just give them their regime and 
that's it. Not really a lot else, not really time to do anything else. (James, staff).  
 
Sometimes their feelings of pressure and stress manifested in an impatient and dismissive 
attitude towards prisoners. For most, this was the product of a pressured and hectic regime, 
but for a small handful, like James, there was a disinterest and ambivalence in forming 
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relationships with prisoners. The Unit had not always been like that. Staff recalled a period 
during which there were fewer prisoners and more staff, when they felt able to dedicate more 
time and resources to relationship building and rehabilitation. Staff used to, for example, 
unlock prisoners and talk to them in the Bubble: 
 
During the day you can give them five, ten minutes of your time…We used to, say if it's 
something a bit sensitive, we'd get them in the Bubble and sit in there and talk, just talk over 
things. You could give them your undivided attention, and it was quality, and they would 
appreciate it. And it could stop them getting angry about something daft. We don't do it now 
like we used to. Before, you could chat with prisoners, and build relationships, all that sort of 
stuff. But, unfortunately, a lot of that's gone because we've cut, cut, cuts. That's the detriment 
of cuts. (Alan, staff). 
 
Most staff suggested it was the current context – a Unit which was often full and short staffed 
– which meant it was hard for staff to commit time and energy to engaging meaningfully with 
prisoners. As a result, staff were often slow to answer cell bells, which were sometimes 
ignored for 20 or 30 minutes. They were slow to move prisoners from the showers or the 
phone booth – again, sometimes resulting in a 15 or 20-minute wait – and were unresponsive 
to prisoners’ requests (to check their property or financial balances). However, the ‘busy’ and 
‘pressured’ regime only partly explains the limited interactions with prisoners. As suggested 
below, staff avoided committing time and energy to relationship building, sometimes because 
of their cynical and distrusting attitudes, but sometimes because of high levels of fear.  
Staff and prisoners 
 
During fieldwork, I observed a toughness to some staff: they held an unsympathetic vision of 
prisoners, whereby prisoners were ‘othered’ and denigrated, and which created considerable 
distance between the two groups.   
 
Staff gave the impression that they did not recognise the human dignity of prisoners (Drake, 
2012, p. 97), in their boastful remarks about use of force; language which belittled prisoners, 
such as ‘chunts’ (childish cunts) or ‘knobheads’ (Fieldwork notes, p. 75); and statements 
about prisoners’ failed suicide attempts, including, ‘I wouldn’t care if he lived or died, he’s 
one of those that causes bother for everyone’; ‘just let the bugger hang’ (Fieldwork notes, pp. 
23, 49). Jokes were often made at prisoners’ expense. For example, in the kitchen, the 
whiteboard containing prisoners’ dietary requirements was titled ‘Fussy Sod Board’; and meal 
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times were referred to as ‘feeding times’, the inference being that the Unit was equivalent to a 
zoo (Fieldwork notes, p. 59). Staff made attempts at ‘banter’ with prisoners, but they tended 
to be insulting and condescending, rather than kind-hearted joviality. These ‘jokes’ and 
comments, predicated on ‘power differentials’, illustrated a careless use of power (Crewe, 
2009, p. 62).  
 
There was ‘moral distance’ between staff and prisoners (Crewe, 2009, p. 63), which placed 
prisoners in the other ‘warring camp’ of Muir’s (1977, p. 226) ‘cynical’ perspective and had 
the effect of ‘othering’ prisoners. Some staff described prisoners as ‘shitbags’, the ‘worst of 
the worst’ (James, staff), and in terms which distinguished them on grounds of humanity: ‘I 
think there’s a difference between officers and prisoners…We seem to, I dunno, have a bit 
more humanity about us’ (Holly). Prisoners were distanced as lesser human beings, 
‘constructed as essentially different and beyond the realms of prison officers’ understandings 
of humanity’ (Scott, 2008, p. 176).  It was easier to ‘other’ prisoners when staff-prisoner 
interactions were so limited. Prisoners were detained in their cells for at least 23 hours a day. 
This produced both a physical and psychological distance between prisoners and staff. One 
member of staff suggested this was a coping mechanism:  
 
You keep prisoners very much at arm’s length, and you dehumanise because it’s easy if you 
dehumanise somebody. It’s easier to lock them up and easier to not think about them…but the 
result is you dehumanise yourself, you take the personal element out of the relationships. 
(Terry, staff). 
 
There was an emotional and relational distance in the Unit. Importantly, the distance brought 
a sense of safety, that ‘arm’s length’ relationships made it easier for staff to do their jobs. 
Distance, as Arnold (2005) suggests, can be an important self-protection mechanism to help 
officers cope with the stresses of their work and the perceived dangers and risks associated 
with their roles. However, one downside of distance is that it creates a space in which it is 
harder for any, let alone the ‘right’, staff-prisoner relationships to thrive (Liebling, 2008; 
Liebling, Price, et al., 2011).  
 
Staff perspectives on ‘choice’ i.e. prisoners were in the Unit as a result of their choices, 
reinforced this distance. This was an important perspective held by ‘traditional-resistant’ 
prison officers (Liebling & Kant, 2018, p. 217)  and by Muir’s ‘cynical’ police officers (1977, 
p. 226). Staff adopted a ‘distinct criminology’ of the segregated prisoner, one which perceived 
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offending, or in this case prison rule-breaking, as a direct result of individual choice and 
rationality: 
 
It seems to be a very easy choice for a lot of people, just go jump on the netting, get them 
down the seg…Then they come down and refuse to go back. So I do think it’s a choice for a 
lot of people. (Holly, staff). 
 
The majority of them choose to go there. How they do that is on them. (Josh, staff). 
 
It is a choice because people make choices, if they do something to be punished for, they’ve 
made that choice to do that. If they’ve got themselves in a position where they’re under threat, 
they’ve made those choices to do that. If they’ve said ‘fuck you, I want a ship out’, they’ve 
made that choice to do that. And they made the choice to commit crime to be put in prison in 
the first place. So, yeah, I suppose it is. Everything’s a choice isn’t it? (Charlie, staff). 
 
A small number of staff recognised the complexity of wing dynamics and the threats prisoners 
faced there. However, for the most part, staff perceived prisoners as directly responsible for 
their transfer to the Unit. Prisoners were viewed as rule-breaking agents, who made choices 
that staff would never make. No special account was taken of the ‘bounded’ nature of choice; 
that decisions were not always freely made (Cornish & Clarke, 1986, 1987; Wikström, 2017). 
Staff overlooked the context for prisoner decision-making, such as the impact of the prison 
environment, turbulent wings, or role of staff decision-making. This perspective furthered the 
‘moral distance’ between staff and prisoners: staff remained at arm’s length, removed from 
‘their worlds’, and disconnected from the prisoner.    
 
A tendency to ‘other’ prisoners, and to overlook the complexities of their ‘choices’, are 
characteristic of Liebling and Kant’s (2018) ‘traditional-resistant’ prison officer, and 
dominated much of the culture of the Unit. However, it was not universal. Some staff 
dissented from the ‘traditional-resistant’ type perspectives. There was a small number (3 or 4) 
who were much closer to Liebling and Kant’s (2018) ‘professional-supportive’ officers. They 
were more patient and invested in their relationships with prisoners. They prided themselves 
on being reliable and ‘seeing things through for prisoners’. They recognised the importance of 
meaningful human contact. They understood how frustrating it could be for prisoners in the 
Unit who felt utterly powerless, and acknowledged how many of the prisoners in the Unit 
(and across the prison) tended to be young and struggling to make sense of very long (30 
years+) sentences. The staff who went against the dominant culture (characterised by 
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negativity, hostility and punitiveness) felt they had to conceal their actions or attitudes. They 
represented the ‘Lonely Braves’ identified by Klofas and Toch (1982, p. 247) (and later 
expanded by Liebling (2007)); they were officers who, by enthusiastically providing ‘human 
services to prisoners’ went against the grain of the established culture (Liebling, 2007, p. 
116). For example, one morning Wayne smashed his observation panel and urinated over the 
inside of his door. He was moved to a different cell, to allow his to be cleaned. His new cell 
was without electricity. Throughout the day he became increasingly agitated and angry. He 
wanted a cell with electricity. He shouted at staff, became upset and distressed. The next day, 
during lunch – when most staff were away from the Unit – Alex cleaned Wayne’s cell. Wayne 
was moved back and calmed down. When I asked Alex why she cleaned the cell, she 
explained ‘the industrial cleaners will take too long to come and Wayne wasn’t doing too well 
in that cell… but don’t tell them lot. I’ll never hear the end of it’ (Fieldwork notes, p. 73).  
 
The indifference or apathy of some staff was, sometimes, a mask for their feelings and 
emotions. It was an example of how staff adapted to working in the Unit: by embracing a 
certain tough, cold and detached demeanour, staff were able to manage their emotions – 
particularly anxiety, insecurity and fear (Arnold, 2005, pp. 405,406; Crawley, 2004). Nearly 
all staff during interview described feeling fearful, anxious and worried about their own 
personal safety: 
 
The most challenging? For me, it's the potential threat to your safety… the thought I might get 
hurt. (Richard, staff). 
 
I think you're always anxious, to a point, because you're the one that's opening the door. You 
don't have an idea of what's behind the door…you can never say, 100 percent, ‘this is how it's 
going to happen’. You never know whether someone is just going to, one day, come out and 
smack you because, obviously, it happens. So I think you're always a bit anxious…Obviously, 
these people that are in here, they're in here for a reason, and a lot of them are unpredictable, 
so you don't know what's going to happen. (Oli, staff). 
 
Simpson makes me very anxious because I’m just waiting for him to go. Patel too, only 
because he’s assaulted staff. All of them, nowadays, because of the last couple of staff 
assaults, I’m thinking they’re all capable…[because] I would never have expected Miller to 
come out and smack someone. He was only saying on the yard, that morning, that he’s got no 
staff assaults on his record. (Holly, staff). 
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A lot of the time, people won’t talk about it, but there are times when you think ‘you’re about 
to fucking hit me’…Obviously that’s a natural situation because of the nature of where we 
work: we work with people who have been in trouble with the police and might not like us. I 
remember when Barlow came out of his cell once…everyone was uncomfortable. He was 
walking really fast, we were all walking really fast, all really close to him. No one was talking 
and everyone thought he was just gonna swing for someone, and he was a real handful to fight 
with as well. Every single person, I don’t care what they say, definitely felt scared and thought 
he was gonna do something. (Charlie, staff). 
 
Fear was associated with concerns about physical safety and was embedded within staff 
perceptions of the Unit as an ‘uncertain place’, with unpredictable prisoners. It was grounded 
in the belief, for many staff, that prisoners in the Unit were dangerous and ‘all capable of 
violence’ (Alan). This belief was influenced by the nature of the environment: staff described 
how working in a high security prison meant they worked with some of the most ‘violent 
individuals in the prison system’ (Alan). It was also, as Richard and Alan indicate, influenced 
by the reputations of some prisoners, formed as a result of an individual’s behaviour before 
arriving at the Unit:  
 
They're all capable of it, obviously, because you just look at their crimes and they're not in 
here for robbing gas meters… they can be quite violent people. (Alan, staff). 
 
So, you think to yourself, if they're so bad that they can't even be held in the CSC unit, which 
is as bad as it gets, and we've got them and you think, wow, that's going to make them quite 
dangerous and the risk is going to be quite high. The same as anyone who assaults a member 
of staff, it automatically puts you on edge, and puts you on your guard. (Richard, staff). 
 
Simpson is still very new. We've got all these horror stories from Woodhill about him. 
Obviously, we're taking him at face value, but there's still that anxiety… is he going to stab 
one of us? Is he going to attack one of us? We don't know whether he's going to do it. So that's 
probably the stress…that's what I've found worse as an officer down here, the unknown. 
(Alan, staff). 
 
Staff narratives of fear and anxiety were common during interviews, but they were emotions 
which were far removed from the confident and fearless selves staff often presented in the 
Unit. A number of staff recognised the difficulties in reconciling feeling afraid with the 
traditional conceptualisation of the prison officer:  
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We all give it – we're big roughty-toughty seg screws or prison officers – and we've got a 
white shirt or black, but these are cotton shirts and they're not made of steel. The reality is, and 
we don't show it, but yeah, you're scared. The risk of getting hurt could be quite high, 
depending on who you're dealing with – like Scott Whaite and Tony Barlow – very violent 
people and they mean what they're doing. (Alan, staff). 
 
When I was younger I sort of bought into this ethos that prison officers were made out of 
stone, and we don't feel fear, we're ‘too tough to feel fear’, and it's just such a really, really 
horrible toxic masculinity thing; that men aren't allowed to be vulnerable, feel scared. Well, 
actually, I feel scared most days down here. (Richard, staff). 
 
The admissions, from Alan and Richard, illustrate the complex culture of the Unit. It was not 
a place where fear and anxiety could be easily expressed. Staff felt they would be perceived as 
weak, unable to cope or that they were ‘fraggled’ (used by staff to denote a mental 
exhaustion, being ‘burnt out’). The group identity was formed, superficially, along principles 
of machismo and bravado; and coping mechanisms (like a ‘brave face’, humour and 
disengagement) were used to mask their anxieties. 
 
None of this is surprising. Existing research suggests that prison officers develop various 
coping strategies to offset the stresses and strains of the work (or their own ‘pains of 
imprisonment’) (Arnold, 2005, p. 413). They cope with their exposure to danger and the 
substantial uncertainty of their work by: (i) distancing themselves from the main source of 
that danger – prisoners; (ii) exuding confidence and projecting bravery and bravado; and (iii) 
developing substantial distrust and suspicion towards prisoners (Arnold, 2005, pp. 399, 414). 
Staff detachment and apathy may be important mechanisms for coping with the uncertainty 
and risk of violence in their work place (Liebling & Kant, 2018, p. 215). However, too much 
detachment or apathy can cause officers to withdraw, so that they cease to care and fail to 
perform their jobs properly (Arnold, 2005, p. 416). Here, the detachment and apathy 
perpetuated the distance between staff and prisoners. The distance meant prisoners were 
conceived as the ‘dangerous others’ (Drake, 2011); it made fear and ‘othering’ not only 
possible, but also likely (Bauman, 1989). Distance created a ‘moral blindness’ (Bauman & 
Donskis, 2013) in which staff failed to recognise the dignity and personhood of the prisoner 
(Liebling & Williams, 2018, p. 1215). This was not helped by the extreme isolation of the 
prisoner: located behind his door for 23 hours a day. There were few opportunities for staff 
interaction with prisoners, and therefore few opportunities for challenging the entrenched 
rhetoric of fear and dangerousness. Thus, the structural conditions of confinement, in many 
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ways, made it easier for staff to ‘other’ prisoners and to maintain their cynical, distrusting and 
detached attitudes.  
Staff and each other 
 
Staff in the Unit were undoubtedly very close. This was, for most staff participants, one of the 
main positives of working in the Unit. Nearly all participants, when answering the question 
‘what do you like about working in the Unit?’, responded with accounts which praised staff 
dynamics and the closeness of the staff relationships:  
 
The thing I love most is the teamwork. I love the type of close working. We are brothers and 
sisters, really, and that's sort of a bit cliché, but…I think we do work like that. That's how it 
makes me feel, band of brothers and all that sort of stuff. (Alan, staff). 
 
The staff are brilliant…Yeah, it's a very close-knit community and we all go out drinking and 
socialising together. Definitely, I've never felt closer. I was a squaddie once, many moons ago, 
and that's very similar, the camaraderie, very close together – you've got to be. (Tony, staff). 
 
Because the level of risk is higher here, we look after each other and we trust each other, 
because people have got your back all the time. Everyone's always looking out for each other 
to make sure you're safe, because we all want to go home in one piece (Alan, staff).  
 
It’s the team – hands down – that’s what made me come down here in the first place. Cos 
even on the worst day, we have a laugh. Everyone picks each other up. If you’re having a 
really rough time, it’s not a problem. We have a laugh, have banter and I think that gets it off 
your chest. Instead of walking around anxious and nervous like you could be, I think laughing 
does you a world of good. And we do have a laugh, as I’m sure you’ll have seen. Not always 
the most appropriate or whatever but you’ve got to have that sense of humour. It’s probably a 
bit dark at times but that’s the best thing about down here, the team. (Holly, staff). 
 
It was evident, from many staff accounts, that positive staff relationships were deemed 
important for feeling safe. Within the group, there was a substantial level of trust and reliance. 
They shared jokes and ‘banter’. They also socialised together outside the prison. They had a 
WhatsApp chat and a Facebook group. They went to the pub together and to music festivals. 
Their relationships extended beyond the boundaries of the prison.  
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In part, their relationships arose as a consequence of operational decisions – the same group 
worked in the Unit most of the time. However, they also arose from the pressures of the 
working environment. During interviews, and informal conversations throughout fieldwork, it 
became apparent how significant, traumatic events bonded staff. Shared trauma can lead to 
greater group solidarity and cohesion, and may explain why the group in the Unit were 
especially close (Rosenbloom & Williams, 2010). Prison officers can develop strong group 
solidarity by sharing intense experiences and danger with their colleagues. They also share a 
‘working isolation’ which arises from the organisational aspects of the work: the shift 
patterns, irregular days off and the sense of alienation from ordinary society (Kleinig, 1996, p. 
69). Thus, officers often describe a sense that only other officers can understand what it is like 
to work in a prison. This produces a camaraderie which reinforces the inward-looking nature 
of the staff group, their dependence on each other in times of threat and their opportunities for 
bonding (Liebling, 2007, p. 107). 
 
Testing incidents – significant and traumatic events – featured in many staff accounts. Often 
the same incidents were described in ways which exposed the scars left in the Unit and on the 
people who work there. For example, many staff recounted how, in January 2017, six 
prisoners were on dirty protest in the Unit. The prisoners smashed their observation panels, 
threw faeces and urine onto the landing, refused to allow staff or cleaners to remove the waste 
(they threatened to throw faeces at anyone who tried), and this continued for four weeks. Most 
staff recognised how this was a hard environment to work in but looked back on it with 
humour, and some identified positives from the situation, particularly as it brought staff closer 
together:  
 
They smashed out their observation panel, they were just chucking all their rubbish and poo, 
everything, piss, all that out. The landing was covered, it was disgusting. It was like that for 
about four weeks. It was manic, unbelievable really. You’d come in, have a shower, and then 
you’d have work clothes to get changed in to. It was horrible. Coming in, just walking through 
all their poo. It wasn’t good. You look at that and think ‘bonkers’, it wasn’t normal at all. At 
the time you laughed, because you thought ‘this ain’t real’. You think ‘how is this actually 
happening’? At the time, it’s not funny but you just laugh through it because everyone is there 
together, doing the same thing, so you’ve gotta do it. (Jason, staff). 
 
I think in a way that was the best thing that happened because it brought everyone even closer 
together. Not at the time – people thought it was rubbish at the time – but the aftermath was 
good. A few of the people who hadn’t been in the seg that long thought ‘well that’s the worst 
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it can get so it’s alright now, everything’s gonna be fine’. I think it pulled people together a 
bit. (Phil, staff). 
 
Similarly, an incident in December 2017 was mentioned by staff in a number of interviews. 
Staff recalled how two prisoners (on separate occasions), who were under the influence of 
spice, set themselves on fire in their cells. One died. This incident had left a mark on many 
members of staff. In interviews, they reflected on how the deaths happened and what could 
have been done differently.  
 
Staff accounts also featured some notorious prisoners. Several staff mentioned Rory. He was 
described as a difficult prisoner. One afternoon, he managed to escape from the telephone 
booth. He took another prisoner hostage – one who had come down from the wing to clean 
the Unit. Rory took the prisoner into the kitchen area, held a blade to his face and made 
threats to ‘stab his eyes out’. Staff intervened, with one staff member offering herself in 
exchange for the hostage.  
 
Staff narratives revealed how significant events, traumatic incidents and noteworthy prisoners 
could have important bonding functions: uniting staff in fear and trauma. In response to their 
challenging, stressful and dangerous work environment, staff developed close relationships, 
loyalty, trust and reliance. There was a level of shared understanding of how difficult and 
traumatic the environment could be. It was an environment in which a group identity – and 
solidarity – could thrive. Whilst good peer relationships can be important for job satisfaction, 
enjoyment and in helping staff to feel safe; some forms of ‘traditional camaraderie’ such as 
humorous (offensive) banter, ‘in-jokes’ and cliques, can contribute to an unhealthy ‘us-them’ 
culture (in staff-prisoner relationships but also in Unit staff/non-unit staff relationships – see 
below) (Liebling, Tait, Stiles, Harvey, & assisted by Rose, 2005, p. 215).  
Staff and outsiders 
 
The closeness of staff created a nexus of power in their hands, which they were able to use to 
influence recruitment decisions, as well as working practices (evident in their treatment of 
‘guests’ discussed below): 
 
We can be quite prescriptive as to who we want to come down here. Sometimes names were 
put forward and we’ve said ‘it’s just not going to work’. It might sound a bit shady but you’ve 
got to get on with everyone because it’s a close team. It’s quite difficult to come in to. A lot of 
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people have said, when they’ve guested, it can be quite intimidating to come down here. That 
was never the intention but you’ve got to get on with them because you’ve got to work with 
them, you’ve got to trust them, and you’ve got to know that when you’re opening the door and 
something goes off, then you’ve got a couple of people who are going to run in and not hide in 
an office somewhere or pretend they haven’t heard the alarm bell or run the other way…which 
we had the other day. (Jason, staff). 
 
Staff in the Unit had some influence when it came to recruiting new officers. During 
fieldwork, names were put forward for new recruits, and staff vehemently objected to some 
individuals. This was based on personal judgments like: ‘he’s a right pain’ or ‘he won’t fit in 
here’.66 As a consequence, there was little diversity in staff in the Unit. All were white, mostly 
male, and most shared the attitudes towards prisoners, and the institution, described above.  
 
Unit staff were also able to influence the working practices of ‘guests’ in the Unit. ‘Guesting’ 
was when an officer, usually assigned to a different wing, was allocated to work in the Unit. 
Staff were often suspicious, hostile and critical of ‘guests’. There was a shared sense, amongst 
Unit staff, that guests were lazy, unreliable and would undermine the safety of all staff in the 
Unit:  
 
Jason: Some of the guests are useless, you can’t rely on them to do a good job.  
Alan: We send them to the yard. That’s all they’re good for. (Fieldwork notes, p.19) 
 
‘Guest’ officer came in to Centre Office, I haven’t seen him before. He picked up Alan’s 
phone and Alan said ‘what do you want, you can’t use my phone, helmethead’. He snatched 
the phone back and put it down. It appears difficult for other officers to come to the Unit, they 
seem on the outside of the tight knit group, they get given the worst jobs (e.g. on the yard), are 
excluded from the ‘in’ jokes and the general team spirit of the officers who work in 
segregation permanently. (Fieldwork notes, p. 37). 
 
Alex came in to the office and was very upset. She explained: ‘we only have two seg staff on 
tomorrow. The rest are guests, we could end up with the shit that the res [residential wing] 
don’t want. I called the gov and told him it won’t be safe because we only have two seg staff 
																																																								
66 Applicant names were informally shared with staff in the Unit. Sometimes by colleagues on the wings, 
sometimes by the applicants themselves. One manager disclosed how informal staff objections meant, for one 
applicant, a rejection for interview. The manager explained that, without staff acceptance, it would have been 
‘difficult’ for the applicant to join the Unit. He suggested there needed to be some level of staff support for new 
staff.  However, staff approval was not always a prerequisite: despite staff protestations, another applicant was 
interviewed and later offered a position in the Unit (Fieldwork notes, p.79).  
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on tomorrow afternoon. He’s just had training on ‘reflections’: well, how about he tries to do 
some reflecting on our own safety? (Fieldwork notes, p. 97). 
 
They typically assigned ‘guests’ to the worst duties. For example, Oli complained about 
distributing post to prisoners, to which Charlie replied ‘we’ve got guests down here this 
afternoon, make them do it’ (Fieldwork notes, p. 71). ‘Guests’ would be sent to the yards, a 
role generally disliked by staff because it involved standing outside in the cold and the rain, 
without cover, for hours. They would be given the task of escorting prisoners to segregation 
review meetings – meetings which most Unit staff dismissed as ‘boring’. As a consequence, 
‘guests’ reported feeling ‘lost’, like a ‘spare part’. As I wrote, in my fieldwork notes:  
 
I was watching from the landings and a ‘guest’ from B Wing came up and said ‘I feel like a 
spare part when I come here. If I come in the morning, I’ll get given the yard and I’m like 
great, I know what to do there. But I don’t know what to do now. Jessica just told me to be on 
hand and answer cell bells when they go, so that’s what I’m doing. But I’m a bit lost’ (p. 73). 
 
Most staff acknowledged that they had a reputation in the prison for being close or ‘cliquey’, 
but justified it by reference to safety and security: 
  
Some staff enjoy it, and some staff see the seg as…because we're quite a cliquey group, they 
feel like they're outsiders when they come down here. But we’ve got to be. You’ve got to trust 
the person opening that door with you. (Jack, staff). 
 
Some people, when they come down here, think ‘oh it’s a clique down here’, but it has to be. 
You’ve got to be a bit closed off; everyone knows we have each other’s back, so that’s why it 
might be hard for other people to enter...People would say that we are [cliquey]...I think we 
are, I think we have a closer knit than everywhere else. (Jason, staff). 
 
They shared the perspective that they had to be a close, tight-knit group – their safety 
depended on it. It helped them through their hard days, they felt able to respond to challenges 
with humour and enjoyed working with people they considered to be their friends. However, 
there were drawbacks to such closeness and these manifested in ways which exacerbated the 
group identity and perpetuated a sense of hierarchy and status differential. Staff, during 
interviews, emphasised their differences from wing staff, in terms of experience and authority. 
For example, James said ‘A, B, C wings aren’t what they used to be…they’re rubbish’. 
Several shared this view, complaining that wing staff tended to be young, inexperienced, 
easily manipulated by prisoners and unable (or unwilling) to enforce the rules. Some staff in 
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the Unit had worked in the prison for many years, but there was also a number of younger and 
less experienced staff. This made little difference to their self-perceptions as more 
experienced ‘rule enforcers’ and ‘respected officers’. Thus, Jason described how the Unit 
staff, when deployed to the wings, would cause trouble by strictly enforcing the rules (e.g. by 
enforcing the rule that slippers were not allowed in the wing kitchens): 
 
We always have the argument ‘oh you’re seg staff, no one else cares. You come up here and 
you cause issues all the time’. It’s because we’re enforcing the rules. We’re going up there to 
do our job, and it should be done by everyone, but they think we’re upsetting the apple cart. 
When we’re not, we’re actually just going up there to do the job, [to do] what is expected. 
(Jason, staff). 
 
Most staff in the Unit thought the rest of the prison staff respected them because they worked 
in a ‘stressful and crazy place’ (Jason). One staff member described how there was a 
perception that you ‘earned your stripes through being in seg. It’s perceived as a sexy, [a] 
macho place’ (Tim). Oli thought other staff perceived it as ‘testosterone-fuelled place’ where 
‘there is a lot of lads...we all laugh and joke and have a banter and mess around together and 
be boisterous’ which, for some, he admitted, could be intimidating. Phil also recognised how 
the Unit could be an intimidating place for others, especially as there were some ‘big staff 
characters’. They were ‘big’ in the sense that they were loud, seemingly confident but also 
physically large and muscular. These perceptions were reinforced by senior management. 
Bulletins were published in the prison, in which Unit staff were named ‘Whitemoor’s dream 
team’. One senior manager described how staff in the Unit were respected because ‘people 
understand they do a really difficult job and people understand that they are hand-picked and 
most staff wouldn’t volunteer to go work there’. These sentiments did little to remove the 
divisions between Unit staff and the rest of the prison.  
 
As a consequence, staff were a particularly powerful group, with a strong sense of group 
solidarity and a clear ‘staff orientation’ (Liebling & Kant, 2018, p. 212), which culminated in 
hostility towards outsiders. This hostility was illustrated by their attitudes and treatment 
towards ‘guests’, but it also manifested in the way they engaged with other outsiders. As 
discussed in Chapter Three, staff were hostile and suspicious of me. They were also critical of 
management and typically opposed managerial decisions. They criticised new ‘CMs 
[custodial managers] who come in and try to put their stamp on it, and it’s just wrong, and it 
never works’ (James). They also criticised the SMT, for making decisions which contravened 
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standard practice in the Unit. These decisions might concern unlock levels or prisoner 
entitlements (for example, Vape pens or refills):  
 
You have people from higher up come and give their two pence worth on prisoners that they 
have no idea about, who they’ve had a two-minute chat with at the door. And, because they’ve 
got more stripes, prisoners think they can get more out of them. So, they will be nice as pie to 
them. Higher up will then say ‘well he doesn’t need to be that unlock level’; ‘he doesn’t need 
to be this, he doesn’t need to be that’. But I threatened to down tools the other week because 
someone was saying that. So I said ‘you go open the door then, go open it on your own then, 
because I’m not playing that game’. Our safety is just as important as anybody else’ – as 
important as theirs [prisoners] – and sometimes, I think, that gets forgotten. (Holly, staff). 
 
I: And what do you think is the most challenging or your least favourite part? 
R: The politics probably…I suppose it can be frustrating because we’re the ones that have to 
face them [prisoners] everyday. We’re not the ones sat behind the desk making decisions 
about their lives; we are their lives. And we are the ones that bear the brunt of whatever 
decision the people sat behind the desk are making. (Jessica, staff). 
 
Governors stick their nose in and they don't really know what they're talking about. Some will 
make decisions and promises that cause a lot of problems – say they promised them Vapes or 
tobacco – and they haven't even consulted staff…and that causes problems, so that's not good. 
(James, staff). 
 
These frustrations were not unique. Many staff relayed their frustration with senior 
management who they perceived as making decisions with little or no staff involvement. A 
common corresponding complaint was that staff felt forgotten and under-valued:  
 
A lot of managers would be more concerned about how the prisoners are [rather] than the 
staff. Some of them are not at all interested. As long as the work is getting done, they’re not 
interested in how the staff are. So it just depends on the governor. Some of them will put the 
prisoners first, and their opinions and their well-being, before the staff. (Phil, staff). 
 
We've had to deal with so much but we just never really get the credit for it. Someone got 
assaulted the other day, the governor came up briefly, but we're sort of forgotten about. They 
just expect us to deal with it – and we do expect to deal with it – but we should still get credit 
for the job we do. And I don't think we're appreciated as much as we should be. (James, staff). 
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Many staff members described feeling neglected and unappreciated by management. They felt 
management expected them to be tolerant and resilient, to accept that violence came with the 
territory. The criticism and scepticism towards management fuelled the group solidarity and 
oppositional status, and reinforced their power. In fact, some senior managers described 
feeling ‘intimidated’ by the Unit and felt uncomfortable going there. This resentment and 
hostility towards management, as well as other outsiders like ‘guests’ (and researchers) 
reflects the cynical orientation, hostility and suspicion identified by Liebling and Kant (2018, 
p. 221) in the ‘traditional-resistant’ culture of Pentonville prison. Liebling, in her earlier work, 
identified how staff attitudes towards their work and management team can directly impact 
their behaviour and, as a result, the experiences and outcomes for prisoners (2007, p. 118). 
Cultures in which staff felt ‘undervalued, alienated or distrustful’, were more likely to be 
experienced by prisoners as unfair, less caring and less safe (Liebling, 2007, p. 118). Staff 
attitudes matter. They can substantially impact prisoners’ experiences, and can directly 
contribute to the survivability of the prison. In the Unit, staff attitudes were often 
unsympathetic, and hostile, both towards management and other prisoners. The occupational 
and organisational working environment may explain these attitudes; specifically, the severe 
isolation and structured regime did little to foster more humane attitudes, nor the ‘right’ staff-
prisoner relationships (Liebling, 2011). Importantly, the attitudes coalesced in a clear ‘us 
versus them’ attitude, although this was not just reserved for prisoners. The Unit functioned 
according to a ‘paradigm that distanced or denigrated’ non-Unit staff, managers and prisoners 
(Liebling & Kant, 2018, p. 221). 
2. Culture, rules and discretion 
 
The culture of the Unit was characterised by a preoccupation with ‘getting the regime done’. 
Staff were detached from prisoners, often viewing them with suspicion and distrust. They also 
viewed non-Unit staff and senior managers with a similar level of distrust and scepticism. 
Importantly, there was consistent and omnipresent fear in staff – they perceived their 
environment as dangerous, violent, uncertain and most described a level of anxiety that never 
quite left them. The culture, generally ‘traditional-resistant’, was an important contextual 
factor, which influenced the implementation of the rules (legal and non-legal) and the exercise 
of staff discretion and judgment. The point is, adherence to rules and laws is bound up with 
the exercise of discretion; and certain cultures can foster positive, careful exercises of 
discretion (like the ‘professionally supportive’ one) or punitive, discriminatory and careless 
use of discretion (like the ‘traditionally-resistant’ one).  
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As discussed in Chapter Four (and in the introduction to this chapter), there is a substantial 
amount of discretion and flexibility in both the legal and non-legal rules. There is discretion in 
the operation of Rule 45, PSO 1700 and the Local Site Rules. They are intended to be used 
flexibly, as the circumstances demand. Yet, too much flexibility and the exercise of too much 
discretion is risky. Sparks et al. (1996, p. 272) warned how ‘consistency is one of the chief 
terms that prisoners use to assess the fairness or legitimacy of the treatment they receive’. If 
discretion is used in varying ways, to achieve variable outcomes, it poses problems for the 
‘justification’ of those decisions; and may exacerbate grievances and frustrations amongst 
prisoners (Sparks et al., 1996, p. 272). 
 
The importance of officer discretion, to prison work, is not a new area of inquiry. 
Criminologists have identified the important interpretative function of prison officers, how 
they exercise discretion, and how they make judgments about how to apply the rules (Crewe, 
2009; Liebling, 2000, 2008; Liebling & Price, 2003). Staff cannot deal with prisoners in a 
rigid, ‘rule-bound manner’ (Liebling, 2000, p. 345). Staff must use their discretion to decide 
how best to manage a situation or a prisoner. Exercising discretion is accepted as a 
fundamental part of the prison officer’s role (Liebling, 2000; Liebling, Price, et al., 2011). It 
would be impossible for officers to adhere to, and enforce, every rule in prison (Liebling, 
Price, et al., 2011, p. 123). Officers have to make a choice about which rules will be followed, 
which will be ignored and which would be stretched (Liebling, Price, et al., 2011, p. 123). 
They make compromises with prisoners or ‘under-enforce the rules’ (Liebling, 2000, p. 343) 
and may turn a blind eye to minor infractions (Crewe, 2009, p. 86).  
 
In the Unit, staff discretion featured in various ways. Staff exercised their discretion in the 
initial decision to segregate; in their decisions pertaining to the period of segregation; and in 
determining whether prisoners should be returned to the wings or transferred elsewhere. 
Discretion also featured in the routine decisions of staff, which concerned prisoner 
‘entitlements’ (to radios, TVs and curtains) and ‘privileges’ (extra tea packs, additional 
blankets, visits to the library or chapel or opportunities for work in the Unit). These decisions 
were not made according to the formal Incentives and Earned Privileges Scheme, discussed 
elsewhere (Liebling, 2008) but instead arose from the established ways of working, those 
which governed the daily prisoner experiences. These informal rules and ways of working 
were not prescribed by formal rules or documents. Instead, they comprised knowledge, 
experience and judgments, which were all informal, tacitly known, and invoked in staff daily 
routines (Giddens, 1984). 
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Discretion thrived in the Unit partly because of the nature of the rules: the PR 1999 were 
broad and ambiguous, and explicitly authorised discretionary judgments of the governor. 
Moreover, PSO 1700 and the Local Site Rules contained substantial amounts of discretionary 
power; and they neglected the various daily operational decisions that staff made. However, 
the operational and cultural context was also an important factor in the exercise of staff 
discretion, whereby staff had: (i) variable knowledge of the rules and different approaches to 
decision-making; and (ii) divergent attitudes towards the rules – some preferred rigid 
enforcement of the rules, whereas others favoured an individualised approach. Together, they 
contributed to an environment which failed to encourage the ‘right’ (or ‘wise’) use of 
discretion, where staff lacked the ‘moral courage’ to wield their power sensitively and 
consistently (Liebling, 2000, p. 346). Instead, staff exercised their discretion in inconsistent 
ways and facilitated a regime which, at times, was neglectful and punitive (Liebling & Kant, 
2018, p. 212).  
Knowledge and decision-making 
 
I don't really read them. Well, there's PSO 1700, I think it’s the seg one, and, again, I should 
really know it, but I don't really take much notice of it. I probably know most of what's in it, 
but just from doing my job rather than actually sitting down and reading it. (James, staff). 
 
I do think sometimes, I think I should read these different instructions, orders, and even like 
the seg rules. I've never read the orders or seg rules. I just know the important rules, because I 
know which ones everyone enforces. But I think I probably should read that other stuff. (Oli, 
staff). 
 
I don’t really know what the rules are, so I dunno. Rules of segregation…filling out the 
paperwork to keep a prisoner in the seg, seg meetings, those are followed. But the local 
procedures, of what they can and can’t have, who moves where and what and why…I don’t 
know what they are. (Charlie, staff). 
 
During fieldwork it became clear that staff had variable knowledge of the rules and local 
norms which governed the daily operations of the Unit. Most staff, like Charlie, could identify 
the main processes – segregation review meetings, 14 and 42 day approval processes, and the 
corresponding paperwork. However, the majority of staff were less clear about the rules 
which governed daily decisions relating to, for example, informal entitlements and privileges. 
This was driven by the limited implementation of the Local Site Rules. The most recent 
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version of the localised rules was finalised in February 2019. During fieldwork, the rules had 
not yet been issued to staff, and I only received a copy of the updated rules after completion 
of fieldwork. It was not wholly an implementation problem: most staff were ambivalent 
towards the Local Site Rules67 (including towards the older version, which was implemented 
six years previously); some staff were unable to recall the content or even where the rules 
could be found. As a consequence, staff relied on rules of thumb – ways of working which 
they learned from each other – rather than any formal rules. As one member of staff 
described, the lack of formal guidance or localised rules meant ‘Spanish practices 
developed…we do things because that was always the way, it’s always been like that’ 
(Trevor, fieldwork notes, p. 7).  However, this system of ‘Spanish practice’ was criticised by a 
number of staff in the Unit. They were sceptical about the basis for certain behaviour and 
practices, which seemingly resulted from entrenched habits and customs rather than any 
considered or informed plan or intention: 
 
Some staff say to other staff, in the morning, that the prisoners have got to take their curtains 
down before they do their rounds. Whereas, to me, that doesn't really make much sense. If I 
can see in to the cell, as long as I feel that I'm happy, and if their light is on and I can see 
what's happening, then I'm happy…but no one really knows why we say that…but it's one of 
them things, like certain rules…So you can't take a roll-on into a shower, roll-on deodorant. 
Well, why can't you take it in there? I don't know, just someone said once that they can't take 
it in there… So, what is someone going to do with roll-on? It's just things like that. I think, to 
a degree, the rules and stuff like that do need updating, or like clarifying, because I've no idea 
why we do lots of things we do. 
I: Would you let someone take roll-on deodorant…? 
R: No, I won't let them, because I know they're not allowed, but I don't know why they're not 
allowed. And when they're like, ‘why are we not allowed to take it’, and I'm like, phoo, I don't 
know I just say ‘you're not allowed to’. (Oli, staff). 
 
There was a rule that prisoners could only have six books in their cell at any one time. A 
completely pointless rule…it didn’t make the place more safe…It was just a rule because it 
had always been the rule. (Richard, staff). 
 
																																																								
67 There was also a strong ambivalence towards PSO 1700. Staff were critical of its guidance and dismissed it as 
having little practical value. Pete expressed frustration at PSO 1700 for being long, out-dated and not particularly 
applicable to the realities of the Whitemoor Unit. Alan complained that PSO 1700 achieved little in practice, 
other than introducing additional paperwork. For him, PSO 1700 was burdensome and of little influence on the 
conditions or regime in the Unit; the paperwork did not improve the material conditions, or lead to a better-
running regime. It was simply an illustration of the recent increase in bureaucracy in the prison (see Chapter 
Six).  
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The only people who can have televisions are ‘level one’ prisoners, with two officer unlocks, 
but why should prisoner property be determined by how many staff need to move him around 
the Unit? The whole point of the unlock level is…Well it’s how many staff will be needed to 
make it safe to move the prisoner around the Unit. But back in their cell, they might be 
absolutely fine. We just do this because ‘that’s what we’ve always done’, but no one really 
stops to question ‘why?’. (Richard, staff).   
 
The rules, well, they’re totally bendable. Because, I mean, I just think a lot of problems that 
we have, we kind of create ourselves. Take Nazeer, who is down here for his own protection, 
why has he been told that he can't get ‘enhanced’ while he's here, but Price, he's threatened a 
prisoner, held a knife to his throat and he fought to come out of his cell in healthcare...why is 
he enhanced, and why has he got his PlayStation and everything else? (Steph, staff). 
 
Staff had to apply rules which they considered lacked a legitimate basis. Some, like Steph, 
Richard and Oli, felt their day-to-day working practices were governed by entrenched 
established practices. Those practices were learned from (and therefore perpetuated by) each 
other. One of my interview questions asked ‘how do you know whether someone could have 
an extra blanket?’. It received fairly consistent responses: ‘from the other staff’, ‘from the 
lads’. As Oli explained ‘well, if I didn’t know what they could have, I’d just ask the others… 
someone here would know the answer’. He further explained: 
 
Obviously… you learn from others, from people. Like when you first come down here, you 
watch people, you see how people work, and see what other people do, and you're picking bits 
of what you like from these people, then that's how you kind of mould yourself, I guess.  
 
‘Learning from others’ and ‘on the job’ training is part of the prison officer role (Liebling, 
Price, et al., 2011). It works well when there are clear, agreed, established ways of working, to 
ensure there is some consistency in staff decision-making. However, staff had wide-ranging 
attitudes towards allowing radios, extra blankets, tea packets and so forth. Some would allow 
prisoners to have them whereas others would not. As such, decisions became individualised – 
dependent on the member of staff. As Jack illustrated, when I asked ‘why don’t you ask 
prisoners to take the curtains down in the morning?’ he replied ‘Because I'd hate to be in their 
situation and have the sun glaring in at me at stupid o'clock in the morning’. The 
individualised approach meant outcomes depended on the member of staff making the 
decision, and their broader attitudes towards risk, rules and discretion. Importantly, staff 
diverged in the latter, with some preferring a more rigid approach to rules whereas others 
advocated for flexibility.  
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Perspectives – rules and discretion 
 
Officers approached discretion in different ways. About one-third of staff advocated for the 
rigid application of ‘rules’. For the most part, staff who advocated for a more stringent 
application of ‘rules’ felt strict adherence would keep them safe. For James, the rules reduced 
the risk of ‘things going wrong’ and therefore helped ensure his own physical safety. This 
view was shared by Oli ‘at the end of the day, the rules are there because the rules are what 
keep us safe’. He then explained how he ‘stuck to the rules’ because he knew he would be 
‘covered’. By that he meant that the rules could be used to justify and support his decision, 
and thereby reduce the risk of prisoners’ complaints and staff rebuke. The concept of safety 
was therefore construed broadly: rules could bring physical safety but also safety from 
reproach or criticism. For Sarah, the rules were resources for new staff: 
  
If you are new to the job, or you hadn't got that experience, or you hadn't developed that 
experience over a number of years, then I suppose your safety is the rules, in being rule-
focused. Having the mentality that this is the rule and this is what will look after me, and this 
is what I must stick to. I think everybody's different and everyone's got their own perspective 
on it, and it perhaps changes with experience, changes with confidence, changes with feeling 
safe or feeling unsafe. (Sarah, staff). 
 
Most staff used the language of ‘rules’, yet often were not referring to the formal ‘rules’ 
prescribed in legislation, PSO 1700 nor the Local Site Rules. They were ‘rules’ in the sense 
that they were the established ways of doing things. For example, I asked both James and Oli 
to provide examples of the ‘rules’ they were referring to. They described local norms, which 
comprised the following practices: only allowing one prisoner out of his cell at a time; having 
two members of staff ‘on the doors’; one member of staff in front and one behind during 
prisoner movement; rub-down practices (such as requiring a prisoner to untuck their trousers 
from their socks); requiring prisoners to return their jackets to the designated hooks after 
exercising on the yard; and requiring prisoners to remove their curtains in the morning. It is 
striking that all those practices were intended to ensure the safety of staff (staff-centred as 
opposed to prisoner-centred). They were also practices which were not contained in the 
formal rules but had developed, incrementally, within the Unit. 
 
In contrast, about two-thirds of staff described a preference for a flexible and individual 
approach to rules and local norms. The majority of staff recognised how staff ‘bent’ the rules 
but this was necessary: ‘when it’s regimented, rigid rules, it’s only ever black and 
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white…there is no grey, nothing, no flexibility…but life doesn’t work like that’ (Alan). One 
member of staff, when describing the fire incident, explained how strict adherence to the rules 
may not always produce good outcomes: 
 
A prisoner down here died as a result of being set on fire from smoking spice, and he died. 
The CM – because the rules said he had to – left to go to security and do the risk assessment. 
The rules said there should be three people present to open the cell door – but three people 
weren’t there – so they left him inside the cell with burns, injuries, because the rules say… Is 
that what we want – somebody is prepared to let somebody burn to death because the rules 
say? (Terry, staff). 
 
Sometimes violating a rule might be the most humane thing to do.  
 
The majority of staff were more flexible in the way they approached ‘entitlements’ and 
‘privileges’ like extra tea-packets, blankets or Vapes. Some would provide extra because it 
was the ‘human thing to do’ (Pete) and of relatively little consequence or trouble for the staff 
to provide: ‘tea packs, coffee... Well, it's just a bit of coffee…what does it matter? If it's going 
to help him and obviously it doesn't really matter to me, does it?’ (Pete). Others perceived 
flexibility as important for rehabilitation, the regime and for staff-prisoner relationships. For 
example, Jack described using his discretion in authorising extended visits: 
 
A basic prisoner is only entitled to a half hour visit…but, generally, if that's the first time 
they've seen their family in six months, you might be a bit… if they're okay with you and 
stuff, you might use your discretion to give them an hour visit – instead of a half hour visit –
because it'll benefit them better, and then it'll benefit your relationship better, and then it'll 
impact on their behaviour. (Jack, staff). 
 
Jack’s description reveals the importance of staff-prisoner relationships. Prisoners who were 
liked, compliant, and well-behaved were more likely to receive additional privileges or 
entitlements: ‘If I like them, or get on better with them, I’d sling them an extra tea pack or an 
extra shower gel’ (Pete). ‘If they’re a decent con, I don’t mind doing that little bit extra for 
them…like, if I’m on nights, I’ll pass the newspapers…’ (Tony). The likability of prisoners 
does factor into staff decisions and use of their discretion. As Liebling (2000, p. 344) 
identified, staff decisions will be influenced by the knowledge of the prisoner, staff 
assessments of risk, and, importantly, the relationships they have with the prisoner. 
Consequently, ‘rules matter, but so do the relationships’ (Liebling, 2000, p. 345).  
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Those staff-prisoner relationships were very important in the Unit. They influenced an 
individual’s unlock level (and therefore their eligibility for a TV, whether they could collect 
their food from the servery or go to the bookshelf in the Unit to choose books). The 
relationships meant some prisoners were trusted more than others. As a consequence, 
prisoners received different privileges and entitlements. This was not the result of variations 
in their formal IEP status, but instead arose from their individual relationships with staff. The 
cases of Joe, Aiden and Norman are prime examples of this.   
 
Joe was a trusted prisoner with a passion for the arts. He was allowed to have paint and 
brushes in his cell. Whilst some prisoners were allowed ‘paint by numbers’ and colouring 
books, Joe had a substantial (and exceptional) amount of art materials in his cell. He was also 
the only prisoner to paint his cell walls with murals and bright designs. Some staff 
acknowledged this was important for his mental health – creativity was an important outlet for 
his depression and suicidal thoughts. Others saw it as unfair, as a form of favouritism, which 
flouted the existing rules. In fact, some members of staff criticised Joe. Some described it as 
property damage ‘he’s damaged our cell with that’ and others demanded he return the cell to 
the original condition ‘he better paint it grey when he leaves’ (Fieldwork notes, p. 44).  
 
Aiden was allowed to work in his cell, he was asked to prepare ‘tea packs’ for the rest of the 
prison. He was also allowed an additional duvet because his cell was cold. Some staff saw this 
as an important way to keep him busy and distracted, as a way to manage his tendency to self-
harm. Others saw this as undeserved preferential treatment (Fieldwork notes, p. 6).  
 
Norman was asked to clean the yards and he received additional payment for doing so. This 
was a privilege reserved for only a small number of prisoners. Some staff supported this, on 
the basis that it helped clean up the Unit and kept Norman occupied. Others criticised it, 
stating that ‘seg prisoners shouldn’t be out making money doing the yards’ (James).  
 
Joe, Aiden and Norman had all been in the Unit for a long time. Staff exercised their 
discretion in ways which benefited them. They are examples of how the rules can be 
‘renegotiated’ in favour of certain prisoners (Scott, 2006) and, as Liebling (2000, p. 344) 
acknowledged, discretion can work in two ways. It can be used wisely, to achieve justice, to 
correct for rules which do not work. However, at other times (as discussed further in the latter 
part of this chapter), discretion can be exercised to exert authority, for ‘new forms of 
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punishment’ and result in substantial injustice (Crewe, 2009, p. 105). Notably, whilst 
divergent perspectives on discretion can produce discriminate outcomes for prisoners, they 
can also create substantial divisions for staff. For example, some staff described how the lack 
of formal frameworks created a ‘grey’ area of ambiguity:  
 
R: It seems there are a lot less rules now, it seems a bit more of a grey area. When I first got 
here, you knew what the rules were. I think that was the CM that was in charge, he was very 
this way or that way. Now it’s a bit more wishy-washy. I don’t know the word but it’s a bit 
more blurred. 
I: Do you have any examples of how the rules have become more blurred? 
R: Just like little things, they used to be set: this is what you’re allowed in your cell, this is 
what you’re not allowed. Now it’s a bit muddled. Now you can have your stereo when you 
could never have it before. And now certain people can have their own clothes, some can’t, 
whereas it never used to be like that…now, it seems to be more on an individual basis. 
I: Which approach do you prefer? 
R: I don’t think there were as many issues as we get now. Back when it was more stringent 
rules, they [prisoners] knew where they stood. There wasn’t people going ‘well he’s getting 
that, why aren’t I getting that’. I think it’s made it a bit too blurred. I think the prisoners pick 
up that if they say certain things or kick off in a certain way then they’ll be able to get 
something else. Whereas that was never the case before. They had to behave to get the extra 
stuff, so I think it’s made it too blurred. (Phil, staff). 
 
Staff acknowledged how the ‘grey’ area created problems for staff consistency. Some staff 
would pass newspapers between cells, others would give out extra packets of sugar or extra 
slices of bread: 
 
I’ve been on nights before and someone [a prisoner] said about passing. I said ‘no, you know 
there’s no passing’. ‘But why? When some others will?’... It was brought up in the briefing 
quite a few times where the SOs were instructing staff that you don’t pass, you don’t give it, 
nothing. You run off the same hymn sheet. But there’s always staff that would do it on the sly, 
so no one could see them, or they’d do it when they’re on nights. It just makes life harder for 
everyone else. I’d probably say three quarters of staff would stick to it but there’s always that 
quarter, those three or four, that want to be everyone’s mate and can’t say no. (Josh, staff). 
 
It creates silly little issues. If a prisoner has asked for extra sugar: they get a tea pack once a 
day, and if they want sugar they buy it on the canteen. But staff – some staff – will get sugar 
from downstairs, like little sachets and slide it under their door. It might not seem a big issue, 
but if one member of staff does it that day, and then the next day they don't, or if another staff 
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member doesn't do it, then it puts them in a tough position; they get a bit of grief. (James, 
staff). 
 
If everyone stuck to the same line you’d never get the issues because the prisoner would know 
not to even ask, because he knows what the answer is. But then it causes uncertainty in their 
head, because they’re thinking ‘can I get away with it today, can I not?’. And then when they 
go a few days not getting away with it, obviously they’re getting pissed off, and they can end 
up losing their shit. Like they did over a slice of bread. (Josh, staff). 
 
These extra ‘privileges’ were only small additions to prisoners’ daily lives but they took on 
much significance. When staff were inconsistent, it created frustration for prisoners. It also 
created a sense of resentment and a lack of understanding for the differential treatment of 
prisoners: 
 
Another time I asked for mackerel and the officer said ‘nah the officers have gone’, and I said 
pass it. There's a hole in the door and the officers pass it through… and he goes, ‘no, I can't 
pass it through there’. I said ‘just open it up and just pass it through. What's so hard about it? I 
need some food’, and he said, ‘oh, I can't, I can't, mate’. I was just like – I'm sitting there – 
one of them would do it yesterday, and I'm like bruv, you're just making my life hard. (Nazeer, 
prisoner). 
 
My clippers used to be outside, so I used to wait on my bell to get my clippers. And she goes 
‘why are they taking these from you, you're allowed them in your cell’. And she gave me my 
clippers. I didn't even know I'm allowed my clippers in my cell. (Nazeer, prisoner). 
 
I was on the phone the other day and saw a guy in the corner cell upstairs [Aiden]. The 
officer’s gone in his cell and asked him for a breakfast box. So they’re keeping all their 
breakfast stuff in his cell. So what’s different between me and him? Why is he allowed certain 
privileges? Yeah. It’s funny here. Not used to the gaff here. (Billy, prisoner). 
 
There was a substantial degree of inconsistency in the Unit. Sometimes this was related to a 
lack of knowledge of the formal rules or local norms governing the Unit (or their inadequate 
implementation). At other times, it was a by-product of staff attitudes towards the rules and 
local norms – some preferring to apply them rigidly, whilst others favoured a more flexible, 
individual approach. For some prisoners this was beneficial (in the cases of Joe, Aiden and 
Norman) but for most others it led to frustration and a sense that decisions were made 
discriminately, unfairly and inconsistently.  
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Importantly, local customs, experiences and shared support for the ideology ‘this is how 
we’ve always done it’ influenced the level of staff engagement with rules and local norms. 
Daily staff working practices – those which related to privileges and entitlements, ones which 
had real potential to impact prisoners’ daily experiences – were in large part influenced by 
rules-of-thumb and established methods of working. As a result, the use of discretion, and the 
corresponding function of law, became subsumed within the culture of the Unit. As Trevor 
perceived: ‘rules back up that culture a lot…sometimes, you’re not breaking the rules, but 
you’re pushing against the essence of the rules’ (Trevor). This is to be expected. Legal 
sociologists have long asserted that norms and customs may be more influential than the 
formal rules, in shaping the different areas of social life. For example, Ehrlich (2002) argued 
that human activity is governed by informal rules and norms that often have little to do with 
formal rules and laws. However, whilst this is to be expected, it is not without its problems; 
and these problems become more concerning in cultures, like the ‘traditional-resistant’ culture 
identified in the Unit. When cultures more closely resemble the ‘traditionally-resistant’ one, 
staff tend to make decisions based on ‘the way things have always been done’; ways of 
working become embedded in the dominant culture and are difficult to change (Liebling & 
Kant, 2018, pp. 212, 214). When the dominant culture, as suggested above, is characterised by 
staff distance, detachment and ‘othering’, it makes it all the more likely that prisoners will be 
treated punitively (Haney, Weill, Bakhshay, & Lockett, 2016, p. 132), as they may be 
perceived as ‘undeserving of forgiveness, kindness and humanity’ (Liebling, 2015b, p. 110). 
Discretion, punitiveness and punishment 
	
Discretion enabled staff to make a number of decisions: sometimes the decisions were wise 
and constructive but, at other times, they were unkind and punitive. The dominant culture 
permitted the more punitive and neglectful exercise of discretion, and the rules were 
important mechanisms for justifying and legitimating such punitiveness. For example, when 
Bilal Patel was brought to the Unit for attacking a member of staff, the response of a Unit 
officer was ‘let’s put Patel in the shittiest cell we have’, and he was placed into a cell without 
electricity (Fieldwork notes, p. 50). Exercise was withheld for troublesome prisoners: ‘If 
someone has hit you the day before and they’re gobbing off at the door, oh yeah yeah you 
don’t want exercise do you’ (Phil, Staff). Nazeer described how a shower was refused before 
his family visit because he had been ‘a bit of a dick that day’. George explained how, when he 
was ‘acting up’, after particularly violent confrontation with staff, his visits were cancelled: 
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My eye was cut open, I had a black eye and my lip was swollen and that’s why they wouldn’t 
let me go on my visit to let my family see it. So they told my family I was refusing my visit 
but I never refused. I would never let them travel all that way for me to refuse. (George, 
prisoner). 
 
There were instances in which staff were able to use the rules (legal and non-legal) to justify a 
punitive approach, to support the refusal or withdrawal of ‘privileges’. This represents, as 
Crewe suggested, new forms of abuse; those which no longer related to ‘physical brutality or 
psychological persecution’ but instead occurred within the ‘bureaucratic folds, through 
distortions of policy and procedure…whose iniquities cannot be easily discerned, let alone 
proved’ (Crewe, 2009, p. 105). For example, Henry was in the Unit for his part in the ‘riot’ on 
the wing, where he injured one member of staff.  Henry was brought to the Unit and placed in 
a cell with a window that failed to close. It was very cold during the winter months. Henry 
asked for an additional blanket, a request which staff refused, on the basis that it was 
prohibited under the ‘rules’. However, Holly later explained ‘he ain’t getting a blanket, he’s 
getting nothing…Not after what he did’. Some staff decisions gave the impression that staff 
acted with retribution in mind. This was not always through actions of ‘rough justice’ 
described later in the chapter, but instead through ‘going slow’, being unresponsive or over-
enforcing rules. George described: 
 
If you’ve done something on a wing in here, assaulted a member of staff or something like 
that, you can tell them what you want but you won’t get it. You’ll get forgotten about in the 
seg. Don’t go asking for canteen, don’t go asking for your property. You won’t get it. And, at 
the end of the day, you’re locked up. So there’s nothing much you can do about it. (George, 
prisoner). 
 
Similarly, Theo explained how, during a long stint in the Unit, he would see prisoners come 
down with nothing in their cells. He asked staff to pass noodles, toothpaste, basic things, but 
staff refused. For him, those practices were less about security but more about punishment: 
 
I think it's more about being mean…if someone comes down to the block, and they've got 
nothing in their cell, and you're trying to get a newspaper or some noodles and that…they've 
got nothing and not even proper toothpaste, deodorant or anything. You ask the officer to pass 
it and they’ll not pass it. The way they go about it is, it's like they're taking pleasure in seeing 
someone suffering. That's what I think. It’s not for security–what they gonna do with noodles 
and toothpaste? (Theo, prisoner). 
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Theo touched on a common thread that featured during both staff and prisoner interviews. 
Participants described how decisions would be made with the aim of ‘security’ in mind. 
‘Security’ was applied broadly and, in part, became a metaphor for the use of discretion and 
unchecked power (Garland, 1990, 2001). For some participants the rhetoric of ‘security’ was 
used to justify their placement in the Unit: 
 
The reason for your segregation is ‘good order and discipline’ – what does that mean? Oh we 
cannot disclose the information because it would jeopardise intelligence gathering and 
national security and that’s the excuse that they used all the time – security, security, security 
– because they hide behind security and that leaves a lot of us prisoners in the segregation 
feeling frustrated. (Imran, prisoner). 
 
DST come and take you and say ‘oh you’re going down the block, we’ve received 
intelligence’. But, intelligence of what? ‘Can’t say’. So now, you’re in the block, not knowing 
what you’re in the block for, for a month or two. If you can’t think on your feet and no 
solicitor, you’ll just end up sitting there. (Leroy, prisoner). 
 
For others, principles of ‘security’ were used to justify decisions made in the Unit, such as 
cancelling visits or placing individuals on ‘closed visits’. Billy and Henry (along with Ricky 
and Shawn) were the main individuals involved in the ‘riot’ (see Chapter Four). They first had 
their visits cancelled and then were put on ‘closed visits’: 
 
Last week, they cancelled our visits because of what we’re down here for. What’s that got to 
do with anything, what we’re down here for?…But when the governor sent a letter – the 
security governor – he’s saying ‘we’ve cancelled your visit because of the situation, [because 
of] what you’re down here for, so while you’re down here just think about what you’ve done 
and don’t do it again’.  And ‘no visits are allowed until further notice’. But hold on a minute, I 
should still get my visit. (Billy, prisoner). 
 
We just got told ‘you’re going to the seg, security reasons’. It’s not fair. In the same way, they 
want to put me on closed visits, for what reason? I haven’t done anything on a visit. I haven’t 
been doing any contraband. I haven’t been trying to get no contraband. So why are you putting 
me on closed visits? My situation took place on the wing, with members of staff that are in seg 
right now and I’m getting along with them. So what is the problem? (Henry, prisoner). 
 
‘Closed visits’ took place in a special room where glass separated prisoners away from their 
visitors. Closed visits are permitted under Rule 34(1) of the PR 1999, which allows the 
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imposition of restrictions upon communications and/or visits between prisoner and visitor. 
Under this rule, closed visits can be imposed to secure discipline and good order. Further 
guidance on ‘closed visits’ is provided in PSI 2011/15. Paragraph 3.1 describes eight 
circumstances in which closed visits can be imposed including: in the interests of national 
security; for the prevention and investigation of crime; for public safety; to achieve good-
order or discipline; for the protection of health or morals; to protect the reputation of others; 
for maintaining authority and impartiality of the judiciary; and for the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of any other person. The PSI emphasises how ‘in the majority of cases these 
measures will be imposed to prevent the smuggling of contraband through visits’ (3.2). This 
part of the PSI caused most contention for Henry (and others). As Henry pointed out, his 
behaviour occurred on the wing, not during a visit. Henry, along with Billy, Ricky and 
Shawn, all described their frustration with the imposition of a practice which they deemed 
illegitimate. They all expressed how their actions on the wing were unrelated to their risk of 
‘smuggling’. They could not understand why closed visits were imposed and felt the sanction 
was imposed as a way to further punish them. As Ricky said ‘but I’m in the seg, I’m already 
being punished. Why are they making it so hard for me to see my family? Closed visits should 
only be for people who bring in contraband. I haven’t done that’.  
 
These prisoner accounts represent only one side of the narrative. There may have been 
legitimate security concerns behind the decisions to initially cancel and later impose closed 
visits. I was not able to explore this empirically; I had no access to the security intelligence 
upon which the decisions were made. That said, these examples valuably illustrate the 
substantial disparities in knowledge. The prison had a ‘monopoly on the technical knowledge 
and discourse of rules’ (Armstrong, 2018, p. 412), which it used to justify its decisions. 
Prisoners were not always privy to the information or ‘intelligence’ behind their transfer to 
the Unit nor behind closed visits.  From the prisoner perspective, it was often difficult to 
understand why decisions were made. As a consequence, it was hard for some prisoners to 
accept decisions which seemed arbitrary and lacking a legitimate foundation. Staff were able 
to make extra-legal discretionary judgments and impose informal punishments – the 
withholding of blankets, preventing access to the exercise yard, or a shower before a visit. 
Thus, the rules were used to justify staff control and punitiveness, and they protected the 
interests of the more powerful and dominant staff group (Drake, 2012, p. 135). They provided 
the ‘legal authority’ for decisions, but did not necessarily sustain the ‘legitimate authority’ of 
the power-holders (Black, 2005, p. 19). In effect, as Scott suggests, the prison could become a 
lawless institution where decisions on prisoners’ daily experiences and circumstances were 
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not determined by legal rules, but were negotiated and embedded within the local 
organisational culture and the personal relationships between staff and prisoners (2006, p. 8).  
Oversight and accountability  
 
There was substantial discretionary power in the Unit, and such power was exercised in a 
particularly dominant culture. The culture (traditional-resistant) may not always encourage the 
‘right’ exercise of discretion, nor constrain the ‘wrong’ use of discretion. As shown above, the 
staff in the Unit were very close. The downside of their friendships, or as one member of staff 
described ‘their family’, was the challenge this posed for accountability. During interviews, 
most staff acknowledged that they would report a colleague if there was a significant issue. 
This was interpreted as behaviour which warranted a formal response, that which threatened 
the safety of staff or was related to staff corruption. They distinguished minor violations or 
behavioural mistakes, which they preferred to resolve personally: 
 
I: Would you ever make a complaint here? 
R: Against who? 
I: Could be against prisoners or staff? 
R: I haven’t done in 15 years. I’d like to think not, but I’d rat out a corrupt member of staff, 
without a shadow of a doubt; but I’m not really about paperwork, I’d rather do it old school 
and talk to people and take them into the office and say ‘I didn’t like that’. I don’t get this 
paper culture. What happened to talking to people and talking it out. Why put it on a bit of 
paper? (Jessica, staff). 
 
I don't really want to be seen as someone who stiches colleagues up for no real reason. If it 
was something serious, like a corruption issue, then I'd definitely put a report in or something. 
But anything I think I can deal with, just by speaking to someone, I'll do it that way. I think it's 
better, and I think you get more respect doing it that way. (Pete, staff). 
 
I: And would you ever make a formal complaint? 
R: No. No, I'd never… I'd never paper anyone. 
I: You'd never what? 
R: Never paper anyone up. 
I: What does that mean? 
R: I've never put in a complaint against people. 
I: Why? 
R: It's grassing, isn't it? I mean, if they put staff life in danger or the security of the 
establishment, I mean, a real, real risk – not like leaving the gate open – then I would paper 
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them up, if there was like a safety risk, but not for most things. I wouldn't because I'm not a 
grass. It's a bit like what prisoners say: they'll never grass on each other. But I'd speak to them, 
rather than go above them, and I might say ‘right, this is what you've done wrong’ blah-blah-
blah…But, yeah, I would never paper someone up. I never have done. (James, staff). 
 
I think we just deal with it behind closed doors…We would deal with it rather than putting a 
formal bit of paperwork in. Maybe sometimes we should, but that's not really my cup of tea. I 
would rather just speak to someone about it. If I had an issue with you I would just say ‘Ellie, 
I'm not okay with that’… And we would sort it out that way, rather than me complaining to 
the governor, or whatnot…(Pete, staff). 
 
Whilst most staff described a willingness to report colleagues over a ‘significant’ issue, there 
were some contradictions in their accounts (and as prisoner Scott, below, reveals it did not 
always translate into practice). Jessica, for example, was keen to stress that she would report a 
‘corruption issue’ but was ‘not really about the paperwork’. Pete and James indicated a 
willingness to resort to formal procedures but stressed the importance of talking to the 
member of staff. This preference featured in several staff accounts. Many staff favoured the 
direct approach. They suggested that if someone made a mistake, or if their conduct fell below 
expectations, they would prefer to speak to them directly. This highlights the important 
oversight function of staff: they are responsible for holding each other to account and for 
ensuring that their peers adhere to the rules. 
 
Oversight and accountability functioned through peer enforcement, rather than staff resorting 
to formal complaint processes. There were several reasons behind their desire to avoid formal 
procedures and paperwork. Some described scepticism towards formal paperwork, dismissing 
it as a waste of time or too burdensome. Others revealed scepticism towards outcomes ‘what 
will paperwork really achieve’? (Pete). However, mostly, staff were concerned about the 
impact that formal complaints would have on their relationships with others working in the 
Unit. They did not want to jeopardise their friendships or be perceived as ‘stitching staff up’ 
or ‘grassing’ on their friends. Their accounts emphasised the value of loyalty, ‘no snitching’ 
and was much like the ‘prisoner code’.  
 
However, there were times when ‘peer enforcement’ failed to uphold rights standards in the 
Unit. There were instances of abuse (physical and psychological). About half of the prisoners 




It's a place for rough justice. I mean, it's been a place for rough justice for a long time, and I 
don't think it's about to change…what I mean is, if you assault a member of staff, them 
officers will come in, with their shields, they’ll take a man down. (Nazeer, prisoner). 
 
There’s [been] plenty of times I’ve been down this seg where prisoners have been assaulted by 
members of staff and a lot of things, like I said, there’s no smoke without fire. They’re not 
going to just come into somebody’s cell and beat you up for no reason. Usually the guy has 
assaulted a member of staff or thrown faeces or something. But still you’re a member of staff. 
If that happens to you, that’s part of your job, you can’t then go in a cell and start stamping on 
the guy’s head. If I did that, I’m down the seg. But down here, if I punched a member of staff 
now, they’d come in with all their shields and that. [But] it depends: if you comply, then 
they’ll comply. It depends... but they don’t follow their rules. (Sam, prisoner). 
 
Most staff recognised a potential conflict between wishing to ‘settle a score’ and 
professionalism in the Unit. They acknowledged how less legitimate intentions might cloud 
their practices. Sometimes, they might manifest in less overtly harmful ways: being slow to 
respond to a cell bell or to post a prisoner’s letter. At other times, the risk or harm might be 
greater, old scores might be settled through the excessive or the over-use of force: 
 
Well, it’s just not decent is it? How awkward is it that Miller gave me a black eye and now 
I’ve got to be like ‘yeah I’ll help you with your problem’. You think ‘nah, I’ve got a fucking 
sore face because of you. I don’t give a fuck about your stupid letter’. (Charlie, staff).  
 
It's quite hard really, when you know your mate has been smacked, or your colleague has been 
hurt, and you've got to give them a shower and a phone call, and treat them nice…There'll 
probably be a bit of resentment for a few days, and then you try get on with it. Yeah, it's hard. 
(Pete, staff). 
 
You've got to take the conflict out of it somehow, and you've got to find a way for it to be 
alright to treat people that have done bad things well. But that's not easy, particularly when 
we're tired, particularly when they've hurt colleagues, or the need to want to punish is quite 
strong. (Terry, staff). 
 
Sometimes, I do think, were we too rough? Were we being excessive with him? But you know 
what? They’ve [prisoners] done what they've done and people are going to have really strong 
feelings about that and, actually, it's human nature and sometimes, if there’s a chance, then we 
are going to go and put a shield in his face. (Steph, staff). 
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There was one particularly compelling example which featured in many staff interviews. I 
was informed about Scott, a prisoner who staff found very difficult to manage. He shouted 
insults and abuse throughout the day, he urinated out of his door, and when staff went in to his 
cell, he tried to bite, spit and scratch them. He was in the Unit for 8 months. After he was 
transferred out of Whitemoor, allegations were made that staff psychologically abused him, 
by goading and tormenting him, and physically abused him through the use of unlawful force 
(examples included kneeing him in the face and kicking him in the stomach). There was an 
investigation within Whitemoor. Officially, staff were absolved from all wrong-doing; but 
unofficially, three members of staff were transferred to work in different parts of the prison. 
Scott featured in many staff accounts, and several staff revealed concerns about his treatment 
and dissatisfaction in the way he was managed: 
 
I said to the CM that ‘he needs to go’. I said ‘he needs to go for his sake and our sake’ because 
the relationship had broken down so much. Some staff were saying ‘yeah, when we go in, 
we're going to punch him' and I really struggle with that. If the prisoners are fighting back, if 
they're not doing what they're told then, okay, they get a shield in the face, because that's what 
they know they'll get if they misbehave. But it's almost that pre-planned goading him, the 
winding him up, that I really struggled with…He was just an arsehole. He spat at us, he was 
vile, so I kind of get that. I get how you get to that point. But then, equally, I just think, we’re 
the professionals and this is actually our job and we should be acting in a professional way. So 
I really struggled, but if I said that to the rest of them they would just call me a goody two-
shoes. (Steph, staff). 
 
I think, when it gets to that point, the governor should be stepping in and saying ‘Do you 
know what? Actually, we've had him for eight months, and other places have only managed 
him for a couple of months, now he needs to be moved’…because it's not fair on us and it's 
just not fair on him…some of the stuff the others used to say about Scott, it really bothered 
me…  
I: What sort of stuff was said? 
R: Well, like, ‘oh yeah, we need to go in on Scott everyday’, ‘we need to check his bars 
everyday’. A couple of them had a fight with him and they were really, really hyped up. It was 
just weird. (Steph, staff). 
 
I: And what’s the worst thing that’s happened down here? 
R: In a way, although it didn’t affect me, probably Scott [because of] the way it affected some 
members of staff. He got to them. I don’t know why he did because, to be honest, I think he 
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was pathetic. We tried and we tried to work with him and he weren’t having any of it… But 
yeah a few staff let him get to them… 
I: Why was that the worst thing? 
R: Because of the way he dragged down quite a few staff. It made for a weird atmosphere for 
a while. I mean, Irene left and never came back. And then other staff, I think they almost 
became a bit obsessive with him in a way and it wasn’t very healthy. They got obsessed with 
Scott, he was the highlight of the day and everything else was on the back burner. I think it 
made him worse because [if] people just ignored him he would quieten down. (Phil, staff). 
 
A number of staff reported reservations in the way Scott was treated. Yet those, like Steph, 
felt unable to voice their concerns. Instead, some members of staff resorted to leaving 
anonymous notes. I never managed to identify who left the notes and what they contained. 
However, it was suggested that the notes were attempts by some staff to ‘blow the whistle’ on 
Scott’s treatment. The notes were not well-received by all in the Unit: 
 
You're dealing with some horrible people. And things happen in the seg and I think they 
should stay in the seg. A couple of things went outside, and I didn't like that. I don't know if 
you know what I'm talking about, but notes were left outside trying to grass up the staff, and I 
didn't like that, so that's one of the reasons I left. (Tony, staff). 
 
The comment from Tony illustrates one of the more troubling aspects of there being a close, 
cohesive group in the Unit. There was a sense that things ‘should stay in seg’. This was 
evident in staff accounts which described their preference for resolving issues directly, 
without using formal procedures, paperwork, and implicitly without involving senior 
managers. This was recognised by some managers, who acknowledged that some staff might 
not ‘whistle blow’ or report prisoner abuse, violence or mistreatment: 
 
I’m not aware of a culture of brutality. Having said that, I did worry when Scott Whaite was in 
our segregation unit, what was going on there sometimes…I don’t think people would have 
come and told me that there’s something that’s not quite right. (Trevor, staff). 
 
Others, such as Pete, made comments which suggested that concealment was needed 
(sometimes encouraged):  
 
I've seen people [staff] punch people [prisoners] for no reason, or hit them when they're on the 
floor; and, yeah, I've seen that. I just tell them after ‘don't do that when I'm about’ because we 
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don't need it. And that's why people – like Scott Whaite – I did think about him. And I didn’t 
see this, but I knew he was in a bad way. (Pete, staff). 
 
Under these conditions, it makes it difficult for staff to hold others to account. Staff reported a 
preference to resolve matters directly with colleagues, yet this did not apply to the case of 
Scott. Scott was a prisoner who was both very vulnerable and a handful for staff, but he 
needed staff to be accountable. He needed staff to be brave enough to escalate their concerns 
to senior management, for there to be a system of checks and balances that operated 
transparently. He needed more than anonymous notes and an ex post facto investigation, 
which occurred after he had been transferred and it was too late.68  
 
The staff, above, described a culture which, much like the prisoners’ ‘no grassing’ code, 
depended on the perceived necessity of loyalty (Bittner, 1970, p. 63; Oliver, 2016, p. 217) . 
One consequence of this loyalty was an unwillingness to escalate breaches of rules, unlawful 
conduct or to expose practices like those used against Scott. There was a secretiveness and 
closed orientation to the group. This was far from the open, honest and non-defensive style 
identified by Liebling and Kant (2018, pp. 210, 224) in ‘professional-supportive’ officers. It 
meant there were weak internal controls on the arbitrary or unfair exercise of discretion.  
3. Conclusion 
 
Staff culture can have an important role in moulding the functioning of law and rules in 
segregation units. The culture in the Unit resembled the ‘traditional-resistant’ type identified 
by Liebling and Kant (2018). It was characterised by staff who prioritised the regime over 
rehabilitation, who had deep-rooted friendships and loyalties, and were suspicious of 
outsiders. They were a group who, in many ways, were united by fear and trauma; 
traumatised people working in a dysfunctional environment. These conditions made it hard 
for law and rules to be perceived as valuable resources – are they something which, as a 
member staff, could keep you safe? Arguably not. Adhering to the law might keep you safe 
from complaints, rebuke or litigation but, during the immediate day-to-day work of the Unit, 
had little significance for staff. More important was having a team they could trust, supportive 
peers, and working practices which ensured they could go home in one piece at the end of the 
day. Strict adherence to the law (and various accompanying rules) was not always perceived 
as the way to achieve this.  Instead, flexibility and discretion were recognised as important for 
																																																								
68 As discussed above, the investigation resulted in staff being cleared of wrong-doing but three members of staff 
were transferred to different parts of the prison.  
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ensuring the daily functioning of the Unit. Staff had the freedom to make decisions which 
directly affected the daily experiences of prisoners. These decisions allowed, at times, for the 
rules to be renegotiated, sometimes in favour of prisoners’ interests, allowing access to greater 
‘privileges’ or favours, but sometimes against them (Scott, 2006, p. 9). Discretion could be 
exercised in ways which extended, or even contradicted, rules and local norms; as was the 
case with excessive use of force, denial of visitation rights and the withdrawal of exercise. 
The rules became optional resources (Bittner, 1970; Liebling, 2000, p. 347), ones which were 
often secondary to established ways of working. They were subsumed by the culture of the 
Unit, one which allowed punitive practices to creep in – practices which, in many ways, were 
legitimated by the rules (or, more accurately, legitimated by the complex combination of legal 
and non-legal rules, and local norms and custom). Through the denial of privileges, 
withholding entitlements, or over-enforcement of the rules, discretion could be exercised in 
punishing ways, to create substantial injustice (Crewe, 2009, p. 105). These practices were 
permitted (and may even have been facilitated) by the culture of the Unit.  
 
Liebling suggested that most staff will follow a ‘set of principles’, which create boundaries 
around or guide the use of their discretion (2000, p. 346), these principles may not always be 
formal legal rules, but they were grounded in a clear organisational vision (p. 346). They 
could be established by the ‘good staff’, those able to create positive ways of working and 
shape the ‘wise’ use of discretion (p. 346). What matters, is that those principles are 
consistent and predictable (p. 346). However, as this chapter sought to demonstrate, the ‘set of 
principles’ in the Unit was largely characterised by: (i) a lack of understanding of rules 
(whether formal or informal in nature); (ii) substantial divergence in practice; (iii) 
individualised decision-making; and (iv) inconsistency. As a consequence, discretion was not 
always bounded or used ‘wisely’. In fact, it was sometimes used punitively, to reflect the 
punitive attitudes of some members of staff; it was driven by ‘traditional’ ways of working, 
rather than by any enlightened approaches to practice. This is important because staff 
judgments – how they interpret and enforce the rules – have a considerable impact on the 
wider institution. The way decisions are made and applied can influence the safety and order 
of the prison, as well as prisoners’ perceptions of staff, the institution, and their associated 
authority and legitimacy (Liebling & Kant, 2018). The value of this should not be 
underestimated. A more ‘legitimate’ prison – one which has the ‘virtues’ of justice, 
recognition and humanity – can ‘literally be more survivable for prisoners than others’ 
(Liebling & Kant, 2018, pp. 212, 214).  
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The unbounded use of discretion can allow misconduct and bad practice to creep in (to greater 
or lesser degrees). Newburn (2015) cautions about the risks of dominant cultures and the 
extensive use of discretion. He identified the main factors which contributed towards police 
officers deviating from the legal rules and becoming susceptible to corruption. He found that 
where there are: (i) high levels of discretion; (ii) low managerial supervision; (iii) low public 
visibility; (iv) peer group secrecy; (v) weak governance mechanisms (oversight and 
accountability); and (vi) ‘moral cynicism’ – defined as a ‘jaundiced view of the world’ (pp. 8, 
9), police deviance becomes more likely. As this chapter reveals, most of these factors are 
present in the daily operations of prison officers, and are especially evident in the Unit. In 
fact, most are intrinsic to their roles, making practices in the Unit particularly vulnerable to 
misconduct (Newburn, 2015, p. 10). This is concerning when we consider officers’ power 
over prisoners’ lives. Prisoners are vulnerable due to their imprisoned status – no longer free 
citizens and have limited agency– and their segregation status –isolated, alienated and almost 
completely reliant on staff (Liebling, 2000, p. 335). It is not difficult to see how segregation 
units are sites which have a serious potential for prisoner abuse and staff misconduct.  
 
There endured, in the Unit, a complex relationship between the formal rules (legal and non-
legal) and informal local norms and customs. All were used, to varying degrees, to secure 
acquiescence of prisoners, to legitimate decisions and to reinforce the dominant culture of the 
Unit. The ‘law’ was sometimes a ‘blunt’ instrument (Hawkins, 1984, 2002) for ensuring 
accountability and upholding principles of justice and fairness (Scott, 2006). In this context, 
the rules did not always function in accordance with the rule of law; they were not always 
used fairly and indiscriminately; were not free from bias or exercised in good faith.  
 
This chapter is not intended to paint a picture of despair. In fact, it reveals important 
opportunities for reform efforts. Firstly, I identified ‘knowledge’ and ‘implementation’ 
problems. i.e. the majority of staff had poor knowledge of the rules; which was a consequence 
of the poor implementation of the rules (the PSO 1700 and Local Site Rules in particular). 
Better and more regular training could overcome this. Secondly, the chapter identified a 
constellation of factors: pressured regime; distant staff-prisoner relationships; close and 
powerful staff relationships; fearful and anxious staff, which coalesced into the distinctive 
‘traditional-resistant’ culture. Culture is directly related to the implementation of new rules or 
policies; specifically, the extent to which staff will embrace and implement them (Liebling, 
2007, p. 8). Importantly, cultures characterised as ‘traditional-resistant’ are less likely to 
embrace organisational change (Liebling & Kant, 2018). The culture may severely undermine 
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reform efforts. Consequently, reform efforts which focus solely on redrafting the legislation, 
PSO 1700 or Local Site Rules, are unlikely to achieve substantial change in practice. Instead, 
efforts should be directed towards tackling some of the cultural factors in the Unit, those 
which led to the punitive exercise of discretion and unkind, dispassionate practices. For 
example, staff could be rotated69 more frequently; members of staff could be assigned 
responsibility for specific prisoners, for ensuring their needs are heard, and encouraged to 
cultivate the ‘right’ relationships; firmer management could be practised in the Unit e.g. 
removal of the ‘wall of shame’ (discussed in Chapter Three) and a ceasing or reduction of 
derogatory references (like the ‘Fussy Sod Board’). Moreover, reform efforts should not be 
limited to clarifying or extending legal mechanisms or regulatory powers. The above shows 
that staff practices are driven by organisational and occupational culture as much as they are 
the rules (legal and non-legal). As such, any reform efforts will need to be comprehended and 
endorsed by officers, which will require substantial staff involvement and staff ‘buy in’. 
Finally, we should remember, prison officer culture is not static (Whitty et al., 2001, p. 231): 
it can be changed. Staff have an interest in embracing changes which improve prison 
conditions. Staff spend a high proportion of their lives in prison: ‘the living conditions of 
prisoners are the working conditions of prison officers’ (Whitty et al., 2001, p. 232). 
However, law and policy reform, alone, may not be the ‘right’ mechanisms for this change.  
  
																																																								
69 Whitemoor has a policy that staff should only spend three years in the Unit, after which they would be 
transferred to a different part of the prison. However, several staff members had worked for ‘two terms’ i.e. five 
years and, on average, had spent three years in the Unit.  
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Chapter Six – Law and Context: Application, Accessibility and 
Authority 
 
[W]hen I first got segregated I didn’t have a clue what was going on. I couldn’t understand 
why I was put into segregation. No evidence was brought and I was willing to sit with the 
governors and ask them what was the issue, or the IMB…what I found was, there’s all these 
veils and veils, you have to take a barrier down before you can move on and then you find 
another barrier, you take that one down, then there’s another one and you can’t get to the root 
cause. (Imran, prisoner). 
 
I: So, would you say you have faith in the law? 
R: No, definitely not. Definitely not. No. And that's scary, when you think about it. It is, innit? 
(Theo, prisoner). 
 
R: What law? …There ain’t no law here. (Nazeer, prisoner).  
	
In the previous chapters, I demonstrated how the functioning of law was contingent on prison 
staff, those primarily responsible for the implementation of rules and processes. Staff had a 
fundamental role in determining when segregation was used, how it was used, and how it was 
experienced. They also had a fundamental role in shaping whether segregation was used 
fairly, indiscriminately and consistently: they were instrumental in giving effect to the rule of 
law. Staff also performed important oversight functions: not only were they responsible for 
complying with the rules, themselves, but also for ensuring that their peers complied with the 
rules (and escalating or enforcing any alleged non-compliance). Staff were important for 
ensuring there was accountability in the Unit. To an extent, there is an implicit expectation 
that staff will act in good faith (importantly, the ‘rule of law’ is contingent on good faith) 
(Jacobs, 1977, p. 116). Yet there is also an implicit recognition, in the complex web of rules, 
that staff may not always do so. This is borne out by the systems of rules and processes which 
are implemented in the Unit (such as internal and external approvals, segregation review 
boards, monitoring by the IMB etc.). Such processes are designed to constrain staff discretion, 
uphold fairness and ensure segregation is used proportionately, for the ‘right’ reasons and in 
the ‘right’ ways. Implicit in these processes (or safeguards) is the recognition of prisoners’ 
vulnerability and the unequal distribution of power. Rules and processes may be one of the 
few ways in which prisoners can be protected and empowered.  
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In this chapter, I focus on how the law, rules and processes are implemented in the Unit. 
Specifically, I discuss some of the structural and environmental constrains which shape the 
application, accessibility, and authority of laws and rules. The chapter is structured in three 
parts. Firstly, I focus my analysis on three procedural processes: (i) internal and external 
approvals (and accompanying paperwork); (ii) the visitation process (from members of the 
IMB, Chaplaincy, SMT and MHT); and (iii) segregation review meetings, which best 
illustrate the prison’s preoccupation with proceduralisation and risk mitigation. They are 
examples of how prison work has become proceduralised, embracing ‘rational legal 
bureaucracy’ (Jacobs, 1977, p. 119). These are internal safeguards, which could, in theory, 
help protect and uphold prisoners’ rights. However, in practice, they protect the organisation 
(‘legal proofing’) (Whitty, 2011, p. 129), by making it more legally defensible. The emphasis 
on procedure erodes the opportunities for engaging meaningfully with prisoners’ rights and 
means these processes may not always be experienced as fair, just or reasonable.  
 
Secondly, given the limits of the accountability mechanisms, identified in Part One, I go on to 
discuss the importance for prisoners in ‘taking law’ into their hands. Specifically, in Part Two, 
I consider the extent to which prisoners can rely on, or access, legal processes and resources, 
including: (i) the ease with which they have access to legal know-how; (ii) recourse to legal 
advisers; and (iii) access to, and utility of, engaging with the accountability mechanisms, like 
complaints processes and segregation review meetings. I suggest that these are important 
mechanisms for protecting and sustaining prisoners’ rights. However, the organisational 
structure and operational practices of the Unit make it very difficult for prisoners to access 
and engage with certain legal protections. 
 
In the final part of this chapter I discuss the implications, for prisoners (and the institution), of 
the weak application of safeguarding processes and the limited access to legal resources and 
mechanisms. I draw on prisoners’ accounts and experiences to suggest how prisoners 
typically responded in one of two ways. They were either: (i) galvanised to educate 
themselves on law and rules, however best they could; or (ii) they became frustrated, defeated 
and cynical towards rules and law. The latter view was more commonly held by prisoners in 
the Unit. These views, as other research shows, can be found elsewhere in the prison system 
(Crewe, 2009, p. 124; Sparks et al., 1996), however, they were particularly acute in the Unit. 
The Unit was occupied by prisoners who were cynical towards the law, rules and processes; 
they had a distinct lack of faith in the law. Law was a euphemism for power; it privileged the 
powerful and justified arbitrary decision-making. The law provided the legal authority, but 
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not the legitimate authority, for the decisions and practices of the institution. Participants’ 
accounts suggest that ‘law’ may not be perceived to be ‘working’ well (i.e. perceived as 
giving effect to rule of law principles) in illegitimate places or institutions.  
 
The main theme of this chapter is that prison processes can provide opportunities for 
constraining power and discretion, for encouraging fairness and equality, and protecting 
human rights. Thus, they are important conduits for effecting, or undermining, the rule of law. 
However, I suggest that when legal protections are proceduralised – and access to legal 
mechanisms and resources are limited and constrained – there is a corresponding risk that rule 
of law principles (like fairness, consistency and equality) are eroded. As a consequence, the 
possibilities for creating (or sustaining) the legitimacy of the institution (see Sparks et al. 
(1996)) are diminished.  
 
Useem and Kimball (1989) introduced the concept of legitimacy to prison sociology. It has 
been developed by subsequent researchers (such as Carrabine, 2005; Scraton, Skidmore, & 
Sim, 1991; Wooldredge & Steiner, 2016) and of importance here, by Sparks et al. (1996), 
who provide a compelling account of legitimacy in their analysis of order in two maximum 
security English prisons. For them, legitimacy had a number of facets including the ‘centrality 
of fair procedures and…consistent outcomes’ as well as ‘the quality of behaviour of 
officials…[and] the basic regime of the institution—its accommodation, services, and 
activities’ (p. 89). Importantly, conformity with the letter of the law and ‘close adherence to 
the written rules’ (Holloway & Grounds, 2003, p. 139) are ‘key to legitimacy and fairness of 
the internal order’ (Whitty et al., 2001). Thus, laws and rules are an important facet of 
legitimacy: they can be conduits through which legitimacy is created or diminished in prisons. 
By this I mean the application of law (how legal rules are applied and discretion exercised) as 
well as the accessibility of law (in terms of legal advice, knowledge and resources) can both 
influence perceptions of fairness and justice. Every ignored complaint, every arbitrary refusal 
to access the PSOs, every unnecessary bureaucratic delay, every unsatisfactory segregation 
review meeting, every petty decision and every perceived miscarriage of justice can threaten 
the legitimacy of the institution (Sparks & Bottoms, 1995, p. 60). Therefore, the law 
(perceptions of, and engagement with) presents an opportunity through which the legitimacy 
of the prison can be re-evaluated, reaffirmed and called into question. This is important 
because if practices, decisions and processes are deemed fair and just (and the ways in which 
law is wielded and perceived is just one of the contributors to this assessment), they will more 
likely be accepted and complied with (Tyler, 1990). As such, the legitimacy of routine 
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encounters, daily interactions, staff decisions, regime operations (and not forgetting the 
underlying presence of law in these), are integral to the ‘success or otherwise of a prison in 
sustaining order over time’ (Sparks et al., 1996, p. 87).  Thus, laws and rules can go to the 
very heart of the prison’s  ‘legitimate authority’; they are important conduits for creating, 
sustaining, (or diminishing), prison legitimacy.  
1. Proceduralisation of law  
 
R: I think some of the statutory instruments are more about arse covering than having any real 
impact and I think sometimes it hinders rehab and stuff like that. I think when you impose 
stuff, it’s never really personalised – demanding review times, all the paperwork, going off to 
the DDC70 – I don’t think is necessarily helpful. I’m not saying you should segregate people 
and forget about them, but I do worry that ticking the box becomes more important than what 
you’re actually doing with the individual. 
R: And, who is that keeping safe? Oh, it’s the organisation. And so we often spend longer 
protecting the organisation than we do the prisoner. The seg reviews, the ACCT process, they 
protect the organisation, it is less about the prisoner. The paperwork is there, and the checks 
are there, but that’s just a way of covering, to protect ourselves.  
I: To protect yourselves from what? 
R: Future litigation of course! (Trevor, staff). 
 
Scholars have written elsewhere that certain prison processes are designed for ‘risk 
management’ (Garland, 2001; Hood, Rothstein, & Baldwin, 2004; Kemshall, 2003; Loader & 
Sparks, 2007); that rules and processes are ways for organisations, like prisons, to manage 
their operational and, importantly, legal risks. Whitty suggests there is a ‘common 
architecture of risk management’ in prisons today (2010, p. 4). Within this ‘common 
architecture’, Whitty provides a persuasive account of how legal risk (i.e. the risk of a legal 
complaint and the resulting litigation) can become framed as an organisational risk (p. 8). He 
suggests that a failure to manage legal risks can prove very costly for prisons, not just in 
financial terms but also in reputational and political ones (pp. 10, 11) (see Downes & Morgan, 
2007; Sparks, 2000).  
 
During fieldwork, it became clear that many of the Unit’s processes and procedures 
functioned in ways which were intended to mitigate legal risk. This was an area of inquiry 
																																																								
70 After 42 days in segregation, approval is sought from the ‘Deputy Director of Custody’ who has a director role 
within HMPPS and is charged with overseeing the high-security prisons within their designated area (e.g North 
or South of the UK).  
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which arose organically during fieldwork (rather than through any intentional investigation). 
For example, there was a system for internal and external approvals in the Unit; extensive 
accompanying paperwork; visitor rounds (from the IMB, governor, Chaplaincy etc.); and 
segregation review meetings. These safeguards were, ostensibly, intended to preserve 
prisoners’ rights. However, in practice, they largely served the interests of the institution. The 
paperwork provided the evidence that the institution had complied with its legal requirements: 
the review meetings and visitor rounds instilled accountability and a sharing of responsibility 
across the IMB, Chaplaincy, MHT and the operational managers within HMPPS. They 
provided the evidence that the institution had discharged its monitoring and oversight 
obligations. As such, the safeguards worked in complex ways and it was not always clear who 
were the intended beneficiaries.  
 
Importantly, these safeguards (the reviews, approval processes and paperwork) gained 
prominence after previous litigation, which was initiated from Whitemoor. In R (Bourgass 
and another) v Secretary of State for Justice (2015) UKSC 54, the Supreme Court highlighted 
a number of failings in the oversight of segregation in prisons. The Supreme Court stressed 
the importance of internal approvals, like segregation review meetings, as well as external 
approvals (such as the referrals to the Secretary of State for Justice). The Supreme Court 
criticised the approach of prison governors, to authorise segregation on behalf of the Secretary 
of State. For the Supreme Court, external referrals were important mechanisms for ensuring 
some degree of independent oversight and accountability, and were deemed important for 
safeguarding prisoners’ rights. Soon after the judgment, on 4 September 2015, Digby Griffith 
(the Director of National Operational Services in the National Offender Management Service) 
wrote to all governors and directors of prisons in the UK prison estate reiterating the 
importance of review processes and segregation review meetings. He also informed governors 
of a new approval process: for individuals held in continuous segregation for 42 days, the 
prison must obtain external authorisation from the DDC. As a result of Bourgass, there was an 
immediate and direct change to the approval process in prisons. It is an example of how 
prisons can be impacted by litigation, and how institutional behaviour and organisational 
methods may need to change as a consequence.71  
 
Many staff described how, since Bourgass, their processes and procedures had been tightened. 
They described the pressures from the introduction of new, additional paperwork, as well as 
the demands of weekly segregation review meetings. However, it was not always clear who 
																																																								
71 Although, as Chapter Two discussed, such change may not always be as envisaged, nor help the intended 
beneficiaries of the litigation. 
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these processes hindered, and who they benefited: Staff? Prisoners? The institution? 
Therefore, the first part of this chapter focuses on the ways in which procedural safeguards 
functioned in the Unit. It focuses on three processes: (i) the internal and external approvals 
(and accompanying paperwork); (ii) the visitation process (from members of the IMB, 
Chaplaincy, SMT and MHT); and (iii) segregation review meetings. The safeguards were 
intended to introduce accountability and transparency to the Unit. 72  However, these 
procedures were heavily criticised by staff and prisoners. The criticisms were rooted in 
perceptions that practices (like paperwork and review meetings) were bureaucratic processes, 
ones which occurred because the rules required them to, but were of little benefit to staff and 
prisoners. They are good examples of how bureaucratic processes can displace the provision 
of services by staff (Drybread, 2016; Gupta, 2012; Meehan, 1986). The institution encouraged 
staff to focus their attention on completing mundane tasks (like paperwork, form filing, rubber 
stamping) and thereby diverted staff away from engaging with prisoners, dealing with their 
requests and the timely implementation of the regime. The bureaucratic demands overrode the 
opportunity for meaningful interactions with prisoners; it reduced the opportunity for 
informed assessments about well-being; and came at the expense of safeguarding.   
Approvals and paperwork processes 
 




When a prisoner is first brought to the Unit, a doctor or nurse should complete the ‘Initial 
Segregation Health Screen’ within 2 hours. A governor level manager must then determine 
whether to authorise segregation based on the outcome of that health screen. If the prisoner is 
deemed fit for segregation (a determination which, during fieldwork, was upheld in all the 
																																																								
72 There was an explicit aim, within PSO 1700, which called for clear lines of accountability for staff, governors 
and Directors (p. 6). 
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cases I observed), he will be detained in the Unit. Then, within the next 72 hours, a governor 
level manager must review the decision for the initial segregation. He/she (along with input 
from the health team) must then complete the: ‘Governor’s Authority for Initial Segregation’, 
‘Reason for Initial Segregation’ and a Self-harm/suicide case review for prisoners on an open 
ACCT. The prisoner is not required to attend this review. From this point forward, 
segregation review meetings then occur every 14 days, during which a governor level 
manager chairs the meeting and is responsible for completing the documentation: ‘Governor’s 
continued authority for segregation’, ‘Segregation Privileges and Behaviour Targets’ and 
another self-harm/suicide case review completed for all those on an ACCT (PSO 1700, p. 14).  
If a prisoner is approaching 42 days in the Unit, an external review must be sought from the 
DDC, an individual outside the prison who sits within HMPPS, and is charged with 
overseeing the high security estate. 73 During fieldwork, every 42-day case which was 
submitted to the DDC for external approval was returned as ‘authorised’. When I asked staff 
if the DDC ever refused authorisation, it was met with a definitive ‘no’.  
 
Alongside this approval process, PSO 1700 requires staff to complete and retain the following 
documentation: 
• Segregation Daily Diary Sheet: contains details of all staff on duty and visitors to the 
Unit.  
• Segregation Unit Daily Log: includes details of the daily activities prisoners had access 
to. E.g. exercise, showers, cell clean etc.  
• Daily Adjudications Record: includes the name of the prisoner, charge, outcome/award, 
and adjudicator for all of the adjudications heard each day. It should be completed by 
segregation staff at the end of the adjudication process. 
• Segregation Daily Memo Notes: intended to record any significant events that happen 
within the segregation unit during the day e.g. control and restraints, use of special 
accommodation (like ‘the box’), comments on the health screen and handover notes for 
staff (PSO 1700, pp. 6, 7). 
 
PSO 1700 permits each establishment to develop their own records, so long as they capture 
the key information, detailed above. As such, there is no standardised record-keeping across 
the prison estate.  
 
																																																								
73 See PSO 1700, pages 22 -33, 40  
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During fieldwork, I observed how these paperwork practices were not always rigorously 
followed. When I reviewed each prisoner’s personal folder, some authorisations were 
missing, and some folders were entirely empty. When I reviewed the Daily Log and Daily 
Memo Notes, they were often short and lacking in detail. Some entries were amended and 
backdated. For example, on one occasion, staff refused to allow Arthur access to the exercise 
yard. This was on the basis that, the previous day, he had been misbehaving, ‘acting up’. 
There was no record of this in the Logs. When staff realised this they updated it 
retrospectively (Fieldwork notes, p. 112, 114). Why do this? By the time they amended the 
logs, Arthur had already lost his yard entitlement – the paperwork did not change the reality. 
Instead, importantly, it changed the narrative. The paperwork stated the reasons behind, and 
was the evidence for, the decision. Significantly, it was evidence that staff had fulfilled their 
legal obligations. The emphasis on paperwork and form filling illustrates the increasingly 
bureaucratised nature of prison work and how documentation is important for mitigating 
institutional (legal) risk. 
 
Staff described how completing the paperwork was an important part of their role. They also 
vociferously complained about it. It was perceived as burdensome and meaningless. They saw 
it as excessive and criticised the prison for being overly reliant on paperwork (and the 
corresponding pressure from the institution for its timely completion): 
 
I don't like all the paperwork you have to do all the time. There's a lot of just rubbish 
paperwork. I could do five bits of paperwork for one incident, all different. Paperwork is just 
rubbish – a real waste of time. (Pete, staff). 
 
I get what we have to do. I get that with, obviously, all the paperwork, I have to do it. I don't 
really understand why I have to do it, but I know all the different pieces of paper...I know how 
to do it, but why we do it, I haven't got a clue. (Oli, staff). 
 
Obviously you’ve got loads of papers, and there’s the one on ‘use of force’ and whatever... I 
think sometimes it can be a bit pressured. I remember when I started in prisons, you didn’t 
have to do it. It was up to you, whether you’d done the use of force paperwork or not. You 
wouldn’t have a time limit. Whereas now, it seems that [within] 48 hours, you have to get it 
done and you’ll get pressure put on you for that…I’m not sure where that’s come from but it 
just has. That’s not just Whitemoor, that’s everywhere, but they seem to have completely 
changed their tack on that. (Phil, staff). 
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Many staff described the prison’s preoccupation with record-keeping. It added to their 
substantial feelings of pressure. It was seen as an evidence trail which protected the prisoner 
but did little to help them in their daily operations in the Unit: 
 
I wouldn’t say the legal paperwork aspects are for the officers at all, I don’t think they protect 
us, they seem to just go towards them. If we miss a tiny bit of paperwork, I mean the tiniest 
little signature, that’s it, everything is thrown out and he’s [the prisoner] got compensation. 
What world is that? When they’re plotting to blow things up and seriously harm people, and 
not just one person. I mean taking out a whole area of people and we get punished for their 
behaviour. I just think it’s wrong, it’s not the right way round at all. It should be that he needs 
to prove why he should have this and not us proving why we’ve not done something wrong. I 
think that’s ridiculous. (Holly, staff).  
 
Holly’s complaint was typical of many staff accounts. For them, the demands of paperwork 
were perceived as privileging prisoners rather than staff. They questioned ‘who did the 
paperwork protect; the prisoner or the institution?’. In the eyes of many, it was not designed 
to assist or protect the staff. For staff, laws and rules were seen as a mechanism which 
protected the prisoner. Importantly, the processes perpetuated ‘us/them’ attitudes in the Unit. 
In effect, paperwork processes were perceived as irritants; they were perceived as diverting 
power away from staff, by eroding the independence of staff to get on with their day-to-day 
duties (Murphy & Whitty, 2016, p. 128). For Scott (2009), this outlook was strongly 
correlated with prison officers who were punitive, authoritarian and who had strong aversions 
to the notion of prisoners’ rights. In many ways, these processes were perceived as 
mechanisms which confronted and challenged the existing authoritarian style of prison 
management (Whitty et al., 2001). In contrast, for prisoners, the law was perceived as 
functioning in ways which protected the institution. Therefore, both groups gave the 
impression that law was a hindrance; that it undermined their power structures, and unfairly 
advantaged the opposing group. Conceived this way, law was everyone’s enemy.  
Visitor rounds 
 
PSO 1700 (p. 7) contains an extensive list of individuals who should visit a prisoner in the 
Unit. Every day, a prisoner should receive a visit from: (i) a governor level manager; (ii) the 
healthcare team; and (iii) the Chaplaincy team. The prisoner should be visited by the 
Governing Governor and a member of the IMB on a weekly basis. These visits occurred as 
required by the PSOs. However, in reality, the visits were a process without much substance. 
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Their visits, and interactions, were often short, with visitors rushing from door to door, and 
presented little opportunity for meaningful interactions or discussions. Many prisoners 
described feeling conscious that staff would be listening and therefore felt reluctant to raise 
any problems or difficulties during these visits: 
 
They’re just following the procedure. They don’t care. It’s different if they’d come and be like 
‘you alright? you need anything?’ but they’re just ‘you alright?’…right…tick…next cell. So 
[shrugs] how is that helping anyone? Because if someone was actually suffering, how would 
you know they are suffering? When you’re not even talking to them. You’re just asking them 
if ‘they’re alright’. They might not want to say ‘I’ve got this issue and this problem’, in front 
of the officers that you’re around, because they want to keep it close to them. Even the 
Chaplaincy department – the Christian guy – he’s alright. He’s alright because when I see him 
he wants to talk but I find it difficult to talk to him, but I don’t know why. But the Imam, 
which is technically my guy, he doesn’t do anything. He just says ‘oh you’re alright’ tick. I’m 
like, all yous are just following procedure. You don’t really care. You just want to see me get 
punished. (Henry, prisoner). 
 
Visitors fulfilled their obligations under PSO 1700 at the most basic level. They discharged 
their legal duties: they visited daily and weekly (as required) and recorded their visits in the 
Segregation Unit Daily Log. Visits were often as Henry described: they were short, no more 
than a few minutes, at each prisoner’s door. There was little attempt to meaningfully explore 
prisoners’ health and well-being. Their visits were impersonal, experienced as punitive and 
lacking in care. Importantly, their obligations were discharged, on paper, but lacked the 
humane substance.  
Segregation review meetings 
 
Segregation review meetings are required under PSO 1700. They are intended to be a 
mechanism through which the members of the segregation review board (‘SRB’) can review 
and approve (or not) the continued segregation of a prisoner. In making this determination, 
the SRB should consider: (i) the initial reason for segregation; (ii) the behaviour and attitude 
of the prisoner since the last review; (iii) the prisoner’s ability to ‘cope’ with segregation; and 
(iv) plans for the prisoner’s transfer or return to the wing (PSO 1700, pp. 11, 12, 13).  The 
meetings require a level of faith and commitment from staff (to be patient, to make time for 
prisoners and to take the meetings seriously) and prisoners (to attend and engage with the 
members of the board). However, my research revealed that both were lacking in the Unit. 
Most staff and prisoner participants were cynical about the purpose, function and 
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effectiveness of these meetings. There was a sense that segregation review meetings were a 
superficial safeguard, they were procedures which occurred every week, but achieved very 
little. In my view, the SRBs were ineffective because they failed to solve the problems which 
mattered most to prisoners, for example, assisting with lost property or obtaining a transfer.  
 
Sometimes the SRB’s problem-solving abilities were constrained by issues beyond 
Whitemoor. For example, transfers took time to arrange: some prisons refused to accept 
prisoners from the segregation unit or prisoners were unwilling to transfer to the prisons that 
would accept them. However, for the most part, their abilities were constrained by the culture 
and nature of the SRB: there was a lack of joined up decision-making, members were not 
always proactive, there was a general unwillingness to take responsibility for tasks and 
members failed to recognise (or were disinterested in) the significance of the meetings (and 
failed to assign adequate time and importance to them). 
 
The main prisoner complaints related to the composition of the SRB. PSO 1700 details eight 
individuals who should attend the review meetings. These include: chairperson (mandatory); 
healthcare representative/ MHT member (mandatory); segregation officer; wing/unit personal 
officer; Chaplain; psychologist; prisoner (for at least part of the board); IMB member (p. 10). 
The SRB in Whitemoor comprised many of those detailed in PSO 1700. Typically, there 
would be: 
• Chair – Governor grade manager (never the ‘number one’ i.e. the Governing 
Governor); 
• SO from the Unit 
• Two officers 
• Chaplain 
• Representative from MHT 
• Representative from OMT 
• IMB member  
• Prisoner 
 
PSO 1700 requires the mandatory attendance of the chair and a member of the MHT. For all 
other members, attendance is discretionary. In Whitemoor, this had the effect of producing 
substantial inconsistency in the composition of the boards. The same individuals rarely 
attended for consecutive weeks. Sometimes a Chaplain would attend, at other times a member 
of the IMB would attend, sometimes a representative from the OMT would attend, but not 
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always at the same time and rarely with the same frequency. The changing members of the 
SRB had a substantial influence on the usefulness of the meetings for prisoners.  For example, 
prisoners who were awaiting information on their transfers (often at least half) were dismayed 
when members of the OMT (charged with responsibility for transfers) failed to attend, as they 
were not updated on the status of their transfer nor were they given any clarity on their 
remaining time in segregation and/or in Whitemoor. On many occasions this caused frustration 
for prisoners who attended the meetings with the hope that their issues (perhaps relating to 
transfer or relocating back to the wing) could be resolved, only to find that key members of 
staff were not in attendance. The discretionary nature of the rules (it is not mandatory for an 
OMT representative to attend) may explain the limitations of the effectiveness of the board. 
However, it may also be explained by members’ attitudes towards SRBs, specifically their 
reluctance to take them seriously and to prioritise their key oversight duties. I observed how 
members prioritised other prison duties – other meetings – over their review board duties. 
There was a lack of commitment from members to attend, which gave the impression that they 
did not take the SRBs seriously, nor recognised them as valuable and worth prioritising. 
Moreover, when members were unable to attend, they rarely communicated their updates to 
other members of the board, to ensure that adequate information and advice could be provided 
to prisoners. 
 
Moreover, the weekly rotation of the chair had an acute impact on the meetings and the extent 
to which prisoners found them to be effective (i.e. able to assist with the problems they raised). 
According to PSO 1700, a prison establishment can determine the most appropriate person to 
chair the SRB. However, PSO 1700 suggests that, in the interests of fairness, the role should 
not be assigned to only one manager: the chair should be rotated (p. 10). Whitemoor made the 
operational decision to have a pool of four or five different managers who chaired the meetings. 
As a result, each week, there was often a different manager. This had the aim of impartiality, 
fairness and independence in mind. However, in reality these aims came at the expense of 
consistency and competency. Although lengthy, the fieldwork notes below provide a good 
illustration of how segregation review meetings functioned: 
 
Time - 14.10 
Freddie (prisoner) 
Freddie: [He arrived and seemed angry and upset.] He said he was pissed off that he was down 
here.  
Chair: You’re down here because you’ve been threatening staff.  
Freddie: What threats? [Shrugs]. 
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Chair: So, you’re denying it? 
Freddie: Yeah. 
Chair: Well that’s the information we’ve got. The security information we have says you 
threatened to stab people.  
Freddie: Who? 
Chair: Mr Riley. 
Freddie: Who is that? I don’t understand who that is. I haven’t done anything. I was asleep in 
bed, then at half 12 they came and got me. I was out in the morning and then half an hour later 
they came and got me.  
Chair: What’s been said to you about being down here? 
Freddie: Only this. 
[He got agitated and cross. Jack (officer) tried to talk to him and bent down and said ‘come on 
now, calm down’. Then Freddie said ‘don’t touch me or you’ll see what I’m capable of’. 
Intimidating, volatile. Unpredictable. He seemed distressed and frustrated]. 
Jack: At the last seg review, it said he’s been deselected. 
Chair: So what’s the plan for him? 
Alan (officer): We don’t really know as yet.  
Freddie: I don’t understand why I’m down here. I can act like a cunt if you want.  
Chair: Well let’s not use language like that, there are ladies present. 
Freddie: I’ll talk however I like. I can act bad to prove to you that I need to be here.  
Chair: See, you are making threats again. 
Freddie: No, I’m saying I could act like that but I don’t. What do I need to do? Start smashing 
stuff up? I’ve been here a week and I don’t know why. I could take the obs panel out and shit 
out of the block.  
Chair: You’re being threatening. 
Freddie: No I’m not, I’m saying I’ve been behaving but I don’t have to. In the past I’ve cut 
people, stabbed people and used violence. I used to seek out sex offenders on the main and 
attack them. But I came here and said I don’t want to do that.  
Chair: Alright, well we’ll deal with this in 14 days.  
Freddie: I’m gunna take the obs panel out now, you absolute fucking dick. Go suck your mum 
off.  
14.25 End (Fieldwork notes pp. 31, 32).  
 
14.35 Harris 
Chair: Your case has been referred to the police, you know why you’re here? 
Harris: No, I don’t know nothing. I’m here to listen. 
Alan: Your adjudication, which was opened by the governor, has been referred to the police, 
they’ll come have a chat with you. They’ll interview you and make a decision on whether to 
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prosecute. If they decide not to prosecute, then you’ll come back to adjudication. Whilst that’s 
going on, you’ll be staying with us.  
Chair: Your review is in 14 days. Everything alright in seg? 
Harris: [Shrug]. 
Chair: Any questions for us? 
Harris: No 
14.40 End (Fieldwork notes, p. 32). 
 
14.48 Aiden 
Aiden: I’m still doing work, being kept busy doing that. 
OMT representative: You’ve got parole at the end of the month. 
Alan: We are trying to sort your stuff for you, the stuff we talked about yesterday. 
Aiden: I got another certificate for English [he seemed proud, happy, smiling].  
[Everyone congratulated him and clapped]. 
Chair: Anything for us? 
Aiden: Nah. 
14.51 End (Fieldwork notes, p. 32). 
 
Chair: God, how many more? 
Alan: Two more. 
 
14.55 Simon 
Chair: Remind us why you’re down here? I’ve never seen you before. 
Simon: Waiting for a referral to D Wing. 
Chair: What do we know about this chap? [Said to the room]. 
OMT representative: He’s from Woodhill, was a seg to seg move. He wants to make a change 
to his life, he wants a referral to D Wing, it’s in the pipeline.  
Alan: Was it previously a drug problem? 
Simon: Yeah. 
Alan: But you’ve been good as gold down here. 
Chair: So you want D Wing if you can? Have they confirmed they’ll have you? 
OMT representative: Not yet but the referral is in. 
Alan: Any other issues, questions or problems? 
Simon: No. I’ve started education down here though. 
Alan: That’s good, so they’ll pay you then.  
Simon: Yeah 
OMT representative: Mental health should be contacted for on-going support for you. 
15.00 End (Fieldwork notes, p. 33). 
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15.02 Nazeer  
Chair: Why you down here? 
Nazeer: I dunno. 
Chair: You’ve been a naughty boy? 
Nazeer: Nah because of conflict. 
Chair: You’re under threat yeah? 
Nazeer: I dunno. 
Chair: What’s been happening? 
OMT representative: Well, we managed to get him a move to Garth, it’s not his first choice 
but I struggled to even get this. We will try for the end of next week. Will you go clear your 
property up over lunch and work out what to take with you? 
Nazeer: Yeah. 
Chair: Anything else you’d like to say? 
Nazeer: Thank you. I wasn’t under threat per se. I was just in conflict and was trying to avoid 
it. 
Alan: We appreciate that and understand. 
Nazeer: Now I gotta move. 
Alan: Yeah and your enhanced [status], we’ll sort it before you leave.  
15.05 End (Fieldwork notes, p. 33). 
 
SRB meetings were scheduled for Tuesday afternoons (14.00-15.30). Between eight and twelve 
prisoners would attend each meeting. The meeting lengths, for prisoners, tended to be short 
(between five and fifteen minutes), and they varied depending on the chair. In the above, the 
chair approached his meetings in a brusque and inpatient manner, rushing through prisoners. 
His meetings were short, no more than five minutes per prisoner. Chairs, like Graham, gave the 
impression, to prisoners, that the board members were not interested in engaging meaningfully 
with them (‘they don’t make any time to really listen to what I’m saying’, ‘all they care about is 
filling out their paperwork’).  
 
In contrast, some chairs approached the meetings in a more constructive way. The better chairs, 
before prisoners arrived, made enquiries with the rest of the board (about the reasons for 
segregation, plans for the prisoner and well-being of the prisoner); they familiarised themselves 
with notes from previous meetings; they introduced themselves and other members of the 
board; they framed their questions neutrally; probed prisoners comments further; were 
solutions focused; demonstrated empathy, compassion and patience; made time to listen to 
prisoners; and tried to work with prisoners, by involving them in the decision-making (e.g. 
asking how they see themselves progressing) to reach a mutually acceptable outcome: 
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14.10 Marcus, prisoner 
Prisoner entered. Chair introduced himself and others around the table. 
Chair: Right, so you’re here because you got on the netting on the wing, you then got CC but are now 
refusing to go back to the wing. What is the purpose of not going back to the wing? 
Marcus: I’ve had nothing resolved. 
Chair: What do you mean? 
Marcus: Stuff was supposed to be resolved that hasn’t been resolved. 
Chair: What needs resolving? 
Marcus: I overstayed my welcome on the wing. I did all of the courses because I haven’t got long left 
but there’s no progression. 
Chair: What do you see yourself progressing to? 
Marcus: B Cat, because I’ve done all the courses. 
Chair: Doing the courses and learning from them are two different things. You came here because you 
jumped on the netting to try enforce a transfer. And if I was a Gov at a new jail, I would be asking, 
have you actually learned anything from the courses when you acted liked that. 
Marcus: I didn’t want to do the courses but I had to. I would like to go Grendon or the TC at 
Dovegate. I haven’t been in a violent situation for over 6 years. Jumping on the netting is nothing 
when compared to other violent people who got a move to a Cat B and have much longer left than I do 
Chair: What did OMT say? 
Marcus: To go back to consolidations [the final part of courses, aimed at ‘consolidating’ learning], we 
sorted a plan in January but it is now February.  
OMT: You cannot do consolidation from segregation, you will have to go back to the wing. 
Marcus: I came off CC last week. 
OMT: You need to go back to the wing and then you can sort your consolidation. 
Chair: We are not trying to stitch you up. Whilst you are in seg the clock stops. You need to get back 
on to the wing and get your consolidation done and then you can get to Dovegate. 
Marcus: I understand that. 
Terry: Are you prepared to go back to the wing? 
Marcus: Yeah 
Chair: So we won’t sign you on, we will take you back to the wing. 
Marcus: You better not be gaming the system. 
Chair: No. Signing you on is not the best course of action. If I was a governor elsewhere, I would be 
interested in how long you were in seg for. So I won’t sign you on because you are better off on the 
wing.  
OMT: The work won’t stop when you’re on the wing. It’ll carry on – I’ll call the psychologists and get 
consolidation going. 
Marcus: Alright 





Chair: Last time we spoke, I asked about D wing. Has someone from D wing spoken to you? 
Simon: No. 
OMT: I spoke to D wing, Simon. The psychologist will come to speak to you in the next few weeks.  
Chair: I’m unhappy because it will take another few weeks, and we have spoken about this at your 
past few reviews. How are you doing down here? 
Simon: I’ve had a bit of stress but I’m alright. 
Chair: Do you need help with that? 
Simon: It’s the anniversary of my dad’s death. He died a year ago. I’ve not had any emotions and that 
stresses me, I’m supressing it a bit.  
Chair: Do you want to speak to anyone about that? Psychology or mental health? We can arrange for 
someone to come talk to you. 
Simon: No, I’m used to dealing with it myself. 
Chair: But your way of dealing with it is substance misuse. You might want to consider talking to 
someone about it. Do you have things in your cell to keep you occupied? 
Simon: I have a TV, that’s fine. 
Officer: I have some activities, painting, art materials, would you like any of those? 
Simon: I don’t mind art and that, yeah please.  
Officer: Okay, I’ll put some bits outside your cell. 
 14.42 End. (Fieldwork notes p.52). 
 
There were important differences in managerial style, tone and relational approach, which had 
a substantial impact on the meetings, one which should not be underestimated. The chair could 
influence whether an individual felt listened to, and felt their problems had been resolved, and 
therefore impacted whether an individual left the meeting feeling satisfied or frustrated. Not 
surprisingly, the meetings that tended to be better, were often longer, but generally resulted in 
fewer explosive outcomes (like Freddie above). The effectiveness of the meetings was 
individualised – in large part dependent on the chair. As such, the meetings were not always 
consistent in approach nor outcome.  
 
Differences in the chair also brought differences in knowledge and insight into each prisoner. 
Each week different people reviewed and oversaw segregation decisions. This was intended to 
introduce impartiality, and reduce the opportunities for bias and discrimination. Whilst a good 
idea in theory, there was a trade-off. Sometimes, chairs had never met the prisoner before and 
they lacked sufficient knowledge about why the prisoner was in segregation or how to move 
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things forward. At other times, there may have been weeks between a chair seeing a prisoner -
weeks during which different decisions and outcomes were agreed. As a consequence, I 
observed how different chairs often had the same, repeated conversations with prisoners; 
commencing with the chair asking the prisoner: ‘why are you here?’, ‘how are you doing?’ and 
‘what can we do for you?’. There was a substantial disconnect between the chairs. There were 
several explanations for this; the rotating chair was one of them. However, I also observed how 
few chairs took the time to read the notes on prisoners from previous meetings. They turned up 
to the SRBs and looked around the table to other members to provide updates and advice. 
Moreover, the notes from each segregation review were not always the most detailed, making 
handovers difficult. Also, amongst the SRB members, there was often confusion about, or 
denial of, responsibility for a particular action. Consequently, there was a combination of 
rotating chairs, poor handovers, poor record-keeping and failures to take responsibility, which 
all contributed to the, sometimes, chaotic and disorganised nature of the meetings. Thus, advice 
and action agreed in the meetings was often disjointed, fragmented, and tended to roll on from 
week to week. In effect, problems trundled on, passed on to the members of the next meeting, 
each time the ‘can was kicked’ further down the road. 
 
Sometimes the lack of knowledge and joined up thinking was a consequence of the nature of 
the environment. There was a complex relationship between the Unit and the security team in 
the prison. The manager and staff working in the Unit were somewhat removed from security 
decisions, despite being responsible for their implementation. For example, Bilal was brought 
to the Unit by the security team, but very little further information was provided to staff or the 
manager of the Unit: 
 
Chair: Perhaps this is something you can help us with. Have you been told why you are here? 
Bilal: Vaguely. 
Chair: Can you tell us? 
Bilal: You have me down here pending an investigation. Something to do with my 
offence…That’s all I’ve been told.  
Alan: That’s more than we know. 
Chair: We are trying to find out what’s going on but security holds all the information. It is 
very hard for us to decide your future without any knowledge about why you’re here. They’ll 
tell you before they’ll tell us. So I can’t make any recommendations about your reasons for 
segregation. But we can check out your welfare, do you have activities and things to do? But 
there’s not much we can do until security give us the information. 
Alan: They sent us nothing. 
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This example illustrates the veil which ‘security’ can create, one which can affect the 
functioning and effectiveness of legal safeguards.74 Security was the ‘ultimate trump card’ for 
the prison authorities and it created a discretionary space in which segregation could be 
justified (Armstrong, 2018, p. 409). Information was not shared with those in the Unit, on the 
basis of ‘security’ reasons. Instead, the chair had to seek guidance from Bilal, hoping he could 
reveal why he was detained in the Unit. This is not how the ‘review’ board should function. 
The board should have, at least, some information of the reason behind the decision, in order 
to be able to ‘review’ and ‘monitor’ the effect of that decision. In Bilal’s case, the chair was 
not able to scrutinise the decision. His ‘review’ and subsequent authorisation was nothing 
more than a rubber stamp. ‘Security’, here, was invoked as the reason for segregation, it 
meant the decision could not be disputed and represented an important instrument of penal 
power (Drake, 2012, p. 88). ‘Security’ was a concept used to justify violations of procedural 
rights (violating the right to reasons and information as set out in Bourgass).  
 
Segregation review meetings were a common area of contention for both prisoners and staff. 
There were many examples from staff and prisoners who both complained that chairs ‘did not 
know what was going on’; and how they felt frustrated with the meetings, which they 
perceived as ineffective, ‘pointless’, and a ‘waste of time’: 
 
I: Do you go to your seg review meetings? 
R: Yeah.  
I: How do you find those? 
R: Shit. Pointless.  
I: Why do you think they’re pointless? 
R: Because they’ve got all those people in there for no reason. It’s just to tick a box, that’s 
what it is. They’ve got about 10 people in there and no one is in your corner at all… they’re 
pointless. I don’t think I’ll go again to the review. 
I: How come? 
R: Right, so, on the first review they said we were staying down here until transfer. So that 
was the first one. The second one they said we were staying down here because of the police 
investigation. In the one after that they said we were waiting for a transfer again. And now, in 
this last one, they started talking about going back on the wing. So I don’t know what’s going 
on. One thing they say one week, one thing they say the next week. (Shawn, prisoner). 
																																																								
74 It also illustrates the ways in which processes like segregation review meetings functioned to perpetuate the 
loss of agency for prisoners: the emphasis on ‘we’ and ‘us’ in ‘deciding your future’ does little to equip the 
individual with responsibility for their own future.  
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[I] had a meeting yesterday for my review. When I was at the review, they weren’t telling me 
anything positive. They changed their minds, [they] just don’t talk no sense. So I felt kinda 
down, I felt kinda stressed out…because you’re in these meetings, being told stuff and when it 
gets to the next meeting, there’s nothing. Nothing happens. Nothing changes. So that makes 
you feel like you’ve got somewhere but you’ve gone nowhere. (Billy, prisoner). 
 
I mentioned to them in that board, I said ‘can you get me to Manchester so I can get my 
accumulated visits’ and then move on from there or Full Sutton. But then when I went on the 
next review, there was no mention of Manchester.. and she said ‘we’ve got nothing down for 
you about Manchester’. So it just wound me up. I thought they didn’t listen to anything I said 
in the last review. (Patrick, prisoner).  
 
I think they’re a bit pointless to be honest, they just seem to go round in circles, especially the 
ones that are down here long term who want ship outs. They go there, they’ll tell them where 
they want ship outs, the governor will listen, he will say ‘keep your head down, do this, do 
that’. They go in there next time and the whole room is completely different people, same 
department but completely different people. ‘So what’s the plan for you?’, the governor will 
start with, then the prisoner says ‘oh don’t you know from the last one, they were looking in to 
this place and this place’. And they will sit there and say ‘oh no, I’ve not got that written 
down’ and it will just go round in circles again and again. That’s why a lot of them get 
frustrated and wound up because they’ll go to seg reviews and they will just have to go over 
the same thing again and again and again and they don’t seem to get anywhere for a long time. 
(Phil, staff). 
 
Fuckin waste of time half the time, aren’t they? I really don’t like them. I think I end up 
feeling so helpless, maybe powerless, frustrated and to see people coming in week after week, 
nothing being done. I can sit there all day long and say ‘we will do this, if you do that’ but it 
doesn’t get done, for whatever reason. (Trevor, staff).  
 
These accounts reveal the importance of comprehensive record-keeping. The complaints 
raised by Patrick and Phil suggest that better note-keeping could mitigate some of the 
disjointedness of the board. Moreover, if board members took the time to familiarise 
themselves with the notes, or review previous discussions or agreed plans with prisoners, they 
would be in a stronger position to give the impression that they care, that they listen to 
prisoners, and that they take their complaints seriously.   
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Moreover, Trevor’s words illustrate the sense of powerlessness and frustration that some 
board members felt. Sometimes agreed actions were not performed because members failed to 
take responsibility for them. For example, I observed instances in which the OMT 
representative thought the officer was responsible for the task, or the mental health member 
was, and vice versa. However, this powerlessness was also related to broader issues, such as 
the broader penal climate in which members were trying to reach solutions. For example, 
members acknowledged how they struggled to obtain transfers because other prisons ‘refused 
to accept’ prisoners from the Whitemoor segregation unit, or that secure psychiatric hospitals 
(sometimes the prisoner’s preference) were full. Thus, the board often had limited options. 
There were few alternatives to segregation which made inspired ‘problem-solving’ difficult 
(Hannah-Moffat & Klassen, 2015). 
 
Both staff and prisoners were critical of the role of other actors (like the IMB, Chaplain and 
MHT), for failing to perform properly their safeguarding functions. Prisoners criticised the 
IMB and mental health representatives for failing to speak up on their behalf. For example, 
Billy complained that:  
 
Mental health were there and the Gov said ‘any evidence of this affecting his mental health?’ 
but he just said nothing. I was like ‘c’mon bruv, speak up’. I haven’t been able to get my 
medication, of course it’s fucking with my mental health (Fieldwork notes, p. 111).  
 
My own observations of the meetings were that the Chaplain, mental health and IMB 
representatives rarely voiced concerns or objections. Few questions were asked. Papers were 
passed around the table, quickly glanced at, and subsequently signed. Whilst these 
representatives may have asked questions and expressed their views outside of the segregation 
review meetings, I was not able to confirm this empirically. Alex Sutherland, the Chairman of 
the IMB at HMP Whitemoor (2015-17), has acknowledged some of the complexities of the 
presence of the IMB at segregation review meetings (2018, p. 50).75 Specifically, according to 
PSO 1700, IMB members should not be involved in the ‘management decision’; they are 
simply required to tick ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to ‘questions of whether procedures have been followed 
and the decision is reasonable’ (p. 50). He suggests that the procedures are usually followed 
and the range of options is so limited that the decision, in the circumstances, is usually 
reasonable. However, he questions, when the alternatives are ‘so thin’, what ‘reasonable’ truly 
																																																								
75 He also identifies some of the reasons for the limited impact of IMB objections to segregation (p.50-51). He 
explains how, for the last six years, the IMB at Whitemoor recorded profound concerns about segregation, yet 
the same problems persist. These problems were identified in Chapter Three; little has changed over the years, 
despite vociferous complaints from the IMB, regarding the regime and conditions at HMP Whitemoor.  
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means (p.50). Moreover, PSO 1700 specifically states that IMB members should not raise 
their objections in front of prisoners. Thus, whilst there is an explanation for the silence of 
IMB members (an explanation which does not extend to mental health representatives, who 
could have been more vocal), this silence gave the impression, to prisoners, that nobody was 
advocating for their interests and that the meetings were little more than a ‘box ticking 
exercise’: ‘why do they all sit there? Just staring at me? When they don’t say nothin? 
Chaplain, IMB, mental health, shouldn’t they be sayin somethin? Nah, they don’t care’. 
(Henry, prisoner). 
 
The meetings were often experienced as a hollow process, one which was intended to 
legitimate decision-making but lacked the substance of such. Staff were aware of the limited 
role of the other representatives: 
 
Sometimes, it feels like a box ticking exercise when we have the IMB there, mental health and 
they don’t really say much and they just sign the papers. So I think, if we’re here as an 
oversight function, we’re not really doing that, so why are we all here? And then, if you look 
at all that paperwork… I have to sign about three bits of paperwork…There is so much 
paperwork, you get bogged down in paperwork. So the process becomes a hindrance, rather 
than a benefit. (Trevor, staff). 
 
Segregation review meetings are, in theory, an important mechanism for reviewing and 
authorising segregation decisions. The various actors (the chair, staff, IMB, Chaplain and 
mental health) are critical for overseeing the use of segregation. However, they authorised 
decisions without much scrutiny or challenge. They legitimated decisions but failed to 
perform their safeguarding function. Both prisoners and staff were acutely aware of the 
problems associated with revolving board members, lack of knowledge, disjointed 
information, inconsistent decision-making, and a lack of ownership for decision-
implementation. The meetings became a revolving door for prisoners. They attended every 
two weeks but felt little was achieved by those meetings.  
 
They were also experienced as intimidating and artificial environments in which prisoners felt 
unable to disclose their concerns or difficulties: 
 
I think I find them very intimidating, because it may be one or two people that I know there, 
but the rest of them I don't really know. They need to be talking more to the prisoners, getting 
to know them. So when it comes to the board they've got a little bit of background and a bit of 
 184 
understanding [about] who is in front of them. Because when I sit here, I think I don't know 
you, I don't know you, don't know you; and you're not going to get to know me in five or ten 
minutes, three minutes, half an hour. You need to spend a bit of time. If they're going to be 
doing seg reviews on prisoners, then they need to go out and about and spend time, or go into 
the Bubble and spend time, talking to the prisoners. (Joe, prisoner). 
 
I’ve sat in cells for so many weeks; sat around thinking, ruminating and that’s 23 hours a day 
in that cell with your own thoughts. Then someone comes [and] gets you – it’s not like you 
know the time – and they bring you in this room and you’ve got all these people staring at 
you, asking you ‘what can we do for you?’. And it’s a bit embarrassing, it’s a bit awkward. 
And for people like myself, who suffer from anxiety and that, it’s quite difficult to go there 
and describe how you’re feeling. (Daniel, prisoner). 
 
Because I’ve been in the seg for so long, I don’t like being around people and that, it’s a bit, I 
feel awkward, I feel out of place. And to go in there, with so many people around the table, 
everyone’s just staring at you waiting for you to say something. It’s intimidating and I never 
know what to say. (George, prisoner). 
 
One of the explicit responsibilities of SRBs, contained within PSO 1700, is to monitor and 
review a prisoner’s ability to ‘cope’ with segregation and to assess whether it is impacting 
their mental health and well-being (p. 11). However, the nature of the SRB – comprising a 
number of changeable individuals – can limit the extent to which these responsibilities are 
fulfilled. The meetings were a difficult space for some prisoners: an intimidating environment 
which made it difficult to reveal their challenges or expose vulnerabilities. Most staff were 
aware of this. They recognised how ‘a room full of strangers’ tended to represent a ‘trip out of 
the cell’, rather than a positive mechanism through which to engage with prisoners and assess 
their well-being: 
 
I kind of get that it would be really tricky to come in to a big room full of strangers – never 
mind if you were emotionally struggling – to get any thoughts out. I sometimes wonder why 
some prisoners come, because they come but they don’t really bring anything, they don’t want 
anything, it’s almost like it’s just a trip out of the cell. (Trevor, staff). 
 
This analysis illustrates how segregation review meetings were, sometimes, inherently flawed. 
The composition of the SRB – with numerous and changeable members – perpetuated 
inconsistency and ineffective decision-making. This was a negative impact which greatly 
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outweighed the intended benefits associated with an independent board.76 Moreover, genuine 
assessments could not be made about prisoners’ mental health and well-being: time and space 
prevented constructive discussions (plans for progression or to hear prisoners’ concerns). In 
many staff and prisoner accounts, the segregation meetings (as implemented) appeared to 
achieve more harm than good. They perpetuated feelings of frustration, alienation and 
unavoidable impotence. In many ways, they failed to reduce the risks in the Unit, and in some 
cases may have even exacerbated them. For example, prisoners’ sense of powerlessness and 
frustration could quickly coalesce into anger and resentment, and provoke severe and 
dangerous reactions. Often prisoners left the meetings making threats of violence, to ‘remove 
their obs panels’ and ‘shit up’. These were not always empty threats. Freddie, after his 
meeting, broke his observation panel and started throwing things out of his cell. Billy, in the 
evening after his meeting, created a ligature and attempted to kill himself. When I asked why, 
he explained his overwhelming sense of powerlessness and frustration at the lack of progress 
and inaction of some staff in the Unit. He described feeling ‘fed up’ with having the same 
conversations, with different members of staff in the meetings, and felt he was getting 
‘nowhere’. Some staff were aware of the detrimental impact of ineffective meetings on 
individuals. Phil (staff) reflected on the catalyst for the group of 5/6 prisoners who, in 2017, 
participated in the dirty protest over a period of several weeks: 
 
I think over 4, 5, 6 months maybe, they became increasingly fed up of going to seg reviews 
and being told the same thing every week… and I think that is a big problem down here – seg 
reviews – because they see a different governor every time, there’s a different person from 
OMT every time, they have to go over the same thing and then they [the board] don’t know 
anything about it. I think that’s why, it just built up from that. (Phil, staff). 
 
Meetings experienced as unhelpful, dissatisfactory or a waste of time fed prisoners’ feelings 
of anger, anxiety, and powerlessness and, on some occasions, contributed to (perhaps fuelled) 
grave actions. When the prison authorities prioritised ‘procedure’, they revealed their 
preference for procedural justice, rather than substantive justice. By rushing prisoners through 
the meetings, approving segregation without much scrutiny, and signing paperwork without 
much thought, they could demonstrate that the segregation reviews had taken place, and their 
legal duties had been discharged (i.e. the procedural requirements were satisfied). However, 
the speed at which the meetings occurred, the lack of attentiveness and investment from the 
board, and the limited options for staff, meant there was little opportunity to meaningfully 
																																																								
76 Board independence was an unlikely, unattainable aspiration, in light of the board composition – always 
comprising members from inside the institution.  
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work with prisoners, to identify solutions and reach outcomes which mattered to prisoners 
(i.e. constructive, substantive outcomes).  
2. Accessibility of law 
 
The above highlights some of the complexities of the internal safeguarding processes. Staff 
did not always endorse the processes and prisoners were cynical about their usefulness (i.e. 
sceptical about whether the paperwork or the segregation review meetings benefited them or 
protected their interests). Thus, during interviews, some prisoners described how it was 
important to take ‘law into their own hands’. By this, they meant, it was important to have 
access to their solicitors and legal resources to empower themselves, to try ‘fight’ the 
practices of staff.  However, it became clear how prisoners did not have easy access to: (i) 
telephones, which created barriers for contacting their legal advisers; (ii) resources, like the 
PSOs and PSIs, which were held in the library and therefore inaccessible to prisoners in the 
Unit; and (iii) accountability mechanisms (like complaints processes and the segregation 
review meetings). Staff were important gatekeepers for a prisoner’s access to legal advice and 
legal resources; they were important actors who influenced if, when and how a prisoner’s 
rights were protected. 
 
Firstly, prisoners were entitled to use the phone every other day. Many prisoners identified a 
reluctance to use their limited phone calls to contact their solicitor. The phone call was a rare 
opportunity to speak to family members and friends, who prisoners preferred to prioritise. A 
number of participants discussed their on-going appeals but explained how it was difficult, in 
the Unit, to contact their legal advisers and therefore difficult to make progress:  
 
R: My solicitor is trying to sort out this [his imprisonment] situation but, as I said, because 
being in here, you only get a phone call every other day, it’s hard. It’s hard to contact him. So 
it’s not really leaving me much room to sort out my situation really.  
I: What would happen if you got to the phonebox to call your solicitor but there was no 
answer? Would you be able to call back later in the day? 
R: I mean, if you’re lucky, you might have an okay officer then maybe, you might. They 
might let you try again if you explain to them. But normally, no, that’s not how it works down 
here. (Kamil, prisoner). 
 
Since moving to the Unit, Kamil found it difficult to keep in touch with his solicitor. If his 
solicitor failed to answer, it was effectively a waste of his phone call. Most prisoners were 
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aware of this risk and therefore chose to prioritise speaking to family members. They put their 
on-going legal actions on hold during their time in the Unit.  
 
Other prisoners described how the timing of the phone call could have a substantial impact on 
contacting their legal advisers. Henry, in his first week in the Unit, complained that the staff 
took him to the phone in the afternoons, sometimes quite late in the day: ‘they keep doing 
this, and I keep missing my solicitor. He doesn’t answer after 4pm and they keep putting me 
on the phone at 4pm’. Thus, prisoners were almost completely reliant on staff and the Unit’s 
routine.   
 
Some prisoners suggested that the limited opportunity for a legal call was ‘against the law’. 
This exposed their outrage and sense that detention, in the Unit, had in many ways violated 
their legal rights. However, as far as the law is concerned, telephone calls are not explicitly 
regulated in the main prison legislation (the PR 1999). There is some limited guidance in PSO 
1700, which states the restrictions in the Unit must be ‘no more than necessary…to protect the 
prisoner…or to maintain the good order or discipline of the establishment’ (p. 9). The 
guidance further states that legal visits and the use of the telephone should be ‘comparable’ to 
that of a prisoner held on normal location (p. 9). According to PSI 2011/49, a prisoner on 
normal location must be given access to a telephone during association ‘and at other such 
times as are reasonably practicable, depending on the nature of the establishment’s regime’. 
At Whitemoor, on normal location, there were three or four telephones on each spur, available 
for prisoners during their periods of association.77 On the wings, these periods of association 
varied, but they tended to provide at least a 2-hour window in which prisoners could use the 
telephones. On the wings, prisoners had much more flexibility to determine when they used 
the telephone and could, if they decided (and their funds permitted), make a number of 
telephone calls each day. In contrast, in the Unit, prisoners had little choice about when (and 
if) they accessed the telephone. ‘Comparability’ was not a helpful barometer. Access to the 
telephones in the Unit was so restricted that it could not be offered in a way which was 
‘comparable’ to the wings.  Moreover, access to the telephone could be withdrawn if a 
‘prisoner’s behaviour and attitude’ made it ‘impracticable or undesirable’ (PSO 1700, p. 15). 
Access to the telephone, and therefore access to a legal adviser, was not unconditional. There 
																																																								
77 These periods varied. The phones could be used between 9 and 10am, before prisoners attended their morning 
workshops. They could then be used between 4.30 – 7.30pm, after returning from the workshops. There were 
also periods in the day when some prisoners did not attend workshops and therefore were able to use the phones 
outside those timeframes. It depended on the schedules for each wing and spur. It also depended on whether the 
wing was ‘locked down’. As discussed elsewhere, during some days the regime was cancelled and prisoners 
were not unlocked from their cells.  
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was no explicit right for a legal call in the legal rules (PR 1999) or accompanying non-legal 
rules (PSOs or Local Site Rules). The PSO makes no distinction between ‘legal calls’ and 
calls with family members. The law and rules, as they functioned in the prison, were only of 
limited value in facilitating access to legal advice. Access to the telephones, and therefore 
access to a legal adviser, were effectively embedded within staff decision-making and the 
operation of the Unit’s regime.78  
 
Secondly, prisoners in the Unit described practical difficulties in accessing legal resources, 
such as textbooks or copies of the PSOs and PSIs. Some prisoners viewed these as important 
documents, containing relevant information, for helping them understand, and perhaps 
challenge, the imposition of segregation. However, the books, PSOs and PSIs were stored in 
the library. Prisoners could put forward an application to attend the library, however, they 
were often refused:  
 
R: So, the PSO is in the library… but we in the seg don’t have access to the library. Well, we 
can put an application in, but I’ve never had that approved. So, because those books have to 
stay in the library – the library won’t bring them here for people to read them – it’s a bit of a 
double-edged sword. Yes they are there and we’ve got access to them but we don’t really have 
access to them, understand what I’m sayin? 
I: That’s probably the time when you need access to them the most. 
R: Yes, exactly, yes. (Eric, prisoner). 
 
What it is yeah…we do read it [PSO 1700], us prisoners, we do…because you want to know 
what your rights are and if staff can do certain things. So we read things like the Human 
Rights Act and everything that falls underneath that…and the PSI and PSO and all these types 
of things…but…If I was out of here, I would go to the library, and go find the thing, so I 
could show it to the governor and say ‘look, you’re not meant to be doing this’. But, 
obviously, I can’t do that, and they know I can’t do that. I’m in the segregation unit so there’s 
nothing I can do about it right now. I’ll have to wait until I come out and then try to fight it. 
(Henry, prisoner). 
 
You can get them [the books and PSIs] if you put in [an] application to go to the library. Cos 
there’s so much books and PSIs, you need to know what you’re looking for. You could go and 
look at, say PSI 49/2011, that is correspondence and safeguarding, you can go and pay for a 
																																																								
78 Although, as Chapter Two discussed, access to legal advisers is also embedded within the wider socio-
economic and political environment, which has reduced the availability of Legal Aid for prison law matters.					
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photocopy…If you’ve got the insight into what you want, you can get it. If you don’t know 
what you want, you’d be lost. (Shawn, prisoner). 
 
Even if prisoners were granted access to the library, as Shawn described, it required a 
minimum level of legal knowledge. One had to know what to look for, which book, PSO or 
PSI was relevant, and this was not always easy to establish. At the very least, prisoners 
needed sufficient time to review the documents, and resources (pens and paper) to make a 
note of the relevant information. Neither are particularly abundant in prisons. It also required 
prisoners to have the financial resources to make and pay for photocopies. Sam (a prisoner in 
the Unit) explained that it cost 10p per sheet to photocopy in the library. PS0 1700 is a 73-
page document, therefore it costs £7.30 to photocopy the full document. Of course, not all 
pages would be needed but 10p per page is still a substantial expense when considered against 
the payment opportunities in the Unit, which are often limited and meagre (e.g. 0.28p (basic), 
£1.41 (standard), £1.52 (enhanced) per session of in-cell education). It was not simple or easy 
for prisoners to access the relevant legal resources.  
 
Prisons are only under a limited obligation to hold copies of statutes, PSOs and PSIs. The 
minimum requirement is for every prison to have a copy of the PSOs and PSIs in their library, 
although access to such can be restricted ‘for security reasons’. This was confirmed by the 
MoJ in its response to a Freedom of Information request in December 2008, which expressed 
concerns about prisoners’ access to PSIs and PSOs.79 In its response, the MoJ confirmed that 
prisoners are not allowed to remove the PSOs and PSIs from the library, but may be able to 
request a photocopy, at their own expense. The MoJ suggested that family, friends or legal 
advisers may be able to print and send the PSOs and PSIs to prisoners (see Freedom of 
Information Request dated 5 December 2008). This is not straightforward. As discussed in 
Chapter Two, there are a number of PSOs and PSIs which have been updated, replaced or 
entirely removed. It can be difficult, even for those of us with legal experience, and access to 
all PSOs and PSIs, to work out which are relevant and still in force.  
 
Thirdly, prisoners described challenges associated with oversight mechanisms like complaint 
processes and segregation review meetings.  
																																																								
79 The FOI request stated ‘I would like to know the procedures that are in place to ensure that serving prisoners 
have full and unrestricted access to PSIs and PSOs. Certain PSIs and PSOs (for example, PSI 45/2007) contain 
template documents that a prisoner can use. I would like to know what procedures are put in place within the 
Prison Service so that prisoners have access to it and so they have the ability to duplicate such documents to 
enable them to take them away for reference purposes, or, as in the case of PSI 45/2007, take them away to 




As far as complaints were concerned, the process required prisoners to complete a complaint 
form and either slide it under the door, or hand it to a member of staff to post in the 
designated ‘complaints box’. Participants raised concerns associated with the lack of 
confidentiality of this process. Some suggested that staff ‘would just read them if they wanted 
to’ (Sam), and others believed that complaints would be leaked to the officers involved. There 
was little faith in the complaints process, rooted in a broader scepticism towards legal 
accountability mechanisms (discussed in the final part of this chapter). Participants’ 
perspectives were also influenced by previous experiences in which they had made 
complaints but received delayed or unhelpful responses. During fieldwork, four participants 
submitted formal complaints, the content of which challenged decisions such as the 
cancellation of visits or the basis for their segregation. Two received a response, although it 
took several weeks (at least three), whereas two others did not receive any response: 
 
I’ve written a complaint but they haven’t even come back to me. I gave it to the officer and I 
don’t even know if the officer posted it because it was…how many of us put in a 
complaint…about 1, 2, 3…about 4 different prisoners put in a complaint and none of us have 
had a reply since. So it’s like, what’s happening? (Henry, prisoner). 
 
Yeah, it's not – so the complaint process…I don't think it's for day-to-day complaints, it's for 
more serious things like if you've been assaulted, or threatening behaviour from staff, it's 
things like that, that's what it's for. That's what I thought anyway. On top of that, numerous 
complaints go missing. I've put in so many complaints that I just don't get replies to. So, it's 
like, you just give up. I've put my time and effort into this, and if I'm not going to get a 
reply…then why bother?… The complaints process can sometimes be effective, but most of 
the times it's a joke because it's like a fucking lottery. (Nazeer, prisoner). 
 
I: Have you used the complaints process here? 
R: Yeah I’ve put three in since I’ve been down here but everything is slow here. I put in a 
confidential access to security about two weeks ago and I still haven’t had a response. I put in 
another complaint about not having a response, and I’ve not had a response.  
I: What do you mean by ‘confidential access to security’? 
R: It’s like, you put it in an envelope, so the officers can’t read it. So …If I want to complain 
to your boss, I’ll put it in an envelope so you can’t read the complaint, kinda thing. 
I: So what was that first complaint about? 
R: About my visits [getting cancelled]. 
I: And why don’t you want the seg staff to see that? 
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R: I wanted it to go straight to security because what would happen is…with a complaint 
form, usually the first response is that the SO will read it, then reply, and they will just fob you 
off basically. So if I put in a complaint for security, it doesn’t go via the SO, so I don’t get no 
dumb response from him. Instead, I put it in an envelope, so no one else will read it and that 
way it’ll go straight to security. (Sam, prisoner). 
 
There was a lack of faith, for many participants, in the usefulness of the complaints system. 
Most reported concerns about delays, whereas others reported more immediate issues: ‘How 
are you meant to complain, when you ain't got no pen, no paper? Then you have to ask them 
[staff] for something, but I don't want to talk to them’ (Johnny). Accessing the complaints 
process was much like accessing legal representatives on the phone: it depended on staff. 
Staff were responsible for ensuring the complaints made their way to the appropriate person – 
a responsibility which many prisoners had little faith in. Many prisoners described a futility to 
the complaints process: they recounted how delays in responding to complaints created 
significant issues; and how such delays contributed to a sense of frustration, powerlessness 
and anger towards the Unit, its regime and those who implemented it.  
 
Similar considerations were raised in the context of segregation review meetings. The 
meetings occurred every week, although the prisoner group was divided in two, with only half 
attending each week. In effect, prisoners attended a segregation review meeting every 14 
days, the maximum limit set out in PSO 1700 (p. 10). Every Tuesday morning, staff visited 
the cells of the prisoners scheduled to attend the segregation review meeting later that day. 
They asked each prisoner if he was intending to attend. Typically only half would choose to 
do so. Many were reluctant because, as discussed above, the meetings were perceived as a 
‘waste of time’ and ‘unhelpful’.  
 
Importantly, staff had the power to determine whether a prisoner attended their segregation 
review meeting and, at times, they refused to allow a prisoner to attend.80 This was justified 
mainly on two grounds: security concerns and operational constraints. 
 
Firstly, security concerns were sometimes used to justify the withholding of oversight 
mechanisms, like segregation reviewing meetings. The case of Bilal is a good example of this. 
Bilal was brought to the Unit and, a few weeks later, started displaying concerning behaviour. 
He was shouting and screaming out of his cell, he removed the TV shelf from the wall and 
																																																								
80 This happened fairly frequently: about three prisoners a month would be denied access (fieldwork notes) and, 
in the case of Bilal, this happened for several weeks (five+). 
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repeatedly hit his head with it, he covered himself with water (and subsequently flooded his 
cell), he wrapped himself in his prayer mat and refused to eat (Fieldwork notes, p. 60). Staff 
were cautious about Bilal because of his ‘unpredictable’ behaviour. As a consequence he was 
assigned a high unlock level, rarely deviating from ‘SO+4’ (supervising officer plus four 
additional officers). He requested to attend the segregation review meetings, but his requests 
were often refused, due to his unlock level. As Steph commented one Tuesday morning: ‘I 
didn’t bother asking [Bilal] Patel because he is SO+4’, thereby implying he was too high risk 
to attend the meetings (Fieldwork notes p. 107). In fact, I only observed him attend one 
meeting, and this was in his first two weeks in the Unit. This worried the Imam who urged 
staff to allow him to attend the meeting but staff refused, again, on the basis that he was 
unpredictable and presented a substantial security threat (Fieldwork notes, p. 64). 
 
It is difficult to know whether this was a proportionate response. I was not able to review the 
security intelligence on which this decision was based (and nor was I qualified to make such 
assessment). My observation, for the most part, was that he was unpredictable and I could 
understand why staff perceived him as a threat. However, there were other ways in which this 
oversight duty could have been discharged. For example, Bilal (with support from the Imam) 
could have been invited to submit written representations, or staff could have facilitated 
smaller meetings in the Bubble. Neither of these options were considered by staff, mostly 
because they represented a break from the norm, a deviation from the typical regime. The 
point of this example is not to dispute the way in which staff assessed Bilal’s risk. Instead, it 
is intended to illustrate how staff made determinations about risk, which influenced whether 
an individual was able to attend a segregation review meeting and access one of the 
safeguarding and oversight mechanisms of the Unit. 
 
Secondly, attendance at segregation review meetings was also influenced by operational 
constraints and demands. After the ‘riot’, a number of individuals were brought to the Unit. 
There were too many prisoners to attend the next segregation review meeting. Shawn, Ricky 
and Billy attended their meetings a week after arriving in the Unit, whereas Henry had to wait 
an additional week before he could attend his meeting. The high number of prisoners in the 
Unit meant the segregation review list was ‘too long’ and prisoners could not attend the 
meetings as frequently as intended (Fieldwork notes, p.68). For staff, this was a pragmatic 
response. For Henry, it produced much anxiety, concern and uncertainty: 
 
I don’t know when it’s going to be, I don’t know if they’re going to take me in. Everyone else 
has been in apart from me, so I don’t get it. We will have to see what happens. It’s weird 
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though, why wouldn’t they take me in? I’ve just been left to sit here whilst all of them go. It’s 
like they’ve just forgotten about me. (Henry, prisoner) 
 
On other occasions (but less commonly), segregation review meetings were cancelled in their 
entirety, for a variety of reasons.81 On one occasion, prisoners were on lockdown, and 
therefore movements to the showers, exercise yard and segregation review meetings were not 
permitted. On another occasion, staff from the Unit were needed on the wings to collect a 
prisoner, one who was presumed violent and volatile, to bring him to the Unit (Fieldwork 
notes pp. 72, 74). As a consequence, there was an insufficient number of staff present in the 
Unit, to move prisoners and therefore allow the meetings to go ahead as planned.  
 
These three examples (the challenges associated with: (i) accessing legal advisers on the 
telephone; (ii) obtaining legal resources like PSOs and PSIs; and (iii) the functioning of 
oversight mechanisms like complaints processes and segregation review meetings) illustrate 
the difficulties which prisoners face in accessing, or engaging with, safeguarding processes. 
Importantly, they reveal how staff have a substantial role as the gatekeepers to accessing legal 
advice and resources. Moreover, they illustrate how opportunities for engaging with law (and 
opportunities for obtaining legal protection) can be limited by the institution. The institutional 
context – which is largely shaped by security concerns and operational demands – can 
override access to legal advice, legal resources and the functioning of legal protections. The 
dictates of a legal order, and rule of law principles, often yielded to the pragmatic concerns of 
the institution (Arbour, 1996, p. 180). Thus, recourse to the law, for prisoners, is bounded: 
constrained by and subordinate to staff discretion, the demands of the regime, and the aims of 
the institution.  
 
3. Experience of law 
 
The above discussion demonstrates the limited and contingent ways in which law and rules 
penetrated the Unit. There was a hollow approval system and a ‘defensive’ paperwork 
process. There was an ineffective segregation review board. Prisoners had restricted access to 
legal advice and resources; and limited engagement with complaints processes and, 
sometimes, even segregation review meetings. When faced with the perceived weak 
accountability mechanisms, prisoners typically responded in one of two ways. They: (i) were 
galvanised to educate themselves on the laws and rules, to be able to enforce their rights and 
																																																								
81 During fieldwork, the meetings were cancelled three times.  
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entitlements; or (ii) withdrew from the processes and described feeling dejected, disappointed 
and powerless.   
 
One third of my participants described a perceived value in gaining knowledge of the law, 
rules and procedures; they perceived an apparent value, or utility to law. Their descriptions 
are reminiscent of Ewick and Silbey’s (1998, p. 47) ‘with the law’ category: whereby law was 
described as game, one in which rules could be used to further individuals’ self-interests (see 
Chapter Two). Not only was it perceived as an important instrument for furthering their own 
material interests82 (i.e. producing positive outcomes) but there was a strong sense that 
knowledge of the law itself (regardless of whether this knowledge achieved a positive 
outcome), was deemed necessary for redistributing power in prison (away from staff, back to 
prisoners), and therefore brought a cognitive sense of safety and contributed substantially to 
perceptions of survivability of prison. Those who felt knowledgeable about law described the 
methods behind their acquisition of legal know-how. They stressed the importance of self-
education, of direct previous experience, as well as the support of peers on the wings. For 
them, it was important to be legally informed because, as Billy suggested, there was a 
perception that staff would not be forthcoming with assistance: 
 
Basically, during my time, I’ve educated myself on the penal system, to know how the law 
affects me. I’ve gone down the library, taken books on tort, contract all that sort of stuff. I 
tried to educate myself in prison because I know a lot of people face difficulties…and I was 
trying to study, you know, self-study, for my appeal, so I’ve become all involved with law. 
(Kelvin, prisoner). 
 
How it happens is through other prisoners – a few of the lads – one or two prisoners on the 
wings, who are very up to date with the law, and they will make it known that you’re allowed 
this or you’re not allowed this…and in most cases they will highlight the law and obviously 
we will use that. (Ali, prisoner). 
 
You know what, we’ve got some prisoner solicitors. There’s a couple of people on the wing 
who know everything. They’ll just deal with the whole thing for you. They know their stuff. 
So a lot of times, people go to them. (Ricky, prisoner).  
 
If I knew what I was doing, the process and everything, I’d use it. But I’m not good when it 
comes to things like that. Obviously, these officers aren’t going to show me what to do, I need 
																																																								
82 For example, to achieve material ends such as recovering private property or to obtain compensation from 
HMPPS.  
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to know another inmate who knows what he’s doing and you have to be on the wing to do that. 
(Billy, prisoner). 
 
Those who felt better informed tended to be those with greater experience of legal processes. 
They relayed a greater tendency to engage with law (e.g. using the complaints process, 
escalating issues to their solicitor or by challenging practices or decisions in the courts). They 
had a corresponding faith in the utility of law, and revealed a belief that law could be used to 
produce the outcome they desired.  
 
Importantly, they perceived legal knowledge as necessary for their survivability in prison. 
Leroy explained, ‘it’s not a great place but you can survive. If you know how to put pen to 
paper, have some understanding of the law, and have a legal team behind you, it’ll be okay 
whilst you’re here. If you don’t, you’re fucked man’. There were three or four other 
participants, like Leroy, who assigned substantial value to legal knowledge: it was perceived 
as an asset which could reduce the power imbalance between prisoners and staff, and help 
correct the knowledge deficit identified by some prisoners. Legal knowledge, for some, was a 
form of legal capital:  
 
They hate it [legal complaints]. That’s what hurts them the most, I think. That’s why I need to 
get my legal knowledge up a bit more, I think. I know a bit about it…I’ve been violated so 
many times, I know I’ve got like a hundred claims but because I don’t really know how to deal 
with it, they got away with it. (Ricky, prisoner). 
 
In prison, the pen is mightier than the sword. And prisons are geared up to deal with violence. 
They’re geared up to deal with aggression, because they’ll just put you in a cell and leave you 
[there]. If three people can’t manage you, they’ll bring six. So the way to enforce your rights 
is through the courts. That’s the best way to resolve anything. And, monetary damages, the 
prison don’t like [them]. They don’t actually like giving a prisoner money for failures of staff. 
It’s only when you actually study the laws, and you actually utilise the law, you’re a problem. 
That’s how they see it. They think ‘ah you’re too knowledgeable with the law, we can’t mess 
about with you’. Cos you know the rules and regulations and the laws. (David, prisoner). 
 
If you go in there [to an adjudication], and they think you don’t know what they’re on about, 
they’ll just do what they want. If your prison number is wrong or if the date on the 
adjudication is wrong, you can get a ‘not guilty’ because the evidence is wrong. But if 
somebody goes in there and they don’t know what they’re talking about, and they can’t state 
the PSI, the governor will say ‘ah that’s just a technicality’, ‘that’s just a type up error’ and 
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they’ll find them guilty for something they shouldn’t have been found guilty for. It’s just nice 
to know, makes things fairer, you know what I mean? (George, prisoner). 
 
Ricky, David and George articulated how knowledge of the law could be an important 
resource for individuals in prison. This perspective recognises the entrenched power 
differentials in prison: staff have a wide ambit when it comes to enforcing rules, and this was 
especially evident in the Unit (as described in the previous chapter, in the context of staff 
discretion). For some prisoners, law was one of the few ways in power could be claimed and 
used to achieve instrumental outcomes. These might be material advantages (money, like 
David suggested) or ideological gains (like a sense of fairness, legitimacy and power 
distribution, as George described). For them, the law could be a tool to achieve certain self-
interested outcomes. However, it also had an expressive and communicative function: as 
David suggested, legal knowledge was a way in which he could demonstrate to staff that he 
made a worthy opponent.  
 
In contrast, the majority (about two thirds) of prisoners were much more cynical about the 
influence of law, and described orientations which placed them closer to those ‘against the 
law’ in Ewick and Silbey’s (1998) research. For them, the law was a presence which limited 
their choices but benefited the prison institution. The ‘law’ (and ‘rules’) were used by staff to 
justify decisions; they became euphemisms for arbitrary power: 
 
What I usually understand about prison is that if a prisoner does something wrong, it’ll be 
pointed out very quickly. But what they do right is never rewarded. Then, if I point out to an 
officer that I’m entitled to this, according to this PSI, usually they just look at you – they give 
you a weird look – and think ‘this guy’s mad’. It doesn’t make a difference. Like if I’m 
entitled to a shower every day and I tell these staff that I’m entitled to a shower every day, PSI 
so and so says... they’ll be like ‘yeah, you’re getting one every other day. You want it or not?’. 
Do you know what I mean? It doesn’t make a difference. They’re good for the staff but they 
don’t really help us against the establishment. (Sam, prisoner). 
 
I know what I'm entitled to and what I'm not entitled to, right? I'm a very educated man, but I 
tell you one thing, when you start giving these people the riot act and saying ‘wait a minute, 
you've crossed the line on the PSO, you've crossed the line on this, you've crossed the line on 
that’. The answer is ‘I don't give a fuck!’ (Joe, prisoner). 
 
I’ve read some of them PSIs and PSOs, but that don't matter in here. They've got the PSI and 
PSO, and then they've got something called local policies, and that's like a fine print of how 
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they get on [with] things. Well, they can say, ‘yeah, yeah, it's not in the PSI, but that's the local 
policy of Whitemoor’. So they use that [the local policy] to make their own rules, which 
they've used here to fuck me over a couple times when I've gone against them.  So, yeah, you 
have to go put a complaint in…But, by the time you've done the paperwork, you've already 
been punished and you've already lost this, or they've won anyway. So you can't win. (Johnny, 
prisoner). 
 
R: A lot of them aren't adhered to a lot of the time, the PSIs. 
I: Why do you say that? 
R: Because I've had governors walk away and I've said, oh, under the PSI so and so, and 
they've just shrugged it off and walked off. I've had that. And, sometimes, you’re better off 
just not saying it. Otherwise… well, they then think you’re a pain, disruptive, you’re a 
‘problem’, a ‘complainer’. That don’t help you either. (Norman, prisoner). 
 
Sam, Joe, Johnny and Norman reveal a perception, common amongst many of the prisoner 
participants, that the legal rules, and non-legal guidance in the PSOs and PSIs, privileged the 
powerful (Armstrong, 2018, p. 412). Their cynicism was predicated on the belief that ‘law’ 
was a blunt instrument and would not help them (Nielsen, 2000, p. 1083). For some 
participants, there was little value in referring staff to passages from the relevant PSO or PSI: 
this was an ineffective approach, which either made little difference or potentially made 
situations worse. There was also a perception that the prison administration cared little about 
conforming to its own rules and processes (and pointing this out would be futile). We know 
that prisoners can be especially concerned that prison authorities ‘deliver’ on their written 
commitments i.e. that they adhere to their own rules and policies (Sparks et al., 1996, p. 239; 
Whitty et al., 2001); and conforming with the rules is one of the main ways in which 
legitimacy can be created or sustained. When staff made arbitrary decisions, or deviated from 
the rules, or ignored prisoners’ attempts at highlighting such violations, it cultivated a sense of 
unfairness and cynicism towards staff authority, the institution and the force of law. 
 
Specifically, their descriptions expose an affinity to Ewick and Silbey’s final category 
‘against the law’ (1998, p. 183), which was rooted in the belief that individuals were 
subordinated and unable to escape the arbitrary exercise of power (p. 184). Ewick and 
Silbey’s participants, in their final category, revealed scepticism towards law: it was 
perceived as dangerous to invoke and something to be avoided (p. 192). If their participants 
were unable to avoid legal encounters, they instead deployed a ‘strategy of resignation and 
deference’ (p. 195). Much of the criticism, scepticism and cynicism, identified by Ewick and 
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Silbey’s participants, were evident in the voices of my participants. This was especially true 
for those who perceived staff as the ultimate gatekeepers, and themselves as powerless. They 
described a sense of resignation, a submission to their fates. For them, it was a situation in 
which laws and rules offered only limited potential and were of very little value.  
 
As a consequence, there was a reluctance to engage in processes, like the complaints system 
or segregation review meetings. For example, Nazeer described how some processes had to be 
used strategically. He explained that the complaints process was not for mundane or trivial 
matters. He would only use it for a serious matter, like an assault: ‘that's what they tell you it's 
for anyway, if you've not got a serious complaint, don't waste the complaints process, it’s not 
worth your own energy’. Otherwise, for him, it was a waste of time, energy and unlikely to 
achieve anything constructive.  
 
Prisoners who shared an orientation close to Ewick and Silbey’s ‘against the law’ category, 
were acutely aware of the power dynamics in the Unit. There was a presumption, for some, 
that on transfer to the Unit, they had rescinded their legal rights. This perspective was borne 
out of a sense of powerlessness, that prisoners were dependent on, and therefore at the mercy 
of, staff. This presumption exposed the stark dynamics of power in the Unit:  
 
[I]nevitably, what rights do you really have? Cos [our] rights are whatever the decision-maker 
makes and you can just either agree with it or don’t. It makes no difference really. (Daniel, 
prisoner). 
 
I think once you come here, you lose a lot of your rights. I think in segregation you have very 
little, and the only rights you have is to shower once every two days and your phone call, and 
even then sometimes they don't even give it to you because they're locked down or they just 
don’t do it. (Nazeer, prisoner). 
 
Here, well, we become subhuman. You know. It’s like the way they give us clothes, the way 
they make us shower only once every other day…it’s like they are just giving us our rights to 
the bare minimum, where they have to do what they have to. (Ali, prisoner). 
 
But once you come to prison, and you haven't got any rights any more, you're a slave to the 
industry that we're living in. So they can do what they want, and they can tell you when to 
shit, sleep, when to eat, whatever. You belong to them. And if you don't do what they say, 
[you are] punished. (Johnny, prisoner). 
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They [staff] don’t care. They just do whatever the governor says. They’ve seen so much 
injustice, and I’ve seen them see it. And the IMB, they don’t do anything. Even the 
Chaplaincy, they’re not interested. You know what it is? They’re just not interested…not 
interested at all…It’s like they lack a certain empathy for prisoners. (Ricky, prisoner). 
 
These narratives were fairly common amongst prisoners who positioned themselves as 
powerless individuals, subordinate to the use of arbitrary power and boundless authority. 
These accounts resemble those provided by Ewick and Silbey’s participants who saw a 
necessity in ‘bowing to what seems like the overwhelming power of police, judges and courts’ 
(1998, p. 195). For those who were sceptical, or ‘against the law’, there was a futility to 
engaging with law. It was perceived as ineffective for producing the outcomes prisoners 
desired – whether it be material improvements, like better conditions or entitlements such as 
TVs, radios, visits and such – or ideological gains, like creating a sense of justice, fairness and 
legitimacy.  
 
There is also a suggestion, within the accounts of Nazeer, Ali and Johnny, of the ‘othered’ 
status of prisoners. This was discussed in the previous chapter, in the context of staff 
perceptions of prisoners. However, it also arose in prisoner discussions during which we 
explored the function of law in the Unit. Some prisoners suggested they were not ‘equal rights 
holders’. For example, Ali described feeling ‘subhuman’, that staff perceived him as only 
eligible for the basic rights, the bare minimum. As such, there was a sense that the ‘law’ had 
forgotten them and that it had, in many ways, let them down. There was also a sense that the 
law (and those who implemented it) lacked understanding and empathy towards prisoners’ 
situations. Ricky highlighted how he felt actors (like staff, the IMB and Chaplaincy) were ‘not 
interested’. Lack of empathy might, as I suggest in Chapter Five, be related to the pragmatic 
distancing of staff: it is easier to lock individuals away for 23 hours a day if you do not relate 
to, or empathise with, their circumstances. However, for many prisoners, this failure to 
consider, or take account of their circumstances, was alienating, another form of ‘othering’, 
and was experienced as a way of subverting rather than ensuring justice (Ewick & Silbey, 
1998, p. 190).  
 
It was not easy for prisoners to access legal advice, obtain legal knowledge and access legal 
resources. Moreover, when attempts were made to engage with processes, like complaints 
procedures or segregation review meetings, the outcomes were not always positive 
experiences: sometimes delayed, unsatisfactory or non-existent. For the majority of prisoners, 
in the Unit, the practical and structural barriers perpetuated cynicism towards engaging with 
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law. Taken together, they coalesced to create an acute sense of powerlessness for many 
prisoners. The Unit was not a place in which many felt law could be accessed (practically) 
and relied on (cognitively). There was a lack of faith in law, and scepticism towards the utility 
and instrumentalism of law. In many ways prisoners described feeling ‘untouched’ by law, 
they identified a ‘legal void’ in the Unit, one in which on-going legal actions were halted and 
future or potential causes of action were rendered difficult or impossible.83 Many participants 
perceived a futility to engaging with complaints processes, or trying to assert their rights by 
reference to the relevant PSI/PSO. The lack of faith in the utility of law meant there were very 
few ways in which prisoners perceived they could legitimately84 challenge the segregation 
decision, their treatment or conditions.  
4. Conclusion 
	
Sometimes you get to that point where you do think ‘it’s them and us’ and that’s [because of] 
the way you’re getting treated by them. If they respect you as a human being, you wouldn’t be 
thinking it’s ‘them and us’. But if they don’t respect you, and they just want to tick their boxes 
all day, they just want to go past us and say ‘you know what, it’s not on me if this guy dies, I 
checked, I asked the question and I’m done’. You do have a lot of people like that. (Henry, 
prisoner).  
	
During fieldwork, it became clear that many of the Unit’s processes – those with a legal 
orientation such as segregation review meetings, approvals and paperwork processes – were 
implemented in ways which were proceduralised. There was a sense that bureaucracy had 
seeped in and created a preoccupation with process in the Unit; practices were process rather 
than outcome driven; and they protected the institution, by providing evidence that the 
institution had discharged its legal duties (to review and monitor the use of segregation). 
 
Staff prioritised completing the paperwork, rushing people through segregation review 
meetings, facilitating the daily checks at prisoners’ doors. These practices were intended to 
instil a sense of accountability and transparency, actioned through a system of reviews, 
authorisations and record-keeping. There was an emphasis on ‘procedural justice’: decision-
makers prioritised certain processes and were concerned to ensure that justice was seen to be 
																																																								
83 For example, Theo and Billy discussed, at length, the status of their appeals. However, neither felt able to 
progress their appeals from the Unit and described having to wait until they were returned to the wings in order 
to do so. 
84 As previous chapters illustrated, prisoners were able to challenge authority in other, less legitimate ways. For 
example by dirty protests, violence or refusals to leave the Unit.  
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done (Kingwell, 2017), rather than ensuring that justice was meaningfully done (‘substantive 
justice’). The substantial bureaucracy, the emphasis on process, influenced prisoners’ 
assessments of their experiences in the Unit. The superficial implementation of the processes 
(perceived as ‘box ticking exercises’ or ‘rubber stamps’) gave the impression to prisoners that 
staff (and the institution) were uninterested and lacked concern. As Sparks et al. (1996, p. 89) 
warn, a ‘procedurally ‘correct’ and bureaucratically efficient regime might simply fail on 
grounds of impersonality and lack of humaneness’ (see Jacobs, 1977).  
 
These processes represented important opportunities for the prison authorities to embrace rule 
of law principles and, in turn, to legitimate their own authority (Paternoster et al., 1997; Tyler, 
1988, p. 128; 2003). However, the processes, as Armstrong suggests, were designed to make 
the Unit (and by extension the prison) a safe place i.e. a legally defensible one, but had a 
dehumanising effect for individuals (2003, p. 298). They allowed for compliance with 
bureaucratic norms, those in which the legal risk was reduced, but diminished the 
opportunities for realising broader moral or social goals (Armstrong, 2003, p. 291). They 
provided a minimum level of legal responsibility and accountability but failed to provide the 
basis for the values needed to constrain or challenge the use of segregation. They removed the 
capacity for a human rights based vision, one in which virtues (like empathy, respect and 
care) could permeate daily practices.  
 
The proceduralisation of safeguards meant some prisoners felt, in order to enforce their 
rights, it was necessary to take ‘law’ into their hands. They attempted to educate themselves 
on the law and rules; they sought advice from solicitors; they engaged with the internal 
complaint processes and segregation review meetings. All of the foregoing were constrained 
by the regime and staff discretion: staff had substantial discretion to determine (and limit) 
whether an individual could engage with the ‘law’, in this way. Whilst such limitations 
galvanised some prisoners to make greater use of the law (there was legal capital in knowing 
the relevant rules and statutes); for the most part, prisoners felt disempowered by the 
processes. For many, the processes were euphemisms for arbitrary power. Processes (like the 
approval mechanisms and SRBs) justified the power of the institution; they provided the 
‘legal authority’ for the institution’s actions, rather than any substantive merit for the action 
(Whitty et al., 2001, p. 239). The processes and structures were demonstrative of legal 
compliance (legal authority) but did not help cultivate legitimacy in the wider sense  
(legitimate authority) (Black, 2005, p. 19). They are examples of how process, and 
bureaucracy can ‘enhance and mask authority’ (Armstrong, 2018, p. 413); and helped 
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reproduce a society in which ‘naked power’ – and not essential rights – could so often be the 
‘rule of law’ (Heritage, 2004, p. 104). 
 
Consequently, this chapter raises important questions about the role of law in segregation 
units, specifically whether (and how) it might ever be considered a legitimate force. Can the 
law ‘work’ (i.e. in ways which give effect to rule of law principles) in environments, like 
segregation units, where there is such an imbalance in power? Or will it inevitably be 
perceived as privileging the powerful and justifying arbitrary decisions? Can law ever be 
legitimate in an illegitimate institution? Undoubtedly, there were ways in which the ‘law’, 
(specifically its processes), could be improved; and, by extension, wielded more legitimately.  
Segregation review meetings could be made better: senior management could stress their 
importance, and emphasise that the board members must make them a priority. Members 
could be required to familiarise themselves with the notes and outcomes agreed at previous 
meetings. Chairs could be trained (or reminded of) communication strategies, particularly 
conflict resolution. Members could be inspired to think more imaginatively about outcomes. 
Access to lawyers and legal resources could be encouraged and supported by staff. Internal 
complaints could be responded to more promptly, thoroughly and in ways which suggest they 
are taken more seriously. Improving these processes may go some way to instilling greater 
faith in the utility of ‘law’.  
 
However, at present, these ‘improvements’ may be unlikely to have any miraculous or 
substantial impact. Segregation review boards have limited options available to them; there is 
little they can do if a prison refuses to accept a prisoner from the Unit (on the basis of being 
full – at operational capacity – a common problem across the prison estate). Moreover, even if 
staff encouraged and supported recourse to lawyers, a prisoner may struggle to obtain Legal 
Aid (see Chapter Two). Thus, prisoners face difficulties which appear, not only at the 
institutional level, but also at the wider political, economic and penal level. Consequently, 
attempts by prison administrators to improve legal processes inside the Unit, whilst welcome, 
may fail to correct for the problems observed outside the Unit, those which plague our 




Chapter Seven – Challenge, Change and Hope 
 
When a person becomes dehumanised, it leaves an impression on you…Segregation messed 
up my speech, my eyesight, I became sensitive to noise…I was assaulted, [I] had my head 
stamped on. It was sadistic. How can they do that?...There’s no point to it, it doesn’t 
encourage pro-social behaviour, it hardens your anger, resentment and frustration…[and] as a 
prisoner behind that door, you are scared, you think it can be opened at any time and you can 
be assaulted. That’s not done by the individual. Instead, it is done by someone who represents 
civilisation, who represents society, because you wear the uniform. That’s the only 
representation of society you meet. So when you are abused, that is society abusing you, [and] 
that is your only connection to humanity. (Usman Khan). 
 
In February 2019, I had nearly a two-hour conversation with Usman Khan. I was introduced to 
him through my work with Learning Together at Cambridge. His insights proved to be a 
helpful sounding board for my research. He had been released two months previously, in 
December 2018. During our discussion, he explained how he spent ‘most’ of his six years in 
prison in segregation units in the High-Security Estate. From Usman’s perspective, he was 
segregated because of the nature of his offence – a Terrorism Act offence – and he could not 
understand the justification for his lengthy segregation. However, this only represents one side 
of the narrative and, unfortunately, I was not privy to the prison’s security information or 
decision-making in this regard. During segregation, he described being abused, both physically 
and psychologically. The word ‘torture’ featured prominently in his account. He also described 
a deep sadness, related to a sense of neglect by society, which developed into a strong sense of 
injustice. On the 29th November 2019, he killed Jack Merritt and Saskia Jones, and wounded 
others. Following the attack, Usman was shot and died. His attack was at an event hosted by 
Learning Together, a University of Cambridge initiative, at which I was present. Since 
November 2019, my discussions with Usman have plagued me, not least because of the unease 
I have since felt about our conversations. In particular, I have searched our discussions for 
signs or suggestions that could reveal Usman’s ill-intent or could have exposed him to have 
been anything other than an ex-prisoner who had returned to the community, who was kind to 
me, and who revealed a determination to start a new, more positive life.  
 
During criminological research, many of us confront ethical questions about our work, 
particularly in prisons when the research boundaries can become muddied and blurred. I have 
had to consider whether I overlooked red-flags or warning signs from a man who killed one of 
my best friends. This question will continue to haunt me. The challenge was that Usman, 
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although describing a difficult and distressing experience of segregation, revealed little that was 
different, starker, or more extreme than many other accounts provided by other participants. 
This is not to say that narratives of torture or abuse featured in every account. In fact, for some, 
segregation was able to provide a greater sense of safety; it was a place of refuge. However, for 
most, there were similar feelings of hurt, frustration, resentment and fear.  
 
I mention this here, in the final part of this thesis, not to detract from the overarching themes of 
the research but to illustrate some of the challenges (the ‘limitations’) of this work. This 
research was not about Usman nor was it about how one comes to terms with such a significant 
event, either professionally as a researcher or personally as a human being. But it has, 
undoubtedly, influenced some of my work over the last few months. Such influence needs to be 
acknowledged. Whilst I have tried to remain objective and neutral, I cannot overlook the way 
in which the incident provoked feelings of dissatisfaction with and concern about our prisons, 
as well as our societal approach to punishment. I was struck, during fieldwork, by the depleting 
resources in prisons, the limited provision of activities (including low-level education and 
menial work, often cancelled because of staff and resourcing issues), the numbers of young and 
inexperienced staff and the extent of disillusionment common across both staff and prisoners. 
Whitemoor felt like a place without hope. These observations and sentiments were even more 
pronounced in the Unit. 
 
So the first limitation of this study concerns the ability of any researcher to remain truly 
‘neutral’. I reflected on this assumption in Chapter Three. Most qualitative work in the social 
sciences involves research with humans, by humans. We can never truly set aside our personal, 
philosophical and political sympathies. We, as the researchers asking the questions, become the 
research instrument. We draft the questions, ask them, ascribe meanings to encounters and 
statements, and ultimately imbue a narrative into an otherwise discrete collection of transcripts. 
Researchers have a special, and distinct, relationship to the field: it was emphasised by Jeff 
(Chapter Three) in his exclamation that researchers ‘breeze in’ but are not responsible for 
locking prisoners up or instructing them to return from the yards. Prison researchers, whilst 
occupying the same spaces as staff and prisoners, experience a very different reality. It may be 
easier for researchers to see distress and feel sympathy because they have different roles, 
relationships and expectations placed upon them.  
 
As I suggested in Chapter Three, there is a level of moral ambiguity to the work; we sometimes 
have to reconcile personal integrity with access to the field (Jewkes, 2012; Sutton, 2011). 
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Humans are fallible, and, by extension, the research instrument is fallible. During interviews, 
follow up questions came too late. Hindsight was precious. I sometimes said things which, on 
reflection, I wished I could retract, and I sometimes omitted things which, in hindsight, I wish I 
had asked (Behar, 1996). We can strive (and hope) for objectivity, neutrality and independence 
but should not deny the ways in which our experiences, understandings and perceptions 
influence our work. To do so would be to overlook our humanity, with all the frailties and 
fallibilities that come with it. We are humans first, researchers second. If we ignored that, we 
would be overlooking the realities of research and the roles we play. Our work would be 
fundamentally dishonest.   
 
There is a second, related, limitation, which concerns the validity of this research. It is a 
limitation inherent in qualitative research generally – observation and interview data are often 
subjective and difficult to validate or independently verify. So much of the analysis is rooted in 
my own perceptions, observations and experiences during fieldwork. They involved both 
objective and subjective assessments, which may differ from researcher to researcher. This is 
not a limitation specific to this research, but is one which is embedded within the broader 
research method of qualitative ethnography.  
 
Thirdly, this study was narrow in focus. The research was directed at one segregation unit in 
one particular prison. It also involved a sample which, for contextual reasons, may not be 
wholly representative of all those in the segregation unit. The nature of the environment meant 
random sampling was not possible. I secured participants mostly through word of mouth. 
Participation was contingent on several factors beyond my control: whether people were 
willing to talk to me (most were); to whom staff would allow me access (generally most 
prisoners); and whether the interviews fitted in with the daily demands of the regime (more 
challenging). Thus, there is an argument that the problems and experiences identified in this 
research may be confined to Whitemoor and are not capable of generalisation. Whilst there 
may be other prisons and other segregation units, which do manage to get things ‘right’, my 
findings do not appear to be an anomaly. Others have identified similar flaws with the systems 
and processes in segregation units elsewhere (see Sutherland, 2018). It is worrying that the 
problems, the flaws and the damage of segregation are so widespread.  
 
Despite this, these limitations should not diminish the value of this research. This thesis has 
offered several legal and sociological insights, which I hope will be of wider interest to 
sociologists, lawyers and policy-makers. It has contributed to our theoretical understanding of 
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the ways in which segregation is used, justified and experienced. It has also considered the 
ways in which segregation has been legally challenged and the relationship between law and 
practice in prisons. Specifically, it has shown how formal legal rules have only a limited impact 
in the segregation unit. In Chapter Four, I showed how much of the current framework – as set 
out in the PR 1999 and PSO 1700 – was broad and ill-defined. They allowed large amounts of 
discretion, which equipped prison managers with substantial latitude for interpretation. 
Segregation was used in a number of different ways, to manage a range of complex behaviour 
and needs. The segregation unit was a place of punishment, intended to be a deterrent, whilst 
also being a preventative mechanism, as well as a place intended for care and rehabilitation. 
Often those aims were in conflict. Importantly, my findings challenged the paradigm that 
segregation was a ‘last resort’ and reserved for the ‘worst of the worst’ (Lanes, 2011). As a 
consequence, I suggested that the law was an ineffective force in constraining the use of 
segregation and in sustaining the legitimacy of the practice. This was partly explained by the 
conflict and contradictions which characterised the use of segregation, in both the aims it 
pursued and the legal authority behind its existence. However, it was also rooted in the 
substantial uncertainty and discretion embedded within the law, which functioned to equip staff 
and decision-makers with great powers of interpretation and decision-making.  
 
This argument was expanded in Chapter Five where I showed how much of the way ‘law’85 
functioned in the Unit was dependent on staff culture. In particular, I drew on the work of 
Liebling and Kant (2018) to show how officer culture –which in this case resembled the 
‘traditional resistant’ type– had an important influence on the functioning of law. In particular, 
I identified how local norms and customs subverted formal laws. This was not always to the 
detriment of the prisoner, but it did produce detrimental outcomes for rule of law principles 
such as consistency, predictability and fairness. I demonstrated how, for many staff, formal 
laws and rules were not valuable resources. Instead, they were perceived as a hindrance or a 
burden. Most staff favoured flexibility and discretion. I also suggested that perspectives on law 
and rules were bound up with perspectives on safety. Formal written rules were not always 
perceived as tools that would necessarily keep staff safe, with most preferring to fall back on 




85 ‘Law’ was interpreted in its most widest sense, as a system of formal legal rules (PR 1999) and non-legal rules 
(PSO 1700 and Local Site Rules) as well as local norms and customs, which all gave effect to Rule 45 of the PR 
1999.  
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In Chapter Six, I suggested that law and rules became proceduralised in the Unit, whereby 
institutional processes prioritised ‘procedural justice’ over ‘substantive justice’. I also 
suggested that a prisoner’s access to and engagement with law was substantially constrained by 
staff and the regime. The perceived weaknesses, or limitations, of various safeguarding 
processes, prompted some prisoners to embrace the law: they attempted to educate themselves 
on the law and rules; sought help from their solicitors; or tried to use complaint processes and 
segregation reviewing meetings to reach their desired ends. There was a suggestion that legal 
knowledge was a form of legal capital in prison. However, for the most part, prisoners felt 
disempowered by the rules and processes. Processes (like the approval mechanisms and SRBs) 
were perceived as protecting and justifying the power of the institution. They provided the 
‘legal authority’ for the institution’s actions rather than any ‘legitimate authority’ (Black, 2005, 
p. 19). 
 
I also drew attention to the contradictions between the external formal law of segregation, and 
the internal norms, customs and practices which gave effect to the law in segregation. Whilst 
law was ostensibly ‘present’ – in name, language and the complex web of rules and procedures 
– it was limited by, and subordinated to, the experiences of everyday life in the Unit. By this I 
mean the ambitions promised by procedural justice, human rights, the rule of law, and natural 
justice principles were subsumed within the bureaucracy, the processes and culture of the 
institution. At times, there was little ‘evidence of the will to yield pragmatic concerns’, of 
security and order, to the ‘dictates of a legal order’, providing support for the argument that the 
rule of law was absent, although rules were everywhere (Arbour, 1996, p. 180). Thus, the Unit 
was a place in the prison – and an aspect of society – which was, sometimes, beyond law’s 
reach.  
 
Most significantly this thesis contributes insights into the effectiveness of law as a mechanism 
for shaping and changing individual behaviour and institutional culture. Throughout, I have 
identified opportunities for improvement:  
 
• In Chapter Four, I suggested the PR 1999, PSO 1700 and Local Site Rules could all be 
updated to include clearer definitions, more precise language, and a better articulation 
of the purpose of segregation and stricter limits on its use. 
• In Chapter Five, I explained how efforts should be directed towards staff culture in the 
Unit. There could be better (and more regular) training on the rules; more frequent staff 
rotations; and firmer management in the Unit, to focus on encouraging more humane 
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standards and ‘right’ staff-prisoner relationships (Liebling, 2008; Liebling, Price, et al., 
2011).  
• In Chapter Six, I highlighted how oversight mechanisms could be improved. Visitors 
(like the Chaplain, Governor and IMB) could make more time for more meaningful 
interactions. I also identified several ways in which segregation meetings could be 
improved: their importance should be emphasised; chairs should be trained and/or 
reminded of communication strategies; and boards encouraged and empowered to 
pursue more imaginative outcomes. I suggested that access to lawyers and legal 
resources should be better supported; and internal complaints should be responded to 
more quickly and more thoroughly.  
 
Importantly, some of these change opportunities include law reform: there might be ways in 
which ‘law’ could work better. However, most do not. Changing law or statutory standards, 
alone, will be unlikely to produce substantial changes to practice, customs, attitudes and 
culture of the Unit. Many of the Unit’s problems originate elsewhere (see Haney et al., 2020). 
They are institutional, political and societal problems which cannot be easily rectified by law. 
For example, segregation is used to manage chaotic, violent and unsafe wings, as well as to 
manage individuals with complex mental illness. The Unit is only one part of one prison86 in a 
greater prison system, one which is under-resourced, staffed by young and inexperienced 
individuals, and close to (or at) operational capacity. Importantly, it occurs in a political 
system which is ‘tough on crime’ (Newburn, 2007); where the provision of Legal Aid for 
prisoners has been substantially reduced. We cannot expect to right the wrongs of our broader 
social, economic, political and criminal justice systems through a short, sharp law reform 
process, directed solely at the segregation unit. To put another way, law reform of the 
segregation unit may not correct the deficits found elsewhere in society. Consequently, 
segregation reform should be considered as part of broader prison reform efforts (Haney et al., 
2020). 
 
It is difficult to predict the future of segregation. As Chapter One showed, it has been a long-
standing part of our prison system. There are strong ideological attachments to segregation 
																																																								
86 The 2019 MQPL at HMP Whitemoor (Liebling et al., 2019) revealed prisoners on the wings felt similar 
frustrations to those in segregation: lack of progression, limited purposeful activity and poor procedural 
organisation (p.2). It also found: wing prisoners ‘lacked hope’; staff and prisoners were disengaged and had only 
limited interactions (p.2); low measures of ‘bureaucratic legitimacy’, ‘organisation and consistency’, ‘wellbeing’ 
and ‘distress’. The researchers concluded that Whitemoor ‘did not cross the legitimacy threshold’ (p.3). Thus the 
experiences of prisoners in the Unit may be reflective of broader cultural dynamics and frustrations experienced 
by those in the rest of the prison.  
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from those who believe it is necessary to maintain order, safety and discipline in prisons. 
However, there has also been strong opposition to segregation, which has prompted 
legislators, policy-makers and prison decision-makers to seek out proposals for reform. I had 
hoped this study might become part of the change process as it developed, if not a blueprint 
for legal reform. But, in reality, legal reform would be insufficient for changing culture, 
practices and conduct within segregation units. As Sered warns ‘…we make a grave error if 
we mistake policy change for culture change – changing the law and changing hearts and 
minds are not the same’ (2019, p. 157). More is needed. Policy-makers and legal reformers 
must consider ways in which greater transparency could be introduced to the Unit; how time 
could be assigned to rehabilitative work; how staff could be better encouraged and supported 
by senior management; how the Unit could be resourced by greater numbers and more diverse 
staff; and how education, work and purposeful activities could be better introduced to 
segregation units. All of these would require substantially greater resources, including time, 
money and individual commitment; and all of these suggestions are aimed at mitigating the 
detrimental impact we now more commonly recognise, if not wholly accept, in the use of 
segregation.  
 
Insofar as the ‘rule of law’ was concerned, it became clear that ‘rules’ were not necessarily 
the instruments which gave effect to the ‘rule of law’. There were many rules and processes 
which existed in the Unit, however, they were not implemented in ways which upheld rule of 
law principles. Thus, the existence of ‘rules’ and ‘law’ did not equate to the existence of the 
‘rule of law’. This was primarily a consequence of the culture of the Unit. Staff were cynical, 
distrusting, lacked empathy and respect, and prisoners were ‘othered’. This was not because 
staff were primarily ‘bad’ individuals but because they were fearful. There were high levels of 
fear and anxiety in the Unit. Staff deemed it a violent, volatile and unpredictable place to 
work. Staff described an enormous amount of pressure and stress which sustained their 
distrust, cynicism and intensified the ‘moral’ distance between staff and prisoners.  
 
The culture meant there was little space for principles of equality, fairness, consistency and 
legitimacy. Thus, legal and policy change may achieve little unless accompanied by cultural 
change. Only then may it be possible to create an environment in which Lord Bingham’s 
principles could be better supported. Part of this cultural change would require challenging 
the cynicism and distrust so entrenched in the Unit, by creating opportunities for cultivating 
empathy, dignity and respect. One way these principles could be achieved is through 
removing some of the physical and psychological distance between staff and prisoners. With 
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an increase in and/or a proper allocation of resources, staff could return to making time to talk 
to prisoners (at their doors or in ‘the Bubble’) and there could be small group work – staff and 
prisoners together – in the meeting rooms, which may create opportunities for fostering the 
‘right’ relationships.   
 
The aim would be, as Preston-Roedder (2013) suggests, to reorient perspectives towards those 
which foster ‘faith in humanity’ (as a preferable perspective to cynicism). Faith in humanity is 
not the same as ‘blind charity’ nor the ‘virtues of ignorance’ (Driver, 1989), which are at risk 
of being dismissed as simply naive and have serious risks of exploitation and harm (p. 665). It 
does not mean we are blind to undesirable behaviours, motives or actions (p. 667). Instead, 
‘faith in humanity’ is about being sensitive to evidence – of decency – but also of risks. It may 
require viewing people favourably but, at the same time, having an awareness that others may 
have, or will, act wrongly (p. 668). This perspective is not about minimising our estimation of 
the harm caused by an individual – whether to themselves or others – but is about ‘growing 
our estimation of the person who caused it’ (Sered, 2019, p. 96). Importantly, this perspective 
demands not only that we see decency and hope for betterment in others, but that we 
pragmatically respond and address behaviours, attitudes or experiences that may undermine 
that hope and betterment. By doing so, we can acknowledge individuals’ risks openly and 
take steps to mitigate that risk.  
 
Segregation, in its current form, is centred on addressing undesirable behaviour: it punishes 
people who have ‘acted wrongly’, it contains those who are deemed risky: but does little to 
mitigate individual risk. The Unit, as many staff agreed, is not a place which rehabilitates 
individuals, nor can it heal past experiences of violence or trauma. It is not a place which 
fosters hope and decency. Segregation is a passive tool – it contains, punishes and restricts – 
and is imposed unilaterally by prison decision-makers. Segregation imposes isolation, shame 
and erodes human relationships. In the Unit, people are treated as if they are only capable of 
causing further harm and pain; the main premise of segregation being an ‘ethic of separation, 
domination and extreme individualisation’ (Sered, 2019, p. 140), rather than one of worth, 
connectedness and human dignity. Nor does segregation demand that individuals work to 
become people who will not commit harm or wrongdoing again. The regime of the Unit 
removes fundamental facets of humanity: it diminishes freedoms; revokes power and agency; 
disregards people’s ability to change; requires little of its prisoners; and offers no opportunity 
for remorse, accountability and meaningful repair (not only in relation to the wrongdoing that 
led the individual to the Unit, but also for their crime that led them to prison). Segregation 
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displaces opportunities for repair and eradicates possibilities for change. It should not be 
surprising then that the same individuals return to the Unit or the ‘long-term seg dwellers’ (as 
staff frequently referred) refuse to leave.  
 
Usman Khan was in prison for a serious terrorism offence. He was also treated extremely 
badly in prison. He went on to commit horrific atrocities. A ‘faith in humanity’ perspective 
does not mean we overlook the violence and significant harm he has caused. Nor am I 
suggesting that a ‘faith in humanity’ centred approach would remove all risk. Instead, I am 
suggesting that this perspective allows some reconciliation of the ‘better’ and ‘worse’ aspects 
of human behaviour. Importantly, that reconciliation must be contextualised, recognising that 
history and social context can be just as much a contributor to harm and wrongdoing as 
individual pathology. As Sered suggests, we can start by asking ‘what happened to you?’ 
rather than ‘what is wrong with you’? (2019, p.228). We can search for human decency whilst 
recognising that others may cause harm, and may be violent or risky. At the same time, we 
can encourage people to take responsibility and meaningful accountability for that harm: to 
‘be sorry’ as well as ‘doing sorry’ (both, Sered suggests, are important for healing and repair 
for all parties –offenders, victims and society (2019, p.239)). There is a valuable utility to this 
perspective, as Preston-Roedder (2013) suggests, having faith in people’s decency tends to 
encourage them to act ‘rightly’.  Our beliefs about people can obligate them, ‘for better or 
worse, to act in ways that confirm one’s expectations’ (p. 676).  
 
Unfortunately, principles from the ‘faith in humanity’ perspective (such as trust, respect, 
decency and dignity) – and the importance of accountability, healing and repair – are not 
recognised in the aims of the current law or policy of segregation. In fact, much of the law, 
rules, policies and processes are silent on concepts of accountability, dignity, morality, respect 
and humanity. Thus, it may not be for the law and rules to cultivate these cultural values. 
Instead, efforts should focus on creating a framework of ethics and rights which matter to 
staff. It could be a set of professional standards87 which defines them, as prison officers. 
These standards could induce a public service ethos, one typically associated with doctors, 
nurses, and social workers. They could become an internalised framework which allows staff 
to hold themselves, and each other, to account. Not only that, but the framework could 
introduce opportunities for staff to empower prisoners, to assist with repair, to enable proper 
modes of accountability. This may be a more effective approach, as it aims at encouraging a 
																																																								
87 With thanks to Adrian Grounds for his advice about possibilities for ethical standards and an ‘internalised’ 
framework of assumptions that could govern how staff make decisions about morality, ethics, necessity and 
legitimacy. 
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system of internal values (intrinsic motivations) as opposed to imposing a system of external 
(blunt) laws and rules (extrinsic commands). 
 
In order to move to a more ambitious position, one in which segregation is no longer a 
fundamental part of the prison system – a vision advocated by influential leaders in the prison 
service – attitudes will first need to change. For, as long as segregation is deemed necessary 
for managing a complex prison population, there will be a psychological reliance and a 
perceived benefit to it. Segregation survives in our penal system as a result of entrenched 
thinking: ‘that’s the way it has always been done’. Segregation is the accepted response to 
threats of violence and disorder in prison. When we talk about abolishing segregation or 
changing current policy, we are not discussing alternatives to something that ‘works’. Instead, 
we are acknowledging that the risks and problems of segregation, as currently stand, are no 
longer ones we can tolerate. We choose something different; not out of bravery, not out of 
curiosity but out of a responsibility to victims, offenders, society and what remains of our 
democracy (Sered, 2019, pp. 132, 158). It is not just about asking whether there is an appetite 
(or political will) for something new, but we should also be asking whether there is any moral, 
ethical or practical basis for continuing with the old. The solution will not be as simple as 
changing the law, as this may do little to change entrenched thinking. However, change, or 
alternative ways of working, are possible. For example, in the 1990s, in HMP Wormwood 
Scrubs, the senior officer from the wing visited each prisoner in segregation, to reintegrate 
them back to the wing; similarly, HMP Oakwood allows trusted prisoners to visit the 
segregation unit to facilitate prisoners’ return to the wings (Edgar, 2018, p. 42); and in 2017, 
HMP Warren Hill discontinued its segregation unit (HMCIP, 2019, p. 14). They provide hope 
that segregation can be improved, changed and may even be capable of abandonment.  
  
I mentioned, in the introduction, my unease with making suggestions about how to ‘improve’ 
the Unit, specifically the risk of becoming unintentionally complicit in supporting the 
existence of the Unit. As Armstrong warns, to criticise segregation means to engage with the 
prison on its ‘own terms’, and thereby be forced to see some renewed form of segregation as 
the solution to the problems (Armstrong, 2018, p. 405). The risk is that we assume the current 
institutional, political and legal framework, rather than questioning it (Garland, 1990, p. 3). 
This is not my intention. There was something ‘profoundly inhuman’ in the way prisoners in 
the Unit were thought about and treated (Liebling, 2015b, p. 110), as if they were mainly 
violent individuals, underserving of kindness or humanity. Whilst my observations suggest 
that a small number were violent and volatile, many others were in no small part vulnerable 
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and suffering. Regardless, no one deserves to be treated as insignificant, worthless, or less 
than human. Being treated in such a manner can lead to hurt, frustration and further potential 
violence (Drake, 2012, pp. 156, 157). Undoubtedly, the Unit was a violent place (both against 
the self and against others): self-harm, suicide attempts, use of force, property damage, dirty 
protests, verbal abuse (staff to prisoners, prisoners to staff), were all common. It was also a 
place characterised by an entrenched – and dangerous – lack of faith in humanity. Prisoners 
were considered, and treated, as violent, volatile and risky. There was a significant lack of 
trust in the Unit. When we treat individuals this way, there is a risk that they come to 
internalise this view of themselves. It may have the effect of ensuring the individual adopts 
the very behaviours the Unit is seeking to prevent and avoid (Preston-Roedder, 2013, p. 677). 
Thus, measures like segregation, intended to remove the risk of violence, may be perpetuating 
it. And the ‘law’ – and legal apparatus – by rendering segregation decisions lawful, sustains 
this violence and punitiveness and contributes to normalising its use (Arrigo, Bersot, & 
Sellers, 2011).  
 
Usman Khan is a stark example of the risks of being treated violently in prison. We will never 
know the extent to which his segregation experience contributed to his actions. However, I 
wonder whether his ‘risk’ could have been better mitigated by a more humane and 
compassionate environment: where prisoner denigration was not tolerated and human dignity 
was respected; and ethics and rights were preserved, not because they avoided falling foul of 
legislation and were necessary for protecting the institution, but because they were the ‘right’ 

























Annex One – Case law summary 
	
Case name Judgment 
Date 
Court Location Facts/ Issues Time in 
segregation 
Decision 
The Queen (AB a 
child, by his 
litigation friend) v 
Secretary of State 
















































15-year-old boy was removed from association (RFA), as a 
precautionary measure. He was transferred to Feltham YOI from 
Cookham Wood and placed into segregation as a consequence of 
previous violence at Cookham Wood. Complaints: 
 
(i) RFA unlawful because the respondents had not complied with 
procedural requirements of the YOI Rules i.e. processes for 
removal and failing to hold regular reviews. The Respondent 
acknowledged the placement into segregation was in breach of 
these rules and provided an apology. 
 
(ii) Failure to provide education: he was not allocated to a 
pathway for education, had not been provided with education 
packs (not even for private study) albeit they were provided at a 
later date. The Respondent accepted that not enough had been 
done to give AB the education provision required under the rules 
and guidance.  
 
(iii) Article 3 ECHR: argued that RFA, in excess of 15 days, was 
such severe treatment that it constituted prolonged solitary 
confinement and was inhuman or degrading treatment.  
 
(iv) Article 8 ECHR: rights to private and family life had been 
interfered with, and such interference was not in pursuit of 
legitimate aims and was not proportionate. 
12 months The High Court: the Secretary of State failed to comply 
with Rule 49 of the YOI Rules (re: procedural oversight 
of removal from association). The Secretary of State had 
failed to comply with the rules requiring the provision of 
education.  
Article 3: The treatment was not sufficiently severe to 
cross the high threshold required for treatment to be 
regarded as inhuman or degrading.  
Article 8: There had been a breach insofar as the 
interference with AB’s rights was not in accordance with 
the law. The High Court made a declaration to this effect.  
 
AB appealed against the finding that there was no 
violation of Article 3. There was a cross-appeal by the 
Secretary of State, challenging the finding that Article 8 
was engaged.  
 
Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals. The threshold of 
Article 3 was not breached, there were good reasons for 
AB’s segregation, his treatment was essential for the 
protection of others and for his own protection. As far as 
Article 8 was concerned, it is engaged when a prisoner is 
removed from association and therefore needs to be in 
accordance with the law and proportionate to the aims of 
8(2).  
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R (Syed) v The 
Secretary of State 




































NS sought judicial review of a decision of 22 September 2016, 
when he was transferred to the Central Managing Challenging 
Behaviour Strategy Unit (‘the Unit’) at HMP Woodhill. The 
prison authorities had received intelligence reports that NS had 
been planning to behead a member of  prison staff. NS later 
created a disturbance and shouted out further threats to behead all 
staff. After which, he was transferred to the Unit.  
 
NS argued his transfer to the Unit involved removing him from 
association (within Rule 45 PR 1999) so that the criteria and 
procedures prescribed by that rule had to be satisfied [1]. NS 
argued that the proper procedures were not followed, the decision 
was in breach of the relevant policies, he did not meet the criteria 
for transfer to the Unit, he was given no opportunity to make 
representations and adequate reasons were not provided. As such, 
the restrictions on his ability to associate with other prisoners 
amounted to an interference with the right to respect private life 
within the meaning of Article 8(1) of the ECHR which was not 
justified under Article 8(2) of the ECHR [33-36]. 
 
Various High Court: NS’s transfer to the Unit did not amount to 
removal from association. The Secretary of State accepted 
that the decision was procedurally flawed and would be 
quashed on that basis.  
The restrictions imposed on NS interfered with his Article 
8 right and such interference was not in accordance with 
the law because of the procedural breaches. However, the 
finding of a violation was just satisfaction and no 
damages were awarded.  
Court of Appeal: considered whether NS was ‘removed 
from association’ within the meaning of R45 of PR 1999. 
It also considered, pursuant the Secretary of State’s cross-
appeal, whether the conditions amounted to an 
interference with NS’s Article 8(1) rights. Held: ‘removal 
from association’ required removal from all other 
prisoners. It did not mean a ‘reduction’ or ‘limitation’ in 
association, and therefore was not satisfied in this case. 
‘Removal from association’ was synonymous with 
‘segregation’ which was a stricter form of separation than 
that experienced by NS [32-33].  The restrictions to 
which NS was subjected, in the Unit, sufficiently 
interfered with NS’s right to a private life [61]. Such 
interference was not in accordance with the law and 
therefore not justified under Art 8(2). However, no 




Secretary of State 
for Justice and 
Sodexo Limited 







For two years, from 19 September 2013 (when she was still on 
remand) D had been held in ‘segregation’ (strictly ‘removal from 
association’). D argued that her segregation was unlawful:  
(i) Her segregation was not authorised by the Secretary of State 
and therefore not in accordance with R45 of PR 1999. SSJ 
2 years The defendants conceded that segregation between 19 
September 2013 and 4 September 2015 was unlawful 
because it was not authorised by the SSJ, as required by 
PR 1999. The High Court held it was not procedurally 








conceded this, in light of the Supreme Court decision in R 
(Bourgass) v Secretary of State for Justice [2016] AC 384; (ii) 
D's segregation was procedurally unfair: she was not entitled to 
receive reasons nor given a reasonable opportunity to make 
representations before a decision was made by the SSJ. D argued 
that she was only provided with the ‘most general idea of the 
allegations against her’ [81]; (iii) Article 3: D submitted she was 
subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment (not torture) [98]; 
(iv) her segregation breached her Article 8 right to private life; 
(v) Article 14: D argued that she was discriminated against based 
on her disability [160]; (vi) D's segregation was unlawful at 
common law as being irrational.  
 
SSJ argued that the terms of D's segregation were far from 
‘complete isolation or even solitary confinement…she was 
permitted to have domestic visits and to have access to a library’ 
[40]. D’s segregation was reviewed by the board every 14 days. 
D had an orderly role. The prison developed and implemented a 
reintegration plan with D. Prison discussed alternatives to 
segregation with D.  
 
 
segregation due to her escape risk [86].  Subsequently, D 
attended meetings of the Segregation Review Board on 21 
and 26 September 2013 where she had the opportunity to 
make representations and could respond to the substance 
of the allegations against her in relation to the suspected 
escape plan [89)]. For the second period of segregation, D 
was segregated because of the serious risk she posed to 
others. This was communicated to D and therefore 
discharged the burden of providing reasons for 
segregation [93]. Consequently, there was no breach of 
the duty to act fairly i.e. no breach of procedural fairness 
[96]. 
 
Article 3 threshold was not met. There was no suggestion 
that D was segregated with the intention of ‘debasing or 
humiliating her; nor any suggestion that the measure was 
calculated to break her resistance or will.’ [122]. The 
regime did not amount to ‘solitary confinement’, D was 
permitted to communicate with other people, was able to 
work as an orderly and had access to the library and gym 
[123]. Although D suffered from a mental disorder, the 
impact of segregation on her health was monitored by 
professionals, including psychologists, and it was certified 
that she could be kept in that environment at all relevant 
times [124].  D’s segregation had a legitimate aim and 
was not imposed for arbitrary reasons. The reality was 
that D posed an exceptionally high risk to others, 
including other prisoners [125]. D’s segregation was kept 
under review on a regular basis and those authorities 
concluded ‘in their professional judgment, which is based 
on extensive experience of prisons, that her continued 
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segregation is necessary’ [127]. 
 
Article 8(1) meant any interference with the right to 
respect for private life had to be justified under Article 
8(2), including the requirement that it must be in 
accordance with the law. The initial period of segregation 
(21 September 2013- 4 September 2015) was not in 
accordance with the law because it was not authorised 
pursuant to PR 1999 [151-152]. There was a breach of 
Article 8(1) for that reason. The court held the segregation 
pursued a legitimate aim, because D was a very dangerous 
offender [55]. It was a proportionate response, for the 
reasons set out in the analysis of Article 3 [156].  
 
There was no breach of Article 14 because D was treated 
no differently than she would have been if she had not had 
the mental health problems [163]. D's mental health 
problems had been taken into account at all material 
times.  
 
The claim for judicial review was dismissed, except the 
judge declared that D's segregation was unlawful during 
21 September 2013 to 4 September 2015; it was not in 
accordance with the requirements of PR 1999 [180].  
 R (Bourgass and 
another) 
(Appellants) v 
Secretary of State 
for Justice 
(Respondent) 










In each of the two cases the claimant prisoner, following an 
incident with another prisoner, was segregated by order of the 
prison governor under R45(1) of PR 1999. After 72 hours each 
claimant’s segregation was reviewed by a Segregation Review 
Board. Each claimant's segregation continued under that regime 
for several months until he was transferred to another prison. The 
reasons given for continuing the segregation included the 
7 months at 
least. 
The lower courts dismissed the claims. On appeal to the 
Supreme Court (SC), the SC held that Rule 45(2) imposes 
specific duties on the Secretary of State, which could not 
be undertaken by the prison governor. Rule 45(2) was 
intended to provide a safeguard for a prisoner against 
excessively prolonged segregation. It could only be a 











maintenance of good order and discipline, investigation of the 
alleged involvement in the assault of another prisoner and the 
unacceptable risk which he posed to other prisoners. Both 
claimants challenged their segregation by way of judicial review 
on the grounds that the procedure adopted breached their rights 
under Article 6.1 ECHR and their common law rights to 
procedural fairness.  
officials who were independent from the prison [88-89]. 
The decision taken by the governor, to continue 
segregation, was therefore unlawful.  
 
Common law fairness required that a prisoner should have 
a reasonable opportunity to make representations before a 
decision was taken by the Secretary of State under rule 
45(2). He must normally be informed of the substance of 
the matters on the basis of which the authority of the 
Secretary of State was sought. That will require genuine 
and meaningful disclosure of the reasons why the 
authorisation was sought but not normally of primary 
evidence. The reasons provided for the claimants' 
continued segregation gave at best only the most general 
idea of the nature of the prison officers' concerns. More 
could and should have been said without endangering the 
legitimate interests which the prison authorities were 
concerned to protect. The imposition of prolonged periods 
of solitary confinement on the basis of what are, in 
substance, secret and unchallengeable allegations is 
unacceptable [98,100]. 
 
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal 
decision. It granted a declaration that the appellant’s 
segregation was not authorised by the Secretary of State 
for Justice and was accordingly unlawful.  
R (on the 











On 2 February 2012, a 'mass move' took place involving a 
number of young persons at Ashfield. During the move, the 
claimants, along with numerous other young persons, entered the 
AstroTurf sports pitch. They said they were protesting against a 
decision to remove the toilet seats from the residential block. 14 
4 days to 2 
weeks 
High Court granted the applications: 
(1) The five who had been restricted for three days had 
each been confined to their cells and permitted out alone, 
for a limited period, in order to  shower, make a phone 
call or take exercise. That represented removal from 
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M young persons entered the pitch, some inflicted damage on the 
goal posts. Staff withdrew from the pitch, due to the risk posed 
by the young persons. Ashfield was shut down causing 
significant disruption and a command centre was opened. The 
boys armed themselves with pieces of the broken football goal 
and approached the laundry room, where they threatened a 
member of staff. Some threatened each other on the pitch. A few 
hours later, a team of officers in protective gear entered the pitch. 
The majority of the young persons surrendered. A handful 
refused to surrender. Two were subsequently taken to the Brunel 
Unit (segregation block) and five were segregated on their wing 
(i.e. confined in their cells in Phoenix Wing).  
 
The claimants challenged: 
i) Unlawful disciplinary measures [9]; 
-A shadow segregation regime referred to as ‘restriction on the 
wing’, was alleged to have taken place on Phoenix Wing 
between 3-6 February 2012. It was an informal scheme, lacking 
any of the safeguards applicable to the formal segregation regime 
(assessment, review and monitoring) and by reason of that, 
unlawful; 
-Incentive and Earned Privileges Policy: the failure by the 
defendant to comply with its own IEP Policy and the Secretary of 
State for Justice’s (SSJ) Guidance; 
-Education: the unlawfulness of the restrictions placed on access 
to education; 
-Gym ban: unlawful blanket restriction on physical education 
including a failure to follow Ashfield’s own policy concerning 
access to the gym. 
 
ii) Unfair adjudication process [10]:  
association and was segregation by another name, outside 
the provisions of R49 YOI Rules and its critical 
safeguards. As to the deprivation of privileges, the 
national policy as contained within the SSJ’s guidance 
(PSI 11/2011) permitted disciplinary proceedings and a 
review of privilege level, and so M could not argue that 
they had suffered double jeopardy by losing privileges as 
well as receiving additional days consequent to the 
adjudication process. The deprivation of education had 
occurred as a result of the gradual nature of M's 
reintroduction to their classes and was done to manage 
risk following the incident and did not breach R38(1). The 
length and nature of the two-week gym ban and the sole 
reason for its imposition having been damage to property 
showed that the measure was punitive in nature. As such 
it was outside the Rules and unlawful [36, 49, 59, 69]. (2) 
There had been a failure to comply with the requirements 
of the guidance in PSI 47/2011 in that relevant paperwork 
was not provided to M's solicitor, although steps were 
taken to rectify the position and the adjudications were 
quashed [78]. 
 
High Court granted the following declaratory relief: i) The 
defendant unlawfully, and in breach of R49 YOI Rules, 
removed MA, NB, HB, SD and GO from association for 
the period 3-6 February 2012; ii) The defendant 
unlawfully restricted the claimants’ use of the 
gymnasium; iii) The defendant unlawfully and in breach 
of Article 6 ECHR failed to provide relevant adjudication 
paperwork to the legal representative of MB in advance of 
the hearing held by the IA on 1 March 2012. 
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-Failure to provide adjudication paperwork, including evidence 
and statements, to legal representatives when requested; 
-Failure to provide witness statements relied upon in relation to 
sentencing in advance of sentencing itself; 
-Absence of any system at Ashfield for ensuring that 
Independent Adjudicators (IAs) are made aware of punishments 
already imposed, thus failing to ensure that overall punishments 
arising from proven behaviour were proportionate and 
appropriate. 
 
Claimants’ argued: Restrictions on the wing imposed upon the 
five claimants (MA, NB, HB, SD, GO) during 3-6 February 2012 
were unlawful being based upon no rule or policy, and were 
without the safeguards of PSO 1700 e.g. assessment, review and 
monitoring. No records were kept by Serco Limited during the 
period of the wing restriction, a mandatory requirement of PSO 
1700. As each of the claimants was contained within his cell save 
for access to a telephone, shower and limited time in the open air, 
this was removal from association.  
Leslie Malcolm v 
Secretary of State 
for Justice [2011] 
EWCA Civ 1538 











26 April-2 October 2007, M was detained in segregation. He was 
provided with 30 minutes of outside air each day, whereas under 
paragraph 2(ii) of PSO 4275 he should have been able to spend at 
least one hour in the open air each day.  
 
M claimed that the failure to secure his entitlement under PSO 
4275 was unlawful and the prison officers: (1) were guilty of 
misfeasance in public office; and (2) acted in violation of his 
Article 8 ECHR right. This was dismissed, so M appealed. 
 
M appealed the finding relating to Article 8, arguing that the 
restriction on his access to open air amounted to an unlawful 
6 months The High Court dismissed his entire claim. 
 
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal: M suffered no 
detrimental effects to his health or wellbeing. M ‘chose 
from the outset, and for his own reasons, to get himself 
moved to another prison by staying in the Segregation 
Unit – rather than moving to a vulnerable prisoner wing 
where he would have been able to have more time in the 
fresh air. Despite the unreasonable nature of his actions, 
the Claimant’s autonomy was respected’ [14]. On the 
particular facts of this case, ‘not least that he was the 
author of his own misfortune, any impact on the 
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interference with his right to private life.  Claimant’s Article 8 right to respect for his private life did 
not attain the necessary ‘level of seriousness’ to amount to 
an interference to breach Article 8’ [14].  
Hassan v Secretary 
of State for Justice 
[2011] EWHC 
1359  











H was serving indeterminate sentences, at HMP Full Sutton, for 
attempted murder and wounding with intent. H had a history of 
self-harm and attempts at suicide. Prison staff believed H had 
been involved in an assault on another prisoner. H was 
segregated between 18 February-12 April 2010, for good order or 
discipline. A couple of days after being segregated, H smashed 
up his cell furniture and fittings. His segregation was reviewed at 
regular intervals and continued for over a month, because of his 
suspected involvement in the assault. H contended that his 
segregation was unlawful as he was segregated on the basis of an 
unsubstantiated assault allegation; that there was no justification 
for it under PR 1999 and PSO 1700; and, as procedural 
safeguards had not been applied, including those designed to 
protect inmates with mental health problems, his Article 3 and 
Article 8 ECHR rights had been breached.  
 
 
2 months The High Court dismissed all grounds of his claim.  
 
H had a ‘record of violence in prison, of very disruptive 
behaviour and there was clear evidence’ of his 
involvement in the assault. PR 1999 and PSO 1700 
procedures were followed. The only issue was whether, as 
prescribed by PSO 1700, H was returned to normal 
location ‘after the shortest possible time in segregation’ 
[47].  
 
The period of segregation was lawful. The Court 
recognised ‘the difficulties which a prisoner may pose for 
the safe running of a prison; the experience which the 
governors have of dealing with them; and their knowledge 
of the risks of and limitations on what may practically be 
done. Their expertise, knowledge and experience in a 
testing environment warrant respect. I was struck by the 
absence of understanding shown in the Claimant’s 
Grounds, Skeleton and oral arguments of the difficulties 
which Mr Hassan posed for the safety of other prisoners 
and staff, and to the good order and discipline of the 
prison’ [49]. 
 
The ‘duration of the period of compliance, evidencing a 
sufficient change in behaviour and attitude for a return to 
normal location to be possible’ was a matter for governor 
and Board. Given H’s background and behaviour in 
segregation, it was reasonable for the Board to decide that 
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a longer period was necessary…Bearing in mind the 
offences which he had committed, especially in prison, his 
record of adjudications and disruption, the reasonably 
suspected assault followed by the violent disorder in 
segregation, and belated grudging compliance, there does 
not appear to be anything disproportionate in a period of 
just over 7 weeks in segregation in order to maintain good 
order and discipline in the prison’ [57]. 
 
‘The Claimant’s arguments exaggerate his mental health 
problems, and under state, to the point of purblindly 
ignoring it, the effect of his behaviour on the safety of 
others and the order and discipline of the prison. There 
was no evidence during his time in segregation that it was 
having any adverse effect at all on his mental well-being’ 
[60-61]. 
 
Article 3 and Article 8 claims failed [63] because the 
court was satisfied with the ‘review Board system, its 
composition, the role of the IMB, the daily visits from the 
Chaplaincy, a member of healthcare, and a governor. The 
Claimant saw a member of the IMB 9 times. He showered 
and exercised regularly. He was provided with the means 
to keep fed, clothed, to attend to his personal hygiene, and 
to clean his cell. He could purchase goods on a weekly 
basis, and read books from the Library trolley. A variety 
of other items is allowed in the cells, including writing 
material, newspapers, radios and religious artefacts. There 
is a system of privileges and incentives which can ease the 
regime. He had access to his lawyers, he could make a 
telephone call at least once every three days, and could 
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have two one hour visits a month, with more depending 
on the level of incentives and privileges earned. 
Conditions were not remotely near what would breach 
Article 3’ [64].  




















Claim for judicial review by 6 Muslim men awaiting extradition 
from the UK and were detained in the Detainee Unit (DU) at 
Long Lartin. None of them had been accused or convicted of any 
crime in the UK, although all were accused or convicted of 
serious crimes abroad, all but one for alleged terrorist offences. 
Because of the risk they represented, they were classified as 
Category A prisoners. The governor decided to change the living 
and working regime in the Unit; he confined them to the 
premises of the DU for all purposes other than healthcare and 
family visits. They had previously been entitled to attend the 
general prison to participate in education, skills workshops, 
sports and religious worship. The change in regime was made 
following the transfer to the unit of one of the claimants (O), who 
had been characterised as representing a continuing and 
significant risk to national security and having a major influence 
on other Muslims. 
 
Claimants’ complaints:  
(i) The decision to impose a restrictive regime was irrational, 
unreasonable, disproportionate or made for illegitimate aims. 
Even if the original decision could not be successfully 
challenged, there was a duty to keep it under review and this was 
not done in a proper manner.  
 
(ii) Two of the claimants, Bary and Ahsan, who suffered mental 
illness, claimed the decision infringed their rights not to be 
 High Court dismissed all claims.  
 
Held that R45(1) PR 1999 did not apply here. The power 
was aimed at putting the prisoner in solitary confinement 
and did not contemplate this kind of regime [27].  
 
Dismissed Article 3: the high threshold of Article 3 had 
not been reached. There was no intention to humiliate or 
debase the complainants. There was little evidence that 
the conditions had an inhuman or degrading effect. 
Importantly, the court said ‘Even harsh regimes may not 
be in breach of Article 3, if the regime is justified by the 
particular risks presented by the prisoner. Thus restrictive 
regimes have been upheld in the case of high security 
prisoners who pose serious security risks’ [32]. The 
claimants posed such risk of violence that the regime was 
justified. Moreover, they still had contact with their 
families, medical and psychiatric services. 
 
Court dismissed Article 8 claims. Any interference with 
the claimants’ Article 8 rights was proportionate and 
necessary to the risks they posed.  
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subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment (Article 3 ECHR). 
 
(iii) All claimants alleged that the decision infringed their right to 
respect their private and family life, contrary to Article 8(1) 
ECHR, which was not justified as being necessary for the 
prevention of disorder and crime.  


















H was detained in HMP Stafford. He had a history of disruptive 
behaviour on the wings and mental health issues. He was taken to 
the segregation unit in August 2006.  He refused to leave the 
segregation unit and was charged with refusing a lawful order. 
As a consequence, he received 7 additional days punishment in 
cellular confinement. This pattern continued for several months. 
During such time, he assaulted prison officers, made threats and 
was disruptive in the unit. On each occasion he was awarded 
more time in the unit. On 13 December 2006, H was found 
unconscious in his cell, with a ligature around his neck. H was 
taken to hospital and died on 15 December 2006.  
 
An inquest took place in April 2008, which explored the 
circumstances of H’s death. H’s mother brought a claim for 
judicial review, concerning the adequacy of the inquest into H’s 
death. Mrs H sought a quashing order of the inquisition and a 
new inquest. She complained that the inquest was in breach of 
the UK’s obligations under Article 2 ECHR, to carry out a proper 
investigation into the circumstances of her son’s death.  
 The High Court allowed the application for judicial 
review and quashed the inquest. It ordered a new inquest. 
The Coroner failed to adequately sum up the case, failed 
to draw material documents to the jury’s attention, and 
failed to call all relevant witnesses.  
R (KB) v Secretary 
of State for Justice 
[2010] EWHC 15 







The claimant, aged 17, was detained at Wetherby Young 
Offender Institution. Wetherby published and operated a system 
of ‘Discipline Incident Reports’ (‘DIR’). The claimant contended 
that the DIR system was unlawful: (i) it was ultra vires, and/or 
contrary to Prison Service policy; and (ii) it offended Article 8 of 
3.5 months The High Court dismissed the claim challenging the IEP 
policy at Wetherby [80]. It also dismissed the Article 8 
part of the claim, as the IEP policy involved no loss of 
‘association’. It was a loss of free time which was 
different to that envisaged by R49 YOI Rules (‘removal 
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M the ECHR [1].  
 
Wetherby also published and operated an ‘Incentives and Earned 
Privileges Policy’ (‘IEP policy’). The claimant argued the policy 
operated to curtail the opportunity for association between 
trainees and it was unlawful in that: (i) it was ultra vires; and/or 
(ii) it offended Article 8. 
 
from association’) which prohibits an inmate from coming 
into contact with, or interacting with, other inmates [74]. 
The IEP system allowed an extra period of ‘free time’ 
which allowed additional association. It was therefore 
lawful. There was no engagement with Article 8. If there 
was any engagement, it was justified and proportionate to 
the purpose of the IEP scheme [78]. 
Allowed the claim which challenged the DIR system, and 
declared that system to be unlawful [80]. There was no 
legal rule supporting the imposition of the DIR system. It 
gave rise to ‘lawless and arbitrary punishment’ [46]. The 
DIR system ‘permits the most junior rank of uniformed 
officer to be both the witness and accuser, in some 
situations also the ‘victim’ …and in some situations the 
arbitrator of the punishment’ [53]. The process at 
Wetherby was outside the YOI rules, and was actually or 
potentially arbitrary in the characterisation of the offences 
to which it applied, and lacked minimum essential 
safeguards for the imposition of punishment [55]. The 
Article 8 part of this claim failed on the basis that there 
was no loss of association and therefore no interference 
with Article 8.  
The Prison 
Officers 
Association v Iqbal 
[2009] EWCA Civ 
1312 











Claimant alleged he had been falsely imprisoned on 29 August 
2007. Prison officers took unlawful strike action leaving him 
confined to his cell all day, without access to normal activities. 
As a consequence of the strike, the Governing Governor ordered 
all prisoners to be confined in their cells.  
 
The court at first instance held that the Prison Officers 
Association (POA) was responsible for false imprisonment and 
damages were awarded. The Judge assessed damages at £5, 
1 day Court of Appeal allowed the POA’s appeal. The first 
instance judge was wrong to hold that any prison officers, 
and hence the POA, was liable for the tort of false 
imprisonment. The failure of the officers to work at the 
prison, whilst potentially a breach of their employment 
contracts, involved no positive action on their part. The 
POA could not be held liable for the tort of false 
imprisonment as the result of a failure or refusal to release 
the claimant from confinement in the absence of a specific 
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 partly because the claimant’s description of the distress he 
suffered was ‘something of an exaggeration’ and partly because 
the declaration the Judge made provided ‘the claimant with just 
satisfaction’. 
 
The POA appealed the finding of liability for false imprisonment, 
and the claimant cross-appealed the quantum of damages. POA 
argued the prison officers took no positive steps to shut the 
claimant in his cell, or even to force him to stay in his cell; they 
merely did not report for duty at the prison, as a result of which 
the prison governor decided the claimant had to be confined to 
his cell; in those circumstances, there was no liability to the 
claimant for false imprisonment.  
duty to do so. Moreover, whilst there was a causal link 
between the officers’ decision to strike and the prisoners’ 
confinement in their cells, the direct and immediate cause 
of the claimant’s confinement was the governor’s order 
and not the prison officers’ decision to strike.  
 
 
R (N) v Secretary 
















The claimant was detained in a single cell, for two weeks 
between 29 April-13 May 2008, at HMP Belmarsh. 
 
N was a UK citizen who converted to Islam. He spent time in 
Syria where he was imprisoned and mistreated, including 
spending time in solitary confinement. N suffered post-traumatic 
stress. N was deported by the Syrian authorities to the UK, where 
he was subjected to a 12 month control order, due to the 
Secretary of State’s belief that N had participated in terrorist 
related activities. N breached his control order and was remanded 
in prison. N was initially placed in a single room on a normal 
wing. He later attempted suicide and was transferred to the 
healthcare centre. N had been categorised as a Category A 
prisoner. He was first placed in a shared cell for category A 
prisoners. However, the prison became concerned about N 
converting other prisoners to a strand of violent Islam. He was 
then removed to a single cell for two weeks. N challenged the 
legality of the decision to detain him in the single cell.  
Two weeks.  N’s application was refused.  
 
Article 3 ECHR: the segregation of a prisoner for security, 
discipline or protection did not in itself constitute a breach 
of Article 3. The conditions in which N was detained fell 
very far short of torture or inhuman or degrading 
treatment. It was a proportionate response to a genuinely 
and reasonably held security concern. There was no 
breach of Article 3.  
 
There was no breach of Article 8. There was no evidence 
of any significant interference with N’s Article 8 rights.  
 
There was no breach of the positive obligations. The 
system and regime provided to N was perfectly adequate 
to uphold his rights.  
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N argued his detention in the single cell violated Article 3 ECHR 
because it subjected him to inhuman and degrading treatment. 
Secondly, and in the alternative, he claimed his treatment 
constituted an unjustified interference with his right to private 
life under Article 8 ECHR. 
 
 In the further alternative the claimant submitted that if the 
negative obligations cast by Articles 3 and or 8 were not violated, 
his placement in a single cell was unlawful because it exposed 
him to a real and immediate risk of violation of his rights under 
Articles 3 and 8 and the defendant’s actions in placing and 
keeping him in a single cell were disproportionate; and the 
defendant did not take reasonable and proportionate measures to 
minimise or eliminate the risk of a breach of obligation. The 
claim was for declaratory relief, damages and costs. 
R (Karl Lewis) v 
HM Coroner for 
Mid and North 























Three linked applications, in which the relatives of prisoners who 
hanged themselves whilst in custody, sought judicial review of 
rulings/directions given by the defendant coroners in the course 
of the subsequent inquests.  
 
SW was the only one held in segregation. There was evidence 
that SW had not been adequately observed, that a proper 
assessment of his risk of self-harm did not take place, and that 
the prison officers responsible for SW’s care had not been 
adequately trained, in particular regarding the requirement for 
hourly observations. There were a number of factual elements 
(causal ones) which the claimant argued should have been put to 
the jury at the inquest. As such, valuable and important 
comments about practices, procedures and omissions in prison 
could not be considered and therefore a proper investigation 
NA The application on behalf of SW was dismissed. Article 2 
did not require an investigation of, or expression of the 
conclusions upon, events and matters that neither caused 
nor contributed to the death in question in order to render 







required by Article 2 ECHR could not take place.  
S.P. v Secretary of 












SP was 17 and held in New Hall YOI. Between 25 September 
and 15 October 2003 she was removed from association and held 
within a segregation unit. This decision was taken in response to 
threats SP made on the wings, particularly that she would like to 
harm others with a razor blade [3].  
 
She sought judicial review: (i) whilst she was segregated, she 
was not provided with the hours of ‘purposeful activity’ referred 
to in PSO 4950; (ii) she was not given an opportunity to make 
representations before the decision to segregate was made.  
3 weeks High Court held there had not been a breach of the PSOs 
which governed the availability of education and 
purposeful activity [34]. The PSOs require that the regime 
should be as ‘full as possible’ but could be limited in 
order to protect the prisoner or to maintain the good order 
of the establishment; the prison was not required to 
provide the full regime as would have been inconsistent 
with that necessity [29-30]. The PSOs encouraged a 
flexible approach and it was for the governor to determine 
what was appropriate for ‘purposeful activity’ [30].  
 
High Court upheld her claim regarding the right to make 
representations. Fairness required that SP should have 
been given the opportunity to make representations before 
an order for segregation was made, unless reasons of good 
order, discipline or urgency or other relevant 
circumstances required otherwise. Here, urgency was not 
a problem and the claimant could have been told about the 
reasons for her segregation. The governor did not satisfy 
the court that there were good reasons for refusing her an 
opportunity to make representations [57-58].  
R (on the 
application of BP) 
v Secretary of State 
for the Home 
Department [2003] 







B, a 17-year-old detainee at Onley YOI, sought a declaration that 
his treatment on two separate occasions, whilst in the segregation 
unit, was unlawful and contrary to YOI Rules 2000 and Articles 
3 and 8 ECHR.  
 
Various (but 
9 days on 
one 
occasion) 
The High Court dismissed most of the claim but upheld 
part. 
 
B's confinement in the segregation unit was not in itself a 
breach of the YOI Rules or the applicable code of practice 
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EWHC 1963 B had a history of self harm and attempted suicide. B contended 
that on the first occasion no heating was provided and he was not 
given anything to do. As a consequence, he felt odd and paranoid 
when he returned to his normal unit. On the second occasion B 
alleged that he was deprived of education, training and physical 
education for a period of nine days. B also argued that the 
Secretary of State had, contrary to Article 3, failed to investigate 
or ensure there was an effective investigation into his allegations 
that three inmates had raped him at another YOI. 
(PSO 1700). However, in failing to provide education, 
training and physical education to B whilst in the unit, the 
institution had breached the YOI Rules. In depriving B of 
his minimum regime activities there was also a failure to 
have regard to his best interests and to his inherent 
vulnerability. 
 
However, a declaration was not appropriate since the 
institution had subsequently changed the regime in the 
segregation unit following a review of the conditions.  
 
The facilities afforded to B within his cell including the 
number of visits, the length of time which he was kept 
there and the penal purpose of the segregation precluded a 
finding that his treatment was in breach of Article 3 
ECHR. There was also no evidence that B's physical and 
psychological integrity were violated in breach of Article 
8. In light of the evidence, no criticism could be made 
against the institution in its response to the complaint of 
rape made by B. 
 
Nolan v Premier 
Prison Services 







N brought a claim against the Prison Authorities (P) for losing 
his personal property during his removal to the segregation unit. 
The property had been put into bags and recorded by prison 
officers, the loss coming to light when the bags were later 
restored to N. N had signed a disclaimer removing from P 
responsibility for personal property in N's possession. N 
contended that the disclaimer did not apply since, in the 
circumstances, he had been unable to physically protect his 
property. P contended that, in a prison environment where 
personal property was at high risk, a wider approach towards the 
NA The County Court held in favour of P.  
 
A duty of care could be established because: (1) it was 
foreseeable that N's property was at high risk of going 
missing; and (2) there was sufficient proximity between N 
and P to create an obligation on P to safeguard N's 
property. However, it was not fair, just and reasonable 
that P be responsible for N's loss for reasons of public 
policy. If prison authorities were to be held responsible 
for such losses, which were a frequent occurrence in 
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establishment of a duty of care should be adopted. prison, the eventual effect would be to severely restrict the 
possessions which prisoners were allowed to have.  
 
Keenan v United 
Kingdom (2001) 














The applicant's mentally ill son (X) committed suicide in Exeter 
prison where he was serving a sentence of four months 
imprisonment for assaulting his girlfriend. A fortnight after 
assaulting two prison officers and only nine days before his 
expected release date, he had been given a disciplinary 
punishment of seven days segregation in the punishment block 
and an additional 28 days imprisonment.  
 
X had been receiving ant-psychotic medication and staff had 
been made aware of his mental health problems. 
 
Within 24 hours of the decision to segregate X, X hung himself.  
 
The applicant complained that the prison authorities had failed to 
protect her son's right to life (Article 2), that he had been 
subjected to inhuman and/or degrading treatment in the period 
before his death (Article 3) and that there had been no effective 
remedy in respect of her complaints (Article 13). She also 
claimed just satisfaction under Article 41. 






ECHR held that: 
(i) There was no violation of Article 2 (right to life): the 
prison authorities responded in a reasonable way to X’s 
conduct, they placed him in hospital care, under watch, 
when he evinced suicidal tendencies. He was under daily 
medical supervision by the prison doctors, who found X 
fit for segregation [99].  
 
However, there was a violation of Article 3 (subjected to 
inhuman and/or degrading treatment). The court was 
‘struck by the lack of medical notes concerning Mark 
Keenan who was an identifiable suicide risk and 
undergoing the additional stresses that could be foreseen 
from segregation and, later, disciplinary punishment. 
From 5 May to 15 May 1993, when he died, there were no 
entries in his medical notes. Given that there were a 
number of prison doctors who were involved in caring for 
Mark Keenan, this shows an inadequate concern to 
maintain full and detailed records of his mental state and 
undermines the effectiveness of any monitoring or 
supervision process’ [144]. ‘The lack of effective 
monitoring of Mark Keenan’s condition and the lack of 
informed psychiatric input into his assessment and 
treatment disclose significant defects in the medical care 
provided to a mentally ill person known to be a suicide 
risk. The belated imposition on him in those 
circumstances of a serious disciplinary punishment – 
seven days’ segregation in the punishment block and an 
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additional twenty-eight days to his sentence imposed two 
weeks after the event and only nine days before his 
expected date of release – which may well have 
threatened his physical and moral resistance, is not 
compatible with the standard of treatment required in 
respect of a mentally ill person’ [116]. 
 
There was a violation of Article 13 (right to an effective 
remedy). The coroner’s inquest had been inadequate as it 
had not provided a remedy for determining the liability of 
the authorities in respect of the treatment of X nor had it 
provided a remedy by way of compensation. The ECHR 
granted the application and awarded £10,000 
compensation.  
Russell (and 
others) v Home 
Office [2001] 3 
WLUK 43 
(‘Russell’) 











In 1994 the three Claimants, Andrew Russell, Gilbert (Danny) 
McNamee and Liam McCotter were prisoners in HMP 
Whitemoor. On the evening of 9 September 1994 they took part 
in an escape from the Special Secure Unit (‘SSU’). They were 
recaptured in the vicinity of the prison. Each claimed he was 
subjected to unlawful violence by prison officers in the course of 
his recapture and that unlawful restraint and force was used in 
the ‘special cells’ of the segregation unit afterwards. Each sought 
damages, including aggravated and exemplary damages, from the 
Home Office. 
 
The Claimants' claims were pleaded in assault and battery, 
alternatively in misfeasance of public office, but both causes of 
action covered the same ground. 
Unknown High Court upheld the claims. The court awarded £1500 
in general damages and £1000 for aggravated damages. 
On the facts, the use of special cells, along with the 
prolonged use of handcuffs and the removal of clothing 
had been necessary. However, unreasonable and 
gratuitous force had been used by the prison officers in 
the segregation unit. However, R’s conduct ‘disentitled’ 
him to an award of exemplary damages.  
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R v Governor of 
Frankland Prison 
Ex p. Russell 
(Right to Meals) 
[2000] 1 WLR 
2027 (‘Ex Parte 
Russell’) 











R, a serving prisoner, challenged the prison governor's policy 
that prisoners within the segregation unit who, in protest, refused 
to wear prison clothing would be barred from collecting their 
daily three meals from the servery, but be provided with one 
meal a day brought to their cell by prison staff. The prison 
governor justified the policy on the basis that ‘giving in’ to the 
prisoners’ protests would undermine discipline and control 
within the prison.  
 
R sought a declaration that those prisoners affected by the policy 
were entitled to have all three meals brought to their cell, 
contending that the right to the provision of food was absolute 
and that no restriction or limitation could be placed upon it. In 
the alternative, R submitted that no restriction which constituted 
an interference with Article 3 ECHR could be imposed. 
 
 
Various High Court granted the application in part. 
(1) The prison governor's policy was unlawful and a 
potential breach of Article 3 ECHR. The prison governor 
could lay down restrictions regulating a prisoner's access 
to food provided that policy satisfied an obligation to 
provide adequate food meeting the nutritional needs of the 
prisoner pursuant to R24 PR 1999.One meal a day did not 
meet the nutritional needs of prisoners. Moreover, the 
right to adequate food could not be withdrawn as a 
punishment. The policy had been introduced in an ad hoc 
manner and contained no provision to safeguard 
prisoners’ health. The obvious alternative open to the 
prison governor had been the provision of adequate food 
to the prisoner in his cell.  
 
(2) R was entitled to such food as was adequate under the 
provisions of R24, rather than a guarantee of three meals a 
day. It followed that the declaration sought would not be 
granted. 
 
The court quashed the policy but refused to grant the 
declaration.  
Racz v Home 
Office [1994] 2 
WLR 23 
 









R alleged that he had suffered ill-treatment at the hands of prison 
officers whilst he was a remand prisoner.  
 
On 11 March 1988 ‘[H]e was transferred to a cell in the 
segregation unit. While located in the cell prison officers 
interfered with the plaintiff’s food by tipping it on the floor of 
the cell and ordering the plaintiff to clean it up. The plaintiff 
went on hunger strike in protest’. During this time, the plaintiff 
was only given a nylon/canvas 'dress' to wear and had to sleep on 
Unknown The House of Lords allowed the appeal in part.  
(i) The Home Office could be vicariously liable for acts of 
prison officers that amounted to misfeasance in public 
office.  
(ii) The paragraph of R's statement of claim alleging 
misfeasance of public office could not justifiably be 
struck out unless it was the inevitable result of proof that 
the unauthorised acts were so unconnected with the 
authorised duties as to be independent of and outside 
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the floor with the covering of a single blanket. He received no 
medication. The plaintiff complained he was subjected to 
intolerable conditions and/or cruel and unusual punishment 
contrary to the Bill of Rights 1688, caused by negligence on the 
part of the defendant, its servants or agents (p. 50).  
 
R sought general, aggravated and exemplary damages for assault, 
battery negligence and misfeasance in public office.  
 
On the defendant's application, Ebsworth J. struck out the part of 
the claim based on misfeasance in public office and rejected the 
plaintiff's submission that the action should be tried by a jury. 
The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by the plaintiff, 
holding that in law the Home Office could not be vicariously 
liable for misfeasance in public office by prison officers. 
 
R appealed to the House of Lords. The main issue was whether 
the Home Office could be vicariously liable for prison officers. 
them, which was a question of fact and degree.  
(iii) In all the circumstances, the case was not one where 
jury trial ought to be ordered. 
 
H v the Home 
Office [1992] WL 
12678558 










In March 1988 H was at HMP Albany. He was an ordinary 
prisoner in a single cell, he worked in the workshops, was a 
member of a ‘food boat’ and able to cook meals in the evening, 
and enjoyed exercise and recreational facilities.  
 
Owing to a failure on the part of the prison authorities to take 
adequate precautions, a computer print-out showing details of 
H’s previous convictions came into the hands of a particular 
prisoner and, through him, became known to a number of the 
other prisoners. Those details showed H had eight previous 
convictions for sexual offences. On 28th March 1988 the plaintiff 
was assaulted by two other prisoners in circumstances which 
showed that his assailants knew of his previous convictions. H 
At least 4 
weeks 
The Court of Appeal dismissed H’s appeal and allowed 
the cross appeal of the Home Office.  
 
There was no question of malice and the complaint was 
only based on carelessness, and since there was also no 
question of ‘intolerable conditions’ the claim based on 
negligence must fail insofar as it seeks damages for 
segregation under R43 (not the assault). Any other 
conclusion would be contrary to Hague (see below). The 
court allowed the cross-appeal of the Home Office 




suffered minor injuries-black eye and bruising to the face. The 
judge held that this assault was a direct consequence of the 
prison authorities' negligence in allowing the computer print-out 
to come into the hands of another prisoner, and the plaintiff was 
entitled damages of £50. Against this finding there was no 
appeal. 
 
Following this assault the plaintiff was, at his own request and 
for his protection, removed from association under R43 of the 
Prison Rules 1964. As a result he was locked in a single cell for 
23 hours per day, had no opportunity to work, his prison earnings 
dropped to the basic amount, was unable to cook his own meals, 
and his educational and recreational facilities were severely 
limited. At the end of April 1988 he was offered a transfer to 
HMP Dartmoor, which he refused, unreasonably as the judge 
held.  
 
£300 damages were awarded for the reduced quality of the 
plaintiff's life at Albany from the date of the assault until the end 
of April 1988, and for the continuation of some feelings of risk 
and vulnerability on the part of the plaintiff which would have 
continued even if he had accepted the transfer to Dartmoor.  
 
The plaintiff appealed against the level of damages awarded for 
this part of his claim, contending that £300 was inadequate to 
compensate him for the damage he suffered by having to go 
under Rule 43. The Home Office cross-appealed on the basis that 
a prisoner's segregation under Rule 43 could not, as a matter of 
law, give rise to a cause of action in negligence. This contention 
was based on the decision of the House of Lords in R. v. Deputy 





R v Deputy 
Governor of 
Parkhurst Prison 
and Others, Ex 
parte Hague 
[1990] 3 WLR 
1210 
 
Reversed in part by 
Court of Appeal 
(Civil Division); 
25 May 1990 
[1990] 3 W.L.R. 
1210 
 
Appealed to the 
House of Lords 
[1992] 1 A.C 58 














H was serving a 15-year prison sentence at HMP Parkhurst. In 
July 1988, the deputy governor, with permission from the 
Secretary of State, transferred H to Wormwood Scrubs and 
continued to segregate him from other prisoners. He was denied 
association and other privileges. H was segregated under R43(1) 
of the Prison Rules 1964. H’s internal applications for redress 
were unsuccessful and he sought judicial review of the deputy 
governor's decision to transfer and segregate him, claiming 
declarations and damages for false imprisonment.  
 
The Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench Division dismissed 
his application.  
 
The Court of Appeal allowed his appeal in part, but held that a 
breach of the 1964 Rules did not found a private-law claim. H 
appealed. 
 
The grounds of the application were: (1) the deputy governor of 
Parkhurst had acted with an unlawful purpose or erred in law or 
acted in breach of the rules of natural justice by failing to provide 
the applicant with reasons for his transfer to Wormwood Scrubs; 
and had failed to allow him to make representations (orally or in 
writing). (2) By authorising the applicant’s  
continued segregation in Wormwood Scrubs (under Rule 43) the 
board of visitors had erred in law or acted in breach of the rules 
of natural justice, by failing to make any effective inquiry into 
the reasons for H’s segregation, and gave no reasons for his 
segregation, and had failed to consider whether a lesser period of 
time was justified and had failed to permit H to make any 
representations (page 66-67).  
1 month House of Lords dismissed H’s appeal.  
 
(i) The legislature intended the Prison Act 1952 should 
deal with the administration and management of prisons, 
but had not intended to confer on prisoners a cause of 
action in damages. The Prison Rules 1964 were regulatory 
in nature to govern prison regime, but not to protect 
prisoners against loss, injury, or damage nor to give them 
any right of action, nor was r.43 intended to confer a right 
of action. 
 
(ii) While a prisoner was subject to the 1952 Act and the 
1964 Rules and to the authority of the governor and his 
officers, he had no residual liberty. Accordingly, no action 
could lie against the Secretary of State or a prison 





Weldon v Home 
Office [1990] 3 
WLR 465 









W was a prisoner detained in HMP Leeds. He complained of two 
incidents which occurred on 9 and 10 May 1984.  
 
On 9 May 1984, the plaintiff alleged he was falsely imprisoned 
and unlawfully assaulted and battered by prison officers. He was 
dragged out of his cell, onto the landing, then down the stairs 
(despite his request to walk) and placed in a cell in the 
punishment block. He was then removed to a strip cell where his 
clothes were taken from him. He remained there until the 
morning; during this time, the plaintiff was further assaulted by 
the same prison officers. He sought damages for false 
imprisonment and assault. 
 
On 10 May 1984, the plaintiff was subjected to further assaults 
and batteries but he alleged no further false imprisonment [467]. 
 
The Assistant Recorder refused to strike out the application, a 
decision which the Home Office appealed.  
 
The appeal by the Home Office raised the question of whether it 
was possible for a prison officer to falsely imprison a convicted 
prisoner (who was in lawful custody). The Home Office, in the 
appeal, sought to have the claim of false imprisonment struck 
out. 
Unknown The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal by the Home 
Office: (1) a prisoner, while lawfully confined in a prison, 
was entitled to the protection of the law for his residual 
liberty, namely, such personal liberty as had not been 
lawfully taken away from him; (2) the alleged facts 
disclosed an arguable case of false imprisonment; (3) 
accordingly, the claim should go to trial. 
 
 
A v United 













Whilst in Wakefield Prison, on 29 July 1978, the applicant killed 
two fellow prisoners and was charged with murder on which he 
was convicted on 16 March 1979, by Leeds Crown Court, and 
sentenced to life imprisonment. He gave no reasons for these 
murders, and none was apparent, except that he stated that he 
was depressed. From 29 July 1978 to the date of the hearing, the 
applicant had been in F Wing at Wakefield Prison, in a special 
6 years ECtHR concluded that Article 3 was manifestly 
unfounded and the risk posed by the claimant justified his 
exceptionally restricted treatment.  
 
‘It is clear from the applicant's past behaviour that he is an 
extremely dangerous prisoner…the applicant has in the 




cell. He was removed from association pursuant to Rule 43(b) of 
the Prison Rules 1964 (p.1). 
 
The applicant complained that he spent 23 hours each day in his 
cell, the remaining hour being spent in an exercise yard. He said 
he was never allowed to associate, or speak to, or see any other 
prisoner in the prison. His only human contact was with figures 
of authority. His cell, which he described as a ‘cage’ since it had 
a cage-like door made of steel mesh, measured approximately 2 
metres by 4 metres. The applicant had no frame for his bed, 
which consisted of four mattresses on the floor, the remaining 
furniture consisted of one cardboard chair, one cardboard table 
and one cardboard corner fitting. The window of the cell was 
approximately 2 metres from the ground and the glass was 
approximately 1 centimetre thick, and frosted so that it was 
opaque. Whenever he left his cell he was accompanied by a total 
of five prison officers but a privacy door separated him from 
them while he had a bath; the applicant contended that this was 
not effective to grant him privacy (p.1). 
 
He complained that the conditions of his imprisonment (lack of 
privacy, oppressive regime, extreme isolation) constituted 
inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR. In 
particular, he was not subject to adequate psychiatric 
examination, and his psychiatric condition has not been 
reassessed since March 1979 (p.2). 
 
repeatedly been involved in extremely violent assaults on 
other inmates, with an attempted murder in 1976, and 
three specific murders, including two of fellow prisoners 
in 1978’ (p.3). 
 
‘Clearly the degree of the applicant's isolation is extreme 
and affects all aspects of his daily life including the rare 
occasions on which he leaves his cell, for example for 
visits and baths’ (p.4). However, ‘the respondent 
Government's duty to ensure the safety and the welfare of 
the prison population as a whole extends beyond the 
conditions of the applicant taken in isolation, to include 
that of other inmates, and the prison staff. In the light of 
the applicant's unpredictable and violent behaviour and 
the wholly exceptional risks which he represents to the 
whole of the population of Wakefield Prison, the 
Commission must regard the conditions of his isolation as 




 Annex Two – GOoD reasons  
 
Name Time in 
segregatio
n (days) 
Code Reason for 
segregation88 
Type89 Outcome 




Preventative  Returned to wing. 
Wayne 109 GOoD Segregation to 
segregation transfer. 
Violence at previous 
prison.  
Preventative Refused to return to 
wing. Transferred to 
segregation unit in 
another prison.  
Mark 249 GOoD Segregation to 
segregation transfer. 
Violence at previous 
prison.  
Preventative Refused to return to 
wing. Transferred to 
segregation unit in 
another prison. 
Patrick 98 GOoD Some intelligence that P 
had access to mobile 
phones. Was located on 
GOoD in the Unit while 
this was investigated. 
Preventative: pending 
investigation 
Refused to return to 
wing. Still in 
segregation at end of 
fieldwork. 
Ali 49 GOoD Segregated on GOoD. 
Involved in a ‘serious 
incident on an exercise 
yard. Incident still being 
investigated. Risk to 





Wished to return to 
wing. Still in 
segregation at end of 
fieldwork. 
Kelvin 49 GOoD Segregated on GOoD. 
Involved in a ‘serious 
incident on an exercise 
Preventative: pending 
investigation 
Wished to return to 
wing. Still in 
segregation at end of 
																																																								
88 As stated in the prisoners’ personal files. 
89 Assigned as follows: Preventative to those identified by the prison as high risk, based on conduct at previous prisons 
(and/or their sentence i.e. a terrorist offence). Pending investigation: to those awaiting the outcome of the prison’s 
investigation into alleged violence or misconduct. Instrumental, to those who engineered a move to the Unit or who, once 
there, refused to return to normal location. Punishment, to those who were involved in rule violations, violence or 
disruption on the wing. Protection, to those who were at risk of violence on the wings or vulnerable due to mental illness, 
self-harm or suicide attempts. These were not always mutually exclusive. For example some individuals, segregated for 
punishment, refused to leave the Unit and their segregation had an instrumental value.   
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yard. Incident still being 
investigated. Risk to 
GOoD unknown at this 
time’. 
fieldwork. 
Johnny 3 GOoD ‘Prisoner is to be held in 
the seg while facts of a 






 Returned to wing. 




Refused to return to 
wing. Still in 
segregation at end of 
fieldwork. 
George 605 GOoD Drugs on wings. Instrumental, non-
violent 
Refused to return to 
wing. Still in 
segregation at end of 
fieldwork. 




 Refused to return to 
wing. Transferred to 
segregation unit in 
another prison.  




 Refused to return to 
wing. Transferred to 
normal location in 
another prison.  
Norman 326 GOoD Drugs on wings. Instrumental, non-
violent 
Refused to return to 
wing. Transferred to 
normal location in 
another prison.  
Daniel 65 GOoD Kissed an officer. Punishment Wished to return to 
wing. Transferred to 
normal location in 
another prison.  
David Not 
available 
GOoD Violent incident with 
another prisoner. 
Punishment  Returned to wing. 
 241 
Theo 30 GOoD Possession of mobile 
phone. 
Punishment  Returned to wing. 
Leroy 5 GOoD Pinched female member 
of staff on the arm 
(assault).   
Punishment  Returned to wing. 
Billy 93 GOoD Involved in ‘serious 
incident’ ('riot') on the 
wing. Intended to 
remain in segregation, 
pending transfer. And 





Refused to return to 
wing. Still in 
segregation at end of 
fieldwork. 
Henry 68 GOoD Involved in ‘serious 
incident’ ('riot') on the 
wing. Intended to 
remain in segregation, 
pending transfer. And 





 Returned to wing. 
Shawn 93 GOoD Involved in ‘serious 
incident’ ('riot') on the 
wing. Intended to 
remain in segregation, 
pending transfer. And 





 Refused to return to 
wing. Still in 
segregation at end of 
fieldwork. 
Ricky 21 GOoD Involved in ‘serious 
incident’ ('riot') on the 
wing. Intended to 
remain in segregation, 
pending transfer. And 





 Wished to return to 
wing. Transferred to 
normal location in 
another prison.  
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Joe 227 Own 
interest 
Segregated due to ‘risks 
of self harm and 
potential drug taking on 
main location’. 
Own protection – 
mental health 
 Refused to return to 
wing. Still in 
segregation at end of 
fieldwork. 
Aiden 299 Own 
interest 
Paranoid on wings, self-
harm, suicide attempts. 
Own protection – 
mental health 
Refused to return to 
wing. Still in 
segregation at end of 
fieldwork. 
Sam 94 Own 
interest 
Under threat on wings - 
'Muslim Brotherhood'. 
Protection – from 
others 
 Refused to return to 
wing. Still in 
segregation at end of 
fieldwork. 
Nazeer 102 Own 
interest 
Under threat on wings - 
'Muslim Brotherhood'. 
Protection – from 
others 
 
Refused to return to 
wing. Transferred to 
normal location at 





Under threat on wings - 
'Muslim Brotherhood'. 
Protection – from 
others 
 
Refused to return to 
wing. Transferred to 
normal location at 


















Annex Three – Interview schedules 
	
Interview schedule for prisoners 
 
Introductions 
Explain about me – PhD student in the prisons research centre.  Research is in segregation units. I am curious 
about how law works in prison, in segregation.  Will be spending a few months here at Whitemoor, observing, 
making notes, chatting to staff and prisoners.  
 
Consent Matters: 
• Discussions kept confidential (except if risk to yourself or someone else) and anonymise names. Taking 
part won’t have any bearing on segregation status or sentence generally.  
• Explain PhD thesis.  
• You can withdraw your consent at any time. 
• If there’s anything you say that you’d like me not to include, let me know. 
 
Will cover a few general questions about you and then move on to focus a bit more on your time in 
segregation and your experience here.  
 
Perhaps we can start with you telling me a bit more about yourself.   
• Where are you from?  
• How old are you (if you don’t mind me asking)? 
• What are you interested in (films, books, hobbies)?  
• What do you feel most proud of in your life? 
• Tell me about your life before prison – what did you do before? 
 
Segregation decision: 
• How did you come to be in the segregation unit? 
• How long have you been in this segregation unit? How long would you say you’ve been in segregation 
in prison as a whole? 
• What was the process for moving you to segregation? How was the decision made? 
• Were you given reasons for the move to segregation? What were they? 
• How did you feel about the segregation decision at the time? (when the decision was made)?  
• Has your mind changed since? OR do you still feel the same? Explore how he feels about seg now. 
• Do you think the situation could have been handled differently? If so, how? (or in your mind is seg the 
best option for you?)  
• Do you think there were any other options available? 
 
Experience of segregation:  
• Could you talk to me in some detail about a full day in seg, right from when you get up to when you go 
to bed: 
o What does a day in segregation look like?  
o How do they pass the time? How many hours in cell? Activities in cell? 
• What is the segregation review board like? How often do you go? What was the experience? 
• What has been the best thing that has happened [to you] in segregation? Is that typical? 
• What has been the worst thing that has happened [to you] in segregation?  Is that typical? 
• What do you like most and least about segregation?  
• How would you describe your experience here?  
o Language of emotions – safe, calm, anger, anxious, lonely. 
• Is your segregation experience in Whitemoor similar to elsewhere? Or are there any differences here? 
• How much interaction do you have with staff? How does that interaction usually go?  
• What is your experience with staff? How much contact do you have with them? How do you perceive 
staff? 
• How do you think staff perceive you?  
• Do you feel respected here [by staff]?  
• Do you feel like you have a voice here? 
 244 
 
• What do you think governs your experience of segregation? [to elaborate: what do you think impacts 
your experience here? The staff? do you think it is the law? Do you think its prison rules, or guidance 
like PSO, or local norms and customs, local culture, staff attitudes?] 
• If you had to give segregation an identity e.g. punitive, caring, rehabilitative, a respite? And why? 
• Do you see segregation as a choice?  
• What do you think segregation is for?  
• Do you want to leave segregation? 
• Do you know what you need to do to leave segregation?  What? 
• Would you change segregation? If so, how?  
 
Legal questions 
• Can you describe a time in seg, when you felt your rights had been violated.  [Then describe in more 
detail, when and how often it occurred, who was involved, how it was experienced and how they 
responded to it. How, if at all, it ended.] 
• If you had a complaint here (link to any of the above negative answers) – how would you deal with it?  
Prompts could follow e.g. would you complain to staff? To the IMB? The prison ombudsman? Your 
solicitor? 
• Would you make a legal complaint? Why? Why not? Would you know how to go about it? 
• If not using law, how would you settle dispute? 
• What is the law for? Do you think it is useful in prison for resolving disputes?  
• What has the law done for you? Do you feel supported by the law, by legal mechanisms (e.g. 
procedures, PSIs) 
• The law has been described as a shield (as a protector) but also a sword (able to inflict damage) – would 
you agree with that? Would you see it as one or the other? How do you see law here? 
• Would you say you are aware of your legal rights and/or legal obligations? 
• Have you ever sued the prison? what do you think about prisoners that sue? What would they think 
about you? What do staff think about prisoners that sue? 
• Do staff follow the rules here?  
• What do rules feel like in segregation? 
• Where do you think your legal knowledge comes from? Peers in prison, previous experience, legal 
advisers? 
 
Final practical questions 
• What’s your nationality?  
• How long is your sentence? And how long have you served?  
• [What is your sentence?] 















Interview schedule for staff 
 
Introductions 
Explain about me – PhD student in the prisons research centre.  Research is in segregation units. I am 
curious about how law works in prison, in segregation.  Spending a few months here at Whitemoor, 
observing, making notes, chatting to staff and prisoners.  
 
Consent Matters: 
• Discussions kept confidential and anonymise names.  
• You can withdraw your consent at any time. 
• If there’s anything you say that you’d like me not to include, let me know. 
 
Will cover a few general questions about you and then move on to focus a bit more on your work in 
segregation and your experience here.  
 
Perhaps we can start with you telling me a bit more about yourself.   
• Where are you from?  
• Age? 
• What do you feel most proud of in your life? 
• What do you like to do outside prison? 
• What is your role? (prison officer, SO) 
• How long have you worked for the Prison Service? For Whitemoor? And In segregation? 
• How were you recruited into seg? 
 
Working in Segregation: 
• What does a day working in segregation look like, from start, including lunch, to end of day?  
• How much interaction do you have with prisoners? How does that interaction usually go?  
• How do you think the prisoners perceive you? How do you perceive them? 
• Do you feel respected? 
• What has been the best thing that has happened [to you] in segregation?  
• What has been the worst thing that has happened [to you] in segregation?   
• What do you like most and least about working in segregation?  What do you find challenging? What 
brings you joy? 
• How would you describe your experience here? [Do you feel safe? Calm? Anxious? Confident?] 
• [If worked in the Prison Service/ elsewhere in W: Is your segregation experience in whitemoor, similar 
to elsewhere? Or are there any differences here?] 
• what do you think impacts your experience here?  
• If you had to give segregation an identity e.g. punitive, caring, rehabilitative, a respite?  
• Do you see segregation as a choice?  
• What do you think segregation is for?  
 
Law 
• Can you describe a time in seg, when you felt your rights had been violated.   
• If you had a complaint here how would you deal with it?  
• Would you make a legal complaint? Why? Why not? Would you know how to go about it? 
• If not using law, how would you settle dispute? 
• What is the law for? (Do you think it is useful in prison for resolving disputes?) Have you found the law 
useful here?  
• What has the law done for you? Do you feel supported by the law, by legal mechanisms (e.g. 
procedures, PSIs) 
• The law has been described as a shield (as a protector) but also a sword (able to inflict damage) – would 





• How do legal complaints make you feel? When made by a prisoner? Have you had much to do with 
them in the past?  
• Would you say you are aware of your legal rights and/or legal obligations? 
• Where do you think your legal knowledge comes from?  
• What do rules feel like in segregation? 
E.g. Extra blanket? Curtain removal? 
• Would you change segregation? If so, how?  
 
Final practical questions 






























Annex Four – Participant information sheet and consent form 
 
Participant information sheet 
 
This form provides an overview of the PhD project which you may wish to participate in. The purpose of this 
form is to explain the motivation and aims of the study, in terms of my interests as a researcher and also the 
relevance to the broader field of criminological research. The form is designed to provide information on the 
purpose of the interview and how the interview data will be used. If you require any further information or 
have any questions concerning this form (or the research project more generally) please feel free to contact me 
using the details provided and I will be happy to discuss further.  
 
My background 
• I completed an MSc in Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of Oxford in 2016. I then 
moved to the University of Cambridge and commenced a PhD in Criminology in October 2017.  
• My research interests are focused on the intersection between law and practice, particularly in 
understanding how law may filter in to prison life.  
 
This project 
• Aims to understand the relationship between law and segregation in English prisons, particularly in 
how the law may (or may not) impact the usage and experience of segregation.  
• Three key questions will be explored: (i) how is segregation used in English prisons; (ii) how is it 
experienced by both prisoners and prison staff; and (iii) how does the law impact such usage and 
experience. 
• The project involves two phases: (i) document review; and (ii) interviews.  
 
Document review 
• If you are happy for me to do so, I would like to review documents associated with your segregation 
decision such as: your segregation unit daily logs, segregation daily memo notes, segregation daily 
diary sheets, pre-transfer information sheets, daily adjudications records etc.  
• One part of the project involves considering the process  behind moves to segregation. Viewing the 
documentation, related to your move, would help me understand processes and how decisions are 
made in prison.  
 
Purpose of the interview 
• The interview is intended to explore the views of people who have experienced segregation in some 
way.  This means participants will comprise: (i) individuals detained in segregation units; (ii) 
individuals recently released (previous 3 months) from segregation back to normal location; (iii) staff 
working in segregation units; and (iv) managers at the prison involved in segregation processes and 
decisions.  
•  I am seeking to understand how segregation is used, the reasons for segregation and how it is 
experienced by individuals from a range of backgrounds and roles. 
• I hope to explore how ‘present’ the law is in segregation practices and whether the law impacts the use 
and experience of segregation.  
 
Format of the interview 
• The interview will begin by exploring your background and journey so far.   
• The interview will then explore a number of themes. The interview will be semi-structured, meaning 
questions will follow a schedule of topics relevant to the study.  
• That said, I am happy for the interview to develop organically. I am interested in your experience, 
perspectives and opinions and do not want to limit the interview in any rigid way.  
• If you are comfortable, I would like to audio record the interview. 
• I am happy for you to identify any matters that you do not wish to be recorded during the interview. 
Please make this clear during or after the interview.  
• You may, at any point, withdraw from the interview and research project. Please just let me know.  
 
Use of data 
• Notes from the document review will be held solely by myself.  
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• Audio recordings will be held solely by myself. 
• I will download recordings from my recorder at the first opportunity. 
• These will not be stored on any shared computer, only on my personal PC, with appropriate password 
protection. 
• The interview will either be transcribed by myself or a professional third party (a transcriber). Any 
professional transcriber would be expected to sign a contract agreeing to the terms of confidentiality 
and anonymity promised below. 
• The data will be stored for a minimum of three years from publication of the research.  
• The document and interview data will culminate in a PhD thesis and will (subject to the confidentiality 
requirements below) form the content of articles published in academic journals.  
 
Confidentiality and anonymity   
• You will be given an alias and nothing will be reported in a manner which identifies you as an 
individual. 
• If we discuss anything that you feel may make you identifiable, and you would rather exclude this 
from the research, please inform me during or after the interview. 
• If I am in any doubt when writing up my thesis I will contact you to see if you are happy for a specific 
point to be reported. 
• Matters discussed in the interview will be kept confidential and will not be disclosed, other than in 
accordance with the above anonymity provisions. That said, if you disclose anything that suggests an 
intention to cause serious harm to yourself or others, or if you reveal information pertaining to a 
security risk, I would be obliged to report this to senior individuals in the prison.  
 
General 
• Please be aware that participation in the research will have no bearing on your current circumstances 
(positively or negatively), in terms of segregation status, sentence or release conditions and you can 
choose to withdraw at any time.  
• If the interviews reveal sensitive or distressing content and you feel like you would like to discuss 
anything further, please be aware that Listeners, the Safer Custody Team and/or the prison chaplain 
are on hand to provide further support. Alternatively, the Samaritans can be contacted on 116123 and 
will provide help and support if needed. 
 
 
Name of researcher:    Ellie Brown              
Address: Institute of Criminology, Sidgwick Avenue, Cambridge, CB3 9DA  





























1. I have read the Information Sheet for this study and have had 
an opportunity to ask questions. 
 
             
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am 
free to withdraw at any time and without giving any reason, 
without any consequences to my segregation status, sentence 
or release conditions, rights or privileges. 
 
 
             
3. I understand how my data will be stored, used and that I am 
able to refuse use of this data.  
 
             
4. I understand how my anonymity will be ensured in the 
reporting of any data drawn from the study.  
 
             
5. I agree to take part in the study under the conditions set out in 
the information sheet.  
 
             
 
 
























Statutes and Rules 
 
Draft of rules proposed to be made under the Prison Act 1898 
Draft of rules proposed to be made under the Prison Act 1899 
Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 
Prison Service Instruction 03/2013 (Medical Emergency Response Codes). 
Prison Service Instrument 15: Visits Function (2011). 
Prison Service Instrument 49: Prisoner Communication Services,  (2011). 
Prison Service Order 1700. 
The European Convention on Human Rights 1950 
The European Prison Rules 2006 
The Human Rights Act 1998 
The Penitentiary Act 1779 
The Prison Act 1898 
The Prison Act 1952 
The Prison Regulations 1840 
The Prison Rules 1964 
The Prison Rules 1999 
The Young Offender Institution Rules 2000 
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules). 
Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 17 December 2015, 70/175 Stat. (2015). 
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